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ABSTRACT 
FREDRIC JAMESON: BEYOND A MARXIST HERMENEUTIC? 
TIlls thesis provides a critical study of the theoretical work of the North American Marxist 
theoretician and critic Fredric Jameson. Jameson has been described as probably the most 
important cultural critic writing in English today and yet there has been no major study of his 
work published to date. TIlls thesis sets out to contribute to such a study. 
One reason for Jameson's relative critical neglect has been his adherence to a tradition of Marxist 
thought, that both within Marxism itself and theoretical discourse in general has been superseded 
by Structuralist and more recently Post-structuralist modes of thought. The first chapter, 
therefore, provides an exposition of Jameson's Hegelianism which is rather more sympathetic to 
Hegel and dialectical theory than the accounts one usually encounters today filtered through 
Structuralist and Post-structuralist readings. The following three chapters focus upon key areas 
of theoretical debates that have emerged over the last two decades - that is, questions of history 
and representation, desire and subjectivity and finally postmodernism. The concluding chapter 
returns to the concerns with which this study opened and once more reflects upon issues of 
totality, politics and style from the perspective of having worked through Jameson's own corpus 
of work. 
My methodology is Jameson's own, that is, I historically situate Jameson's work and provide an 
immanent critique of his texts. This study is by necessity selective, focusing upon specific areas of 
Jameson's oeuvre that I see as theoretically important today and to which Marxism still has 
significant contributions to make. The question that underlies this thesis is in brief: are the 
specific concerns of Hegelian Marxism once more back on the theoretical agenda and can 
Hegelian Marxism provide answers to some of the aporias of contemporary culturaL theoretical 
and political discourse? 
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NOTES AND ABBREVIATIONS 
Quotations from Jameson's major publications are cited with the abbreviation listed below. All 
other quotations followed by a superior number refer to the edition cited in the Notes at the close 
of each chapter. 
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LM 
SV 
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Sartre: Origins of a style Second Edition (New York Columbia University Press, 
1984 
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(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971) 
The Prison House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian 
Formalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972) 
Fables of Aggression: Wyndham Lewis The Modernist as Fascist (Berkeley: 
University ofCalifomia Press, 1979) 
The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (London: 
Methuen, 1981) 
Late Marxism: Adorno, or, The Persistence of the Dialectic (London: Verso, 
1990) 
Signatures of the Visible (London: Routledge, 1990) 
Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 
1991) 
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INTRODUCTION 
Fredric Jameson is probably the most important cultural critic writing in 
English today. 1 
This study originates from the belief that Colin MacCabe is right to extol the work of Fredric 
Jameson, whilst at the same time acknowledging the relative paucity of critical attention that 
body of work has attracted.2 It is not the aim of this study to reflect specifically on this 
situation but rather to redress the balance through a critical assessment of Jameson's 
theoretical work. Jameson remains unashamedly an Hegelian Marxist and in the 
contemporary postmodem climate this is seen to present a particular difficulty with his work, 
that is, his concern for totality, or totalizing thought. Whilst the concept of totality itself is 
not the focus of any single chapter it can be seen to provide the underlying thread that runs 
throughout this study. Indeed, I would suggest that in emphasising the totalizing nature of 
Jameson's thought and its corollary, his style, both Jameson's critics and admirers tend to 
commit the same errors that he is all too frequently accused of; in short, of stressing identity 
and continuity over difference and variability. MacCabe delineates the problem well in his 
discussion of the difficulties one encounters with Jameson's work: 
At one level this difficulty must simply be encountered - Jameson's style is an 
integral part of the effort to understand the world as both one and multiple, and 
if there is difficulty and awkwardness there is also pleasure and grace. . .. He is 
a systematic thinker, like Sartre and Adorno, his two great masters. That is to 
say even the most local and specific analysis finds its place within an 
overarching theoretical framework. The specific analysis is always related, 
albeit in a dialectical fashion, to an extraordinarily sophisticated and detailed 
theory of culture and society. That theory, however, provides the underlying 
assumptions and reference - it is not present explicitly in every text. It is thus 
the paradoxical case that to read Jameson is always to read the entire oeuvre 
rather than a single particular text.3 
1 
This sense of Jameson's oeuvre ism is also endorsed by Douglas Kellner in his introduction to 
the only published collection of essays devoted to Jameson's work.4 On the one hand I share 
this view and it provides one of the organising principles of the present study; however, it is 
also my contention that an emphasis on Jameson's oeuvreism tends to play down the 
situational nature of Jameson's discourse. It elides the extent to which Jameson's use of terms 
such as "totality" and "narrative" has changed and evolved over the years, as well as the extent 
to which the political-theoretical context has determined the emphasis and nuance of his work. 
To argue such a case is not to reject the first premise but in fact to keep faith with Jameson's 
own historicizing project and to assert the priority of context over text. 
Each of the chapters that follow will focus upon one specific area of Jameson's oeuvre, that is: 
form, history, desire and postmodernism.5 In keeping with the totalizing principle that to 
engage with one part of the work is to engage with the corpus as a whole I will attempt to 
explicate not only Jameson's own texts but also the theoretical presuppositions and positions 
that lie behind many of his formulations. There is often with Jameson's work the sense that a 
particular text is building upon work that has been done elsewhere or developing an idea that 
was argued for and settled in a different context. Therefore, I have tried both to situate 
Jameson's texts and to lay bare many of the debates from which his work emerges. 
This is a theoretical study and I do not offer a critique of Jameson's critical practice, accepting 
his own dictum. that . no interpretation c~ be effectively disqualified on its own terms by a 
simple enumeration of inaccuracies or omissions, or by a list of unanswered questions' (PU, 
13). There are indeed plenty of critiques of Jameson which offer alternative interpretations to 
his and I leave these to individual readers to decide which they find most satisfactory.6 The 
method of analysis I have adopted is also Jameson's own, which is neither to uncritically 
endorse nor to refuse a particular theory but rather: 
2 
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working [my] way completely through it so as to emerge, to the other side, 
into some wholly different and theoretically more satisfying philosophical 
perspective. (pa vii) 
My method, then, is one of immanent critique, to take Jameson's work on its own terms and 
gradually work through its categories and concepts revealing their own theoretical weaknesses 
and inconsistencies, finally to emerge at a "politically" more satisfying perspective. Such a 
procedure I would contend does not invalidate Jameson's project as a whole, nor does it 
discredit the many insights of his critical practice, but it does provide the opportunity to 
reformulate certain of the problematics with which he wrestles and above all allows us to 
retain the problems themselves: that is to say problems of totality, of history and agency, of 
the relationship between cultural artefacts and their socio-historical moments, of 
representation and political aesthetics. These are issues that many postmodernists, following 
Baudrillard, are all too ready to bracket and it is one of the great strengths of Jameson's work 
to have kept them at the centre of his theoretical concerns. Jameson's texts therefore are 
marked with a political commitment that is rare in contemporary theory and also, what is 
either overlooked or ignored by most critics, an intellectual generosity that can genuinely 
tolerate difference, opposition and contradiction 7 
This political and theoretical equanimity is itself very much rooted in the vicissitudes of the 
American Left and precisely the position of the radical intellectual in post second W orId War 
American society. Jameson's passage to Marxism was rather oblique and this personal history 
j 
has had a lasting resonance on the orientation, tone and the political-theoretical emphasis of 
his work. Jameson's formative political experiences were during that period of the late 1950s 
and early 1960s that were characterised by the emergence of the "New Left". In Marxism in 
the United States: Remapping the History of the American Lefts Paul Buhle traces the 
evolution of the New Left out of the complex conjunction of the new social movements of 
Feminism, Black consciousness, civil rights and N~c1ear Disarmament. According to Buble, 
the New Left marked a distinct break from the old left tradition of economic Marxism, which 
3 
focused primarily on industrial struggles and saw the state as the principal vehicle of socialist 
transition. The New Left, on the other hand, privileged areas of cultural politics, focusing on 
the universities as their primary site of struggle, as bases from which to 'start controversy 
across the land'.9 In an essay with James Kavanagh, Jameson has himself reflected on this 
situation of campus Marxism While the Universities and literary studies in particular may 
seem an unusual site for the resurgence of Marxism, being somewhat detached from the fray 
of political and economic strife, Jameson and Kavanagh suggest that to the contrary 'it is 
perhaps in the "weakest links" of bourgeois ideological domination - those areas where 
political and economic structures are less directly at stake - that Marxism can find the 
opportunity for its most daring advances'.lO The politics of culture were no longer seen by the 
New Left as some mere superstructural epiphenomenon but as a crucial component for the 
development of a socialist politics in general: 
The analysis of literary and cultural texts and the tasks of "cultural revolution" 
in general, then, increasingly appear as central, not secondary, to socialist 
political strategies - necessary conditions for transforming the patterns of 
ideological closure and political passivity that are enforced in societies like ours 
less by fear of the police than by fascination with the page or screen. 11 
With respect to culture, however, the New Left also substantively differed from previous 
generations of radicals in that they were the first generation born into an era of television and 
an all-pervasive mass culture; unlike its forebears the New Left did not share an unreserved 
reverence for European High culture and t~e printed word. Jameson's own work is interesting 
in this respect in that it presents a prolonged meditation on the classics of European literature: 
Balzac, Flaubert, Conrad, and Joyce, for example, whilst simultaneously reappraising what are 
often seen as more marginal figures like George Gissing and Wyndham Lewis, and giving such 
popular forms as crime thrillers, Science-Fiction and Hollywood blockbuster mo"ies equally 
serious attention. Recently Jameson has paid less attention to the canonical works of realism 
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and modernism, focusing more upon popular forms and less well known figures of Second and 
Third world culture. 
The specific political and theoretical trajectory of the New Left, suggests Buhle, has its 
extrinsic, historical explanation; in the period immediately after 1965 'there was a renaissance 
of traditional forms of American radicalism', particularly in the areas of racial conflict, the 
women's movement and the free press. However, what was very obviously lacking 'were the 
two historical conditions ascn'bed as central to mass radicalism by orthodox Marxism',12 that is 
to say, an economic crisis and working-class militancy. The absence of these two central 
characteristics of traditional Marxian analysis appeared to discredit the older Socialist and 
Marxist teleologies. The answer lay not in repeating old formulas but in constructing a new 
Marxism appropriate to a new situation. Above all, what distinguished this younger 
generation of radicals ,notes Buhle, was that they 'grew up almost completely ignorant of the 
struggles that had passed by'. 13 Buhle writes: 
The feeling of starting over began here for the simple reason that the existing 
organisations and ideas seemed so obviously inadequate to the civil rights 
revolution or to the problem of nuclear disarmament. Perhaps not since the 
turn of the century had the sense of virginal beginnings been so absolute. 14 
Distanced from their own national traditions and resources American intellectuals looked to 
Western Europe for role models and for Jameson this meant initially the figure of Jean-Paul 
Sartre and later the Frankfurt School: 
for a whole generation of French intellectuals, but also for other Europeans, 
most notably the younger British left, as well as for Americans like myself: 
Sartre represented the model of the political intellectua~ one of the few role 
models we had, but a sufficient one. 1.5 
Sartre was, as Douglas Kellner has pointed out, Jameson's "original choice", that initial 
gesture or unjustifiable decision which, in existential tCfll15, inaugurates one's "project". The 
influence of Sartre can still be seen in Jameson's most recent writings, not only in the 
5 
recurrence of categories such as totalization or "praxis" but more significantly through 
Jameson's commitment to consciousness and the experiential. Jameson's existential-
phenomenological roots exerts a strong influence on the inflection of his Marxism and what is 
often criticised as his residual humanism 16 
Reading Sartre: The Origins of a Style today one is immediately struck by the complete 
absence of any perceptible Marxist influence, an impression enhanced by Marxism's obvious 
centrality to Jameson's second publication: Marxism and Form. Speaking of his own 
conversion to Marxism, Jameson observes that it was not so much a direct result of reading 
Sartre, but rather a case of reading through him: 
I came to Marxism through Sartre and not against him; and not even through 
the later, Marx oriented works such as the Critique, but very precisely through 
the "classical" existential texts of the immediate post-war period. 17 
In other words Sartre's texts paved the way for Jameson's acceptance of Marxism by 
establishing both the theoretical background and the "problematic" with which he was to 
wrestle. However, this problematic or original choice that Jameson made contains within it 
certain dilemmas that remain unresolved in Jameson's work. Kellner notes that: 
The early Sartre was received in the 1950s in the u.s. and elsewhere as a 
figure of the individualist radical intellectua~ as the rebel against convention of 
all sorts. IS 
In adopting Sartre as a role model Jameson was signalling his own radica~ nonconformist 
intentions; but at the same time he was adopting as his model of intellectual engage, an 
individualistic radical who sought to redefine the role of the politically committed intellectual 
outside of any mass political organisation. Perry Anderson has eloquently charted the fate of 
Sartre's own project,19 and I shall not rehearse the arguments once more here; suffice it to say 
that Sartre's pessimism and disillusion have been shared by many in the Western Marxist 
tradition and have also left their mark on Jameson's own work.2o For the North American 
6 
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radicals of the early 1960s the problem was how to define a position in opposition to the 
hegemonic discourse without a readily accessible Marxist tradition. 
This dilemma is instructively inscribed within Jameson's own early work, Sartre: lhe Uri gins 
Qf a Style, which, as the title indicates, is concerned with the development of a particular style. 
Jameso~ rejected the then dominant New Critical doctrine of the text as a self:enclosed unity 
or verbal ico~ rather focusing upon the interrelationships between a text's intrinsic properties 
and its extrinsic determinates. The essential problem with Ihe Origins Of a ~tyle was that the 
conceptual framework which provided Jameson with his analytical categories was none other 
than the those of the study itself: There was thus a certain circularity about the whole 
exercise. This was not simply a moment of theoretical blindness on Jameson's part but was 
itself constrained by history. Jameson was attempting to develop a theoretical position in 
opposition to the dominant strain of Anglo-American positivism and, with respect to literary 
theory, a still hegemonic New Criticism. The dilemma for Jameson and his contemporaries 
was to find a suitable conceptual framework with which to challenge these orthodoxies and in 
the absence of a Marxist traditio~ the principal alternative model was the 
existentiaVphenomenological, the very object of Jameson's study. This political and 
methodological double-bind provides the particular conjunction from which Jameson's radical 
and critical project will emerge~ it also: 
points to an isolation of the radical intelligentsia in the McCarthyist era and its 
aftermath which lacked a tradition ~t hand which could be brought to bear on 
its cultural concerns, or which could politically mobilize it or ofter models of 
radical self-identification. 21 
This was a situation that Jameso~ amongst others, set out to rectifY and has over the last few 
decades radically transformed. 
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THE DIALECTICS OF FORM 
Despite its lack of a Marxian conceptual framework, Sartre: The Origins of a Style does 
serve to highlight a number of Jameson's most abiding theoretical and philosophical concerns. 
in particular on questions of narrative and form. In this opening chapter I shall examine these 
questions under the rubrics of: the logic of form, the logic of content and Metacommentary. 
The logic of form will consider Jameson's conception of form as in itself political and 
ideological and also his own form and practice, specifically in relation to the notion of a 
dialectical style of writing and thinking. The logic of content entails what is, for Jameson, a 
fundamental dialectical law of form, that is to say, a work's ultimate determination by its 
content. I shall initially outline the nature of this dialectical law before considering the content 
of Jameson's own early work, in particular Marxism and Form. This chapter will, therefore, 
be predominantly expository which in itself raises a formal dilemma as Marxism and Form is 
also an expository text. Whilst acknowledging the problems that such double exposition 
involves, particularly in terms of over-simplification, I believe such an operation to be justified 
with regard to the centrality and recurrence of a number of key concepts in Jameson's corpus, 
concepts which find their earliest articulation in this text. I have already mentioned those of 
narrative and form to which we could add: allegory, genre, Utopia, reification and History. 
J 
Therefore the purpose of this section will be to clarifY Jameson's use of these concepts and 
terms. Finally I shall sketch Jameson's initial formulations for a method of dialectical criticism 
or Metacommentary. 
9 
The Logic of Form 
the content of a work of art stands judged by its fo~ and ... it is the realized 
form of the work which offers the surest key to the vital possibilities of that 
determinate social moment from which it springs. (MF,55) 
In the preface to Marxism and Form Jameson identifies the conceptual opponent of his work 
as that amalgam of 'political hoeralism, empiricism, and logical positivism which we know as 
Anglo-American philosophy' and suggests that it is the critique of this tradition 'which makes 
up the tendentious part of my book, which gives it its political and philosophical cutting edge' 
(MF, x). Marxism and Form, however, undertakes no such critique in the sense of explicitly 
and systematically contesting the ideas and presuppositions of empiricism or positivism 
Indeed Jameson does not even go so far as to identify any particular currents or tendencies of 
Anglo-American philosophy which he is against. It is rather the ideological function of such 
discourses with which he is concerned: 
The method of such thinking, in its various forms and guises, consists in 
separating reality into airtight compartments, carefully distinguishing the 
political from the economic, the legal from the political, the sociological from 
the historical, so that the full implications of any given problem can never come 
into view; and in limiting all statements to the discrete and the immediately 
verifiable, in order to rule out any speculative and totalizing thought which 
might lead to a vision of social life as a whole. (MF, 367-8) 
Speculative philosophy is the designation Hegel gave to his own practice to distinguish it from 
, 
the critical philosophy of Kant. For Jameson, then, "speculative thought" is "dialectical 
thought", it is thought which moves from the whole to the part and back to the whole again. 
The difficulty that many encounter when confronted with dialectical prose is not so much a 
stylistic one, suggests Jameson, hut' a measure of the unfamiliarity, in our society, of attempts 
to think the total system as a whole'. 1 It is perhaps the consistent emphasis upon this concept, 
the concept of "totality", more than any other of his i4eas, that defines Jameson's corpus as a 
10 
distinctive body of work in relation to contemporary theory. Jameson's work has relentlessly 
argued for the necessity of critics and theorists to retain a conception of "totality". In place of 
the anti-speculative and individuating bias Jameson identifies with Anglo-American 
philosophy, notably its emphasis on the individual fact or object, Marxism and Form 
adumbrates an alternative mode of thought, that of dialectical thinking. The text "represents" 
rather than argues for such an alternative in the sense that, for Jameson, the dialectic as a 
mode of thought is 'nothing more or less than the elaboration of dialectical sentences' (MF, 
xii). We must look for his critique not in the "content" of the text, in the sense of an argument 
or thesis, but in its own "form". Dialectical thinking directly challenges those isolating and 
inhibiting tendencies of empirical and positivistic thought by foregrounding the essential 
interrelatedness of events and phenomena and, through its very procedures, forcing its 
practitioners to make connections and thus draw 'unavoidable conclusions on the political 
level' (MF, x). Indeed for Jameson there is an ultimate obligation to 'come to terms with the 
shape of the individual sentences themselves, to give an account of the origin and formation' 
(MF, xii) if any concrete description of a literary or philosophical phenomenon is to be 
complete. A concrete description of Jameson's own oeuvre will therefore sooner or later be 
obliged to give an account of what Terry Eagleton has called Jameson's 'magisterial, busily 
metaphorica1'2 sentences. Paradoxically this most palpable feature of Jameson's texts, their 
particularly dense and rhetorical style, has, as Eagleton notes, so often been passed over 'in 
polite silence or with a shyly admiring phrase'.3 Alternatively, some less sympathetic critics, 
., 
have seen Jameson's style as a sign of a more fundamental and inherent weakness in his work 
and thought.4 The present analysis therefore will take as its minimal unit the sentence before 
considering progressively larger units of composition: the example, the essay and the book 
itself 
Whilst the isolation of such units is by no means ~rbitrary, they should not be taken as 
absolute and fixed categories in the sense that there is a particular form of "dialectical 
11 
sentence", which we may pick at random and hold up as an example of how all the others are 
written, or should be written. Such an approach would itself be undialectical to the extent that 
it seeks to isolate and freeze the dialectic, seeing it as a static and mechanistic operation, the 
application of a "thesis - antithesis - synthesis" formula to any given problem This is to treat 
the dialectic as an essentially formal practice or device which one can use with a little 
ingenuity to resolve any conceptual antinomy or textual contradiction. On the contrary, 
nothing could be further from the processes of dialectical thought; the dialectic is not simply a 
formula to be applied, but is intrinsic to the object itself Every object carries within itself that 
which it is not, it carries within itself its own opposite as an implicit comparison or differential 
perception which, even ifunacknowledged, is always made. One always identifies an object by 
differentiating it from what it is not, what is known in classical Hegelian dialectics as the 
"identity of identity and non-identity". The dialectical method is profoundly relational and 
comparative in character, the terms of the dialectic do not exist a priori, as pre-existent 
categories but rather emerge from the dialectic's object or content. As a method of analysis 
and critique it is inseparable from the gradual working through of the system's own inner 
logic, through 'a sympathetic internal experience of the gradual construction of a system 
according to its inner necessity' (MF, xi). 
Dialectical thinking is, for better or for worse, irrevocably associated with systematic thought, 
for which Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit stands as the great model. For Hegel systematic 
J 
philosophy was not simply a matter of personal preference but an objective necessity, in other 
words, what is in the system is not the result of individual caprice but a consequence of the 
logic of the system itself The order and organisation of the system will be determined by the 
structure of the object of study. For example the object of the Phenomenology is "spirit" or 
"mind", it therefore commences with the most basic level of consciousness: that of sense-
certainty. Hegel shows how such a conception of cons~iousness is internally contradictory and 
incoherent; for a more adequate understanding of consciousness we must move to a higher 
12 
level of consciousness, which he calls self-certainty, whereupon he agam repeats the 
operation. The Phenomenology, then, represents a series of stages or conceptual shifts that 
consciousness must undergo if it is to attain "Absolute Knowledge". Absolute knowledge is 
not so much an idea that is suddenly revealed to us at the end of the system but is the journey 
itself: the progression from a partial to a complete understanding; it is the process, the 
development of consciousness that matters.5 The whole dialectical process, the elaborate 
construction and working out of the dialectical system represents or enacts this movement 
towards absolute knowledge. As the system itself emerges from its object, the whole system 
correspondingly remains implicit in any given object or indeed at any given moment of the 
process. 
If we take an example from Jameson's analysis of Adorno we can see how the dialectical 
system begins to unravel itself from a given point of departure. Jameson describes a passage 
from Adorno's Philosophie der neuen Musik as an object lesson in dialectical thinking and a 
'poetic object' in its own right (MF, 7), a status that Jameson's own prose can be said to 
emulate: 
What happens is ... that for a fleeting instant we catch a glimpse of a unified 
world, of a universe in which discontinuous realities are nonetheless somehow 
implicated with each other and intertwined, no matter how remote they may at 
first have seemed; in which the reign of chance briefly refocuses into a network 
of cross-relationships wherever the eye can reach, contingency temporarily 
transmuted into necessity. (MF, 8) j 
In a single sentence Jameson momentarily holds together the 'fleeting instant' and the 'unified 
world', a 'discontinuous', fragmented reality and an intrinsically interrelated universe; each 
subordinate clause moves from the particular to the universal, from the disparate to the 
unified, from the part to the whole. But the sentence does more than grasp these moments as a 
set of static and rigid binary opposites, it grasps them as moments in flux, in process. The 
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sentence rhetorically carries us forward through a series of expanding horizons: an instance, a 
world, a universe, and simultaneously higher levels of abstraction: a 'fleeting instant', 
'discontinuous realities', 'the reign of chance'. As so o~en with a Jamesonian sentence, it 
pivots on the semi-colon, veering round upon itself The dialectic of the sentence passes over 
into its opposite as the ephemeral and contingent comes face to face with the brute fact of 
necessity. 
However, this tendency of the dialectic to unite what we had previously felt to be 
irreconcilable differences or opposites is only the first movement of the dialectic. Dialectical 
thought is thought to the second power, in the sense that it is thought at once about its object 
and at the same time about its own operation and status as thought; it seeks to be both 
conscious and self-conscious simultaneously. It is that movement that Hegel descnoed as 
Aujhebung or "sublation", which at once cancels and preserves its object through a process of 
"immanent critique". Immanent critique does not displace an opposing view simply by insisting 
that it is incoherent and asserting one's own view as the better option but rather by immersing 
oneself in the opposing perspective and revealing how it is internally incoherent and thus 
neutralising or cancelling it.6 At the same time it preserves the original categories by working 
through the~ explicating their inconsistencies and contradictions, and demonstrating how a 
coherent understanding of these categories can be reached only by reconceptualizing them 
dialectically. To put it another way, the categories that we use to describe the world are 
j 
themselves inadequate to the task and the contradictions they reveal can only be resolved 
coherently when we reflect upon the nature of the categories themselves. Jameson has 
described his own method in a similar way; it is not, he suggests, a matter of refusing or 
rejecting outright an alternative system of thought but of: 
working our way completely through it so as to emerge, on the other side, into 
some wholly different and theoretically more satisfYing philosophical perspective. 
(PH, vii) 
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We should not simply reject or abandon inadequate categories out of hand but lift them up and 
rethink, reconceive them, or, as Jameson says, convert 'the problem itself into the solution' 
(MF, 34). The classical dialectic operates through this double movement or double negation: 
first, as we have already seen, by passing over into its opposite and then by negating this first 
movement, transcending it and incorporating both elements at a higher level of abstraction, 
whereby one can see not only what differentiates objects but also what unites them. 
To return to our example, Jameson's use of the semi-colon signifies that initial shift of gears of 
the dialectic, at once differentiating and binding together the two distinct but dependent halves 
of the sentence. It signals that a connection has been made but that these remain determinate 
parts, in other words, a conceptual shift has taken place or a jump in levels of abstraction. In 
the present case the immediacy of the textual analysis is transcended as we pass over to the 
realm of chance and necessity. But this remains only the first step, the first negation; if thought 
is to become fully self-conscious it needs to reflect back upon its own operations. This dual 
movement is what Hegel called "absolute negativity".7 In terms of Jameson's sentence this 
negation of the negation would entail a process of self-reflexivity, of reflection upon the 
process of thought embodied in the sentence itself Contingency is not usually considered the 
dialectical contrary of necessity; necessity designates that situation in which man must struggle 
with the material conditions of life, at its most basic level with nature itself: to satisfY his most 
fundamental needs and requirements, to maintain and reproduce life. The dialectical contrary 
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to this realm of necessity, a realm in which human potential is able to develop in its own right 
and not under the immediate constraints of material need, is what is known as the realm of 
freedom. To lift thought fully to the second power therefore we must make one more turn of 
the gears as we transcend the realm of necessity and attempt to recover the realm of freedom. 
But that as yet unrealised realm cannot be articulated in the content of the work except as an 
empty and abstract intellectual category and can therefore only be realised in the form, in the 
very structure of the sentence. Thus the transitory character of Jameson's lexis: 'fleeting', 
IS 
'briefly', 'glimpsed' and 'implicated' foregrounds the very elusiveness of the concept, of our 
inability to visualise or conceive such a realm except in the most provisional and transitory 
manner, as an aesthetic experience, in the connectedness of it all. The sentence does not insist 
or belabour the necessity of totalizing thought, or the dialectical unity of part to whole, but 
operates as a gestalt in which foreground and background oscillate continually. The visual and 
spatial metaphor refocuses our perception as the eye moves from the isolated fragment to the 
farthest horizon. Just as Adorno's text for Jameson temporarily transmutes contingency into 
necessity, his own text transmutes the immediacy of textual analysis into a glimpse of the 
totality. 
Jameson's style, then, is not a matter of adornment, the expression of an individual taste or 
personal preference but rather a style of "enactment". It is in Jameson's own form, in the shape 
of his individual sentences as well as his texts, that the method of dialectical thought is 
embodied and demonstrated. Language is not a transparent medium through which we 
perceive meaning but is itself productive of meaning, and dialectical thought constantly holds 
up before us this productivity as it reflects upon its own situation and status. It is as much 
through his syntax and punctuation as in the content or meaning of the words he employs, that 
Jameson conducts his polemics against Anglo-American philosophy and enables or shapes 
alternative modes of perception. It is a style that unapologetically makes demands of its 
readers; the very density and self-consciousness of dialectical prose spurns the quick and 
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superficial reading. In a 1982 interview Jameson responded to a question on the difficulty of 
his style with the observation: 
Why should there be any reason to feel that these problems [of culture and 
aesthetics] are less complex than those ofbio-chemistry?8 
The difficulty of dialectical thought and writing is proportionate to the difficulty of the ideas 
with which it is dealing; "real" thought, suggests Jameson, whether it be about bio-chemistry 
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or literature, is difficult and an insistence on the virtues of "clarity" does not necessarily 
correlate with a greater insight or understanding. 
The basic story the dialectic has to tell us, according to Jameson, is that of the dialectical 
reversal, 'that paradoxical turning around of a phenomenon into its opposite of which the 
transformation of quantity into quality is only one of the better known manifestations' (MF, 
309). Jameson sees this paradoxical reversal as essentially a question of limits, 'of the reversal 
of limits, of the transformation from negative to positive and from positive to negative; and is 
basically a diachronic process' (MF, 309). To gain a full understanding of any given reversal, 
or set of reversals, Jameson argues, we must always reimmerse the dialectic in concrete 
history. This dialectical imperative towards the concrete, which I shall discuss at greater 
length in the final section of this chapter, marks every step of Jameson's text. Ifwe take as our 
next unit of composition not the compositional unit of the paragraph but the conceptual unit 
of the "example", it will become apparent how Jameson consistently regrounds his own text. 
Jameson initially situates each author or analysis in its own concrete historical moment. Thus 
his discussion of Schiller places 'the Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Mankind during 
that fateful winter of 1793-1794' (MF, 85) when the French Revolution was increasingly tom 
between the twin alternatives of the Terror and counterrevolution. Similarly, the originality of 
Herbert Marcuse is seen as his attempt to rethink the philosophical systems of Hegel, Marx, 
Freud and Schiller in 'the light of the utterly new soci-economic environment of post-
industrial capitalism which began to emerge at the end of World War II' (MF. 106-7). 
Historicizing the object, however, is only the first step, it is the essence of the dialectical 
method to raise us to a level of self-consciousness which is simultaneously directed at the 
object, the example in question, and the thought process itself. Thus, not only is Marcuse's 
originality to be judged in the light of his rethinking of previous philosophical systems in the 
light of his own historical moment but it is also with. regard to that historical moment, that 
paradoxical context of' [a ]bundance and total control' (MF, 107), in which we must assess 
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Marcuse's own achievement. 
For Jameson, the example, or rather the necessity of using examples, is a sign of 'thought 
imperfectly realised' (MF, 338). Examples are 'always the mark of abstraction or distance 
from the thought process: they are additive and analytica~ whereas in genuine dialectical 
thinking the whole process would be implicit in any given object' (MF, 338). In such a 
situation, suggests Jameson, the thought process is rent asunder, on the one hand providing us 
with a presentation of a method, and on the other, a series of examples of objects. Yet it is the 
very essence of dialectical thinking to deny such a separation between form and content, 
between the thought process itself and its object of study. In transcending this subject-object 
split the dialectic can be said to be doubly historica~ at once historizicing its object of study as 
well as its own conditions of possibility. Whether he reflects on the nature of Science-fiction 
in the Cold war9 or the dialectics of post-World War II missile technology (MF, 310) Jameson 
constantly grounds the abstract in the concrete. 
Dialectical thinking, then, is nothing less than the practice of the dialectical method, the 
'ceaseless generation and dissolution of intellectual categories' (MF, 336). Each sentence 
stands as a figure for the process as a whole, but at the same time we can only grasp the full 
import of an individual sentence when we situate it in relation to that more elusive and 
difficult concept of "totality". It is the very abstractness of the dialectical style that forces us to 
move beyond the individual and isolated phenomenon and apprehend it as part of a network of 
relations: 
abstract terminology clings to its object as a sign of the latter's incompleteness in itself: 
of its need to be replaced in the context of the totality. (MF, xiii) 
Herein lies the real difficulty of dialectical thinking and particularly of a dialectical style of 
writing, 'its holistic totalizing character' (MF, 306). Dialectic thought is totalizing thought, 
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exhibiting an inherent 'preference for the concrete totality over the separate abstract parts' 
(MF, 45), it consistently makes connections, drawing together the most disparate phenomena 
and historical moments. This tendency to draw everything together accounts for some of the 
complexity and density of dialectical prose as well as its breadth, as it ranges over what we 
had always accepted as distinct and specialised areas of study revealing hitherto unnoticed 
connections. At its best this creates what Jameson calls a "dialectical shock" as the reader is 
forced into a new perception through the yoking together of what we had previously 
perceived as utterly distinct phenomena. Such a shock, suggests Jameson, is 'constitutive of 
and inseparable from dialectical thinking' signalling 'an abrupt shift to a higher level of 
consciousness, to a larger context of being' (MF, 375). Its presence, for Jameson at least, will 
be the mark of any genuine Marxist criticism 
Some preliminary remarks are required here, with regard to the evaluative implications of 
Jameson's hierarchical metaphor. lo Jameson takes over from Hegel the notion that each 
movement of the dialectic takes one to a "higher" level of consciousness, or, to a "larger" 
context of being, although the presuppositions behind these statements are never drawn out. A 
higher level of consciousness would also imply a "lower" level of consciousness, a level that 
the more enlightened Hegelian Marxist is presumably above, or, outside ot: Jameson, correctly 
I believe, criticises Hegel for reserving a place outside of his system for the philosopher, 
arguing that, not even the philosophers can escape history. And yet, Jameson's argument 
frequently appears to reserve that position for the Marxist theorists. The notion of higher and 
lower also implies a value judgement with regard to distinct kinds of consciousness without 
clarifying how such value judgements are made and, above all, by whom? 
The presence of the dialectical shock is not only to be felt at the level of the sentence or 
example, but also with larger units of composition, o~ which Jameson's favoured form is the 
essay. Ifwe exclude his doctoral thesis, Sartre: The Origins of a Style, all of Jameson's major 
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published works, such as Marxism and Form, The Political Unconscious, Postmodemism, 
Or, The Cultural LOgic of Late Capitalism and Signatures of the Visible are volumes of 
collected essays, whilst the shorter works: The Prison House of Language and Fables of 
Aggression are essentially extended essays. It is by no means coincidental that the essay was 
also Adorno's preferred form, and indeed, suggests Jameson, the form in which his best work 
was accomplished. ll In 'The Essay as Form' Adorno reflects upon the characteristics of the 
essay: 
Instead of achieving something scientifically, or creating something artistically, 
the effort of the essay reflects a childlike freedom that catches fire, without 
scruple, on what others have already done.12 
This sense of transgression and playfulness has its analogy at the level of the sentence with 
Jameson's emphasis on the role of punning or "wordplay" as the very essence of the dialectic. 
What is often perceived as a confusion of terms in dialectical thought is, according to 
Jameso~ nothing less than the attempt to push against the very limits of the terms themselves. 
If we take for instance Jameson's use of the term "form" we can see that he simultaneously 
uses the term to designate a particular individual style of writing as well as the conventional 
classifications of genre and also specific modes of thought. Form would thus appear to 
function as a generic term which directs our attention not to one specialised area of aesthetics 
or poetics but operates as a mediatory categ~.ry between individual modes of representation 
and wider social forces. Form is both an aesthetic category and an historical phenomeno~ it is 
implicated in both but is reducible to neither and the wordplay of the dialectic forces the 
reader to think both situations simultaneously. Similarly the category of the aesthetic remains 
undefined within Jameson's texts, designating both the aesthetic experience of the spectator 
and reader as well as broader historical and cultural movements such as modernism and 
postmodernism What such dialectical wordplay foregrounds therefore is the priority of 
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context over text, the precise meaning of the word comes from the context in which it is used 
rather than a definitive univocal meaning. 
Jameson is aware of the objections that will be raised against this notion of wordplay, 
suggesting that such wordplay maybe seen to confuse categories and be inadmissible in older 
types of analytical and logical reasoning. But it represents the very essence of the dialectical 
method, . a scandal for static rationality, its inner movement dramatizes the irresistible link 
between a formal concept and that historical reality in which it originated' (MF, 335). 
However, such dialectical wordplay may simply be a way of facilitating a rather vague and 
imprecise use of terminology. For example, what exactly does Jameson mean by older types of 
analytical and logical reasoning? Jameson never openly identifies the philosophical traditions 
he is polemicizing against, which makes it difficult to construct a counter argument in terms of 
his critique. It also means that his criticisms remain at a very general level and are once again 
difficult to refute with regard to specific criticisms. If we go back to the notion of the 
inadmissibility of wordplay for analytical philosophy, the suggestion behind the term 
"inadmissible" is that something ought to take place but does not. In other words, that 
analytical philosophy ought to allow such wordplay but in fact denies it. However the reasons 
for avoiding such wordplay in a philosophical discourse, such as its lack of terminological 
precision or intellectual rig our and consequently a tendency towards conceptual confusion, are 
not considered by Jameson. 
To return to Adorno once more, the essay, he argues, eschews traditional notions of method 
and enquiry taking as its raw material objects already culturally and historically determined 
and 'treating what is normally held to be derived, without however pursuing its ultimate 
derivation'.13 The essay thus has the freedom to commence and conclude where it chooses, it 
has to draw no "final" conclusions. It gains its polemical and critical force through its capacity 
to reorder, or recombine, its pregiven material in a new and potentially disruptive way: 
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the law of the innermost form of the essay is heresy. By transgressing the 
orthodoxy of thought, somethlng becomes visible in the object which it is the 
orthodoxy's secret purpose to keep invisible. 14 
Ifwe consider Jameson's much acclaimed essay 'Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture' we 
can see how, at his best, Jameson cuts through the often polarised and static positions of 
academic debate, lifting the reader onto a terrain where the north American tourist 
indiscriminately rubs shoulders with Heidegger. Jameson commences his essay by defining the 
conventional polarity between "Mass" and "High" culture, and indeed, will retain and use 
these designations albeit in a qualified and modified form. For instance, those who valorise 
mass culture need to take account of its pervasive anti-intellectual and anti-theoretical stance, 
particularly as this position is largely propagated by intellectuals themselves who have as yet 
failed to provide an adequate method of study for those objects they valorise. On the other 
hand, strong advocates of high art, specifically those derivative of the Frankfurt School, suffer 
from a corresponding over-estimation of the positive value of high art, 'namely the 
valorization of traditional modernist high art as the locus of some genuinely critical and 
subversive, "autonomous" aesthetic production'. IS What is immediately apparent is that 
Jameson is seeking to move beyond the sterile binary opposition which the debate between 
high and mass culture has all too frequently been locked into and which inevitably declines 
into ethical and value judgements. He insists on the need to replace such sterile debates with a 
more historical and dialectical approach: 
Such an approach demands that we read high and mass culture as objectively 
related and dialectically interdependent phenomena, as twin and inseparable 
forms of the fission of aesthetic production under capitalism. 16 
Jameson's primary rhetorical gesture is that of the dialectical reversal, at every twist and turn 
of the text we find ourselves attempting to look at the situation from at least two perspectives, 
or as Jameson would say of looking both ways at once. If we take the concept of reification 
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itseIfwe can see how such reversals function. For Jameson: 
The theory of reification (here strongly overlaid with Max Weber's analysis of 
rationalization) descnoes the way in which, under capitalism, the older 
traditional forms of human activity are instrumentally reorganised and 
"taylorized," analytically fragmented and reconstructed according to various 
rational models of efficiency, and essentially restructured along the lines of a 
differentiation between means and ends. 17 
With the universal commodification oflabour power under capitalism, continues Jameson, all 
forms of human labour can be separated out from their 'unique qualitative differentiation as 
distinct types of activity' and be distinguished quantitatively 'under the universal exchange 
value of money'.ls In this sense, then, the distinct quality or "ends" of human activities have 
been bracketed, 'leaving all these activities free to be ruthlessly reorganised in efficiency 
terms, as sheer means or instrumentality'. 19 
However, the notion of reification also provides us with an alternative perspective, that of 
consumption. Reification not only transforms human activity into sheer "means" but also into 
an "end" in itsel£ the commodification of labour power turns it into a product, or commodity, 
to be "consumed". The implications of such a reversal, with regard to culture, are that not 
only should we reflect upon the commodification of cultural artefacts but also upon the fact 
that in a consumer society all commodities take on an aesthetic dimension. One does not just 
buy the commodity itse1£ the new car, the television set, clothes or food, but one also buys an 
image, or into, what is often referred to as, a "life-style". In this sense, argues Jameson, we 
consume 'less the thing itsel£ than its abstract idea',20 and it is this image or abstract idea that 
Jameson calls the aesthetic dimension of the commodity. 
The dialectical shock and the dialectical reversal are characteristic of Jameson's texts and 
persistently underscore the need to reperceive familiar problems in a new light. Jameson 
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continues by refuting the spurious equation of "mass" with older forms of popular and folk 
culture on the grounds that mass culture is defined by its social situation which is structurally 
distinct from and not directly equitable with pre-capitalist forms of culture. Likewise, our 
notions of "high" culture are distinct from the historical situation of a Shakespeare or a 
Dickens. In other words, High culture designates Modernism, whose dialectical contrary is 
Mass culture and to begin to view them in this light is to move beyond the specializations of 
English Literature and Cultural studies, opening up a whole new shared terrain upon which 
they can both be seen to dialectically interact. 
By focusing on the historical specificity of high and Mass culture Jameson highlights not only 
what separates and differentiates these two realms but also what unites them. Both are 
products of commodity reification and the escalating fragmentation of capitalism: 
Capitalism systematically dissolves the fabric of all cohesive social groups 
without exception, including its own ruling class, and thereby problematizes 
aesthetic production and linguistic invention which have their source in group 
1:~ 21 llle. 
Both Modernism and Mass culture have (in the broadest sense of the term) the same content; 
what differentiates them is the way that each processes or transforms this raw material: 
Both modernism and mass culture entertain relations of repression with the 
fundamental social anxieties and concerns, hopes and blind spots, ideological 
antinomies and fantasies of disaster, w~ch are their raw material; only where 
modernism tends to handle this material by producing compensatory structures 
of various kinds, mass culture represses them by the narrative construction of 
imaginary resolutions and by the projection of an optical illusion of social 
harmony. 22 
Thus in a final dialectical transformation of the essay we find Jameson bringing to bear upon 
the artefacts of mass culture the analytical methods of the Frankfurt School and revealing that 
repressed and critical, or negative, . dimension of even the most degraded type of mass 
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culture'.23 In other words, its Utopian impulse, the repressed desire for a collective existence 
which implicitly stands in contradiction and antagonism to the social order from which the 
artefact itself emerged.24 
In the essay, then, concepts gain their precision and weight not through their derivation and 
definition but in relation to one another: 
concepts do not build a continuum of operations, thought does not advance in 
a single direction, rather aspects of the argument interweave as in a carpet. The 
fruitfulness of the thoughts depends on the density of this texture.2's 
This fecundity is again demonstrable from our present example. In 'Remcation and Utopia in 
Mass Culture' Jameson weaves a rich texture which encompasses not only Modernism and 
mass culture, the Fran.k.furt school and Hollywood but also Kierkegaard and pop music, genre 
theory and the Freudian unconscious, the writings of Guy Debord and Baudrillard. The 
conjunction of such discourses is not an end in itself but selVes as a incentive to further 
thought, as the essay gestures towards various potential areas of study. For instance: Jameson 
offers a redefinition of Modernism not as the solution to commodification but as a reaction to 
it. He also highlights the common ground between the Marxian concept of reification and 
post-structuralist notions of the materialisation of the signifier, as well as pointing to the 
paradox of repetition from Freud to Baudrillard's notion of the simulacrum all the way to TV 
soap operas. Jameson does not resolve these ql,lestions but leaves them open ended, whilst his 
own short analyses of Jaws and The Godfather (parts I and II) illustrate just two possible 
options. 
The essay is an inherently discontinuous and fragmentary form, a form which does not attempt 
to mask its fragmentary status but on the contrary accentuates it. The dialectical essay ought 
to be, according to Adorno 'the critical form par excellence',26 at once more dynamic and 
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more static than, what Adorno designates as, traditional thought. The unity of the essay is 
determined by the unity of its object, it does not attempt to abolish discontinuities but works 
through their fissures, there will always be a tension between presentation and what is 
presented, between form and content. 
Paradoxically, then, it is the very restrictiveness of the essay as a form that facilitates the 
release of the full potential of the dialectical imagination. The tension between form and 
content gives it an edge and intensity which is lacking in more discursive prose. The problem 
for the essayist-dialectician is how to link these fragments together: 
For the fundamental problem of the dialectical writer is precisely that of 
continuity. He who has so intense a feeling for the massive continuity of history 
itself is somehow paralyzed by that very awareness, as in some overloading of 
perception too physical to be any longer commensurable with language. 
(MF,50-1) 
Jameson suggests that what binds together Adorno's essays are less their thematic content 
than their "style" and their shared historical moment; the problem of continuity is resolved less 
through the writing of a narrative than the "construction" of larger units. As much could be 
said for Jameson's own texts: Marxism and Form is organised 'around the sign of Discourse 
itself (MF, xii), it is Jameson's most self-consciously dialectical text and one feels at every 
moment that imperative to totalize: from the strenuous efforts of the individual sentence to his 
readings of other writers, Jameson is constantly making connections. He insists on the 
interrelatedness of Sartre's existential and Marxist views, reading the Critique of Dialectical 
Reason not as a break with the ideas of Being and Nothingness but as its completion: 
Marxism is a way of understanding the objective dimension of history from the 
outside; existentialism a way of understanding subjective individual experience. 
(MF,208) 
Rather than foregrounding the discontinuity of Sartre's thought and insisting on the presence 
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of an epistemological break, Jameson emphasises the consistency of categories between 
Sartre's early and late work. Similarly Jameson gives us a dialectical reading of Lukacs in 
which the idealist categories of Theory of the Novel, mediated by History and Class 
Consciousness, are related to the more concrete and historical categories of The Historical 
Novel. The Political Unconscious with its focus upon narrative is organised around a central 
narrative of Realism - Naturalism - emergent Modernism. Postmodernism, Or, The Cultural 
Logic of Late Capitalism on the other hand, drawing on the heterogeneity of its own object of 
study and reflecting the collapse of grand narratives in the postmodem age, lacks a core 
narrative presenting a more copious and expansive text befitting its dominant organisational 
category of "space". It ranges over such disparate phenomena as: architecture, economics, 
New Historicism, photography and De Manian deconstruction, which are bound together by 
the historical moment of the postmodem. In his work on postmodernism we can also see how 
far Jameson has moved away from a purely dialectical mode of thought. The dialectic clearly 
persists in these works but their principal conceptual instrument is what Jameson calls 
"transcoding". The notion of transcoding was first sketched by Jameson in Marxism and 
Form: 
What is implied here ... is the notion that at a certain level of concreteness the 
thing itself-or what we will later call its existential reality - may be formulated 
in anyone of a number of alternate codes, may be rearticulated in anyone of a 
number of different dimensions: as literary structure, as the lived truth of a 
determinate social organisation, as a certain type of subject-object relationship, 
as a certain distance of language from its object, as a determinate mode of 
specialization or of the division of labor, as an implied relationship between 
classes. (MF, 354) 
The operation of transcoding serves to rewrite a given problematic in order to cast it in a new 
light, to see it from a different perspective, from which solutions may be more apparent. It is 
this operation which Jameson sees as accounting for the eclecticism of his work rather than 
some all-inclusive Hegelian system building. He also suggests that the transmigration of the 
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earlier dialectical concept of "metacommentary" into a procedure of transcoding is to be 
accounted for by the transition from a concern with the individual literary or cultural text and 
intrinsic polemics around various methodologies and interpretations and the move to 
theoretical struggles or polemics at a higher level of abstraction. We shall return to assess how 
satisfactory Jameson's formal solutions are in later chapters. 
A more pressing formal dilemma, though, we could perhaps characterise as (to borrow 
Jameson's own phrase) the "waning of affect". Ifwe consider for example two of Jameson's 
path-breaking essays: the 1971 'Metacommentarr and his influential 1984 work on 
postmodernism 'Postmodernism, Or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism'. Both of these 
programmatic essays became sites for intense theoretical debate, for Marxists and non 
Marxists, alike and as one rereads them today they retain all of their initial impact. They both 
have that combination of breadth and clarity which we have already discussed with respect to 
'Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture'. Their "shock-effect" is not as a consequence of their 
novelty, of having had revealed to oneself something entirely new, but rather the sense of the 
familiar being revealed in an entirely new light, of having disclosed to oneself something that 
was simply there all the time if only we could have thought about it in the right way or clearly 
enough. These essays have the effect of startling one out of the complacencies of comfortable 
but rather tired modes of thought. But the effect seems to be lost when the thirteen pages of 
'Metacommentary' are expanded to a hundred pages on the nature of dialectical criticism (as 
in the concluding chapter of Marxism and Form), or the forty pages of 'Postmodernism' is 
incorporated into a four hundred page book (Postmodernism, Or, The Cultural Logic of Late 
Capitalism ). 
There is a tendency with dialectical prose to try to say everything, to cover every angle and 
perspective, before one actually says what it is one wi~es to say. This can lead to diffuseness, 
to the style becoming ever more convoluted and opaque as it draws-in ever increasing 
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amounts of raw materials. The price that is paid for this is often the loss of that dialectical 
shock which Jameson sees as the mark of genuinely Marxist criticism This is by no means to 
dismiss or play down the significance of the longer discursive works but to suggest that what 
is most scandalous and transgressive in dialectical thought, its shock effect for the Anglo-
American consciousness, is somehow lost. The polemical and critical cutting edge of the essay 
is lost as it is incorporated into larger forms. Indeed, as ~e read the longer texts we tend to 
slip back into traditional modes of thought, into a narrative or analytical frame of mind. I do 
not wish to suggest that the need for greater clarity and understanding is undesirable in itself 
but rather that a dialectical mode of thought and style is not necessarily the best instrument for 
achieving such clarity and understanding.27 A book brings with it different expectations, the 
anticipation of a synthesis, the need for concrete conclusions. Again this is not to suggest that 
Jameson avoids such issues - see for instance the extended theoretical chapters which form the 
core of his books, 'Towards Dialectical Criticism', 'On Interpretation', 'The Existence of 
Italy', and 'Secondary Elaborations'. But, as Jameson notes, the essay can be seen as 
'fragments of or footnotes to a totality which never comes into being' (MF, 52) and the parts 
never quite form a whole; they can never be more than yet another fragment. The essay can 
offer a glimpse of the totality, but it always remains out of reach. The more the ideas are 
fleshed out and elaborated the greater the sense of repetition, and the feeling that we cannot 
actually get beyond the starting point. There is then, I would suggest, an initial anti-climax on 
reading Jameson's books, a sense of formal disappointment which must be off-set against the 
sheer intellectual intensity of the individual fragments themselves. 
The Logic of Content 
It is ... one of the most basic lessons of dialectical method that the potentialities 
for development of a given mode of thought lie predetermined and, as it were, 
foreordained within the very structure of the initial terms themselves, and 
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reflect the characteristics of its point of departure. (MF, 9) 
What we have examined so far in terms of the political and ideological aspects of form should 
not be taken to imply that Jameson is a Formalist. Formalism has a tendency to downgrade 
content, seeing it as little more than the projection of the form. The Russian Formalists for 
example saw literary history as: 
a series of abrupt discontinuities, of ruptures with the past, where each new 
literary present is seen as a break with the dominant artistic canons of the 
generation immediately preceding. (PH, 52-3) 
But this process of perpetual change and renewal was seen as 'being inherent in the nature of 
artistic form itseI£:' (PH, 53) once a particular form had grown stale and lost its force a new 
form emerges to replace it, to once more "defamiliarize" and make-strange the literary 
artefact. For Jameson, on the other hand, form is an historical phenomenon not regardless of 
its content but precisely because its content is social and historical in character. Form, 
suggests Jameson, is nothing less than 'the working out of content in the realm of the 
superstructure' (MF, 329), the evolution of forms, far from consisting of a self-motivating 
logic, represents the emergence of new types of content forcing their way to the surface and 
displacing the older obsolete forms. In other words, literary change 'is essentially a function of 
content seeking its adequate expression in form' (MF, 328), a process Jameson designates as 
the "logic of content". The logic of content dictates that the raw materials themselves shape 
and restructure the formal codes of presentation: 
content, through its own inner logic, generates those categories in terms of 
which it organizes itself in a formal structure, and in terms of which it is 
therefore best studied. (MF, 335) 
Such a process entails a movement from the intrinsic to the extrinsic, that is to say, a gradual 
enlargement of the critical perspective from the individual work to that larger social reality 
from which it emerges. So, for instance, reflecting on the nature of Marx's materialism 
Jameson observes that we cannot fully understand Marx's ideas until 'we understand that 
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which it is directed against, that which it is designed to correct' (MF, 365-6), we need to move 
beyond the isolated texts to consider their background and conditions of possibility. As much 
needs to be said for a full understanding of Jameson's own theoretical project, as wen as his 
Marxism The particular problem or dilemma that this poses with respect to Jameson (as 
indeed for many Marxist writers) is that his work must be seen in relation to not one but two 
backgrounds. Jameson's texts are always directed against, at least, two audiences 
simultaneously, what we may broadly define as an academic audience and a political one. I 
have already noted how Jameson's preface to Marxism and Form identifies a general 
intellectual antagonist or opponent. This can be said to represent the negative or critical 
component of his text; I should now like to consider its positive component. In situating his 
own text Jameson notes the 'absence of any genuine Marxist culture in academic circles' (MF, 
x), indeed, in the early 1970s when north American students thought of Marxism they only 
had recourse to the struggles and polemics of the 1930s which bore little relation to their 
contemporary needs and aspirations. Similarly the few familiar Marxist critics still readily 
accessible, Christopher Caudwell or Ernst Fischer, no longer seemed adequate or applicable to 
current critical requirements, particularly with the shift of critical emphasis since the 1930s 
from content based criticisms to more formally based methods. In his 1982 Diacritics28 
interview Jameson enlarged on this need for a Marxist cultural presence, suggesting that any 
real systematic change in American society required as a minimal first step the creation of a 
social democratic movement but this in turn entailed two preconditions: the creation of a 
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Marxist intelligentsia and of a Marxist culture, or intenectual presence. The significance of 
Marxism and Form lies not just in its methodological formulations and theoretical insights but 
in the central role it was to play in creating a strong Marxist presence within academic circles. 
Marxism and Form was to make available to an American audience, for the first time, an 
alternative tradition of Marxist literary theory, a tradition which focused not upon the content 
of works but upon their fonn. Marxism and Form,. therefore, has an immediate academic 
audience at once popularising and disseminating Marxist ideas, whilst, as we saw in the 
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previous section, challenging current academic and intellectual orthodoxies. 
However, Marxism and Form also has an implicit, or esoteric, audience as the text is engaged 
in its own dialogue within Marxism This internal dialogue finds formal expression in the 
tendency of Marxist thinkers and writers to "speak in code": with Jameson, for example, his 
persistent reflections on the possibility for a renewed Utopian imagination or Utopian impulse 
can be rewritten in a more orthodox terminology of a socialist society and socialist 
transformation. Similarly Jameson's recent formulation of the concept of "cognitive mapping" 
is perhaps more familiar to us as that older notion of class consciousness. The practice of 
speaking in code is not simply a matter of the esoteric propensities of individual writers but 
can be seen as a consequence of the diversity of Marxisms. Marxism is by no means a 
homogeneous or unified body of knowledge and as Jameson observes: 
it is perfectly consistent with the spirit of Marxism - with the principle that 
thought reflects its concrete social situation - that there should exist several 
different Marxisms in the world today, each answering the specific needs and 
problems of its own socio-economic system (MF, xviii) 
As a figure in the nascent New Left, Jameson was an active participant in the search for an 
adequate theoretical discourse through which an understanding of post second World War 
North American capitalism could be achieved. Paul Buhle has described it as a feeling of 
starting over again, observing that the New Left 'felt instinctively that the weakness of this 
generation was its lack of firm training in the critical traditions of thought which Europeans 
seemed to understand so well'.29 The Frankfurt School seemed to offer just such a model of 
critical practice but appeared lacking in other respects: 
The Frankfurt School anticipated much of the distinctive problematic of the 
New Left, which would soon disinter its works and reestablish its influence. 
Yet at the same time the Frankfurters, in their peculiarly European despair, 
were unable to feel the real pulse of resistance in American popular life.30 
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What was required was a Marxism appropriate to the demands of an afiluent consumer 
society, a Marxism that did seek to impose its own political solutions but dealt with the 
realities of the United States in the 1960s and 70s. Buhle identifies two of the most pressing 
dilemmas of the New Left as the need for a 'reformulation of the concept of revolutionary 
agency3! - as Jameson says the problem for the street fighter today is 'precisely where the 
street is in the superstate' (MF, xviii) - and the need for a coherent theory' of developing a 
politics and theory equal to the ambition of naming, and overcoming, a system for which the 
available analyses had fallen short'.32 Marxism and Form is very much part of this realignment 
and renewal, indeed, it is seen by many as the Ur-text of the renaissance in Marxist studies in 
the 1970s: 'establishing the legitimacy of Marxist aesthetic theory among broad sections of the 
literary critical profession'.33 Jameson's own project is unrepentantly theoretical: 
there is no tactical or political question which is not first and foremost 
theoretical, no form of action which is not inextricably entangled in the sticky 
cobwebs of the false and unreal culture itself: with its ideological mystification 
on every level. (MF, xviii) 
The only theory adequate to the task in hand, for Jameson, in its ability to encompass the 
sheer quantity of raw materials, is Hegelian, or what is known as "Western" Marxism, a 
tradition of which Jameson is now the foremost practitioner and advocate. 34 The inaugural 
text of this tradition is Lukacs' History and Class ConsCiousness with its own philosophical 
roots in the Hegelian dialectic. Throughout Marxism and Form Jameson relentlessly argues 
.~ 
for the case for a Hegelian-Marxist model over and against the more deterministic varieties of 
economic Marxism and dialectical materialism Thus Marxism and Form delineates the 
tradition from which Jameson's ideas are evolving as well as addressing the perceived needs 
and priorities for a contemporary Marxist critical practice. Furthermore Marxism and Form 
can be seen to map the conceptual parameters of some of the most central and recurrent 
concerns of Jameson's theoretical career: Benjamin. as allegorist, Bloch on the Utopian 
impulse, Schiller and Marcuse on the hermeneutics of freedom, Lukacs on narrative and 
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mediation, Sartre on the primacy of history and class struggle and finally the relationship 
between Marxism and Hegelianism along with Marxism's conjunction with other philosophic 
and academic disciplines. I shall briefly consider each of these figures in tum, specifically 
highlighting Jameson's theoretical interest in each dialectical theory, before turning to the 
actual nature of his Marxism m the next section. 
Adorno and Form. 
As we saw above Jameson derives from Adorno an abiding concern for the shape of 
individual sentences; he also discovers in Adorno a very particular conception of form, a 
conception that is both historical and political in character. Jameson characterises earlier forms 
of Marxist criticism as genetic in that they emphasise the historical evolution of works of art 
and the emergence of capitalist institutions from pre-capitalist societies. Such criticism he 
suggests: 
has furnished a convenient introduction both to the subtleties of the dialectical 
method and to the complexities of Marxist social and economic doctrine. 
(MF,Il) 
This form of criticism has tended to focus upon the content of literary works and how this 
content "reflects" its social and historical moment. However much validity a content-
orientated criticism may retain for contemporary, as well as historicaL Realisms is not at issue 
here but clearly such criticism will face major obstacles when it comes to deal with much 
twentieth-century art and literature. Therefore Jameson argues that what was once 
demonstrable from the content of literary works must now be seen to be at work within the 
form itself: as it is 'the model that now helps us to read the bewildering and massive substance 
of the real of which it began by being the projection' (MF, 11). However Jameson does so with 
the proviso that we distinguish between form as an isolated phenomenon, the single cultural 
artefact, and the individual form as a figure for some much larger historical process. In other 
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words, we must differentiate between a model that is synchronic and static and one that is 
diachronic and dynamic. 
Jameson observes that 'to juxtapose against its historical background a cultural item 
understood in an isolated, atomistic way... is to ensure the construction of a model that 
cannot but be static' (MF, 9). If we are to construct a model that is dynamic we must 
transcend the individual artefact and move from the juxtaposition of an individual form against 
its socio-historical background to the juxtaposition of the history of the particular form. 
against that same background; to construct what Jameson calls an "historical trope" whereby 
the individual cultural artefact stands as a figure for the history of the form itself; in the sense 
that Adorno saw the names of the great artists not as solitary geniuses. as isolated figures, but 
as 'so many moments in the history of the form, as so many lived unities between situation and 
invention, between contradiction and that determinate resolution from which new 
contradictions spring' (MF,19). The transition from the individual object to its history also 
necessitates a change in language as the relationship between the cultural item and its 
background is changed from one of point to field, or particular to universa4 to become one of 
two contiguous fields, thus 'the language of causality gives way to that of analogy or 
homology, of parallelism' (MF, 10). This process entails a double movement, the individual 
cultural artefacts must be viewed on two distinct but interrelated levels: firstly, in relation to 
their own semi-autonomous sphere with its own internal history and dynamic and secondly, in 
relation to their specific socio-historical moment. The difficulty such a procedure encounters, 
according to Jameson, is the tendency with literary discourse, particularly in its more 
representational forms, 'of slippage from form into content which cannot but blur the 
methodological points to be made' (MF, 11). Jameson's argument is similar to that of the 
Russian Formalists, with their notion of "defamiliarization" or "estrangement," Jameson 
suggests that if the form. becomes too familiar it b,ecomes increasingly difficult to draw 
methodological and historical conclusions from its analysis. Therefore, we need to estrange 
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the object of study in some way, to perceive it in a new light. Thus, argues Jameson, the ideal 
'material for a full-scale demonstration of such historical models would no doubt be drawn 
from spheres as distant from everyday life as possible' (MF, 11). Paradoxically then, it is 
precisely the tendency of art and literature in modem society to attempt to seal itself off within 
its own specialised and hermetic sphere, to attempt to retain its sense of autonomy that 
enables us to see it as profoundly historical in nature. 
According to Jameson, one of the great values of literary and cultural studies in relation to the 
dialectical process is that they provide a microcosm of the method as a whole. The processes 
of change and development that we can see relatively transparently within the realm of culture 
thus provide analogies for change and development within the more opaque macrocosm of the 
socio-economic system However if the work of art can be said to be a microcosm of the 
larger socio-historic moment in that it reproduces the structure of society, this is not in terms 
of its content as a reflection of that society but rather through its formal resistance to that 
given historical moment: 
The work of art "reflects" society and is historical to the degree that it refuses 
the socia~ and represents the last refuge of individual subjectivity from the 
historical forces that threaten to crush it. (MF, 34-5) 
The socio-economic is inscnbed in the work not as mimesis but as 'concave to convex, as 
negative to positive' (MF, 34), in other words, as a contradiction right at the heart of the work 
itself As Terry Eagleton writes: 
The aporia of modernist culture lies in its plaintive, stricken attempt to tum 
autonomy (the free-standing nature of the aesthetic work) against autonomy 
(its functionless status as commodity on the market); what warps it into non-
self-identity is the inscription of its own material conditions on its interior. J~ 
The work of art, suggests Eagleton, is divided against itsel( it is "contradiction incamate",36 
at once a commodity and the attempt to refuse, or . deny, its own commodity status. For 
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Adorno, the work of art is inherently contradictory, and herein, argues Jameson, resides its 
political value, through its attempt to reconcile real social contradictions. 
Benjamin and Allegory. 
Frank Lentricchia commences his book After The New Criticism with a discussion of the 
relationship between "symbol" and allegory. Following Frank Kermode's work Romantic 
Image he observes that a distinction between the symbolic and allegorical usage of language 
has been made since the early Romantics and locates its most recent expression in the New 
Critical doctrine of the unity of the poetic object and the heresy ofparaphrase. The distinction 
is essentially an ontological one whereby the symbol is seen as • ontologically full while 
allegory is thin at best, and at worst "unsubstantial" '" only an illusion of being.'37 Just as 
Cleanth Brooks insisted that a poem is and cannot be paraphrased or rewritten in any other 
discourse without a consequent diminution of its aesthetic qualities, the symbol can be said to 
have a privileged relationship to Being in that it facilitates a direct experience of Being rather 
than some second order representation or vision of Being. Allegory, on the other hand: 
As a type of arbitrary and abstract discourse ... maintains ontological 
separation and the division of the subject and object. 38 
Paradoxically this privileging of the symbolic function of language, rather than providing ever 
greater numbers of readers with a direct experience of some ultimate Being or meaning, seems 
to have had the reverse effect. Lentricchia notes that the poetic language of the symbol was 
not only seen to be different from ordinary language but "better"; . since it is the locus, ... of 
our most satisfying and valuable experiences as human beings'.39 As this distinction between 
poetic language and ordinary language deepened the difference, writes Lentricchia, escalated 
into privilege and 'privilege, in a supreme irony, drives the seer and his expressive language 
into the silence of solipsistic revery'.40 In other words the symbolic function of poetic language 
becomes exclusive rather than inclusive. With the gradual dissolution of the New Critical 
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hegemony in the 1950s there was a marked shift towards once more demystifying poetic 
language and restoring it 'to the place where the forbidden subjects of history, intentio~ and 
cultural dynamics could be taken up once again'.41 One of the key texts in this transition was 
Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Criticism and as we shall see in the following chapter Frye's 
archetypal model has a significant influence on Jameson's own political hermeneutic. 
In Marxism and Form, however, Jameson reconsiders the value of allegory through the work 
of Walter Benjamin: 
Benjamin's thought is best grasped as an allegorical one, as a set of parallel, 
discontinuous levels of meditation which are not without resemblance to that 
ultimate model of allegorical composition descn"bed by Dante. (MF, 60) 
Jameson transposes Dante's four levels - the literal, the moral, the allegorical and the 
anagogical - into the more contemporary categories of the psychological, the moral, meaning 
in language and politics, thus regrounding Dante's eschatology so that 'the human race finds 
its salvation not in eternity, but in history itself (MF, 61). The contemporary value of allegory 
for Jameson is inextricably entwined with the fragmentation of social life: 
allegory is precisely the dominant mode of expression of a world in which 
things have been for whatever reason utterly sundered from meanings, from 
spirit, from genuine human existence. (MF, 71) 
Jameson also notes that the preference for th'e symbol over allegory is the expression of a 
value rather than an aesthetic judgement 'for the distinction between symbol and allegory is 
that between a complete reconciliation between object and spirit and a mere will to such 
reconciliation' (MF, 72). Benjamin, on the other hand, suggested a temporal distinction 
between symbol and allegory, the symbol allows that sense of reconciliation but remains 
contingent, the reconciliation is instantaneous but cannot endure over time and as such 
represents the historical limitations of the symbol as well as expressing the historical 
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impossibility of any enduring reconciliation in the contemporary world. Whilst: 
Allegory is, on the contrary, the privileged mode of our own life in time, a 
clumsy deciphering of meaning from moment to moment, the painful attempt 
to restore a continuity to heterogeneous, disconnected instants. (MF,72) 
In a world which we perceive as increasingly fragmented and discontinuous, allegory allows 
us to move from the psychological to the historical, to move between levels of experience 
without abolishing the specificity of each individual level but at the same time doing justice to 
what Jameson perceives as a yearning for completion, for wholeness. 
Schiller and Marcuse: The Hermeneutics of Freedom. 
The concept of Utopia, maintains Ruth Levitas, 'is about how we would live and what kind of 
a world we would live in if we could do just that'.41 However, there is a sense in which our 
visions of the future, be they Utopian or Dystopian, are not so much about the future as about 
our own present. Indeed, one could go further and suggest that all visions of the future are 
dialectically related to the present as that moment's completion, as with the scientific and 
technical Utopias of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, or as its negation. as 
an indictment of current society and its imaginary rectification. This is by no means an 
incidental feature of some futuristic visions but is structurally inherent in the genre itself: a 
consequence of the dependence of thought upon its social and historical moment. If we take 
the inaugural text of the genre, Thomas More's Utopia, we find the first half of the text is 
nothing less than a meditation on contemporary social evils, whilst the latter half offers us a 
vision of society in which these evils are remedied. Conversely Swift's Utopian, or rather 
dystopian, vision in the final book of Gulliver's Travels offers us a stark contrast between the 
Yahoos and the Houybnbnms, a contrast which reverses the conventional text book distinction 
between a rational (Man) and an irrational being (a horse) which Swift studied as a student in 
Dublin. What this suggests is another characteristic of Utopian thought, that it is constrained 
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by the present. A full Utopian or alternative society will only be realisable in the future, in an 
already transformed environment. For example, William Morris's classic vision of a future 
society News From Nowhere provides us with a polar opposite to the technical and industrial 
visions of Saint Simon or Bellamy but it also enacts an 'inversion'43 of the contemporary 
relations between manual and mental labour. Morris's envisaged rural and artisan community 
is nothing less than a projection of his own way of life and concerns, what Perry Anderson has 
called a 'collective transvaluation' of his personal life-situation. 44 
It: therefore, our visions of the future speak to us not so much of the future but of our own 
present, what does this say for an age in which Utopia is no longer conceivable? Does our 
inability to visualise an alternative future not pass judgement on the impoverishment of our 
own imaginations rather than the possibilities for any given future? Jameson's desire to 
reawaken our "Utopian impulse", the desire for a qualitatively different kind of society, finds 
expression in the need for a new hermeneutic. For Jameson, hermeneutics is not merely the 
technique of biblical exegesis but is also a 'political discipline' providing 'the means for 
maintaining contact with the very sources of revolutionary energy during stagnant time, of 
preserving the concept of freedom itself (MF, 84). The concept of freedom provides the 
privileged instrument for a new political hermeneutics but the concept must be viewed as an 
"interpretative device" rather than a philosophical idea: 
For wherever the concept of freedom is once more understood, it always 
comes as the awakening of dissatisfaction in the midst of all that is - at one, in 
that, with the birth of the negative itself: never a state that is enjoyed, or a 
mental structure that is contemplated. but rather an ontological impatience in 
which the constraining situation itself is for the first time perceived in the very 
moment in which it is refused. (MF, 84-5) 
Whatever form the concept of freedom may take, it inevitably involves 'a sudden perception 
of an intolerable present which is at the same time, but implicitly and however dimly 
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articulated, the glimpse of another state in the name of which the first is judged' (MF, 85). It 
also involves, therefore, a shift in levels of perception: from the individual to the social, the 
psychic to the historical, the subjective to the objective. The concept of freedom, therefore, 
will entail that operation outlined in the previous section as "transcoding", the rewriting of the 
terms of one level of experience into the terms of another. 
Jameson offers two models of a political hermeneutics, that of Fredric Schiller and Herbert 
Marcuse. Jameson reads Schiller's Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Mankind not 
primarily as a work of aesthetics but of politics and as one of the first meditations on cultural 
revolution. Schiller posits an 'ideal presupposition' or 'ideal harmony (MF, 87) against which 
the various forms of modem alienation can be judged. This ideal harmony which Schiller 
describes as the "state of nature" is defined by two essential characteristics or drives: the 
Sto!ftrieb and the Formtrieb. The Sto!ftrieb designates the various material passions and 
appetites whilst the Formtrieb designates the attraction of Reason under the sway of which 
the individual ceases to be an isolated monad and becomes a "species-being". A state of nature 
or harmony is achieved when these two drives are in equilibrium, when both are satisfied 
without the suppression of either. Schiller thus identifies a third drive through which the other 
two may be balanced and a state of harmony attained: 
Such a drive is the Spieltrieb, the impulse to play, which underlies artistic 
activity in general, and in which both the appetite for form and that for matter 
are satisfied together. (MF, 89) .J 
Freedom is seen at this point as 'nothing more than the mutual neutralization of these two 
powerful drives' (MF, 89) but the importance of the aesthetic experience, suggests Jameson, is 
that it provides a 'practical apprenticeship for the real political and social freedom to come' 
(MF, 90), a glimpse of an alternative world and qualitatively different way of life. Indeed for 
Jameson the real significance of Schiller's work lies in his analysis of works of art as (what 
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Jameson will later call) a symbolic act: 
teaching us to see the very technical construction of the work as afigure of the 
struggle for psychic integration in general, to see in images, quality of 
language, type of plot construction the very figures (in an imaginary mode) of 
freedom itself. (l\1F, 91) 
In the harmony of the work of art we can catch a glimpse of that ideal state of nature. Schiller 
then recasts that older opposition between a state of nature and civilization as an opposition 
between different forms ofpoetry, between "naive" or primitive poetry and the abstract poetry 
of modem times. However, the problem with Schiller's model is that it is diagnostic rather 
than prophetic, situating Utopia in the past rather than in the future. It needs, therefore, to be 
dialectically completed, or complemented, and for this Jameson identifies not its chronological 
successor, Romanticism, but the work of the Surrealists. Jameson argues that Romanticism 
could not be said to complete or complement Schiller's project in that it was not "new" in a 
positive sense of the term, as a solution to those problems meditated upon by Schiller, but was 
rather a reaction against the unprecedented material changes taking place. The familiar 
Romantic topoi and motifs represent so many "defence mechanisms" (l\1F, 95) by which a 
generation attempted to ward off' unpalatable social transformations. The Surrealists, on the 
other hand, represented a direct challenge not only to orthodox notions of rationality but also 
to the 'middle-class business world' itself. Jameson draws a parallel between the Surrealists' 
conception of the image as 'a convulsive effort to split open the commodity forms of the 
objective universe by striking them against each other with immense force' (MF, 96) and 
Schiller's conception of Freedom as the neutralisation of two powerful drives or forces; with 
the qualification that 'now the commodity impulse is turned back upon itsel( its own inner 
contradictions transformed into the motor of its self-destruction' (MF, 97). 
According to Jameson, Schiller's thinking can be said to be dialectical to the extent that it 
defines phenomena against one another, that the Stofftrieb is defined in relation to the 
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Formtrieb, but his system is also static to the extent that the twin drives remain relatively 
symmetrical, thus still enabling them to balance each other out and a state of harmony be 
achieved. Today, however, it may be more appropriate to define ourselves as in a situation 
where the Formtrieb can be said to be dominant: 
Little by little, in the commercial age, matter as such has ceased to exist, and 
has given place to commodities, which are intellectual forms, or forms of 
intellectualized satisfactions: this is to say that in the commodity age, need as a 
purely material and physical impulse (as something "natural") has given way to 
a structure of artificial stimuli, artificial longings, such that it is no longer 
possible to separate the true from the false, the primary from the luxury-
satisfaction in them. (MF, 96) 
The transition from Schiller to Surrealism in Jameson's text also entails a shift in register as 
Jameson rewrites, or reinterprets, Schiller's dualism in the more familiar terms of the Freudian 
economy of drives. In an increasingly commercialised and commodified epoch, argues 
Jameson, it is no longer adequate to see freedom in terms of the neutralisation of equally 
contending forces, as in Schiller's model, but rather in terms of the liberation of the suppressed 
force. In Freudian terms, the pleasure principle has been completely subordinated to the reality 
principle, and it will be through the reawakening of the pleasure principle that freedom is 
expressed. Jameson writes: 
desire is the form taken by freedom in the new commercial environment, by a 
freedom we do not even realize we have lost unless we think of it in terms, not 
only of the stilling, but also of the awakening, of Desire in general (MF, 101) 
Jameson, then, wishes to make a distinction between what he calls desire as the 
'pseudosatisfactions which make up the market system' (MF, 100-1) and "Desire" in general. 
The distinction between the lower case desire and the capitalised Desire represents, for 
Jameson, a distinction between the satisfaction of singular desires, as in the satisfaction of 
simple consumption or the gratification of immediate needs, and 'Desire as a force' (MF, 102). 
The distinction is important in the sense that desire, as singular and contingent, entails the 
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renunciation of other desires for its satisfaction, whilst "Desire" requires the 'release of all 
desire' (MF, 102) for its satisfaction. However, it is not clear in his presentation what Jameson 
means by "Desire as a force". lbis presents some difficulties: for example, Jameson's text 
moves from Schiller to Surrealism to Freud and Marcuse, but are all these figures using the 
term desire in the same sense? With regard to Freud, is Jameson referring to desire as the 
hbido, of the Essays on Sexuality, or desire as Eros, of Beyond the Pleasure Principle? Again, 
what is the relation between the capitalised Desire which Jameson uses in these pages on 
Schiller and the lower case desire in the following pages on Marcuse? In the present context 
Jameson wishes to make a distinction between the two but in his consideration of Marcuse he 
appears to make no such distinction. 45 
The work of Herbert Marcuse, suggests Jameson, provides us with a contemporary rethinking 
of this dilemma, of the nature of freedom and desire, in the context of the post-industrial 
consumer society. By the 1960s the scientific Utopias of the post-war period had been 
thoroughly discredited; it was also a period which saw the loss of any visible "agents" of 
historical change. Marcuse's attempts to theorise a new strategy of liberation must be seen in 
the light of this paradoxical situation of over-abundance and ubiquitous control: 
the happier we are, the more surely we are given over, without even being 
aware of it, into the power of the socio-economic system. itself (MF, 108) 
Advanced capitalism's ability to co-opt and incorporate all forms of resistance has the effect of 
neutralising the negative, to the extent that even tolerance itself can be said to be a repressive 
mechanism. For Jameson 'a genuinely human existence can only be achieved through the 
process of negation' (MF, 108); it was the value of Adorno to reassert the role of negative 
dialectics in the realm of aesthetics and the originality of Marcuse's work to theorise the role 
of negation within the psychological and socio-economic spheres. Thus at the level of the 
psyche Marcuse formulated the notion of "repressive desublimation" wbereby it is not only the 
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repression of sexual drives that results in neurosis but also their uninhibited release that results 
in psychic fragmentation and disorientation: 
the society of sexual abundance encourages overt but specialized sexual 
activity as a way of reducing conscious unhappiness within the system, of 
foreclosing conscious dissatisfaction with the system, while at the same time 
compensating for the necessarily increased impoverishment of the environment 
from an emotional or libidinal point of view. (MF, 109-10) 
At the political level, the co-option of all forms of opposition and struggle results in a 
corresponding weakening of class struggle as there appears to be no way of negating the 
system as a whole. This is where the Utopian impulse once more emerges. As the symbolic 
negation of all that is, it replaces the role of art in Schiller as the blueprint for a future society, 
embodying 'the newest version of a hermeneutics of freedom' (MF, 111). Individual, 
contingent freedoms must be seen as figures for freedom in general and it is only when we 
grasp happiness as not merely positive satisfactions of somatic needs but also as negative, 'as 
a symbolic refusal of everything which that society has to offer, that happiness can recover its 
right to be thought of as a measure and an enlargement of human possibilities' (MF, 112). As 
with Jameson's discussion of desire, he insists on the need to move beyond happiness as solely 
the concern of the individual to happiness as a collective phenomenon, if the slogan is to have 
any political force. For Marcuse, this new hermeneutic, indeed the foundation of all 
hermeneutic activity, is grounded in ~emory. 'The memory of gratification' quotes Jameson, 
'is at the origin of all thinking, and the impulse to recapture past gratification is the hidden 
driving power behind the process of thought' (MF, 113). Memory, therefore, will serve a 
crucial mediating role between the psychological and the political, the inside and outside, and 
in this sense is the origin of Utopian thinking: 
The loss or repression of the very sense of such concepts as freedom and desire 
takes, therefore, the form of a kind of amnesia or forgetful numbness, which the 
hermeneutic activity, the stimulation of memory as the negation of the here and 
now, as the projection of Utopia, has as its function to dispel, restoring to us 
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original clarity and force of our own most vital drives and wishes. (MF, 113-4) 
Bloch's Utopian Impulse. 
A problem that all Marxist criticism must confront is the position that it accords to so called 
right-wing or reactionary literature. Indeed the relative paucity of a "revolutionary" or 
socialist literature suggests the need for a response that is more positive than the older forms 
of ideologiekritik. In one of his earliest essays46 Jameson observed how ideology was also an 
attitude towards "Being", towards the world itself: For a conservative ideology to work it 
simply has to "Be", to be in the world without drawing attention to itself or its essential 
historical and political nature. The problem for radicals, on the other hand, is that by definition 
they are not interested in the world as it is but in changing it, in moving beyond or through 
Being searching out its flaws and contradictions. The radica~ not content with Being itself but 
with ideas and ideals, is drawn necessarily into abstraction. This suggests a certain dilemma 
with respect to the "political" nature of literature in that the 'very source of literature's 
intensity lies precisely in its contact with Being', 47 its sense of permanence and timelessness. 
To define a conservative or reactionary literature as that which does not wish to draw 
attention to its own political and ideological situation is to define it as 'just literature it self. 48 
A revolutionary literature, on the other hand, which seeks to show the world not as it is but as 
it ought to be, not as eternal but as historic~ as both changing and changeable, will by its 
very nature tend towards the abstract. Such a literature cannot rest comfortably in the world 
but must draw attention to itself: to its historical situation and status, and can only do this 
through the exposition of ideas, that is to say, through "talk". Theoretical abstraction always 
threatens to abolish the work itself: as it becomes merely a "novel ofideas" or a "thesis play". 
The problem of "great" literature, therefore, is that it is inevitably reactionary; what is 
required, according to Jameson, is not so much an ideological critique as a model through 
which: 
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the official oplDlons and positions of such reactionary authors may be 
considered surface phenomena, rationalization and disguises for some more 
basic source of energy of which, on the analogy of the Freudian model of the 
unconscious, they are unaware. A Marxist hermeneutic would then have the 
task of restoring to that energy the political direction which rightfully belongs 
to it, of making it once more available to us. (MF, 119) 
Jameson detects the sources for such a model in the philosophy of Ernst Bloch and the work 
of Paul Ricoeur, particularly in Ricoeur's distinction between a negative and a positive 
hermeneutics. Ricoeur defines a negative hermeneutic as the hermeneutics of suspicion, as 
demystification and the destruction of illusion; the critiques of Marx, Freud and Nietzsche are 
all exemplary in this sense. A positive hermeneutic, on the other hand, seeks to restore some 
original forgotten meaning and offers renewed access to some essential source of life. For 
Jameson any successful "concrete" hermeneutic will combine these two impulses, the 
demystificatory and the restorative, and Bloch's notion of the 'Utopian impulse' provides the 
vehicle for just such a gesture. 
Bloch defines "Utopia" not in terms of form or content, in the sense of a specific literary genre 
or a blueprint for the realisation of a future society, but rather as a function, a specific 
tendency toward the future. Ruth Levitas includes within Bloch's definition of Utopia, not 
only literary Utopias, but also: day dreams, myths, fairy tales, travellers tales, sea voyages of 
medieval Irish Monks and alchemy,' and suggests that what binds these diverse materials 
. 
together is that they all • constitute "dreams of a better life"'.49 According to Jameson, it is not 
just our narratives that constitute dreams of a better life but objects themselves, 'everything in 
the world becomes a version of some primal figure, a manifestation of that primordial 
movement toward the future and toward ultimate identity with a transfigured world which is 
Utopia' (MF, 120). There is an imperceptible tendency of all things toward the future which 
becomes known to us through what Bloch calls Spuren . By its very nature then this tendency 
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is rather difficult to define and acceptance of it seems to require an act of faith rather than 
logical argument or analytical justification. Spuren'are the traces or tracks, or in contemporary 
terminology the signs, by which we read the world. The Spuren or trace can be an)1.hing and 
everything: 
the trace in Bloch is both an external object and an immediate experience: its 
authenticity is certified, before any conscious intellectual interpretation, by the 
sheer fact of the astonishment with which we pause before these glowing 
emblems in which some urgent yet utterly personal secret seems to be 
concealed. (MF, 122) 
Adorno compares this process of deciphering with the childhood experience of reading Indian 
stories: 
A broken twig, an imprint on the ground speak to the expert eye of youth, 
which does not confine itself to the things everyone sees but engages in 
speculation instead. so 
There is, in other, words always something concealed, something hidden in the traces of 
everyday life, one may not know what this is but there is a feeling, a certainty, that it is there 
and it is at this point that speculation focuses. For Bloch then there is an ontological tendency 
toward the future, Being is incomplete in itsel( it is always in process of Becoming. 
"Astonishment" is what one feels towards the world itseH: it is for Bloch 'one the most 
concrete possible modes of our being-in-the-world' (MF, 122); however, what astonishes is 
not being itself but the anticipation of being-t~-come, the traces or signs of the future in the 
present. The essence of Bloch's conception of Utopia, notes Levitas, is "anticipatory 
consciousness", the anticipation of some, as yet, unrealised future. This notion of the 
anticipatory consciousness is itself dependent on Bloch's central concept of the "Not Yet". 
There are two aspects of the Not Yet: its subjective, ideological pole in the form of the Not-
Yet-Conscious and its objective, material pole as the Not-Yet-Become. The former concept 
rests on the notion of the unconscious as not only the repository of repressed material and 
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drives but also as a creative source in its own right; it is also the source of preconscious 
material that has, as yet, not come to consciousness. The latter rests on a conception of the 
material world as fundamentally unfinished and always in process: 
Utopia, as the expression of the Not·Yet·Conscious, is vindicated in so far as it 
reaches forward to the real possibility of the Not· Yet-Become; it is thus 
actively bound up in the process of the world's becoming as an anticipation of 
the future (rather than merely a compensation in the present) and, through its 
effects on human purpose and action, as a catalyst of the future.~l 
The concept of the Not·Yet serves to account for the relationship between desire and 
satisfaction, or rather the drive from one to the other, but, argues Levitas, if Bloch's 
conception of Utopia is not to relapse into idealism or voluntarism it must distinguish between 
'dreams of a better life that constitute real possibilities and those that do not'.52 Bloch, 
therefore, makes a distinction between what he terms "abstract" and "concrete" Utopias, or 
those that project "compensatory" elements and anticipatory elements respectively. The task 
of cultural criticism is to reveal or recover the anticipatory elements 'from the dross of 
contingent and compensatory elements which Utopia is dressed up in particular historical 
circumstances'.53 However, for Bloch, even the most abstract of Utopias is better than no 
Utopian thinking at all, as it contains the intention towards a better life. There can be found, 
therefore, in the most contingent and compensatory representation a vestige of anticipatory 
consciousness. 
For Jameson, this question of the status given to the future marks the distinction between 
Bloch's philosophical and hermeneutical systems. According to Bloch, there are two ways in 
which we experience lived time: filled-affects or emotions and expectation· affects. Both are 
fully temporal experiences but the former projects what Bloch calls an "inauthentic future" in 
that: 
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they ask for fulfilment in a world at all points identical to that of the present, 
save for the possession of the particular object desired and presently lacking. 
(l\1F,126) 
They are thus a compensatory affect whilst the expectation-affects, on the other hand, aim less 
at a specific object than at a 'future disposition or constitution of the self ... the experience of 
hope consists in a coming to consciousness of that relationship to the as yet inexistent implicit 
in all these emotions, and may therefore stand as their structural archetype and at the same 
time as their most concrete affective manifestation' (MF,127). According to Jameson, Bloch's 
transition from philosophy to hermeneutics: 
consists in a changing of valences, a transition from negative to positive, which 
suggests the deeper underlying principle that every negative in some fashion 
implies a positive which is ontologically prior to it; indeed, that every negative 
may therefore serve as a means of access to that positive which it conceals. 
(l\1F,132-3) 
The positive is to be found located within the negative itself as it is in the nature of hope 
always to be thwarted: the future is never quite as we imagined it to be. The negative must be 
reabsorbed back into the positive as 'an enlargement of our anticipations to include and find 
satisfaction in their own negations as well.'(MF,137) Utopia is always deferred but it is this 
essential anticipation and dissatisfaction that moves time forward and transforms each 
contingent wish into a figure for the Utopian wish and each contingent present into a figure 
for Utopia itself: 
Utopian moment is indeed in one sense quite impossible for us to imagine, 
except as the unimaginable; thus a kind of allegorical structure is built into the 
very forward movement of the Utopian impulse itself: which always points to 
something other, which can never reveal itself directly but must always speak 
in figures, which always calls out structurally for completion and exegesis. 
(l\1F, 142) 
We shall see the concrete working out of this Utopian impulse in the following chapter. For 
the present, I should just like to note that the level of abstraction involved here makes it very 
so 
difficult to understand what the Utopian impulse actually is. For example, what does "a 
changing of valences" with regard to philosophy and hermeneutics really mean? Also, for a 
philosophical discourse are such vague and imprecise terms appropriate, or does that very 
imprecision mask a deeper philosophical confusion? 
Lukacs: Reification and Oass Consciousness. 
If there is a single text that underlies Jameson's theoretical project it is not so much Hegel's 
Phenomenology or Marx's Capital but, as Terry Eagleton has pointed OU~.54 Lukacs' History 
and Class Consciousness and in particular its chapter on German idealism., 'Reification and 
the Consciousness of the Proletariat'. For Jameson, Lukacs is not merely a theoretician of 
Realism, but rather of "totality" and "mediation",.5.5 and he draws on Lilics for two of his 
most abiding theoretical concerns: the role of narrative as a fundamental organisational 
category of the human mind and the essential mediatory function of rem cation in modem life. 
Jameson reads History and Class Consciousness as not so much a political text as an 
epistemological one, laying the foundations for a Marxist theory of knowledge. Marxism is 
often understood as a theory of economic or material interests but, for Jameson 'Marxism is a 
theory of collective or class self-interests' (MF, 184), class consciousness being defined as 
'the a priori limits or advantages conferred by affiliation with the bourgeoisie or the proletariat 
upon the mind's capacity to apprehend external reality' (MF,182). Thus in 'The Antinomies of 
Bourgeois Thought' Lukacs reveals how it is the material conditions of society itself that 
define the limits of modem critical philosophy: 
the contradiction that appears between subjectivity and objectivity in modem 
rationalist formal systems, the entanglements and equivocations hidden in their 
concepts of subject and object, the conflict between their nature as systems 
created by "us" and their fatalistic necessity distant from and alien to man is 
nothing but the logical and systematic formulation of the modem state of 
society . .56 . 
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Lukacs argued that Hegel's epistemological break was to insist upon the dialectical and 
historical nature of knowledge, that knowledge is not the result of a 'confrontation between 
rigid forms's7 but is dialectically enacted between the subject and the object. For Jameson: 
Lukacs' originality is to have returned this abstract philosophical problem to its 
concrete situation in social reality itself: and to have posed the question of the 
relationship between universality on the epistemological level and the class 
affiliation of the individual thinker himself (MF, 184) 
Lukacs rejects the notion of a Marxist epistemology as a theory of reflection, as this implicitly 
conceals the rigid duality that it was the virtue of Hegel to transcend, insisting that the identity 
of 'thought and existence' lies in the fact that they are both 'aspects of one and the same 
process',S8 that is history itself Martin Jay notes that Hegel could defuse the problem of the 
correspondence between thought and existence through an endorsement of Vico's verum-
factum principle, that is to say, the 'true and the made are interchangeable'.s9 Thus for Hegel: 
the subject of knowledge and the object of knowledge were inherently identical 
because the latter was produced out of and constituted by the former.60 
Whereas, Hegel posited the notion of "Absolute Spirit" as the totalizing subject of history, as 
'both subject and object of knowledge, the maker and the made of reality itself61 Lukacs 
substituted the proletariat for the role of both the subject and object of history, as both the 
makers and the made of history and thus being in the privileged position of achieving 
knowledge of the totality. The central concept in Lukacs' epistemology, to explain the non-
identity of thought and existence, or the subject-object split, is "remcation". 
Remcation, broadly, has two senses in Marxist thought: firstly, it refers to the 'act ... of 
transforming human properties, relations and actions into properties, relations and actions of 
man produced things which have become independent ... of man and govern his life.' And 
52 
secondly, it refers to the 'transformation of human beings into thing-like beings which do not 
behave in a human way but according to the laws of the thing-world'. 62 The concept can be 
found in Marx, particularly in his analysis of commodity fetishism in Capital I, ch.l sect.4 and 
more generally applied to all categories of capitalist production in Capital ill ch.48. But it 
was with Lukacs' "creative" reinterpretation of the idea that it emerged as a central concept in 
Marxist thought and it is in this sense that Jameson generally uses the term. Lukacs saw the 
commodity-structure' as the centra4 structural problem of capitalist society in all its aspects'63 
and the essence of this structure 
is that a relation between people takes on the character of a thing and thus 
acquires a "phantom objectivity," an autonomy that seems so strictly rational 
and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the 
relation between people.64 
In other words the essence of commodity-structure is reification; as the commodification of 
society increases, in the sense that capitalism must continuously reproduce itself at ever higher 
levels of productivity, reification penetrates ever more deeply into every aspect of our lives. 
For Lukacs reification is synonymous with what Max Weber defined as "rationalization", or 
the 'strictly rational organisation of work on the basis of rational technology. 6.5 
Rationalization designates that process by which older forms of production are broken down 
into their component parts and reorganised into more efficient units of production. We can 
again see the means/ends split whence ends are to all intents and purposes "bracketed" and the 
way left open for the total rationalization or instrumentalization of society as a whole. 
Finally, Lukacs' conception of reification is closely related to, although not identical with, the 
concept of alienation, in that human labour becomes objective and independent of human 
beings themselves. Alienation designates that double-bind whereby human labour comes to 
stand over and against those labouring as a hostile alien force. Under capitalism human labour 
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is no longer a means to an end, the satisfaction of human needs and desires, but becomes an 
end in itself as all "natural" human relations are replaced by commodity exchange, a worker 
does not sell himself as a labouring person but his abstract capacity as labour power. Thus all 
human needs and desires must be satisfied in and through the commodity exchange system, 
and following Lukacs subject to the inexorable logic of reification: 
The transformation of the commodity relation into a thing of "ghostly 
objectivity" cannot therefore content itself with the reduction of all objects for 
the gratification of human needs to commodities. It stamps its imprint upon the 
whole consciousness of man; his qualities and abilities are no longer an organic 
part of his personality, they are things which he can "own" or "dispose of" like 
the various objects of the external world. And there is no natural form in which 
human relations can be cast, no way in which man can bring his physical and 
psychic "qualities" into play without their being subjected increasingly to this 
reifying process. 66 
Sartre: Agency and History. 
In the light of Jameson's later trajectory rereading Sartre: The Origins of a Style one is struc~ 
not so much by its lack of Marxian categories, as by its lack of historicity. In a 1984 
'Afterword' Jameson had recourse to the work of Walter Benjamin as a theoretical corrective 
for this historical deficiency but in Marxism and Form he was to reassert the primacy of 
history and class struggle through Sartre's own work, specifically the Critique of Dialectical 
Reason . For Jameson, the value of the Critique for' dialectical literary criticism lies in the 
way it poses the problem ... of mediation' (MF, xiv), that is to say, the movement from one 
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level of social life to another: the psychological to the politica~ or the cultural to the 
economic. The project of Sartre's Critique was to provide 'a theory about the collectives in 
and through which our individual lives are pursued' (MF, 209). In place of what Jameson sees 
as orthodox Marxism's economic determinism and reduction of individual experience, the 
Critique reasserts the central role of "agency", by posing two fundamental historical problems: 
the responsibility of the individual for collective events over which he clearly 
has no control, and the manner in which the material and contingent accidents 
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of history are to acquire a kind of meaning (without which, history itself 
becomes accidental and contingent). (MF, 287) 
Sartre's response to these questions revolves around the twin categories ot: what he terms, 
"seriality" and the "group-infusion". History from Sartre's perspective can be seen to oscillate 
between two poles, between: 
moments of genuine group existence and long periods of serial dispersa~ or, 
at any given moment, as a complicated coexistence of groups at various 
stages of their development and masses of serial individuals surrounding 
them (MF, 249) 
In place of the Hegelian notion of stages, or historical periods and the Marxist notion of 
successive modes of production Sartre posits a cyclical view of history. As Jameson points 
out, there are a number of difficulties with Sartre's model; not least that, in his desire to 
redress the balance of the Marxian theory of history with a reassertion of agency, a reciprocal 
over-estimation of the role of individual actors and their historical consciousness has taken 
place. There is also the problem of social class: Jameson acknowledges that as a 
phenomenological description of the real sense of urgency and intensity of group dynamics 
Sartre's account may be exemplary, but it in effect precludes that fundamental Marxian 
category of' social class as an actor in history' (MF, 256). The group is essentially 'timeless' 
and as such: 'can experience time and change, duree, merely as a gradual deterioration from 
that initial moment of intensity in the formation of the group'(MF, 261). 
Marxism, according to Jameson, has two languages, or codes, with which it can speak: it can 
articulate the processes of history objectively in terms of the development of economic modes 
of production (as in Capital) or subjectively as the history of class struggle (as in The 
Communist Manifesto). Sartre has chosen the second of these codes, whilst presupposing the 
first, rewriting the 'entire complex ofreified relationships in terms of that first and basic reality 
of human action and human relations' (MF, 297). Social class is a mediatory category, it 
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partakes of both, in Sartre's terms, serial and group formations. For Marxism. class affiliation 
is defined not ahistorically but as 'a particular relationship to a particular, determinate mode of 
economic production' (MF, 283). Marxism's two codes are thus dialectically interrelated, 
neither can be privileged at the expense of the other. The complex dynamics of social class 
and history will be considered in greater detail in the following chapter. 
Metacommentary 
What is wanted is a kind of mental procedure that suddenly shifts gears, that 
throws everything in an inextricable tangle one floor higher and turns the very 
problem itself(the obscurity of [a] sentence) into its own solution (the varieties 
of Obscurity) by widening its frame in such a way that it now takes in its own 
mental processes as well as the object of those processes.67 
Jameson's 1971 programmatic essay 'Metacommentary' provides the first sketch that such a 
procedure would take. This short essay outlines the fundamental principles for a dialectical 
criticism which Jameson will reconsider in much greater depth in the concluding chapter of 
Marxism and Form. His discussion commences with a consideration of the current disrepute 
that interpretation has fallen into, with the aim not so much of reasserting a particular mode of 
interpretation as of reflecting upon an historical moment in which we no longer feel the need 
to interpret: 
The starting point for any g.enuinely profitable discussion of interpretation 
therefore must be not the nature of inte ... rpretation, but the need for it in the first 
place. 68 
Indeed, is it that the meaning of modernist art has become so transparent that we no longer 
have to involve ourselves in the elaborate processes of deciphering or is it, on the contrary, 
the very "meaninglessness" of such artefacts that engenders theories of emotive and purely 
sensual rather than cognitive responses? Jameson takes Susan Sontag's influential book 
Against Interpretation as his point of departure, reco~ting the historical nature of this anti-
interpretative tendency, noting that in both philosophy and literature all the major twentieth 
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century schools have shared a similar preference for method in place of metaphysics or form 
over content. What is less often remarked upon, however, is the tendency of form to slide into 
content in the sense that what is initially a preference expressed by the critic is then projected 
onto the work itselfbecoming an aesthetic in its own right. Thus Sontag: 
begins by denying the rights of all interpretation, of all content, only to end up 
defending a particular type of (modernistic) art that cannot be interpreted, that 
seems to have no determinate content in the older sense. 69 
Jameson observes that this is also the case with the Russian Formalists who inverted the 
traditional relationship between form and content, viewing 'the aim of all technique as the 
production of the work of art itse1f1° rather than directing the reader outside the work to 
some ultimate ground or meaning. But what was initially an attempt to isolate the uniquely 
literary quality of the work, what defined "literariness" apart from everyday discourse, 
eventually resulted in a 'radical aesthetization oflife'.71 For: 
if content exists in order to permit form, it follows that the lived sources of that 
content - the social experiences, the psychological obsessions and dispositions 
of the author - also come to be formally motivated, to be seen as means rather 
than ultimate ends or meanings. 72 
Indeed, even the author comes to be seen as merely one more device for bringing the work 
itself into being. 
As with Sontag's recourse to modem. art the Formalists' emphasis on the lyric and the short 
story can also be seen as a consequence of its own procedures. The Formalists identified 
literariness, or poetic language, with language that drew attention to itself: drew attention to 
its own status as language and as such renewed one's perception of the material quality of 
language. Literature achieves this through a process of "defamiliarization" or "making-
strange", in other words, literature retards perception, it causes one to dwell on its own status 
as an artefact. As a particular form once more becomes familiar the method of 
defamiliarization must be renewed or rejuvenated in some way, to once again jolt one out of 
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familiarity, and for the Formalists this process worked through the elevation of a new 
"popu1ar" form. Jameson observes that there are two particular problems with the notion of 
defamiliarization. Firstly, it is an ahistorical concept: Shklovsky saw the process of literary 
change as 'a uniform mechanism the same at all times and all places' which militates against 
any genuine sense of literary history and 'ends up turning diachrony into mere appearance' 
(PH. 59). Secondly there is the problem of events in time: does defami]iarization operate only 
upon the isolated image or figure, or can it also deal with a series of events or narrative? For 
Shklovsky the technique remained the same in both cases, it was just a matter of a difference 
in scope. But the problems of narrative cannot be solved by the simple enumeration of 
techniques and devices, by the exposition of how well a given work "retards" its own 
progression. Following Lukacs, Jameson proposes narration as a 'basic way of coming to 
terms with time itself: and with concrete history' (PH. 62). Narrative is a temporal experience 
and unlike the short story, myth, or tale: 
there are no pre-existing laws that govern the elaboration of the novel as a 
form: each one is different, a leap in the void, an invention of content 
simultaneous with the invention of the form. (PH, 73) 
The very notion of retardation implies a separation of form and content though, formalised as 
the dual concepts of "fabu1a" (story) and "szujet" (plot, or discourse). Shklovsky's method 
therefore is unable to deal adequately with narrative and this finds its correlative in his 
principal object of study: the short story. ~ 
Jameson attributes to Formalism the paradoxical status of 'the basic mode of interpretation of 
those who refuse interpretation'.73 At the very heart of its procedures is the notion of 
"bracketing": if all content is merely the projection of form then texts have no extrinsic 
referent, a given text speaks only of itself: of 'its own coming into being' (PH, 88). The 
bracketing of all extrinsic referents allows for the construction of an intrinsic system or model 
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of literariness but it also returns the content by the back door: 
Only pre-existing things - objects, institutions, units of some kind - can be 
defamiliarized; just as only what has a name to begin with can lose its familiar 
name and suddenly appear before us in all its bewildering unfamiliarity. 
(PH, 70) 
In other words, we must bring with us a sense of an original meaning, a knowledge of the 
content prior to its formal presentation, for it to be defamiliarized. An act of interpretation has 
initially taken place, in the sense that we now understand the "defamiliarized" object as not 
being what we had previously taken it to be. 
Similarly, French Structuralism can be seen to be no less contradictory. Structuralism shares 
with Formalism Saussure's 'foundational distinction between langue and parole" (PH, 101) 
but whereas Russian Formalism concentrated on the individual artefact, structuralism 
attempted to descnbe the overall organisation of the sign system itself. Structuralism, suggests 
Jameson, 'can best be grasped as a philosophical formalism' (PH. 195), it rejects notions of 
substantive thought and insists on the bracketing of the referent: there is no one-to-one 
correspondence between a sign and its referent. But this raises something of a dilemma for 
structuralists as most do presuppose beyond the sign itself some ultimate ground or reality as 
referent. So whilst 'its concept of the sign forbids any research into the reality beyond it' 
Structuralism maintains the notion of'some ultimate ground 'by considering the signified as a 
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concept "of' something' (PH. 106). Structuralism, then, initially rejects any pretence to 
interpretation, rather 'proposing ... to replace the substance (or the substantive) with relations 
and purely relational perceptions'.74 But once it has mapped these relations as a set, or series, 
of binary oppositions it invariably sets out (as with Levi-Strauss' analysis of myth7.5) to 
interpret these patterns of oppositions: 
The most characteristic feature of structuralist criticism lies precisely in a kind 
59 
of transformation of form into content, in which the form of structuralist 
research ... turns into a proposition about content. (PH, 198-9) 
Thus we find that stories are about stories, narration about the act of narration and ultimately 
the content of a given work is nothing but language itself We are then, according to Jameson, 
in the situation of being forced to interpret at the very moment we show most reluctance to do 
so. 
For Jameson, though, the question of whether or not to interpret a given work is not really the 
issue. It is more a matter of history, what is required is to historicize the cultural artefact, to 
lay bare its conditions of possibility. It is not a case of making value judgemepts about the 
work or attempting to resolve its contradictions but of historically situating the work so that 
those contradictions become meaningful in themselves. For Jameson every commentary must 
at the same time be a meta commentary, it must include a commentary on its own conditions of 
existence: 
Thus genuine interpretation directs the attention back to history itself: and to 
the historical situation of the commentator as well as of the work. 76 
Structuralism, therefore, can be seen to fall short of a genuine metacommentary to the degree 
that it is not self-reflexive and does not contain a commentary on its own procedure and 
conceptual instruments. Jameson likens metacommentary to the Freudian hermeneutic in that 
it is based upon the 'distinction between symptom and repressed idea, between manifest and 
J 
latent content, between the disguise and the message disguised'.77 Such a distinction he 
suggests answers our initial question "why does a work need interpreting in the first place?" 
because what is implicit in the latent-manifest distinction is the function of a Censor of some 
kind. Jameson does not directly spell out what this censor may be, or may entail, but a brief 
consideration of his concluding analysis of Sontag's essay 'The Imagination of Disaster' 
reveals the direction in which Jameson's thought is d.eveloping. Sontag analysed 1950s and 
60s science fiction films as an expression of "the deepest anxieties about contemporary 
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existence".78 Jameson agrees with this analysis as far as it goes but argues that it only 
considers the :films on their own terms, at the level of their manifest content and not in relation 
to their form. According to Jameson, this manifest content masks a deeper, or latent, content 
which is markedly different from Sontag's existential anxieties. For Jameson, 1950s and 60s 
science fiction :films are more to do with unconscious fantasies about the nature of work, in 
other words, with the alienation of labour in advanced capitalist societies. This notion of a 
repressed fantasy structure and in particular the effacing of any traces of labour from the 
surface of cultural artefacts provides the thesis behind The Political Unconscious and will be 
the subject of the following chapter. 
For Jameson, then, it is not the content of works of art that need to be interpreted but rather 
their form. Indeed, ili:e content of a given work, is 'already meaningful from the outset, being 
nothing more nor less than the very components of our concrete social life: words, thoughts, 
objects, desires, people, places, activities'.79 A work of art does not confer meaning on these 
materials so much as transform the meaning they already possess. For metacommentary, 
therefore: 
the process of criticism is not so much an interpretation of content as it is a 
revealing of it, a laying bare, a restoration of the original message, the original 
experience, from beneath the distortions of the censor: and this revelation takes 
the form of an explanation why the content was so distorted; it is inseparable 
from a description of the mechanism of censorship itself 80 
j 
Jameson: Hegel, l\'larx and Marxism. 
Jameson gives a much fuller exposition of dialectical criticism in the concluding chapter of 
Marxism and Form, whilst at the same time asserting the primacy of Marxist analyses. 
Marxism, he suggests, is not just one more theory of history, or theoretical discourse, but is 
the most theoretically complete and satisfying discourse available to us today. For Jameson 
Marxism includes Hegelianism, in that it was Hegel who identified the principle at work in 
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dialectical analyses as the adequation of subject to object, individual to universal, or part to 
whole, but it was Marx who regrounded the dialectic in concrete history. 'Towards Dialectical 
Criticism.' can be seen to take that familiar Hegelian form of moving through a series of stages 
or steps each logically opening out onto the next. The 'ever-widening net of exposition, in 
which each topic seems to recapitulate the previous one in a different context and on a higher 
plane' bringing us ever closer to what Jameson sees as the 'ultimate object of all dialectical 
thought which is the concrete itself' (MF, 309). Thus we move from an exposition of the 
dialectical model itself to the dialectics of content, from the relationship between form and 
content to the distinction between Hegelian and Marxist dialectics, through to the regrounding 
of the work and the nature of social class until finally we emerge into history. 
For Jameson the very principle of the dialectical reversal, the passing over of a given 
phenomenon into its opposite, is a diachronic process, indeed dialectical relationships 
presuppose a diachronic framework as a condition of their articulation. Any analysis 
presupposes the isolation of limited groups or series, the "Historical novel" or the 
"Romantics" for instance, but each of these categories presupposes a larger background 
against which they are defined. The initial problem for any dialectical theory of literature will 
be 'the unity of the literary work itself: its existence as a complete thing' (MF, 313). Following 
the Russian Formalists, Jameson observes how every individual work is perceived against a 
generic background and thus the autonomy of the work is itself a dialectical phenomenon in 
which 
, 
it is read as a work in a given form, or against a given form, in a context in 
which the various genres are felt to coexist at the fixed distances from each 
other in relatively systematic complexes which can themselves form the object 
of study in their historical coexistence or succession. (MF, 313) 
Our perception of a given work or author is always a .differential one; a given phenomenon's 
position in a determinate sequence not only connects to the other phenomena but also affirms 
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its own specificity. What then becomes of more interest, suggests Jameson, is the original 
terms and categories by which the sequence is constituted and the limits which frame it, 
forcing us to consider not only what is included in a given sequence or model but also what is 
excluded from it. The problem of categorisation, then, is that it has to impose limits, a 
beginning and an end, on what is in fact a process, a continuum. The strength of the various 
formalisms of the twentieth-century have been their ability to give 'an account of the total 
style of a culture and of the profound unity of each of the moments of cultural history as they 
succeed each other' (MF, 324). The weaknesses of such synchronic and ahistorical methods 
though is their 'inability to project diaChrony or to operate successfully in anything but a single 
instant or vertical cross section of time' (MF, 325). In other words they are unable to 
satisfactorily account for historical change. What distinguishes the Hegelian model is the 
relative transparency of its diachronic constructs, which are 'clearly identified not as empirical 
realities but as ideal constrocts only.' (MF, 326) which must be reimmersed in history to be 
completed. Thus the Hegelian model permits work in time but 'is distinguished by that 
ultimate and inevitable, structurally inherent movement toward its own dissolution, in which it 
projects the Marxist model out of itself as its own concrete realization and fulfillment.' (MF, 
326) 
The distinction between Marxist and Hegelian dialectics, according to Jameson, is not one of 
method but of the type of self-consciousness involved. For Hegel this is a logical self-
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consciousness which remains at the level of thought whilst: 
the Marxist dialectic, on the other hand, the self-consciousness aimed at is the 
awareness of the thinker's position in society and in history itself: and of the 
limits imposed on this awareness by his class position - in short of the 
ideological and situational nature of all thought and of the initial invention of the 
problems themselves. (MF, 340) 
In other words, the Marxist dialectic insists on the material and historical nature of all 
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thought. Thus suggests Jameson: 
philosophical thinking, if pursued far enough, turns into historical thinking, and 
the understanding of abstract thought ultimately resolves itself back into an 
awareness of the content of that thought, which is to say, of the basic historical 
situation in which it took place, (MF, 346) 
Hegel retained a position' outside of history for the philosopher of history himseH: and was to 
that extent unable to grasp the notion of being-in-situation in its most paradoxical dimensions.' 
(MF, 365) This movement then back into history is the hermeneutic dimension of dialectical 
thinking, that point, as in 'Metacommentary., in which the original latent meaning stands 
revealed. Dialectical thinking involves a shift from the abstract and conceptual level to the 
concrete and historical in which thought is reconnected to lived experience and stands judged 
insofar as it is placed in historical perspective: 
Thus such dialectical judgements enable us to realize a momentary synthesis of 
the inside and the outside, of intrinsic and extrinsic, of existence and history: but 
it is a synthesis which we pay for by an objective historical judgement on 
ourselves. (MF, 348) 
We must finally confront at this juncture, then, the problem of historical determinism. For 
Jameson, the whole problematic of Marxism's teleology is, in a sense, a false problem in that 
history is unlike any other object of scientific study; there cannot be a concept of law or 
scientific prediction for history in the manner in which we define laws for the physical 
sciences: 
in history the hypothesis of identical or recurrent factors in different events is 
possible only at the price of increasing generalization, a movement away from 
the unique historical fact which permits us to see similarities as from over a 
great distance. (MF, 359) 
It is precisely this indeterminacy of distance which marks history out from the other sciences 
but at the same time allows us to view it either from' close-up or from a larger perspective. 
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Historical understanding, suggests Jameson, is a process of "specification" and "rectification" 
in that we specify particular historical events or phenomena and then undergo a process of 
rectifying our received images of that event. Thus, the notion of historical determinism may be 
more adequately understood in terms of historical necessity. Once we have moved through 
this process of specification and rectification we have a sense of not only how a particular 
event happened but how it could only happen in just that way and no other. Historical 
necessity operates after the fact, it is not so much predictive as something we only understand 
with hindsight: 
The notion of historical necessity is therefore something like a historical trope, 
the very temporal figure of the process of historical understanding, and 
presupposes an ever closer approximation of the concrete, an ever greater 
enlargement of the context of the historical meditation, such that the alternative 
feeling of chance is not so much disproven as it is rendered inconceivable and 
meaningless. (MF, 361) 
For Jameson the attempt to predict represents a failure to think in a situational manner and it 
is just such a failure of thought that Marxism seeks to rectify. Jameson characterises 
Marxism's mental operation as 'a kind of inner "permanent revolution'" (MF, 362) for which 
every systematic presentation of it will falsify it to the degree that it freezes it into a system: 
Insofar as Marxism is a critical rather than a systematic philosophy ... we would 
expect the materialism of Man to be not a coherent position in itselfbut rather 
a correction of other positions - a rectification in dialectical fashion of some 
preexisting phenomenon, rather than a doctrine of a positivistic variety existing 
in its own right. (MF, 365) 
For Jameson the mark of a "genuine" Marxist criticism will be its apprehension of the 
concrete, which takes place in the realm of the synchronic and in this respect Marxism shares 
a terrain with sociological criticism What distinguishes Marxism from sociology, though, is its 
"subjective" element, that is to say its understanding of the concept of "class". Sociological 
studies tend to identify and then isolate their particular object of study, in this case a particular 
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class. For Marxism on the other hand class is a differential and relational concept, the very 
notion of a class implicitly designates other classes and can only be understood in relation to 
those other social classes. So, for Marxism the analysis of class does not involve the 
movement from one distinct area to another so much as ways of relating distinctive positions 
together. Just as the analysis of a given work is seen to be incomplete unless we can begin to 
understand the conditions in which it was made and against whom it was directed or designed 
to correct. In this sense Marxist criticism does not involve the movement from one specialised 
area to another - from literature to economics, say - but rather the movement from 
specialisation to the concrete, from the isolated literary text to history itself. The introduction 
of socio-economic material into Marxist criticism is not simply a gratuitous act to enable 
critics to talk about external issues but 'an enlargement structurally inherent in such criticism, 
as an intrinsic and indispensable moment in Marxist literary criticism seen as a "form" of 
understanding' (MF, 378). If the individual cultural artefact can be said to "reflect" its social 
and historical moment, which for Jameson it certainly does, then 'what it reflects is not so 
much the class in itself as some autonomous cultural configuration, but rather the situation of 
that class, or, in short, class conflict' (MF, 381-2). 
With the concept of class we begin to emerge into history, for within Marxism class not only 
has this synchronic dimension, its differential and relational character, but also a diachronic 
dimension, that is to say its place in the historical process itsel( 'its participation in a given 
• 
and determinate stage in historical evolution' (MF, 385). The difficulty of our relationship to 
the past, to historical events, is that it is not static and fixed but constantly changing due to 
our own distance from the given moment and also the perspective we take on our own 
situation: 
History is indeed precisely this obligation to multiply the horizons in which the 
object is maintained, to multiply the perspectives from which it is seen; 
(MF,390) 
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Thus Marxism has the advantage of a multiplicity of codes with which to view a given 
phenomenon. We have just discussed the possibility of reuniting the object with its class 
affiliations but we could also see it in terms of the economic code: that is to say to view the 
work of art as a thing given but also as a product, an object that has been produced, a 
commodity in other words and this will entail not only an analysis of the mode of production 
but also of its distn"bution and consumption. What we consume suggests Jameson is not only 
the product itself but also the idea of the thing, the pleasure principle as the very essence of 
the distinction between use-value and exchange-value. But it is: 
the profound vocation of the work of art in a commodity society: not to be a 
commodity, not to be consumed, to be un pleasurable in the commodity sense. 
(MF,395) 
Thus we return to Adorno whereby the evolution of artistic forms is not seen as in some way 
parallel to, or homologous ~ the changes in social reality but as internal to the work itself: 
as distortions and contradictions in the raw material itself by the commodity form which finds 
its expression in the formal properties of the work itself This is what Jameson calls the inner 
form, defining it as a hermeneutic concept, although not in the sense of some universal 
essence or law, but as the reaffirmation of the interpretative operation itself: 
The overall movement of a Marxist criticism is, of course, just such a passage 
from the surface to an underlying reality, from an apparently autonomous 
object to a vaster ground of which this object proves a part or articulation. 
(MF,402) 
J 
The literary work then can be seen to have a symbolic function in which it is not so much 
the story or content which gives satisfaction but the form itself without which the story 
could not have been articulated. The inner form of modem texts can be said to be 
production as such or "literary" production in particular, the writing of particular kinds of 
sentences. The function of dialectical criticism then will be the laying bare of this inner 
form which is at once a disguise and a revelation of th'e concrete. As Jameson outlined in 
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his essay on Metacommentary it will be a process of removing the censorship and bringing 
to the surface the repressed of the work. 
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mSTORY: THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS 
History as a totality (universal history) is neither the mechanical aggregate 
of individual historical events, nor is it a transcendent heuristic principle 
opposed to the events of history, a principle that could only become 
effective with the aid of a special discipline, the philosophy of history. The 
totality of history is itself a real historical power - even though one that has 
not hitherto become conscious and has therefore gone unrecognised - a 
power which is not to be separated from the reality (and hence the 
knowledge) of the individual facts without at the same time annulling their 
reality and their factual existence. It is the real, ultimate ground of their 
reality and their factual existence and hence also of their knowability even 
as individual facts. 1 
Throughout Marxism and Form, Jameson consistently recapitulates and enacts the 
movement of the dialectic from the intrinsic to the extrinsic, from the isolated, individual 
artefact to its ultimate ground in history. With its opening exhortation "Always 
historicize!" The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a SOCially Symbolic Act 
unequivocally announces itself as a continuation and a deepening of this project. In many 
ways The Political Unconscious completes and subsumes the work of Marxism and Form 
and The Prison House of Language as Jameson, for the first time, moved beyond the 
critical surveys of his earlier work and offers a synthesis of his own ideas, ideas which 
were initially sketched in a differ~t form in texts such as 'Metacommentary' and 'Toward 
a Dialectical Criticism'. The publication-' of The Political Unconscious also signalled 
Jameson's most ambitious engagement with contemporary theoretical debates up to this 
point in timel and his emergence as a major theoretician in his own right. As Terry 
Eagleton writes in his short survey of North American criticism, 'The Idealism of 
American Criticism',3 The Political Unconscious established Jameson 'as without question 
the foremost American Marxist critic, and one of the leading literary theorists of the 
Anglophone world'.4 
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However, the critical reception of The Political Unconscious was by no means 
unanimous; in the United States Jameson's text was extremely influentia~ whereas in 
Britain its reception was rather muted. Following the publication of The Political 
Unconscious in 1981 there was a flurry of interest in Jameson's work in the USA: the 
Miami University of Ohio held a symposium on his work in 1982, the proceedings of 
which were subsequently published in a special issue of Critical Exchange. Diacritics also 
devoted an issue to Jameson's work, as did the New Orleans Review.' James Kavanagh's 
opening panegyric sets the tone for many of the subsequent articles from the Ohio 
symposium; reflecting on the transformation of the American critical scene from the 
heyday of New Criticism to the present centrality of Marxist criticism, Kavanagh suggests 
that this has largely been brought about through the work of Fredric Jameson: 
I want to mark this transformation, this reopening, of a field of theoretical 
and ideological practice as a nontrivial political accomplishment of which 
this "special issue" is but one more result. Yes, we must recognize the 
historical conditions of possibility - the constant irruption of revolution 
from Vietnam to Central America, the re-emergence of capitalism's social 
and economic crisis, etc. - that set the stage for the discursive subject 
"Fredric Jameson" to be the bearer of a possible ideological project; and 
we must also recognize that this project was so effectively realized only 
because a lived subject (however fictional and precarious) made a 
discipline~ comprehensive, and immanent appropriation-critique of 
virtually every critical language issuing from the crevices of the Western 
ideological apparatus, persuasively turning the attention of each to 
Marxism. such that it is becoming almost unimaginable to do literary theory 
without taking Marxism sympathetically into account. 6 
In contrast Eagleton concludes his review of the Jameson's work with the wry comment: 
For the question irresistibly raised for the Marxist reader of Jameson is 
simply this: how is a Marxist-structuralist analysis of a minor novel of 
Balzac to help shake the foundations of capitalism?' 
How then can we account for such a disparity· in the text's reception, from equally 
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sympathetic Marxist critics? Robert Young has identified three principal reasons for the 
extreme variance in the American and British receptions of the text: firstly, The Political 
Unconscious appeared 'at a time when the tide of deconstruction seemed virtually 
unstoppable,'8 yet Jameson's Marxism could at once appropriate Derrida's insights and at 
the same time supersede Deconstruction itsel£ 9 Secondly, Jameson's Marxist criticism 
offered a return to a kind of ethical criticism. which Structuralism and Deconstruction 
appeared to have ruled out of debate. As Young writes 'this appealed to a traditional 
understanding of criticism's value, as well as to male critics who felt increasingly upstaged 
by the forceful politics that feminism had made available to women'.10 Finally, and 
perhaps most significantly for the text's reception in Britian and Europe,11 The Political 
Unconscious was seen to herald, what Jameson called, the 'Althusserian Revolution' (PU, 
37). Indeed The Political Unconscious seemed to announce Althusser as 'a great 
discovery',12 as the latest thing in a rapidly changing theoretical field. Yet, as Young 
points out, the text was appearing in Britain in 'a post-Althusserian context'.13 Jameson's 
British readership was already familiar with Althusser's work. and more specifically the 
Althusserian influence on literary theory through the work of Macherey and Eagleton's 
Althusserian phase.14 In other words, Jameson was heralding a theoretical revolution that 
had already passed by and of which the critique was now firmly established within British 
Marxism. l' Indeed, by the end of the 1970s, the impetus behind the Althusserian 
reconstruction of Marxism, and its' impact, was already on the wane. 16 
. 
Jameson's theoretical wager was to present a version of Marxism which was at once open 
to the plurality of the new theoretical climate but at the same time insisted upon the 
priority of Marxist interpretation. This is a paradox, I shall argue, that not even Jameson's 
great rhetorical skills could ultimately, successfully, achieve. In a long and closely argued 
opening chapter, entitled 'On Interpretation', Jameson offers a sustained defence of his 
Hegelian-Marxist position, a critique of the limitations and ideologies of post-structuralism 
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and a reinvigorated method of Marxist interpretation. As with his earlier work, Jameson's 
theoretical strategy remains one of inclusion and co-option, rather than exclusion and 
rejection, seeking to retain the positive and useful elements of contemporary theoretical 
discourse whilst simultaneously revealing its inconsistencies and aporias; which, as we 
observed in the previous chapter, can only achieve coherence in the context of an 
overriding Marxist analysis. However, contrary to the emphasis of Marxism and Form 
upon the diversity of Marxism, The Political Unconscious proposes the primacy of 
Marxism from a more global and totalizing perspective, as a final untranscendable horizon; 
'the absolute horizon of all reading and interpretation' (PU, 17). Marxism is no longer 
conceived of as a situation ally specific discourse but rather the one mode of thought which 
subsumes an other interpretative systems within its own historical narrative and assumes 
priority over other, secondary, methodologies by its very density and semantic yield. 
In this chapter I shall examine Jameson's historicizing and incorporative strategy. I shan 
initially consider the relationship between Marxism and historicism, outlining Jameson's 
formulation of what he terms "structural historicism" before examining this concept in 
more detail with respect to The Political Unconscious. My consideration of this text will 
take the form of an analysis of the two major propositions behind its title The Political 
Unconscious: Narrative as a SOCially Symbolic Act, that is: History as a political 
unconscious, and History as narrative. The former will reconsider the sense in which we 
are to understand the political as "unco'nscious" or alternatively the unconscious as 
"political". The latter will consider the suggestiveness of Jameson's reformulation of the 
Althusserian problematic of structural causality. This analysis will focus upon Jameson's 
reading of the work of Jacques Lacan and Louis Althusser respectively. Whilst the work 
of these two figures clearly facilitates Jameson's project and the formulation of the concept 
of structural historicism their work also defines the limitations of his strategy of 
subsuming diverse philosophical positions within his own Hegelian Marxist narrative. In 
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the following chapter I shall return to the efficacy of Jameson's attempt to subsume, what 
would appear to be, radically heterogeneous discourses within his own overarching 
Marxist historical narrative, by focussing on his attempt to co-opt the work of Deleuze 
and Guattari into his own problematic. 
Marxism and Historicism 
In the essay 'Marxism and Historicism'17 Jameson highlights four traditional solutions to 
the problem of historicism (that is to say 'our relationship to the past, and of our 
possibility of understanding the latter's monuments, artifacts and traces'18): 
Antiquarianism, Existential historicism, Structural typology and Nietzschean 
antihistoricism and argues that Marxism as an absolute historicism is superior to these 
more limited and ideological options. The first and last of these solutions are the least 
satisfactory, as essentially they both amount to a refusal of the problem itself: albeit from 
opposing directions. Antiquarianism seeks to solve the problem by in effect abolishing the 
present and dwelling in the past, whilst Nietzschean antihistoricism with its notion of 
necessary forgetting or forgetfu1ness valorizes the present at the expense of any 
knowledge of the past. I shall not, therefore, be considering these options in any detail as 
Jameson is much more interested in the possibilities offered by the second and third of our 
solutions. 
Existential historicism has its theoretical origins in the conception that 'every culture is 
immanently comprehensible in its own terms',19 it does not, suggests Jameson, seek to 
reconstruct a linear, evolutionary or genetic history (immediately susceptible to charges of 
teleology) but rather designates a "transhistorical event": 
by which historicity as such is manifested, by means of the contact between 
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the historian's mind in the present and a given synchronic cultural complex 
from the past.20 
Existential historicism, therefore, finds its practitioners in the realms of cultural studies and 
aesthetics, or what is more broadly defined as the "humanities". It essentially views 'the 
experience of history [as] a contact between an individual subject in the present and a 
cultural object in the past',21 that is to say, an aesthetic experience. For Jameson, the 
strength and value of existential historicism lies in 'quality of rapt attention that [it] brings 
to the objects of its study', 22 but herein also lies its central flaw or weakness. The dilemma 
for existential historicism is that both the subject and object poles of this experience are 
open to infinite relativization, and in order to contain or restrict this process it must rely 
upon certain ideological presuppositions about human nature. If it is not to collapse into 
mere chronology, the simple succession of one thing after another, it must, a priori, posit 
a notion of unity: 
This principle of unity, or, in other words, the ideological underpinning of 
existential historicism, is then derived from German Lebensphilosophie, in 
which the infinite multiplicity of human symbolic acts is the expression of 
the infinite potentialities of a nonalienated human nature. 23 
Our experience of history can thus be seen to restore something of this richness which is 
so lacking in today's alienated and.reified world. However, there is clearly a 'fundamental 
imbalance of such views of historical eXperience, which oppose the response of an 
individual subject to the collective realities of any moment of the past',24 and we must look 
elsewhere to restore this balance. 
The final solution we have yet to consider is that of structural typology, which I shall only 
briefly discuss here as it will be the subject of the final section of this chapter. Structural 
typology provides us with the dialectical counteIpoint to our previous position: whereas 
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existential historicism follows the path of subjective experience as it orientates our 
relationship to the past, structuralist historiography follows the path of the object, 
focussing on the forces and events of history as the determinate reality of an objective 
historical process, and organising this data around various forms of patterning or 
typologies. In other words, Structuralist Historiography is not concerned with our 
subjective experience or interpretations of history but with the "deep" structures or 
patterns embedded within texts and which construct or constitute both that history and our 
experience of it. Structuralist historiography does not seek to articulate a sequence of 
events as causally related but rather the "conditions of possibility" for the emergence of 
given phenomena. By privileging the synchronic system over diachronic constructs 
Structuralist historiography repudiates two 'related and essentially na"ative forms of 
analysis';2s what can be termed the teleological, or Enlightenment sense of progress, and 
the genetiC, or imaginary construction of a past term as the evolutionary precursor of a 
fuller term that has historical existence. Therefore, Structuralist historiography does not 
reconstruct the past as the precursor or cause of the present but rather builds 'a model of 
"transition" from one to the other, and this is no longer then a genetic hypothesis but 
rather an investigation of structural transformations'. 26 Thus contrary to existential 
historicism we have a greater sense of the vast and impersonal movement of history, of 
processes beyond the control and influence of individual subjects. but we have also lost 
that vital and urgent sense of contact with the past that was the great virtue of existential 
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historicism. What structuralist typologies lack, suggests Jameson, is reflexivity, that 
dialectical self-consciousness which would raise structuralism to a consideration of its own 
historical moment. 
For Jameson, Marxism, as an absolute historicism, provides the only solution to this 
dilemma, uniting the urgency and intensity of exist~tial historicism with the articulation of 
collective forces in the manner of Structural typologies. Indeed, Jameson goes so far as to 
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suggest that structural historiography is not necessarily radically different from or 
incommensurable with existential historicism: 
On the contrary, semiotic analysis of such texts generally discloses the 
operation of "deep" semic oppositions - a kind ofhistoricalpensee sauvage 
- which can usually be found to project a whole structural typology of 
cultures imperceptible at the surface of the text and disguised or displaced 
by the emphasis on the sensitivity of the individual historian-subject. 27 
Equally, all "deep" structures can be rewritten in "something like" a narrative or 
teleological vision of history. Jameson's aim, therefore, is to formulate what he terms a 
structural historiCism, which would do justice to both the insights of existential 
historicism and structural typology; which would also accomodate both the subject and 
object poles of historical experience and provide a solution to the 'seemingly unresovable 
alternation between Identity and Difference'28 as the rock upon which all historicisms 
come to founder. The use of the Marxian concept of "mode of production" facilitates just 
such a squaring of the circle in that it functions not as a narrative of emergence but 
genealogically. That is to say as 'the narrative reconstruction of the conditions of 
possibility of any full synchronic form'.29 For Jameson, mode of production is a 
differential concept in that any given mode of production (for example, capitalism) 
presupposes all previous modes of production (feudalism, Asiatic mode, primitive 
communism etc.), as well as anticipating a future mode of production. In this sense no 
mode of production exists in isolation or a!'pure" state but coexists, at any given moment, 
with all the other modes of production. To borrow Raymond Williams' distinctions: at 
present capitalism represents the dominant mode of production but sedimented within this 
are the residual forms of previous modes of production as well as the emergent form of a 
properly socialist mode of production. We are still in need, however, of a concept or 
category with which to think this structural coexistence of various distinct modes of 
production, as well as the process of transition ·from one mode to another: Jameson 
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suggests the term cultural revolution (again, I shall return to this concept in greater detail 
below). 
Mode of production would, therefore, appear to meet the requirements of the object pole, 
articulating the unity and identity of given historical periods whilst simultaneously 
acknowledging their difference from previous as well as subsequent historical moments 
and their intrinsic diversity. But we still need to identify the position of the subject and for 
this Jameson suggests the present formulation allows him to reground the subject in 
history in three distinct ways. Firstly, a subject's relationship to the past is no longer to be 
seen as a relationship between an individual subject and an isolated cultural artifact but as 
a mediation for a non-individual and collective process: 'the confrontation of two distinct 
social forms or modes of production' whereby individual acts of reading and interpretation 
are seen as 'allegorical figures for this essentially collective confrontation of two social 
forms'. 30 This in turn enables the second movement of regrounding to take place as 
history now retains the urgency of the past in the sense that 'the past will itself become an 
active agent in this process and will begin to come before us as a radically different life 
form which rises up to call our own form of life into question'.31 Finally, in that mode of 
production structurally implies a future just as fully as a past it allows for the articulation 
of the utopian impulse: 'the sense of a hermeneutic relationship to the past which is able to 
grasp its own present as history 'only on condition it manages to keep the idea of the 
future, and ofradica! and utopian transformation, alive'.31 I will now consider more fully 
Jameson's conception of History and his mediation between existential and structural 
historicism, suggesting that a number of theoretical problems arise from his attempted 
synthesis of a synchronic mode~ mode of production, and diachronic process, the 
unending narrative of class struggle. 
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History as Political Unconscious 
For Jameson the problems of historicism enumerated above can only be resolved by 
Marxism because Marxism alone grasps the 'essential mystery of the past' as a single great 
human adventure: 
These matters [the events of the past] can recover their original urgency for 
us only if they are retold within the unity of a single great collective story; 
only if: in however disguised and symbolic a form. they are seen as sharing 
a single fundamental theme - for Marxism, the collective struggle to wrest a 
realm of Freedom from a realm of Necessity; only if they are grasped as the 
vital episodes in a single vast unfinished plot: (PU, 19-20) 
The dilemma for Jameson is how to restore these faint murmurings of the past and recover 
this single great story? It is this task that Jameson sets himself in The Political 
Unconscious, or more specifically, the attempt 'to restructure the problematics of 
ideology, of the unconscious and of desire, of representation, of history, and of cultural 
production, around the all-informing process of na"ative' (PU, 13). What is required, 
suggests Jameson, is a mode of interpretation which can accommodate the notion of 
structural causality: in other words, a mode of interpretation which lays bare the 
"conditions of possibility" rather ~an the "causal" determinates of texts. We will see just 
how successful Jameson is in formulating such a mode of interpretation below. 
The operation of historicizing, notes Jameson, can take either of two paths, that of the 
object (the things themselves, the objective structures of a given cultural text), or, the 
subject (the concepts and categories by which we attempt to understand those things, the 
interpretative categories and codes through which we receive and decipher the text). The 
Political Unconscious follows the second of these' paths but it does so with the proviso 
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that we can never confront a text immediately 'in all its freshness as a thing-in-itself, all 
texts come to us mediated by prior interpretations; thus Jameson's' object of study is less 
the text itself than the interpretations through which we attempt to confront and 
appropriate it' (PU, 9-10). The political or historical interpretation of texts is not merely 
some extrinsic or supplementary method but, for Jameson, provides the ultimate horizon 
for all interpretation and reading, because ultimately everything is political and social in 
character: to distinguish between political and nonpolitical texts is itself a symptom of the 
reification of the contemporary world. Marxism's claim to theoretical primacy rests on 
just such a recognition of the political nature of our everyday lifeworld and the final 
determination not by economics or class struggle but by History itself and: 
It is in detecting the traces of that uninterrupted narrative, in restoring to 
the surface of the text the repressed and buried reality of this fundamental 
history, that the doctrine of a political unconscious finds its function and its 
necessity. (PU, 20) 
For Jameson, interpretation or the hermeneutic operation is essentially an allegorical act; 
allegory, as it has been stigmatized in recent theoretical discourses, is usually understood 
as the rewriting of a given text in terms of some master-narrative or code which provides 
the key to the understanding of that text. This has rightly been seen as a reductive 
operation in which the plurality of narratives and semantic possibilities is reduced to mere 
variations on a single theme, reducing the heterogeneitY of narratives to a homogenous 
Ur-narrative. Jameson, on the other hand, suggests that allegory should be seen as an 
exemplary method, not for reducing diversity but for resisting the reduction of the 
collective to the individual and: 
the opening up of the text to multiple meanings, to successive rewritings 
and overwritings which are generated as so many levels and so many 
supplementary interpretations. (PU, 29) 
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Indeed, for Jameson, the allegorical operation or moment is unavoidable as every formal 
method can be said implicitly to contain and project a philosophy of history. Ethical 
criticism, for example, which for Jameson remains the hegemonic discourse in literary and 
cultural studies, rests on certain presuppositions about human nature and experience, 
accepting these as eternally given rather than historically and culturally specific. Even the 
most stridently anti-interpretative Structuralism can be said to project a master code in 
which everything is to be rewritten. that is to say, language itself We are then, in a 
position in which interpretation is unavoidable and . all of the original philosophical 
systems or positions in recent times have in one way or another projected a hermeneutic 
which is specific to them' (PU, 61). Jameso~ therefore, argues that we should not simply 
abandon the laborious work of interpretation in favour of the more recent celebrations of 
immanence, materiality and schizoid texts; on the contrary, we should more rigorously 
work through it. As in Marxism and Form, Iameson highlights the medieval system of the 
four levels as a 'particularly suggestive' (PU, 31) system for making connections between 
what now appear to be the incommensurable realms of: the public and the private, the 
psychological and the socia~ the poetic and the politicaL However his real interests, in the 
present text, clearly lie elsewhere, indeed the "strong" rewritings that Jameson proposes 
themselves presuppose another analytic system: 
if not a conception of the unconscious itsel( then at least some mechanism 
of mystification or repression in terms of which it would make sense to 
seek a latent meaning behind a nianifest one, or to rewrite the surface 
categories of a text in the stronger language of a more fundamental 
interpretive code. (PU, 60) 
For Jameson, psychoanalysis is 'the only really new and original hermeneutic' (PU, 61) 
since the medieval system alluded to above, although psychoanalysis is to be understood 
not as the study of sexuality as such but as the study of "desire". Jameson also insists on 
the need to historicize psychoanalysis, emphasiziIig that the discovery of desire 'as the 
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very dynamic of our being as individual subjects' (PU, 65) and the possibility or 
precondition for its articulation and analysis, its dynamics and the mechanisms of 
repression, is dependent on an initial isolation of sexuality as an object of study. 
Therefore, the discovery of psychoanalysis is itself dependent on, or a consequence ot: the 
increasing abstraction of experience in modem society. In other words, it presupposes, as 
a condition of its possibility, the processes of "rationalization" and "reification" that are 
associated with the emergence of capitalism. The limitation of the Freudian modeL at 
least for Jameson's conception of a political unconscious, is that it remains locked within 
the problematic of the individual subject and individual psyche, whilst Jameson's notion is 
unequivocally "collective". Therefore, Jameson shifts 'from the Freudian hermeneutic to a 
quite different interpretative system, comparable only to the psychoanalytic one in the 
persistence of just such a valorization of desire' (PU, 68), that is to say, the archetypal 
system of Northrop Frye. 
For Jameson, Frye's greatness lies in his willingness to raise issues of community and 
collective representation, seeing literature as the 'symbolic meditation on the destiny of 
community' (PU, 70). In his appropriation of the medieval system of the four levels Frye 
reversed the third and fourth levels, the moral and the anagogic respectively, so that the 
system's: 
figural and political momentum is broken. and the collective content of the 
image has been reprivatized in the henceforth purely individual terms of the 
isolated body and the merely personal ecstasy. (PU, 73) 
Jameson, on the other hand, insists on the need to keep faith with the medieval model in 
which this final anagogic level rewrites or transforms the third subjective level into a 
meditation on 'the destiny of the human race as a whole' (PU, 31). The system that 
Jameson proposes then for the political and historical interpretation of texts draws on the 
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insights of both the previous systems, relying on the Freudian conception of the 
unconscious and the dynamics of desire and from Frye the conception of bodily 
transfiguration as a figure for the perfected community and collective life. 
I shall return to the question of the efficacy of Jameson's attempt to draw together these 
diverse systems of interpretation: medieval allegory, Freudian unconconscious and Frye's 
archetypes, below. Initially, though, I shall outline Jameson's own version of political 
hermeneutics from what is perhaps the most theoretically dense and intricately argued 
chapters of Jameson's oeuvre, 'On Interpretation'. 
Jameson's interpretative system proposes a series of concentric circles, or "semantic 
horizons", of interpretation, what he designates: the political, the social and the historical 
The first horizon coincides with the individual text itsel( which fonowing the work of 
Levi-Strauss on the structural analysis of myth, is to be read as a symbolic act: 'the 
individual narrative, or individual formal structure, is to be grasped as the imaginary 
resolution of a real contradiction' (PU, 77). The value of such a formulation is that it 
inscribes a movement beyond the purely formal properties of the work itself: not in the 
sense of a movement to some abstract extrinsic criteria but 'rather immanently, by 
construing purely formal patterns .as a symbolic enactment of the social within the formal 
and the aesthetic' (PU, 77). The act of'interpretation then, must grasp the text as a 
"determinate contradiction". In Jameson's earlier work the presence of the "dialectical 
shock" was seen as the mark of genuinely Marxist criticism. In The Political Unconscious 
that role falls to the notion of "contradiction" as the central category of any Marxist 
analysis: 
The methodological requirement to articulate a text's fundamental 
contradiction may then be seen as a test of the completeness of the 
analysis: (PU, 80) 
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The shift of registers from the text to the real is inscribed in the very ambiguity of the 
notion of a "symbolic act". Depending on which half of the term is emphasised the 
operation is merely a symbolic act and its solutions imaginary, or, it is a genuine act, albeit 
on the symbolic level For Jameson, the ambiguity of this notion is fortuitous in that it not 
only dramatizes the situation (and dilemma) of art and culture in contemporary society but 
it also dramatizes the present status of the Real itselt: The ambiguity, however, does not 
only exist within the concept of the symbolic act but also within Jameson's text. Jameson 
borrows this concept from the work of Kenneth Burke (PU, 81) and when discussing the 
notion in relation to Burke uses a lower case "r" in relation to the "real". We may surmise, 
therefore, as there is no definition of the term, that "real" designates a realist conception of 
reality as independent of human perception and activity. However, in the following 
paragraph there is a significant change in register: 
The literary or aesthetic act therefore always entertains some active 
relationship with the Real; yet in order to do so, it cannot simply allow 
"reality" to persevere inertly in its own being, outside the text and at a 
distance. (PU, 81) 
The lower case "real" has now been replaced by a capitalized ReaL whilst the use of the 
semi-colon links this capitalized Real with. the "reality" in quotation marks in the second 
half of the sentence. Yet the no~ion of the Real (capital R) derives from the work of 
Jacques Lacan and does not refer to reality (in quotation marks or otherwise). I shall 
examine Lacan's conception of the Real in greater detail below specifically in relation to 
the parallels Jameson's draws between it and Althusser's notion of "absent cause". For the 
present I shall just highlight the slippage that has taken place in Jameson's text between: 
real - reality - Real, as these terms do not designate the same phenomena and the 
conflation of these terms will produce serious theoretical confusions within Jameson's 
hermeneutic. For my own purposes of exposition I shall continue to use the capitalized 
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Real when Jameson does so in his text and in relation to Lacan's notion of the Real, at all 
other times I shall use the more conventional reaL 
As we shall see in the following chapter contemporary attacks on representation have 
effectively discredited notions of reality, or the real, as some ultimate ground or locus of 
meaning. Just as Saussurean and post-Saussurean semiotics have unremittingly bracketed 
the referent as an object of knowledge susceptible to veridical criteria, literary theory has 
bracketed history. Jameson, on the contrary, insists that 'one does not have to argue the 
reality of History', although this is by no means the common-sense empirical reality one 
might at first assume. History, here, is not so much the "context" within which literary 
texts are then reinserted, as was the emphasis in Marxism and Form, but rather a 
"subtext", whereby the text itself is seen as a rewriting or 'restructuration of a prior 
historical or ideological sub text. This subtext, however, is nowhere immanently available 
to us as a thing-in-itself as it must always be '(re)constructed after the fact' (PU, 81). 
Therefore, the literary text is always in an active relationship with the Real, not in the 
sense that its content "reflects" reality but in the way that the Real is drawn into its own 
formal structures: 
The whole paradox of what we have here called the subtext may be 
summed up in this, that the literary work or cultural object, as though for 
the first time, brings into being that very situation to which it is also, at one 
and the same time, a reaction. (PU, 81-2) 
History, according to this formula, may not need to be argued for as it is not a text and is 
both non-narrative and nonrepresentable but it must be qualified in the sense that history is 
only accessible to us in textual form, that is to say 'it can be approached only by way of 
prior (re)textuallZation' (PU, 82). Jameson also distinguishes between two forms that this 
historical subtext can take: the primary form is that which we have already indicated as a 
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social contradiction, the secondary one is the place of ideology and takes the form of an 
aporia or antinomy. 
As we have seen the function of contradiction is central to Jameson's Marxist hermeneutic 
and is here accorded priority, in the form of a "real social contradiction", over the 
"ideological antinomy". However, the precise nature of dialectical contradiction implied 
by Marxist theory is itself conteste<L as we shall see below Althusser grounded his 
distinction between the Hegelian dialectic and the materialist dialectic in a distinction 
between a "simple" contradiction (Hegelian) and a "complex" contradiction (Marxist). 
Equally the status of dialectical contradiction in relation to the social reality and the 
ideological nature of an antinomy or opposition is problematic. In his essay 'Marxism and 
the Dialecticl33 Lucio Colletti draws the distinction between an antinomy and a 
contradiction as between two forms of opposition: real opposition and dialectical 
opposition. Colletti writes: 
'Real opposition' (or 'contrariety' of incompatible opposites) is an 
opposition 'without contradiction' ... It does not violate the principles of 
identity and (non)contradiction, and hence is compatible with formal logic. 
The second form of opposition, on the contrary, is 'contradictory' ... and 
gives rise to a dialectical opposition. 34 
Drawing on Kant1s definition of a ~eal opposition, Colletti argues that the two elements of 
the opposition are real and positive in their own right. That is, they do not need the 
contrary element with which to define themselves, thus the opposition is exclusive, 
constituting 'a relation of mutual repulsion'.3.5 Dialectical opposition, on the other han<L is 
an 'instance in which one opposite cannot stand without the other and vice-versa', neither 
of the elements is 'anything in itself or for itself.36 Both elements in a dialectical 
opposition, therefore, are negative and the dialectical relation is a negative relation, a 
mutual attraction of opposites. Thus the dialectical relation, unlike the real opposition, is 
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an inclusive relation, each element only has meaning in relation to the other: 
Each term therefore, to be itself: implies a relation to the other term.; the 
result is a unity (the unity of opposites). Only within this unity is each term 
the negation of the other.37 
As Colletti points out, there do not exist phenomena which in-themselves are negative, 
that is, are "non-being," as that which negates is itself the result of a positive cause. Thus: 
What we are dealing with in fact is oppositions which, precisely because 
they are real, are 'devoid of contradiction' and hence have nothing to do 
with dialectical contradiction.38 
In short, reality can be said to contain real oppositions but it is non-contradictory. 
According to his own definitions, then, Colletti concedes that the dialectical contradictions 
of capitalism, of which the conflict between capital and wage-labour stands as the 
foremost, are not contradictions as such but in fact real oppositions. Insofar as the 
conflict between capital and wage-labour can be said to be real it cannot be said to be 
contradictory. However, this would appear to contradict Marx himself: for whom the 
conflicts of capitalism 'are dialectical contradictions in the full sense of the word'.39 
How, then, can we reconcile this position with Jameson's assertion that opposition is 
ideological and contradiction is in fact rea~ insofar as what Jameson calls the social is real. 
Colletti insists that it is an error to see contradiction as the precondition for any possible 
reality, as certain forms of dialectical materialism have contended. On the contrary: 
In [Marx's] view the contradictions of capitalism do not derive from the 
fact that capitalism too is a 'reality' .... in Marx's view, capitalism is 
contradictory because it is a reality that is upside-down, that is 'stood on its 
head'.40 
Following Marx's theory of surplus value, Colletti argues that separation appears as the 
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normal relation in capitalist society. Separation, through the division of labour and the 
severance of use-value from exchange-value, creates an 'an inverted situation, in which 
what is essential ... becomes accidental, and what is accidental becomes the norm'.41 In 
other words, it is the very unreality of the commodity structure that is now the reality. 
Thus, suggests Collett~ the Marxist theories of fetishism and alienation 'draws very close 
to the theory of contradiction'.42 In short, it is the very structure of capitalist society that 
determines its contradictory nature, a contradiction deriving from the heart of the 
commodity itself The contradictory nature of capitalism does not arise from the reality of 
capitalism but rather from its very "unreality"; from its inverted relations between use-
value and exchange-value and capital and labour. It is this historical contradiction that 
Jameson seeks to prioritize over the now ideological oppositions; as they refer to a reality 
that, for Jameson at least, no longer exists within the capitalist mode of production. 
To return to Jameson's hermeneutic model, his second horizon of interpretation moves 
beyond the text itself and operates at the level of class discourse. Jameson follows 
E.P. Thompson's definition of class as a relational concept; in other words, the notion of 
class represents an 'historical phenomenon, unifying a number of disparate and seemingly 
unconnected events, both in the raw material of experience and in consciousness'.4] For 
Thompson, such a definition of class is incompatible with the notion of "structure", or 
indeed, even with the sense of' class as a "category"; rather it entails an historical 
., 
relationship, whereby class experience is determined by the productive relations into which 
persons are born. Class-consciousness, according to this definition, designates 'the way in 
which these experiences are handled in cultural terms: embodied in traditions, value-
systems, ideas and institutional forms'.44 As in his earlier work, therefore, Jameson 
emphasises the relational characteristics of class, whereby each class can only be defined in 
its relationship with other social classes; and insists on the differential nature of class 
ideology or class-consciousness, that is to say, that its values, ideas and traditions are not 
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fixed and immutable but active and fluid in opposition to other class discourses. For 
Thompson, however, the notion of class as one of historical process is incommensurable 
with the notion of structure, and whilst Jameson retains this definition of class in terms of 
an historical phenomenon, he also rewrites class discourse, the textual realization of the 
historical phenomenon, as a structure. I shall return to the dialectic of process and 
structure at the end of the present chapter. 
This relational and oppositional conception of class discourse facilitates Jameson's 
rewriting of the categories and terms in which the text is understood as a "dialogical 
structure", in the sense that the dialogical relationship is understood as antagonistic. The 
object of study at this level is what Jameson calls the ideologeme or 'the smallest 
intelligible unit of the essentially antagonistic collective discourse of social classes' (PU, 
76). However, Jameson's reading of the Bakhtinian notion of dialogism as essentially 
antagonistic is somewhat at variance with the general tenor of the Anglo-American 
domestication of Bakhtinian ideas. For example, in her preface to Problems of 
Dostoevsky's Poetics Caryl Emerson writes: 
In place of the comfortable patterns of synthesis and Aufhebung, Bakhtin 
posits a dualistic universe of permanent dialogue'.'" 
Whilst accepting that dialogism is not dialectics (Hegelian, Marxist or otherwise), neither 
.. 
is it the "comfortable" world of pluralistic dialogue. For Bakhtin, language in its concrete 
form of the 'living utterance'46 is in a constant state of struggle with other utterances in its 
specific historical and social moment. Thus, contrary to the tradition of Saussurean 
linguistics Bakhtin does not treat language as an abstract system but as first and foremost 
a social phenomenon: 
The living utterance, having taken meaning and shape at a particular 
historical moment in a socially specific environment, cannot fail to brush up 
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against thousands of living dialogic threads, woven by socio-ideological 
consciousness around the given object of an utterance; it cannot fail to 
become an active participant in social dialogue. 47 
For Bakhtin, the word participates in a social dialogue but this is distinct from dialogism 
which is internal to the word itself; it is precisely, writes Bakhtin, 'this internal dialogism 
of the word, which does not assume any external compositional forms of dialogue'48 which 
gives the word its enormous power. Language, therefore, can be a dialogue, or indeed a 
monologue, but it is also at all times, be it in a dialogue or a monologue, dialogical The 
base condition of language, argues Bakhtin is dialogised heteroglossia, that is to say, 
linguistic meaning is the result of a struggle between two contending forces: the 
centripetal forces which attempt to unify a given language and fix meaning and the 
centrifugal forces which constantly disrupt this unitary tendency and create new meanings. 
No language can be either one or the other, that is unitary or heteroglot, as both forces are 
necessary to keep a language alive; every utterance, writes Bahktin, 'participates in the 
"unitary language" ... and at the same time partakes of social and historical 
heteroglossia'.49 In this sense, then, we can agree with Jameson that the dialogic nature of 
language is essentially "antagonistic". 
But Jameson is proposing more than simply the antagonistic nature of language, he is also 
suggesting that language embodies the "contadictory" positions of social classes: 
Within this new horizon, then, the basic formal requirement of dialectical 
analysis is maintained, and its elements are still restructured in terms of 
contradiction ... contradiction here appears in the form of the dialogical as 
the irreconcilable demands and positions of antagonistic classes. (PU, 85) 
In the terms of the definitions of contradiction and opposition given by Colletti we can say 
that dialogism is contradictory rather than oppositional in the sense that both elements in 
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the dialogical relation are mutually dependant. Neither of the structuring forces of 
language can exist in its own right and for itsel£ In Marxism and the Philosophy of 
Language Volosinov describes the inclusive relation of dialogism, the: 
word is a two-sided act. It is determined equally by whose word it is and 
for whom it is meant. As wor~ it is precisely the product of the reciprocal 
relationship between speaker and listener, addresser and addressee. Each 
and every word expresses the "one" in relation to the "other." I give myself 
verbal shape from another's point of view, ultimately, from the point of 
view of the community to which I belong. 50 
The word is always at least double, its meaning the result of a verbal interaction between 
addresser and addressee. However, this interaction does not take place between two 
isolated individuals but between two subjects within a specific historical and social 
context. The language each uses does not simply express their individual points of view 
but rather the points of view of the communities from which each derives. For Bakhtin 
and Volosinov it is always the context rather than the text that defines a given utterance's 
meaning. Volosinov writes: 
The immediate social situation and the broader social milieu wholly 
determine - and determine from within, so to speak - the structure of an 
utterance. 51 
Language cannot be divorced from its conditions of possibility, furthermore, it is those 
very conditions of possibility which structure any given utterance, which structure it 
internally. We do not need to fully endorse Volosinov's sociologism to accept the primacy 
of context over text and that ideology (Volosinov's community view and Bakhtin's "world 
view") is not an extrinsic doctrine propogated through language but is internal to language 
itself Language, writes Bakhtin, is 'ideologically saturated'Sl it is 'shot through with 
shared thoughts, points of view, alien value ju~gements and accents'.5J With each 
utterance the previous usage of words remain sedimented within them and is carried into 
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the current usage. Language is not an homogenous and unitary system but rather a 
"stratified" complex of languages, in conflict with each other and embodying a specific 
ideological perspective in its very structure. Each and every word, according to 
Volosinov, 'is ideological and each and every application of language involves ideological 
change'. 54 
It is in this sense that we must understand Jameson's term ideologeme, not as some kind of 
ideological slogan but as intrinsic to the form of the text, and in the structure of its 
language. Whereas the first level saw the text as an enactment, the imaginary resolution of 
a real social contradiction, immanent in the formal patterning and structure of the text, the 
second level treats the text as the parole, or individual utterance, of the langue of class 
discourse. The emphasis on the dialogic nature of class discourse entails that we not only 
listen to the hegemonic discourse - Bakhtin's centripetal or unificatory force· but we also 
attempt to retrieve the silent and repressed voices - the centrifugal, decentralizing, 
disruptive forces Bakhtin associated with carnival and low-life and for Jameson of class 
struggle - against which dominant discourses struggle and define themselves. For 
Jameson, the value of the concept of the ideologeme resides in its 'amphibious nature' 
(PU, 87); which can manifest itself either as a pseudoidea, in the sense of a belief system 
or abstract value, or 'as a protonarrative, a kind of ultimate class fantasy about the 
"collective characters" which are classes in opposition' (PU, 87). But herein also lies the 
-' 
problem with Jameson's concept, he writes 'as a construct it must be susceptible to both a 
conceptual description and a narrative manifestation all at once' (PU, 87). One could well 
ask: Why must it? Particularly as Jameson goes on to say that ideologemes can be 
elaborated in either direction independently. As with so many of Jameson's formulations, 
its very flexibility, which in Jameson's own hands facilitates frequently brilliant and 
insightful readings of texts, makes it difficult to de~e and even more difficult to utilize." 
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The final horizon of interpretation situates the cultural text in relation to 'history as a 
whole' whereby a given text is read in terms of the ideology of form. The previous 
horizon emphasised the distinctive and antagonistic nature of class discourses, drawing 
attention to the polyphonic rather than the mono logical character of discourse. But, 
suggests Jameson, the inverse operation is equally feasible in that: 
such concrete semantic differences can on the contrary be focused in such a 
way that what emerges is rather the all-embracing unity of a single code 
which they must share and which thus characterizes the larger unity of the 
social system. (PU, 88) 
This single code provides a new object of study which transcends the previous two levels 
and can be designated as mode of production: 'the symbolic messages transmitted to us by 
the coexistence of various sign systems which are themselves traces or anticipations of 
modes of production' (PU, 76). I have already indicated how Jameson fends off 
accusations of linearity and teleology with regard to the notion of mode of production 
through a conception of structural co-existence and I should now like to consider this in 
more detail. For Jameson, even the most schematic and mechanistic conceptions of 
historical "stages" entail a conception of a cultural dominant, an ideological form specific 
to a given mode of production, but he goes on to argue this does not imply that mode of 
production designates a synchronic system The problem with synchronicity, he observes, 
is that it has become synonymous with notions of the "total system" and as such implicitly 
excludes the function of the negative: 
In particular, everything about class struggle that was anticipatory in the 
older dialectical framewor~ and seen as an emergent space for radically 
new social relations, would seem, in the synchronic model to reduce itself 
to practices that in fact tend to reinforce the very system that foresaw and 
dictated their specific limits. (PU, 91) 
At the level of cultural production, any antisystemic or oppositional tendencies ostensibly 
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inscnoed within the work would also be seen as ultimately deriving from and reinforcing 
the system itself This dilemma can only be resolved if we respect the various levels of 
historical abstraction as, for instance, with Jameson's series of enlarging theoretical 
horizons. Such a system allows one to respect the specificity of individual texts and also 
conduct a synchronic analysis in terms of the mode of production; whilst at the same time 
the system's projection of a longer view of history avoids the structural limitations 
imposed by notions of a total system A second problem that arises with the notion of 
historical stages or periods is that the system tends to result in a purely typological or 
classificatory operatio~ whereby texts are simply slotted into their appropriate historical 
moment. Jameson argues that his system of expanding horizons avoids this pitfall through 
its insistence on the role of "contradiction" at each stage of the process: 
we can effectively validate the horizon of the mode of production by 
showing the form contradiction takes on this level, and the relationship of 
the cultural object to it. (PU, 94) 
In the previous section, I suggested that no mode of production exists in a pure form but 
always co-exists with other modes of production. For Jameson, the implication of this is 
that whilst the concept of mode of production may be said to be synchronic, the actual 
moment of the co-existence of several distinct modes is not, on the contrary, it is 
dialectically open to history. Any attempt to thereby classify texts according to their 
respective modes of production will inevitably be forestalled as all texts will be seen to be 
'crisscrossed and intersected by a variety of impulses from contradictory modes of cultural 
production all at once' (PU, 95). The object of study for this third horizon will be what 
Jameson terms "cultural revolution"; this designation has its most immediate resonance 
with the Chinese experience of the 1960s and indeed Jameson does not dismiss or 
foreclose on such associations, particularly in the sense of revivifying the revolutionary 
process from the bottom-up; however, the concept has much wider connotations. In its 
broadest terms cultural revolution defines the process of transition from one mode of 
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production to another and as every concrete historical society is a coexistence of several 
distinct modes of production: 
Cultural revolution will therefore be a moment of "non synchronous 
development" ... a moment of overlap, of the struggle in coexistence 
between several modes of production at once . .56 
The Western Enlightenment can be seen as just such a moment of struggle and as part of 
the bourgeois cultural revolution. In other words, cultural revolution designates the 
process through which social formations retrain or repro gramme subjects for new modes 
of social life, the process through which subjects acquire new habits, new modes of 
consciousness and transform human practices. In terms of literary and cultural studies, 
Jameson sees the notion of cultural revolution opening up 'a whole new framework for the 
humanities',.57 in the sense that the cultural practice of a given mode of production 'has as 
its essential function to recreate at every moment the life world of that particular mode 
and to keep it in being at every moment' . .58 This process of cultural reproduction, 
however, is not merely a secondary, superstructura~ activity dependent upon the primary 
process of material production but rather 'a single immense process on all these levels' . .59 
Thus, for Jameson, cultural producers are "ideologues", although ideologues of a very 
special sort, and all cultural texts are the sites for class struggle through the confrontation 
of their various ideologies: 
The task of cultural and social analysis thus construed within this final 
horizon will then clearly be the rewriting of its materials in such a way that 
this petpetual cultural revolution can be apprehended and read as the 
deeper and more permanent constitutive structure in which the empirical 
textual objects know intelligibility. (PU, 97) 
In this sense cultural revolution designates the "non synchronous development" of culture 
and social life, it is, suggests Jameson, beyond the synchronic/diachronic dichotomy. The 
ideology of form therefore defines 'the determinate contradiction of the specific messages 
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emitted by the varied sign systems which co-exist in a given artistic process as well as in 
its general social formation' (PU, 98-9). We should note though that at this level a 
dialectical reversal has taken place and "form" must now be apprehended as "content" in 
the sense that' the formal processes are now grasped as sedimented content in their own 
right, in other words they carry 'ideological messages of their own, distinct from the 
ostensible or manifest content of the works' (PU, 99). For example, through literary 
genre. I should now like to examine in greater detail some of the presuppositions that 
underlie Jameson's system of dialectically expanding horizons. 
The notion of a political unconscious clearly involves an initial broadening of the concept 
beyond its conventional usage. For Jameson, the political unconscious is a "collective" 
unconscious rather than a site of repressed desires and drives associated with an individual 
psyche. However, Jameson's collective unconscious is not a Jungian one in the sense of a 
repository for mythical archetypes but rather Walter Benjamin's nightmare of history: 
As in all previous history, whoever emerges as victor still participates in 
that triumph in which today's rulers march over the prostrate bodies of their 
victims. As is customary, the spoils are borne aloft in that triumphal 
parade. These are generally called the cultural heritage .... There has never 
been a document of culture which was not at one and the same time a 
document of barbarism 60 
For Jameson, this heritage of violence and barbarism remains sedimented within our 
cultural texts, not in their content, in the sense of proletarian novels or socialist realist art, 
but rather through the form, through what we have identified as the various levels of 
"contradiction" within the text. Jameson's key mechanism, or mediation, between cultural 
texts and their social and historical situation is the Marxian category of reification. As we 
shall see in the final chapter, one problem with Jameson's use ofreification is his uncritical 
acceptance of Lukacs' use of the term A second,' and more symptomatic, problem with 
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Jameson's usage is any clear definition of the sense in which he is using the term. Indeed, 
his longest consideration of reification comes within a consideration of rationalization: 
For the dynamic of rationalization - Weber's term, which Lukacs will 
strategically retranslate as reification in History and Class Consciousness-
is a complex one in which the traditional or "natural" ... unities, social 
forms, human relations, cultural events, even religious systems, are 
systematically broken up in order to be reconstructed more efficiently, in 
the form of new post-natural processes or mechanisms; but in whic~ at the 
same time, these now isolated broken bits and pieces of older unities 
acquire a certain autonomy of their own, a semi-autonomous coherence 
whic~ not merely a reflex of capitalist reification and rationalization. also 
in some measure serves to compensate for the dehumanization of 
experience reification brings with it, and to rectify the otherwise intolerable 
effects of the new process. (PU, 62-3) 
With a characteristic Jamesonian sentence one is overwhelmed with the density and 
complexity of the sentence itself: as the seemingly relentless and ruthless process of 
rationalization - or is it reification? - as described by Jameson suddenly turns back upon 
itself and provides its own compensation, Jameson's semicolon making the link between 
the historical process and the psychical effect. However, what exactly are 'post-natural 
processes or mechanisms'? And what is the status of a "certain" autonomy or "some 
measure" of compensation? How far does autonomy stretch here and what exactly is 
becoming autonomous from what? Jameson's description appears to simultaneously 
explain all and nothing, as become~ clear in a later proposition: 
the crisis of the social totality is the result of the same phenomena -
reification, social fragmentation. the division oflabour, Taylorization-
(PU, 190) 
To say that the crisis of social totality is the result of social fragmentation seems to be 
rather tautologous. Furthermore, is Jameson suggesting that the reification is the same as 
social fragmentation, the division of labour and Taylorization or are these all different 
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aspects of the same phenomenon - the crisis of social totality? 
To summarize the position, then, whilst it remains unclear exactly what Jameson means by 
reification, its mediatory function is reasonably clear. Reification at once accounts for the 
historical processes of differentiation, separation and division under capitalism and at the 
same time for the psychic fragmentation at the individual experiential level. For Jameson, 
the traces of human labour are gradually effaced from the products of commodity 
production as the levels of specialization and division increase. However, these traces can 
never be complete erased as all commodities remain, in the last instance, produced. Using 
the analogy of Freudian psychoanalysis Jameson suggests that these traces have been 
repressed through the processes of commodity production and the structure of commodity 
fetishism Pursuing the analogy further, if we analyse the mechanisms by which this 
repression takes place, it will be possible to retrieve and restore those latent traces of 
production to the manifest content of the text. Jameson finds textual justification for this 
semantic expansion of the concepts of the unconscious and repression through Levi-
Strauss' analysis of myths as imaginary resolutions of real social contradictions and 
Northrop Frye's conception of literature as a symbolic meditation on the destiny of 
community. There is, however, a more significant presupposition in The Political 
Unconscious upon which this widening of the concept of the unconscious would seem to 
rest and which Jameson never fully elucidates: that is to say, the equivalence between 
o· 
Jameson's conception of History and the Lacanian conception of the "Real". Jameson uses 
Lacan's capitalised Real consistently throughout his text, associating it directly with 
Althusser's notion of "absent cause" and consequently aligning it with his own conception 
of History. 61 I shall discuss Althusser's notion of structural causality in greater detail in 
the following section. Here I shall restrict myself to an analysis of the Lacanian notion of 
the ReaL arguing that whilst the Lacanian and Altht,lsserian systems appear to share certain 
concepts and terms, they in fact remain incommensurable. 
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In his essay 'Imagining the Real: Jameson's use of Lac an' Michael Clark writes: 
Following Lacan's argument that the Real is inaccessible except through the 
traces of its effects upon the symbolic, Jameson claims that History, too. 
can never be perceived or experienced except through its effects upon the 
various devices by which we mask its ultimate priority - most notably. the 
narratives that encapsulate and dramatize the various ideological fantasies 
operating at any particular period.62 
Following Jameson, Clark further states: 
Lacan's transposing the ground of consciousness from what Freud calls the 
"other scene" of the unconscious to the mechanisms of symbolic structures 
opens the unconscious to the determination of history as it functions at the 
material and socia11evels on which symbolic structures exist for Marxism 63 
Clark's claim is essentially that Lacan's reformulation of the concept of the unconscious 
and its relation to the Real enables Jameson to ground the text in History and retain access 
to History without recourse to a naive realism or wIgar materialism, and at the same time 
to formulate a conception of the unconscious and subjectivity which does not fall into the 
errors of either humanism or anti-humanism but allows for the articulation of the 
relationship between individual experience and trans-individual processes. The problem is 
whether or not such a claim is sustainable. 
Firstly, we must dismiss the notion that Lacan's conception of the Real has anything to do 
with empirical reality. For Lacan, realitY 'is perfectly knowable'64 but the Real is 
unknowable, it is, according to Lacan, that which resists symbolization absolutely. As a 
concept it is also inextricably entwined with Lacan's notion of the three orders or registers: 
the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real The capitalization of these terms distinguishes 
them from Lacan's early uses and also from more traditional conceptions of the symbol 
and symbolization. 65 The Imaginary order is the realm of the mother-child dyad, it is the 
pre-linguistic realm of sense-perception, of identifications and an illusory unity and 
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coherence, illusory in the sense that the child has not yet individuated itsel£ Between the 
ages of six and eighteen months the child begins to recognize its own image and to identify 
with that image, gradually formulating the conception of itself as that image. This is 
Lacan's well known Mirror stage. However, according to Lac~ what the child 
recognizes in the mirror is not so much itself as an ideal image, what Lacan caUs the 
specular self. The child sees in this specular image an ideal image of wholeness and 
coherence that the child itself lacks through its, as yet, underdeveloped motor control and 
linguistic competence. In this illusory, specular world, then, the child: 
seeks to provide himself or herself with consolation by identifying with 
chosen fragments of the world, by finding an imagined wholeness of the 
ego reflected in the seeming wholeness of the perceived thing. 66 
The mirror is a metaphor for any reflexive surface, the mother's face for example, in which 
the child sees its image reflected back and bestows upon that image a unity and coherence 
that the child herself or himself lacks. The Imaginary, therefore, is the birth place of the 
narcissistic "ideal ego," a realm of identification, mirror reflection and an illusory sense of 
wholeness. Malcom Bowie writes: 
By way of the Imaginary the original identificatory procedures which 
brought the ego into being are repeated and reinforced by the individual in 
his relationship with the external world of people and things. 67 
As the child formulates the concept ofl. of the specular I, of the image, it also suffers its 
first moment of alienation as it realizes the ideal I of the image is not itself: the child 
realizes that it has "mis"-recognized itself in the mirror. The realization of its mis-
recognition, for Lac~ leads to a profound "splitting" in the child, the realization that it is 
not complete or whole but essentially "lacking" in coherence and unity. The emergence of 
the split-subject is the moment for Lacan of ' the deflection of the specular I into the social 
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r.68 That is the moment in which the child emerges from the Imaginary realm of the 
mother-child dyad into the Symbolic Order an~ what Lacan calls, the Law of the Father. 
The Symbolic is the realm of language and the signifier, the child emerges into the 
Symbolic through the acquisition of language - the ability to formulate and articulate the 
concept "that is I". It is in the realm of the Symbolic that the child is fully constituted as a 
subject, but a subject that is doubly alienated. The first moment of alienation came about 
through the realization of its mis-recognition of the ideal image, the second moment 
comes about through language itself At the very moment at which the subject can be 
represented in the Symbolic it is displaced through the substitution of the "I". In other 
words, through the process of naming itself the subject becomes a representation of itself 
in the Symbolic order. It is now the subject's position within the Symbolic order, in 
Lacan's chain of signification,69 that constitutes it as a subject. 
It is language that marks the barrier between the Imaginary and the Symbolic, neither 
realm is reducible to the other but each is deeply implicated in the other. There is no area 
of the Symbolic upon which the imaginary does not impinge, in the sense that it defines a 
limit to the Symbolic. Equally the Symbolic delineates the terrain of the Imaginary, indeed 
the acquisition of language in the Symbolic is the precondition for any articulation of 
Imaginary experience. In this sense the Symbolic determines and structures Imaginary 
. 
material The Symbolic, then, is coextensive with the social field in its broadest sense; it is 
the realm oflanguage, of differentiation and above all desire. It is with the emergence into 
the Symbolic that the unconscious comes into being: for Lacan, it is only through language 
that we can have access to unconscious material Language, therefore, can be said to 
structure the unconscious material, or in Lacan's famous slogan "the unconscious is 
structured like a language". This is not to say that ~e unconscious "is" language but only 
that as unconscious desires must be mediated through language, the linguistic structures 
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will be imposed upon those desires and condition the form they take. 
Finally, we come to the last of Lacan's orders, the Real I have already insisted that the 
Real is not to be taken as reality as Lacan's notion of the Real is essentially that which 
resists mirror reflection and symbolization, it is beyond representation and linguistic 
expression. Not surprisingly, therefore, it is an area of Lacan's work that exponents say 
least about, for example, in his influential essay 'The Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan'70 
Jameson commences his discussion of the three orders with the observation: 
If the notion of the Real is the most problematical of the three - since it can 
never be experienced immediately, but only by way of the mediation of the 
other two - it is also the easiest to bracket for the purposes of this 
presentation.71 
However, for my purposes it is necessary to say a little more than this. The Real functions 
as the limit of the Symbolic and Imaginary, it cannot be assimilated to either of the other 
two orders but acts, as Malcom Bowie puts it, as 'a permanent agent of disharmony 
between the two'.72 Bowie contrasts Lacan's conception of the Real with Freud's 
conception of reality: 
For Freud "reality" is the world external to the human mind, and the 
"reality principle" lies in the individual's recognition that this world places 
limitations upon him as he,pursues his pleasures. For Lacan, on the other 
hand, the Real is that which lies ou}side the symbolic process and is found 
in the mental as well as in the material world: a trauma, for example, is as 
intractable and unsymbolizable as objects in their materiality.71 
The Real of trauma, therefore, is that which is impossible to assimilate, the Real of 
repression is that which is impossible to say, and the Real of a symptom is that which is 
impossible to bear.74 The Real, for Lacan, therefore is that which it is impossible for the 
subject to bear and: 
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which can be known only through the effect of a shock and about which 
nothing can be said, which is why the characteristics of the Real are all 
negative. The Real is a limit you run up against; it is the void, the 
impossible, an impasse.75 
This negative conception of the Real would not appear to square with Jameson's positive 
conception of History as the final untranscendable horizon of all interpretation and the 
terrain of class struggle. However, as we shall see below, History for Jameson also has its 
negative side as that which refuses desire. It would also not appear to be how Jameson 
understands the concept of the Real: 'it is not tembly difficult to say what is meant by the 
Real in Lacan,' he writes, 'It is simply History itself.76 However, Jameson does 
acknowledge that for psychoanalysis the history in question is the history of the subject, 
which is not quite the same thing as Jameson's more elusive "History itself'. Indeed, it is 
rather 'the resonance of the word' that suggests to Jameson that a 'confrontation'77 
between the materialism of psychoanalysis and historical materialism is long overdue. 
Lacan's reintroduction of the Rea~ argues Jameson, once more raises the question of the 
"referent," long thought to have been banished by structuralist and poststructuralist 
theory. The introduction of the referent immediately raises accusations that one is positing 
a naive form of "identity theory", in the sense that there is an identity, or presupposed 
unity, between the concept of a phenomenon and the phenomenon itself Lacan's 
conception of the decentred or split subject however annuls such charges as the subject 
'can know union neither with language nor with the Real and ... is structurally at a 
distance from both in its very being'.78 Equally, Lacan's conception of the Real also avoids 
the suggestion that History is simply a text like any other. The Real is not only that which 
resists symbolization absolutely but also acts as a "term-limit" upon the Symbolic, the very 
function of History in Jameson's schema. Thus for Jameson the study of the referent is not 
so much the study of the meaning of a given text but 'of the limits of its meaning and of 
lOS 
their historical preconditions, and of what is and must remain incommensurable with 
individual expression'. 79 
As we have already observed what makes Jameson's system dynamic rather than 
typological or classificatory is his insistence on the role of contradiction, the presence of 
History in a particular text and at each horizon of interpretation manifests itselfin the form 
ofa contradiction. Clark notes that contradiction in Jameson's work 'as the measure of the 
effect of History on its "narrativization'" functions in a same way as that of desire for 
Lacan, that is to say as 'an "anchoring point" that orients the symbolic toward the Real'.so 
11ris parallel between the functions of desire and contradiction is further reinforced 
through Jameson's identification of the relationship between desire and the Real and his 
own conception of the relationship between desire and history, in the sense that History is 
that which resists desire: 
So in addition to marking the effect of the Real on the Symbolic, desire 
also marks the threshold between the individual and the social, a 
connection that suggests an extension of desire beyond the individual 
subject - the very task that Jameson says must be achieved if the Freudian 
model of the unconscious is to function within a Marxian perspective. 81 
Just as for Lacan the Real is that which is impossible to bear, History for Jameson is 'what 
hurts' (PU, 102). According to Clark, Jameson's text marks 'a significant advance over 
~ 
prior efforts to adapt Lacan to Marxism';82 however, in a previous essay83 he also 
highlighted a number of difficulties with the text. There are obvious parallels, suggests 
Clark, between Lacan's three Orders, or registers: the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the 
Real and Jameson's three horizons of interpretation: text, society and History, or to put it 
another way, text as: imaginary resolution, socially symbolic act and History as non-
representable. But this parallel between James~n's three horizons and Lacan's three 
registers is never made explicit in The Political Unconscious. Indeed, there is a certain 
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incompatibility between the Lacanian notion of the relationship between the Real and the 
Symbolic and Jameson's relationship between text and History, in the sense that the text 
simultaneously articulates and textualizes its own situation, as though it did not exist prior 
to that textualization. This, suggests Clark, is to confuse two ontologies and simply to 
insist that we must grasp both these incommensurable dimensions of the symbolic act does 
not solve the problem or tell us how to do so. On the other hand, the refusal to make 
explicit the parallels with Lacan could be approached from the opposite direction as an 
indication that we should not be too ready to assimilate one system to the other, 
respecting the specificity of the object of both: desire for Lacan and History for Jameson. 
On the one hand, Jameson insists that Marxism and psychoanalysis, whilst presenting 
'striking analogies of structure',84 are not superimposable upon each other, and we must 
respect the specificity of each discourse and its distinct object of study. On the other hand, 
Jameson writes as if the concepts of Marxism and psychoanalysis are interchangeable and, 
indeed, the same thing. This confusion can be traced to the work of Althusser himself: 
who liberally appropriated terminology from psychoanalysis, his most familiar 
appropriation being the Freudian concept of "overdetermination". He used Lacanian 
concepts in his reformulation of the concept ofideology: 
Ideology, then, is the expression of the relation between men and their 
"world", that is, the (overdetermined) unity of the real relation and the 
imaginary relation between them arid their real conditions of existence. In 
ideology the real relation is inevitably invested in the imaginary relation. 8.5 
For Althusser the subject is constituted through ideology by a process of interpellation or 
hailing.86 Through the process of interpellation 'the subject is both positioned in ideology 
and confirmed in his own recognition of himself.87 Very briefly and schematically this 
process, according to Althusser, is a specular or mirroring process whereby ideology hails 
'individuals as subjects' who thereby recognize themselves in the image of the dominant 
107 
ideological 'Subject' which in turn enables 'the mutual recognition of subjects and Subject' 
and finally 'the subjects recognition of himself. 88 Althussers use ofpsychoanaJytic theory 
for his own theory of ideology is stated explicitly in the conclusion to his short essay 
'Freud and Lacan' in which he writes: 
Freud has discovered for us that the real subject, the individual in his 
unique essence, has not the form of an ego, centred on the 'ego', on 
'consciousness' or on 'existence - whether this is the existence of the for-
itself: of the body-proper or of'behaviour' - that the human subject is de-
centred, constituted by a structure which has no 'centre' either, except in 
the imaginary misrecognition of the 'ego', ie. in the ideological formations 
in which it 'recognizes' itsel£89 
Althusser goes on to say that this 'structure of misrecognWon' is the concern for 'all 
investigations into ideology'.90 As Michele Barrett points out Althussers vocabulary trails 
'Lacanian resonances' 91 but he does not reproduce Lacan's theories in a precise way and 
indeed uses Lacan's concepts in very different senses. For example, Althussers use of the 
term imaginary 'might be reduced to "lived": it is the domain of emotion, affect, will and 
experience'.92 This is not an everyday usage of the term, writes Barrett, but neither is it 
Lacan's. Similarly, Althussers specular theory of ideology speaks of misrecognition but as 
my overly schematic description of the process above makes clear 'his entire approach is 
cast in terms of the process of recognition as the means by which the subject is constituted 
to itself and to others'.93 As I outlined in,my discussion of the Lacan's Imaginary order, 
the very comer stone on which Lacan's theory of the Subject rests is that initia4 
fundamental, mis-recognition by the child of its own image in the mirror. Althussers 
theory of ideology, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with how subjects recognize 
themselves through ideological systems of representation. 
As Barrett suggests this is not simply a question of emphasis or whether or not Althusser 
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understood Lacan properly but 'whether he (or anyone else, indeed) could integrate such 
an argument into an account whose backdrop was the Marxist theory of reproduction of 
the relations of production'. 94 Reflecting on Althusser's conclusion to the essay 'Freud 
and Lacan' which I quoted above, Barrett acknowledges that here Althusser comes closer 
to Lacan than in any of his other writings. But when Althusser comes to investigate 
ideology the social categories through which subjects recognize themselves 'may fit the 
Marxist framework in which Althusser was operating ... but they do not correspond at any 
meaningful level with the content of Lacan's arguments about the ego and its 
identifications'.9s Barrett concludes 'with the advantage of hindsight, the gulf between 
Althusser and Lacan appears now as completely unbridgeable'. 96 I shall, therefore, 
conclude this discussion of Lacan with a final insistence that what Lacan meant by the 
Real and Althusser by structure or absent cause is emphatically not the same thing. 
Jameson's horizons of interpretation may trail resonances of Lacan's three orders but there 
is no correspondence between them in any meaningful sense. 
Similarly, Jameson describes his horizons of interpretation as dialectically equivalent to 
Northrop Frye's conception of levels or phases: the literal or descriptive, the formal, the 
archetypal and the anagogic; but the actual nature of this equivalence is left unsaid. This 
still leaves the problem of what is the relationship between these three horizons and what 
is the mechanism of transition from one to another. Jameson's own practice does little to 
resolve the dilemma as he focuses on each particular object of study: the symbolic act, the 
ideologeme and the ideology of form, individually and each in relation to a different text 
suggesting that Jameson himselfmay remain uncertain on this point. As James Iflland puts 
it: 
I do not wish to suggest that the text cannot be all three of these differently 
formulated objects of study. Rather my question is how is it all three?97 
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A number of critics98 have also questioned the notion that History is repressed and 
operates as a textual unconscious. In the concluding chapter I will suggest that this results 
from Jameson's over-reliance on the concept ofreification at the expense of other forms of 
mediation; here I would like to propose that contrary to Jameso~ History may be 
emphatically present in our cultural texts. Jonathan Arac foregrounds the dilemma of the 
political (un)consciousness in Jameson's text through a critique of Jameson's reading of 
Conrad. Arac does not offer an alternative reading but rather through a juxtapositioning 
of Jameson's text with that of a previous generation of left criticism (Irving Howe's 
reading of Nostromo in Politics and the Novel) highlights what Jameson actually leaves 
out, that is to say, 'the historical-political consciousness actually available in the work'.99 
Taking the opening paragraph of Nostromo, Arac reveals a scene not absent of people but, 
on the contrary, replete with traces of human presence, human labour and an 'historical 
consciousness wholly suppressed by Jameson's reading'lOO In other words, in order for the 
geiger-counter of the political unconscious to unveil the repressed and buried reality of 
history it must first repress and bury it. I should now like to consider at greater length the 
status of History itself and in what sense we can say that History is a narrative. 
History as Narrative 
As I indicated above Marxism is for Jameson an "absolute historicism" in the sense that it 
simultaneously historicizes its object of study and its own conditions of possibility. In 
other words it constantly underscores the historicity of its own conceptual operations and 
categories, thus: 
Marx's method ... excludes from the outset any possibility for theory to 
alienate itself speculatively in its own ideational products by presenting 
them either as ideal realities without a history of their own or as idealities 
that refer to a reality that would itself be nonhistorica1. 101 
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However, the view that Marxism is an historicism, "absolute" or otherwise, received its 
most stringent critique from the work of Louis Althusser in his seminal work Reading 
Capita/. 102 Althusser's critique of historicism revolves around two central theses which he 
sees as the inevitable outcome of reading Marxism as an historicism: the first is that it 
tends to conflate the various distinct levels of society (the economic, the political, the 
ideological etc.) thus reducing and flattening the concept of totality into a version of the 
Hegelian conception of totality. Secondly, the process of mediation tends to posit an 
identity between specific and distinct levels thus eliding their real differences. The index 
of this theoretical lapse is that it 'precipitates the theory of history into real history; 
reduces the (theoretical) object of the science of history to real history; and therefore 
confuses the object of knowledge with the real object'. 103 
In The Political Unconscious, Jameson subjects Althusser's three forms of historical 
causality or effectivity - mechanica4 expressive and structural - to a thorough 
reexamination, arguing that Marxism is not only an historicism but as an absolute 
historicism it can accomodate the Althusserian critique. The first form of historical 
causality, mechanical causality, or the billiard-ball effect, would appear to have been 
conclusively refuted by modem physics, and for Althusser it lacks the capacity to think the 
effectivity of the whole on its parts. Jameson, however, suggests that concept has a "local 
validity", citing the example of 'the crisis in late nineteenth-century publishing, during 
which the dominant three-decker lending library novel was replaced by a cheaper one-
volume format, and the modification of the "inner form" of the novel itself (PU, 25), as 
just one instance where it retains a certain explanatory force. Although, on balance, it 
remains an inadequate and unsatisfactory category for a greater understanding of the 
historical process, mechanical causality can be said to have a provisional value in cultural 
analysis through its assertion that material and con~ingent accidents can have an effect on 
the structure and tone of our narrative paradigms. For Jameson, therefore, mechanical 
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causality is less a concept that can be 'evaluated on its own terms, than one of the various 
laws and subsystems of our peculiarly reified social and cultural life' (PU, 26). The heart 
of Althusser's attack on historicism is reserved for the second category of expressive 
causality which he identifies with an Hegelian conception of history. History, for Hegel, 
'is mind clothing itself with the form of events or the immediate actuality ofnature'.104 In 
other words, history is min<L or spirit, as it manifests itself in nature, in the external world. 
As with the philosophy ofmin<L Hegel's philosophy of history can be seen in terms of the 
growth and progress of "world-spirit" as it attains ever greater self-realization, or self-
awareness. The progress of world-spirit therefore can be descn"bed as an historical 
narrative in which the journey of world-spirit is divided into chapters or historical periods 
as the 'world spirit passes through stages at each of which it possesses a more adequate 
awareness of what it is'.105 What "spirit" is, in the sense of full self-awareness, is 
"freedom": the idea of spirit, according to Cohen, and freedom are two ways of descn"bing 
the same thing: 'the idea of spirit is freedom'.l06 In short 'history is spirit's biography'lo7 
with freedom as its telos. However, suggests Jameson, we should not view the attainment 
of "Absolute Spirit" as the final stage of history but rather, as with absolute knowledge, it 
'is meant to describe the historian's mind as it contemplates the variety of human histories 
and cultural forms'. 108 
For Althusser, the two essential characteristics, or errors, of the Hegelian conception of 
J 
history are its positing of homogenous continuity of time and its contemporaneity. The 
former is a direct consequence of the 'the continuity of the dialectical development of the 
Idea'.109 In other words, just as the growth of consciousness is punctuated by stages as 
consciousness dialectically transcends unsatisfactory and inadequate levels of awareness, 
'the science of history would consist of the division of this continuum according to a 
periodi=ation corresponding to the succession of <?ne dialectical totality after another'.1I0 
As we shall see in a moment this would effectively rule out the possibility for and the 
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specificity ot: the coexistence of distinct historical times. The latter characteristic is the 
precondition for the former in the sense that 'the structure of historical existence is such 
that all the elements of the whole always co-exist in one and the same time, one and the 
same present, and are therefore contemporaneous with one another in one and the same 
present'.ll1 The contemporaneous nature of the Hegelian social totality allows for the 
isolation of what Althusser calls the essential section or vertical break, that is to say 'a 
break in the present such that all the elements of the whole revealed by this section are in 
immediate relationship with one another, a relationship that immediately expresses their 
internal essence'.lll For Althusser, the Hegelian conception of history also constitutes 
itself as the absolute hori=on of all knowing, knowledge can never be anything but 'the 
existence in knowing of the internal principle of the whole'. 11] Thus the anticipation of an 
alternative future, which Marxism's capacity to entertain sets it apart from other theories 
of history, is effectively ruled out. The Hegelian model also leads us to a fallacious 
separation of synchrony and diachrony, whereby: 
The synchronic ... presupposes the ideological conception of a continuous -
homogeneous time. It follows that the diachronic is merely the 
development of this present in the sequence of a temporal continuity in 
which the 'events' to which 'history' in the strict sense can be reduced ... 
are merely successive contingent presents in the time continuum. 114 
According to Althusser, the most. serious misconception deriving from Hegel's view of 
history is its formulation of the social whole, or totality, as an expressive whole, in the 
sense that 'it presupposes in principle that the whole in question be reducible to an inner 
essence, of which the elements of the whole are then no more than phenomenal forms of 
expression, the inner principle of the essence being present at each point in the whole'.115 
In other words, the notion of an inner essence and outer phenomena presupposes that the 
totality, ifit is to be applicable everywhere and at every moment to each of the phenomena 
arising in the totality, must have a certain nature, which the parts are merely the outer 
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expression of This reduces the heterogeneity of historical time to an homogeneous 
continuum and the specificity and relative autonomy of the distinct levels of the social 
totality to a contemporaneous or homogeneous present. Therefore, contrary to mechanical 
causality, expressive causality allows us to think the determination of the whole on the 
parts but it does so only if we conceive of the whole as totality in a spiritual or 
metaphysical sense. 
The Hegelian or Western Marxist tradition saw Marx as preserving Hegel's structure of 
historical periods, but, in the well known formula of "standing Hegel back on his feet", 
endowing the form with a new content. For Marx it is not man's consciousness that 
shapes the world but his material conditions. Althusser, on the other han~ rejects the 
notion of a continuity between Marx and Hegel insisting on an "epistemological break" or 
"rupture" between the mature Marx of Capital and previous modes of thought, including 
Marx's own earlier writings. Althusser insists that Marx's "epistemological break" was to 
reject the empiricist conception of history, whereby history is simply given, and to replace 
this givenness with the "concept" of his object of study. In other words, to replace the 
knowledge of the thing-itself with the knowledge ofits concepts: 
every scientific discipline is based at a certain level, precisely that level at 
which its concepts find a content ... Such is the level of Marx's historical 
theory: the level of the concepts of structure, superstnlcture and all their 
specijications.116 
We must therefore, according to Althusser, reject any conception of history as the 
"science of the concrete", or that the theory of history 'as theory', could be subject to the 
'concrete' determinations of 'historical time'. 117 We must construct the object of history as 
a knowledge of history by producing the concept of history, that is to say, the historical 
fact: which 'as opposed to all the other phenomena that occur in historical existence, can 
be defined as afact which causes a mutation in the existing structural relations'.118 For 
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Althusser the object of history, as a science, has the same kind of theoretical existence and 
occupies the same theoretical level as the object of Marx's political economy. Indeed, 
Marx's theory ofpolitical economy entails, or presupposes, a theory of history in the sense 
that the theory of political economy only considers one level of the social totality whilst 
the theory of history takes the totality as a whole as its object of study. 
Althusser's conception of totality is that of a structure within which exist subordinate or 
regional structures. Thus, the economic structure exists as one level or region of the 
structure as a whole: 
the economic cannot have the qualities of a given (of the immediately 
Visible and observable, etc.), because its identification requires the concept 
of the structure of the economic, which in turn requires the concepts of the 
structure of the mode of production (its different levels and specific 
articulations) - because its identification therefore presupposes the 
construction of its concept. 119 
In other words, the economic structure must be seen as a regional structure embedded 
within a global structure, or, to use a spatial metaphor, 'a complex and deep space, itself 
inscribed in another complex and deep space',120 The Marxian conception of the social 
totality, therefore: 
is constituted by a certain type of complexity, the unity of a structural 
whole containing what can be called levels or instances which are distinct 
and 'relatively autonomous', and co-exist within this complex structural 
unity, articulated with one another according to specific determinations, 
fixed in the last instance by the level or instance of the economy. 121 
This formulation, however, poses a number of problems, for we as yet lack the concepts 
with which to think the determination of phenomena by a structure and the determination 
of one structure upon a subordinate one, or the relations that exist between structures; in 
other words, 'how is it possible to define the' concept of structural causality'?122 
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Althusser accounts for the determination of subordinate structures by determinate ones 
with the concept of "overdetermination", or multiple causality. Althusser's insistence on 
the distinction between the Hegelian and the Marxian dialectic is of paramount importance 
in this respect. Althusser writes: 
If we clearly perceive the intimate and close relation that the Hegelian 
structure of dialectic has with Hegel's 'world outlook', that is, with his 
speculative philosophy, this 'world outlook' cannot really be cast aside 
without our being obliged to transform profoundly the structures of that 
dialectic. Il3 
For Althusser, the structure of the Hegelian dialectic cannot be separated from Hegel's 
philosophy of history, which reduces the complex and contradictory nature of the 
historical process to a "simple" contradiction, internal to the dialectic itselL Thus, writes 
Althusser, the 'simplicity of the Hegelian contradiction is made possible only by the 
simplicity of the internal principle that constitutes the essence of any historical period'. 124 
In other words, the diversity and heterogeneity of history is reduced to the singular 
principle of dialectical development. Ifwe carry this principle over into Marxism, argues 
Althusser, through the temptation to invert Hegel or stand the Hegelian dialectic back on 
its feet; it: 
results in the radical reduction of the dialectic of history to the dialectic 
generating the successive modes of production, that is, in last analysis, the 
different production techniques. There are names for these temptations in 
the history of Marxism: economism' and even technologism.12.5 
As Jameson points out, Althusser's critique of Hegelianism is in fact a coded critique of 
Stalinism within the French Communist party (PU, 37) and Stalin's version of dialectical 
materialism, or diamat, which produced 'a unilinear vision of history as the evolution in 
fixed sequence of progressive modes ofproduction'.126 Althusser opposed to the simple 
contradiction of the Hegelian dialectic and its Marxian variant, in the form of the reduction 
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of all, what we may call, contingent contradictions to the general contradiction between 
the forces and relations of production, the new concept of complex contradiction and 
overdetermination. Althusser argues that: 
If ... a vast accumulation of' contradictions' comes into play in the same 
court, some of which are radically heterogeneous - of different origins, 
different sense, different levels and points of application - but which 
nevertheless 'merge' into a ruptural unity, we can no longer talk of the sole, 
unique power of the general' contradiction'. 127 
In Althusserian terminology, the contradictions at different levels of society will have a 
relative autonomy and cannot be reduced to a simple principle of dialectical contradiction. 
The social structure is a complex unity of different and distinct but interrelated levels and 
regions, each level has its own internal contradictions and these contradictions are 
determinate upon the social structure and not simply the product of a general 
contradiction. 
The problem for Althusser is how to think this new concept of structure and for this he 
borrows the category of Darstellung (or, presentation). For Althusser the concept of 
Darstellung designates 'the mode of presence of the structure in its effects, and therefore 
to designate structural causality itself. 128 In other words: 
the structure is immanent in its effects, a cause immanent in its effects in 
the Spinozist sense of the term, that the whole existence of the structure 
consists of its effects, in short that the structure, which is merely a specific 
combination of its peculiar elements, is nothing outside its effects. 129 
History, therefore, is what Althusser calls an "absent cause", something that we know, not 
as the thing-in-itself: but through its effects; indeed the very notion of the concrete is the 
product of thought and not empirical existence itself: We cannot know history itself: in 
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the sense that my opening quotation from Lukacs implies, but only have knowledge of it 
as the concept of history, and must therefore maintain at all times the distinction between 
the object of Knowledge (the concept of history) and the real object (the empirical events 
of history). 
Jameson concedes that on its own terms the Althusserian critique is 'quite unanswerable' 
(PU, 27), but in a characteristic gesture suggests that this is to miss the point: Althusser is 
not attacking historicism as such. What is really at issue here, suggests Jameson, is a dual 
problem around the nature of periodization and the representation of History. Firstly, 
there is a synchronic dimension to the problem in which the concept of an historical period 
presents everything as 'a seamless web of phenomena each of which, in its own way, 
"expresses" some unified inner truth' (PU, 27). And secondly, a diachronic dimension 'in 
which history is seen in some "linear" way as the succession of such periods, stages, or 
moments' (PU, 28). For Jameson the second problem represents the prior one, for the 
reason: 
that individual period formulations always secretly imply or project 
narratives or "stories" - narrative representations - of the historical 
sequence in which such individual periods take their place and from which 
they derive their significance. (PU, 28) 
What Althusser is really attacking under the rubric of expressive causality, and historicism 
generally, suggests Jameson, is in fact allegorical interpretations which seek to rewrite 
given sequences or periods in terms of a hidden master-narrative. Althusser's critique of 
historicism, in other words, can be read as code for the critique of vulgar Marxism or 
economism, and in place of Hegel we should read Stalin. However, if we understand 
allegory not as the reduction of the heterogeneity of historical sequences to a 
predetermined narrative but in the way outlined abo,ve130 then the concept of an historical 
narrative can be rehabilitated. Indeed, Jameson proposes that his conception of the 
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political unconscious can resolve this dilemma, of accommodating the Althusserian 
critique within a teleological, or more accurately narrative, vision of history, by relocating 
it in the object. This would then allow for a defense of expressive causality along the lines 
of the case made for mechanical causality in that it has a local validity: 
if interpretation in terms of expressive causality or of allegorical master 
narratives remains a constant temptatio~ this is because such master 
narratives have inscribed themselves in the texts as well as in thinking about 
them; such allegorical narrative signifieds are a persistent dimension of 
literary and cultural texts precisely because they reflect a fundamental 
dimension of our collective thinking and our collective fantasies about 
history and reality. (PU, 34) 
Our task as critics is not to abolish these faint murmurings of history and reality from texts 
but to retain them, and open ourselves up once more to the reception of history through 
our cultural texts. When Althusser underlined the absolute distinction between our 
knowledge of the Real and the Real itself: he did not thereafter abolish the ReaL in the 
sense of a reality independent of our conceptualizations and symbolization of it. Thus, 
suggests Jameson, we can reformulate Althusser's conception of history which at once 
takes account of his critique of expressive causality and of interpretation generally but at 
the same time retains a place for these operations: 
history is not a text, not a narrative, master or otherwise, but that, as an 
absent cause, it is inaccessible to us except in textual form, and that our 
approach to it and to the' Real itself necessarily passes through its prior 
textualization, its narrativization in the political unconscious. (PU, 35) 
Like the Althusserian conception of structure, History is not immediately present, not 
graspable in itself but is something we know through its effects or textualizations. 
However, Althusserianism has posed something of a paradox in that it has 'effectively 
discredited the Marxian versions of a properly teleological history' whilst at the same time 
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restoring 'the problematic of mode of production as the central organizing category of 
Marxism' (PU, 33). Jameson observes that if Althusserian Marxism is to be classified as a 
structuralism then it must be with the proviso 'that it is a structuralism for which only one 
structure exists' (PU, 36) that is to say the mode of production. For Althusser, the mode 
of production is identified with the structure as a whole, with the total system of social 
relations and relationships between levels. Thus on the one hand the concept of mode of 
production takes on something of an eternal nature, whilst on the other the emphasis of 
the semi-, or relative, autonomy of distinct levels has legitimated 'a renewed defense of the 
reified specializations of the bourgeois academic disciplines' (PU, 38). This ambiguity, 
according to Jameson, is a consequence of Althusser's rejection of "mediation". 
Mediation, or as Jameson now terms it transcoding, is the traditional way in which 
Marxism makes connections between disparate phenomena and social life generally: 
Mediation is the classical dialectical term for the establishment of 
relationships between, say, the formal analysis of a work of art and its 
social ground, or between the internal dynamics of the political state and its 
economic base. (PU, 39) 
Althusser rejected mediation on the grounds that it posited an identity between phenomena 
and conflated distinct levels. However, Jameson argues that Althusser's notion of semi-
autonomy relates just as much as it separates and ifwe are to define difference, then we 
need a prior concept of identity which to define it against. Mediation is just such a 
process in that it 'undertakes to establish [an] initial identity against which then - but only 
then - local identification or differentiation can be registered' (PU, 42). This is not to 
affirm an identity between the phenomena concerned but register a relationship between 
them and for Jameson: 
Such momentary reunification would remain purely symbolic, a mere 
methodological fiction, were it not understood that social life is in its 
fundamental reality one and indivisible, a seamless web, a single 
inconceivable and transindividual process, 'in which there is no need to 
invent ways of linking language events and social up-heavals or economic 
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contradictions because on that level they were never separate from one 
another. (PU, 40) 
Just as historicism was not Althusser's real target, Jameson insists that neither is the 
concept of mediation for which we should rather read "Homologies" of the type practised 
by Lucien Go]dmann, which tended to posit all too easy solutions whilst forestalling the 
laborious work of theory, and also the productionist ideologies which make fatuous 
equations between manual and intellectual labour. 
At this point Jameson is ready to reappraise the work of Althusser, drawing the conclusion 
that structural Marxism is not so much a radical break with traditional Marxisms but a 
modification within the dialectical tradition: 
Althusserian structural causality is therefore just as fundamentally a 
practice of mediation as is the "expressive causality" to which it is opposed. 
(PU, 41) 
Indeed, not only do we discover that Althusser is in accord with Hegel but also with 
Lukacs. According to Jameson, Lukacs' notion of totality is one of a methodological 
standard, 'an essentially critical and negative, demystifying operation' (PU, 52) and as such 
is "non-representational". Thus, it can be seen to rejoin Althusser's notion of "absent 
cause".13l Jameson's appraisal and reformulation of Althusserian Marxism is nothing less 
than a virtuoso performance of di~lectical ~bt1ety and ingenuity; however, his assimilation 
of Structural Marxism back into his own Hegelian paradigm seems just a little too neat, 
everything falls into place a little too readily. Reading Althusser, and whilst ackowledging 
the criticism that Jameson and others have made of this "one-dimensional Marxism", one 
still feels that Althusserianism and Hegelianism remain radically incommensurable. 
According to Robert Young, what Jameson is attempting to bring about is: 
something which from a perspective of European Marxism is true1y 
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scandalous, namely a rapprochment between the two antithetical traditions 
of Sartre and Althusser, incorporated within a larger Lukacsian totality. 132 
Jameson's recourse to Lukacs and Sartre in less pronounced in The Political Unconscious 
than in his earlier texts but it remains there through his conception of History. However, 
argues Young, it is this very question of history that so divides the two figures and they 
cannot be simply synthesized together as Jameson attempts to do. As we have seen 
Jameson's key categories are: narrative, mediation and totality. Following Lukacs, 
Jameson insists that narrative is not merely a literary category but a central function of the 
human mind, one of our main organizational categories for ordering the world around us. 
But as Young persuasively argues: 
Narrative thus articulates the subject and the objective, and this 
reconciliation apparently enables Jameson to dispense with the problem of 
the subject altogether. 133 
The locus of Jameson's dialectical recuperation of expressive causality is to relocate the 
problematic in the object, situating the traces of an historical master narrative in the texts 
themselves. Yet this would seem to contradict Jameson's opening assertion of following 
the path of the subject; it also does not resolve the problematic but simply relocates it. 
Young suggests that Jameson's synthesizing strategy completely misses the substance of 
Althusser's critique of Sartre, namely that for Sartre, 'consciousness remains the basis for 
the structure of the totality'. 134 The very real differences between Althusser's and Sartre's 
respective views of history are simply elided as Jameson's synthesizing involves 'more of 
the persuasive rhetoric of a rough argument than a theory whose logical premises and 
moves have been demonstrated in detail'. 13' Such a synthesizing strategy, which 
consistently eradicates theoretical differences, observes Young would be impermissible in 
a European intellectual climate strongly influenced by post-structuralism and 
deconstruction. Jameson's sweeping, all-inclusive, theoretical gestures can be seen as a 
consequence of his position as a Marxist within the· Unitied States and more specifically as 
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an academic Marxist. As Young indicates 'The Political Unconscious remains noticably 
circumspect in spelling out the politico-theoretical implications of what it is trying to dO'136 
indeed, the one reflection on the kind of politics Jameson's theorizing implies is a footnote 
on alliance politics (PU, 54). As I shall argue below, Jameson's strategy and view of 
History as a single great adventure appears to be a particularly North American 
perspective of history which tends to over hastily assimilate cultural and historical 
diversity to a single master narrative. 
Althusser forcefully argues that the 'inversion' of a problematic retains the same structure 
as that problematic: 
If it is true that the 'inversion' of a problematic retains the same structure as 
that problematic, it is not surprising that the relationship of direct 
expression (given all the necessary 'mediations') between real history and 
philosophy conceived by Hegel and Croce recurs in the inverted theory: 137 
It will therefore not be surprising, in what Jameson would call a return of the repressed, to 
find the same dilemmas arising in Jameson's inversion of expressive causality that he 
wished to banish in the first place. Thus his defence of mediation against the overhasty 
positing of an identity between phenomena and the conflation of distinct structural levels 
finds its theoretical justification in just such a conflation, in the sense that mediations will 
remain purely a fiction unless we grasp sociallife as 'in its ftmdamental reality one and 
indivisible, a seamless web, a single inconceivable and transindividual process' (PU, 34). 
Equally Jameson's strenuous efforts to define History as a single great adventure. as the 
great unfinished narrative of the collective struggle to wrest the realm of freedom from the 
realm of necessity, rest on the positing of a single unified and homogenous time. For 
Jameson, this is the time of class struggle, or rather of North American capitalism. In a 
series of contentious essays on "Third World" literature138 Jameson proposed that: 
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Third-world texts, even those which are seemingly private and invested 
with a properly libidinal dynamic - necessarily project a political dimension 
in the form of national allegory: the story of the private individual destiny 
is always an allegory of the embattled situation of the public third-world 
culture and society. 139 
To substantiate this claim Jameson offers a reading of a work by 'China's greatest writer, 
Lu Xun'l40 and Xala by the Senegalese writer Ousmane Sembsne. Jameson's readings, are 
as always illuminating and provocative, but can we really reduce the diversity and 
heterogeneity of "all" third-world literature to the examples of two writers and on the 
basis of such a reduction can we seriously argue that third-world literature always 
constitutes national allegories? The unease one feels with such a sweeping, over 
generalizing, statement is only heightened by the insertion of a clause on 'a properly 
libidinal dynamic'; what would be an "improper" libidinal dynamic? And who is to decide 
what is proper and improper in such a case: the writer, the indigenous critic or the first-
world cultural theorist? Reflecting on his increasing discomfort upon reading Jameson's 
essay Aijaz Ahmad writes: 
when I was on the fifth page of this text (specifically, on the the sentence 
starting with "All third-world texts are necessarily ... " etc.), I realized that 
what was being theorised was, among many other things, myself Now, I 
was born in India and I am a Pakistani citizen; I write poetry in Urdu, a 
language not commonly understood among US intellectuals. So, I said to 
myself: "All? ... necessarily?" It felt odd. Matters got much more curious, 
however. For, the farther I read the more I realized, with no little chargin, 
that the man whom I had for so long, so affectionately, even though from a 
physical distance, taken as a comrade was, in his own opinion, my 
civilizational Other. 141 
Jameson's totalizing logic treats the whole "third-world", a problematic concept in itself as 
Ahmad points out, as a homogenous entity in which the Other is constituted as the same. 
In Jameson's text, the third-world is defined '~olely in terms of its experience of 
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colonialism'. 142 It therefore reduplicates the history of European colonialism. For 
Jameson, the third-world provided the dialectical contrary to first world multi-national 
capitalism, which as we see in chapter 4, will increasingly be eroded by the globalization of 
postmodern culture. In terms of The Political Unconscious we are now in a position to 
answer that recurrent question what is "History itself"? and whose single great adventure 
is it? As Young writes: 
No one apparently is allowed a history outside of 'us' - that is Western 
civilization and the Western point of view, which for Jameson seems to 
mean the USA 143 
Jameson would not appear to have accommodated the Althusserian notion of structural 
causality within his own conception of structural historicism so much as to have annulled 
the former through a revamped Hegelianism in the shape of the latter. 
However the Althusserian conception of structural causality cannot be folded back quite 
so easily into a narrative vision of history with its continuum of time, for Jameson the time 
of class struggle. For Althusser there is no single continuum of time but different times 
deriving from the possibility of different histories corresponding to the different levels of 
the social whole: 
Each of these different 'levels' does not have the same type of historical 
existence. On the contrary: we have to assign to each level a peculiar time, 
relatively autonomous and hence' relatively independent, even in its 
dependence, of the 'times' of the other levels. We can and must say: for 
each mode of production there is a peculiar time and history, punctuated in 
a specific way by the development of the productive forces;l44 
However, this does not seem to be the lesson that Jameson draws from Althusser. 
Criticizing Jameson's Eurocentrism, which would perhaps be more appropriate to describe 
as US-centrism, Young writes: 
12S 
Such an arrogant and arrogating narrative means that the story of "world 
history" not only involves what Fredric Jameson describes as the wrestling 
of freedom from the realm of necessity but always also the creation, 
subjection, and final appropriation of Europe's "others".14S 
Before considering Jameson's politics of desire in the next chapter, I shall briefly examine 
two more aspects of his political unconscious, that is: the nature of the relationship 
between history and text or narrative and Jameson's "solution" to the problem of 
diachrony through the non-synchronous development of modes of production. 
Jameson emphasises that History, in the sense that he aligns it with Althusser's "absent 
cause" or Lacan's "Real", is fundamentally non-narrative and nonrepresentable; equally it is 
not a text but it remains inaccessible except through its prior (re)textualizations. 
However, as John Frow points out: 
If history is accessible only through discursive or epistemological 
categories, is there not a real sense in which it therefore has only a 
discursive existence?146 
Jameson is at pains to avoid such a conclusion as this would lead down the post-
structuralist and postmodemist path that there is nothing outside the text. Such 
arguments, according to Roy Bhaskar, rest on a confusion between ontological and 
epistemological categories, what he calls the "epistemic fallacy"147 or the reduction of 
"being" to "knowing". Unfortunately, lameson's defence of an independent reality seems 
to amount to no more than a single sentence: 
One does not have to argue the reality of history: necessity, like Dr. 
lohnson's stone, does that for us. (PU, 82) 
History, for Jameson, is the experience of necessity, it is not a narrative in the sense that it 
represents the content of a story but rather the form through which we experience 
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necessity; the formal effects of an absent, nonrepresentational cause. We find ourselves 
then in the paradoxical situation that Jameson's justification for History as a 'properly 
narrative political unconscious' (PU, 102) is that it needs no justification: 
Conceived in this sense, History is what hurts, it is what refuses desire and 
sets inexorable limits to individual as well as collective praxis, which its 
"ruses" turn into grisly and ironic reversals of their overt intention. But this 
History can be apprehended only through its effects, and never directly as 
some reified force. This is indeed the ultimate sense in which History as 
ground and untranscendable horizon needs no particular theoretical 
justification: we may be sure that its alienating necessities will not forget 
us, however much we might prefer to ignore them (PU, 102) 
History is not so much a thing, or a process we can know, as a structural limit upon 
consciousness, a limit we constantly come up against whether we intend it or not. It 
would seem, though, that after having painstakingly worked through the Althusserian 
strictures against historicism we are back where we started, that is to say, the precipitation 
of the theory of history into real history, or the conflation of the object of Knowledge with 
the real object. In other words, the reduction of the theory or science of history to history 
itself and which, as Michael Sprinker has pointed out, 'risks collapsing into empiricism'.148 
However, we need not completely abandon the concept of history as essentially narrative, 
or more specifically the narrative of class struggle. According to Paul Ricoeur 'if history 
were to sever its links with narrative it would cease to be historical'149 but the insistence 
on the essential narrative character of history is not to be confused with the defense of 
narrative history. What Jameson appears to overlook in his conception of a political 
unconscious is the gap inscribed between the historical narrative and history itself by the 
very act of narration; 'the distance introduced by narrative between itself and lived 
experience ... Between living and recounting, a gap - however small it may be - is opened 
up. Life is lived, history is recounted'. ISO For Ricoeur, narrative's particular value and 
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fruitfulness lies in its "intelligibility", in its ability to organize the bewildering mass of 
historical data into a form that is readily understandable. As Louis Mink writes: 
narrative is a primary cognitive instrument - an instrument rivale<L in fact, 
only by theory and by metaphor as irreducible ways of making the flux of 
experience comprehensible. lSI 
Ricoeur obselVes that both human experience and narrative share a fundamental quality in 
that they are both temporal in character; temporality does not in itself constitute a 
narrative. Thus according to Mink . our experience of life does not itself necessarily have 
the form of narrative, except as we give it that form by making it a subject of stories'.lS2 
This process by which we select and organize the various events and actions that we wish 
to recount is what is known as "emplotment". The notion of emplotment has the 
advantage of foregrounding the inherent ideological component of history. Our historical 
narratives are not neutral or scientifically objective but contain and project certain 
presuppositions. For instance, the notion of the plot is that it has a begining a middle and 
an en<L yet history is necessarily selective, not only in the events and actions it chooses to 
recount but where it chooses to begin and end and the point it decides that a given 
narrative is coherent and complete. This does not necessarily imply that history is anything 
we choose it to be; one can still put a case for an independent reality subject to veridical 
criteria, whilst acknowledging the mode of presentation as itself an important signifier of 
meaning. We can therefore perhaps refonnulate Jameson's conception of History and 
Narrative to take account of both Althusser's notion of the specificity of historical times 
and the recent reflections of historiography and suggest that: History is not a narrative, 
master or otherwise, but remains inaccessible to us except through its prior 
(re)narrativizations, which always presuppose an implicit political unconscious. 
If Jameson's project exhibits a tendency towards 'an overly homogenous conception of 
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time, it also falls prey to the charge of "contemporaneity", Jameson's use of mode of 
production as the final determining instance seeks to avoid the charge of economism or 
. vulgar Marxism by designating it as the unity of the forces of production and the relations 
of production, He then identifies the mode of production, following Althusser and 
Balibar, with the social totality as a structure,IS3 Gregory Elliott snmmarizes Bahear's 
thesis thus: 
As a conceptual object, a mode of production was conceived by Balibar as 
a self-reproducing totality which reproduced both the relations and the 
forces of production and the non-economic conditions of existence, ie, the 
requisite conditions of the other instances, 154 
The problem with such a definition, Elliott points out is that it cannot account for the 
transition from one mode of production to another, as each mode of production becomes a 
self-enclosed totality, Aware of this problem, Balibar first proposed a general law of 
transition based upon the postulate of transitional modes of production 'characterized by a 
'dislocation' between the forces and relations of production', 155 According to Elliott, this 
solution is ruled out on at least three accounts: firstly, it requires a distinction between the 
synchronic and the diachronic which Althusser's epistemology rules out. Secondly it 
restores the very teleological representation of history Althusser's strictures ruled out. 
And finally it still cannot account for the transition between a transitional and a non-
transitional mode of production. . Balibar, therefore, proposed a second solution to the 
problem of transition from one mode of production to another: 
Periods of transition, he conjectured. are' characterized by the coexistence 
of several modes of production', The noncorrespondence between the two 
connexions of the economic structure and between the different social 
levels during them, 'merely reflects the coexistence of two (or more) modes 
of production in a single ''simultaneity'', and the dominance of one of 
them over the other ',1.56 
This would certainly appear to accord with Jameson's theorization of dominant, residual 
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and emergent modes of production and non synchronous development as I outlined it 
above. However, Elliott identifies a number of presuppositions, again not all of which are 
consistent with Althusserian epistemology, but of 'greatest salience here was the 
distinction made ... between mode of production and social formation'IS7 According to 
Elliott the fruitfulness of this distinction: 
is to differentiate between the theoretical Marxist concepts (themselves of 
different degrees of abstraction) employed in the analysis of any given 
historical/social reality and the particular realities ... under analysis. ls8 
However, it is precisely such a distinction which Jameson's theorization wishes to forestall. 
arguing that it is inadequate and misleading 'to the degree that it encourages the very 
empirical thinking which it was concerned to denounce, in other words, subsuming a 
particular or an empirical "fact" under this or that corresponding "abstraction" (PU, 95). 
For Jameson, what we can take from the notion of social formation is the concept of the 
structural coexistence of several modes of production simultaneously and this 'at one 
stroke' resolves the problem of the synchronic and diachrony. Jameson writes: 
What is synchronic is the "concept" of the mode of production; the moment 
of the historical coexistence of several modes of production is not 
synchronic in this sense, but open to history in a dialectical way. (PU, 95) 
However, it takes more than an act of fiat to resolve this dilemma, and Jameson's response 
does not really seem to be a solution. Firstly, Jameson insists that there can only be one 
totality which he identifies with the mode of production but if there is a structural 
coexistence of more than one mode of production would not this imply the structural 
coexistence of more than one totality? For Balibar, this indeed was one of the logical 
outcomes of his theory of transitional modes of product ion. I 59 Secondly, Jameson argues 
the necessity of a structural dominant, so that we can distinguish between the various 
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historical modes of production, and the transition between these various dominants he 
accounts for with the concept of cultural revolution. But is there not a sense in: which, if 
no mode of production exists in a pure state but always in coexistence with other modes 
of production, history can thus be said to be in a state ofpermanent cultural revolution? If 
we take Jameson's example of the Enlightenment, there is a sense as Habermas argues that 
this is an unfinished project,16O that postmode~ far from signalling the end of the 
Enlightenment, signals that it has yet to be completed. This in itself does not undermine 
Jameson's thesis but it does raise series questions about the explanatory force of the 
concept. At which point can one particular cultural revolution be said to be the dominant 
one and how does one define this dominance? Furthermore, if the transition between 
modes of production is defined in terms of cultural revolution and as I have stated this 
appears to be the permanent state of affairs. Are we not in exactly the same position as 
Bahoar whereby all modes of production thus appear to be transitionary modes and how 
do we therefore explain the transition between these transitionary modes? Alternatively 
how do we explain the transition from one cultural revolution to the next? 
In Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence G.A Cohen writes, as Balibar also 
acknowledges, that mode refers to a way or a manner and not a set of relations. 161 The 
economic structure, insists Cohen, is just that: a structure, 'a framework of power in 
which producing occurs' whilst' the mode of production is a process, , a way of 
producing'.16l Following Cohen we can distinguish three senses in which Marx used the 
concept of mode of production: firstly, in the sense of the material mode, or the way in 
which men work with their productive forces. Secondly, the social mode as the social 
properties of the productive processes and finally, the mixed mode as the designation of 
both the material and social properties of the way production proceeds. It is in this final 
sense that Jameson uses the term but although ev~ry structure is subject to process, this 
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does not make it a process itself:: 
The economic structure is ... variously implicated in movement and 
process, but to represent the structure as itself a process is to violate both 
the concept of structure and the intent of historical materialism 163 
As with Jameson's definition of class, as at once structural and an historical process, 
Jameson wishes to have it both ways, but as E.P. Thompson states these two positions 
remain incommensurable. Similarly, contra Jameson, we cannot equate the mode of 
production with the social totality and which is at once a structure and a process. 
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THE POLITICS OF DESIRE 
An entire minor mythology would have us believe that pleasure (and 
singularly the pleasure of the text) is a rightist notion. On the right, with 
the same movement, everything abstract, boring, political, is shoved over 
to the left and pleasure is kept for oneself: welcome to our side, you who 
are finally coming to the pleasure of literature ! 1 
The relationship between pleasure and politics, and indeed the question of pleasure itseI£: 
has always been a problematic one for the left. As the quotation from Roland Barthes 
illustrates, the left is traditionally portrayed as puritanical and aridly intellectual whilst the 
right is seen as hedonistic and decadent. In his essay 'Pleasure: A Political Issue'l 
Jameson examines this resistance on the part of the left (if indeed there is such a 
resistance) to issues of pleasure and in particular he highlights the "class" dimension of 
sexual politics: 
The conception of the primacy of class issues and class consciousness 
suggests that from a working-class perspective, issues of sexual liberation 
may be grasped, not on their own terms, but rather as so many class 
ideologies and as the collective expression of groups (such as middle-class 
youth) that working-class people identify as the class enemy 3 
Similarly for women the politics of pleasure is by no means simply an existential issue, (or, 
as I shall suggest below merely an ethical concern of one's relationship to one's own body) 
but is rather' a matter of group struggle'4 ~d is inextricably bound-up with issues of male 
power and domination. Thus in Laura Mulvey's influential essay 'Visual Pleasure and 
Narrative Cinema's an interesting reversal takes place whereby it is now the destruction of 
pleasure that is seen as the radical and h1>erating solution. Therefore writes Jameson: 
if it begins to turn out that the value of "pleasure" as a political slogan is 
not merely unattractive to working-class people but also to women, then its 
ideological effectivity is evidently a rather diminished one.6 
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However, Jameson is not advocating that the left should simply resign itself to the 
situation, accepting the mythology that surrounds pleasure and in effect abandoning the 
terrain to the right. On the contrary, Jameson insists on the need to reformulate our 
conception of pleasure and define, what he terms, its "proper" political use. Jameson 
notes that there is no such thing as pleasure in its own right, 'only pleasurable activities, or 
something like a fading effect of pleasure after the fact'7 and what is really at stake in the 
polemics over pleasure is not so much the experience itself but rather the 'idea of 
pleasure, the ideologies ofpleasure'8. 
Therefore, in this chapter I will very briefly examine the contemporary ideology of 
pleasure through the work of Foucault and Barthes as a contrast to the ideology of desire 
expounded by Deleuze and Guattari in the Anti-Oedipus. In order to assess this 
notoriously difficult text I shall initially contextuaIize Deleuze and Guattari's work in the 
politics of post-May '68. I shall also outline Freud's conception of desire and at greater 
length Lacan's notion of desire and the role of the phallus. The justification for such an 
extended exposition, in the case of Lacan, is that while Deleuze and Guattari stridently 
reject the Lacanian structural model it is also Lacan's theorisation of desire and 
signification which initially facilitates the thinking behind Anti-Oedipus. I shall then 
consider Jameson's own politics of Desire; initially examining his endorsement ot: and 
claims of affinity with, Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus. I shall also consider this text 
as an example of Jameson's method of sub~g other discourses within his own Marxist 
horizon and analyse how satisfactory this operation is. Secondly, I shall give an exposition 
of Jameson's own formulation of a h"bidinal apparatus before finally examining the 
relationship between desire and Utopia through Jameson's dialectic of ideology and 
Utopia. 
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Ideologies of Pleasure 
As Foucault's work on the history of sexuality shows, the very notion of pleasure 
constitutes a prob/ematique, that is to say, a word that must be considered in relation to 
its overall conceptual framework, the set of relations or theoretical conjuncture in which it 
exists. Foucault traces a genealogy of this prob!ematique from the Greco-Roman period 
to the present, concluding that the Greeks provide an 'ethical experience which implied a 
very strong connection between pleasure and desire'9 which stands in stark contrast to 
contemporary experience 'where everybody· the philosopher or the psychoanalyst • 
explains that what is important is desire, and pleasure is nothing at aUI • lO For Foucault, 
pleasure is essentially an ethical problem, in the sense of the way 'we constitute ourselves 
as moral agentsl,B in other words, it is a relation of one to one's set( to one's own body. 
Pleasure is thus characterised as a practice of the sel£ Desire, on the other hand, is not 
simply a question of personal ethics, it is not reducible to the subject in the sense that it is 
a practice of the self but is rather at the very heart of our constructions of subjectivity. 
We think of ourselves not merely as subjects that desire but as desiring subjects; desire is 
what drives us forward, and is part of the unconscious structures of society, the social 
nexus within which our subjectivity is constructed and reconstructed. In short, desire is a 
force or drive that is greater than its individual manifestations. it is also a collective 
concern. ll 
Foucault acknowledges that the Greek ethics he outlines are far from perfect, providing 
only a male ethics of domination and virility, and never taking into account the pleasure of 
the other. However, he contends that the great vinue of Greek ethics is that they 
maintained a relationship between desires, acts and pleasures, whilst: 
The dissociation - or partial dissociation at least - of this ensemble would 
later become one of the basic features of the ethics of the flesh 
[Christianity] and the notion of sexuality [theorised through 
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psychoanalysis].ll 
1bis dissociation of pleasure and desire within contemporary discourse is clearly visible in 
the publication of two seminal texts in the early 1970s: Roland Barthes' The Pleasure of 
the Text (1973) and Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus (1972). As his title indicates 
Barthes is concerned with "pleasure" and he shares with Foucault a certain antipathy to 
the theoretical value attnouted to desire: 'we are always being told about Desire', writes 
Barthes 'never about Pleasure; Desire has an epistemic dignity, Pleasure does not'.14 
Deleuze and Guattari, on the other hand, focus upon "desire" and have nothing substantial 
to say about pleasure at all. Whilst the terminus of both The Pleasure of the Text and 
Anti-Oedipus will be seen to be the celebration of immanence and the intensity of the 
moment, each text reaches this terminus by a very different route and correspondingly 
projects its own ideology of pleasure and desire. 
The Barthesean ideology of pleasure renounces all political commitment in favour on an 
individualistic hedonism of the text, or as Barthes so eloquently puts it, the 'text is (should 
be) that uninh.ibited person who shows his behind to the Political Father.l~ For Barthes 
the pleasure of the text consists of an erotics of reading, a surrendering of oneself to the 
flux oflanguage, its contradiction and difference, to its plurality of voices or what Barthes 
calls a "sanctioned Babel". The precondition for such an eroticism of the text is essentially 
its excess: its repetition to excess and its unexpectedness, in the sense that it is 
~ 
"succulently new". In other words, the pleasurable text is that which goes beyond 
representation, that undoes nomination through its excess; it is something we can say 
nothing about and only surrender ourselves to the polymorphous perversity ofjouissance: 
With the writer of bliss (and his reader) begins the untenable text, the 
impossible text. This text is outside pleasure, outside criticism, unless it is 
reached through another text of bliss: you cannot speak "on" such a text, 
you can only speak "in" it, in its fashion, enter into a desperate plagiarism, 
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hysterically affirm the void of bliss (and no longer obsessively repeat the 
letter of pleasure ).16 
Jameso~ on the other hand, insists on the need to move beyond concepts of pleasure in 
this 'narrow, culinary, bourgeois sense'17 to reflect upon, what he calls, the "deeper 
subject", the h1>idinal body itseli This, I shall argue, is to move from the terrain of 
"pleasure" to "desire" and to see that pleasure, or more precisely what I will now define as 
desire, is a figure, an allegory, for a larger process of transformation: 
the thematization of a particular pleasure as a political issue ... must always 
involve a dual focus, in which the local issue is meaningful and desirable in 
and of itself: but is also at one and the same time taken as the figure for 
Utopia in general, and for the systematic revolutionary transformation of 
society as a whole. IS 
Ideologies of Desire 
The Anti-Oedipus emerged from that period of' euphoria and disillusionment, hl>eration 
and dissipation, carnival and catastrophe'19 we now know as May '68. For a brief and 
dramatic moment in the spring of 1968, writes Terry Eagleto~ it appeared that the 
combined forces of the French student protests and worker's strikes would rock the 
French state to its very foundations. As the protests collapsed in disarray and the 
working-class movement was betrayed by its "supine Stalinist leaders" the French state re-
established order. After the defeats of 1968 Deleuze and Guattari, like many others on the 
left, sought to redefine the terms of political struggle and to formulate a conception of 
-' 
"molecular" politics; that is to say the politics of small autonomous groups which tended 
to fight around single issue campaigns and more localised struggles. The rationale behind 
such a strategy was that the traditional working-class organisations, the PCF and the 
Unions, had been revealed to be complicit in the maintenance of the existing social 
structure at the very moment when revolutionary change appeared to be imminent . 
Indeed, no less a figure than the arch-Marxist Louis Althusser himself has provided 
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probably the most eloquent and succinct analysis of this situation. 
Although Althusser did not break with the Communist party after May '68 his critique of 
the party apparatus and the party machine, when it finally came a decade later, was 
devastating. In a tone markedly different from that of his path-breaking works two 
decades earlier Althusser now writes: 
Behind [the] view of a scientific theory produced by bourgeois 
intellectuals, and 'introduced ... from without' into the working-class 
movement, lies a whole conception of the relations between theory and 
practice, between the Party and the mass movement, and between party 
leaders and simple militants, which reproduces bourgeois forms of 
knowledge and power in their separation. 20 
According to Althusser, Marxist theory had regressed somewhat from the work of Marx 
himself and more specifically, Marxism was still lacking in fully developed theories of the 
state, of superstructures and ofpolitical organisations. Historically this has meant that the 
working-class movement has tended to reproduce bourgeois structures of power and 
organisation. Such a situation, suggests Althusser, has led to tragic consequences for the 
working-class: from the horrors of Stalinism to the contemporary policies of the PCF. 
Every organisation, argues Althusser, needs an apparatus, it needs a structure, but the 
influence of bourgeois ideology alone is insufficient to explain the reproduction of 
bourgeois divisions of power within the working-class movement. Rather, the Party itself 
., 
can be seen to reproduce the dominant ideology through its own structure and 
organisation and in particular through 'the difference between its leaders and its militants' 
which replicates 'the structures of the bourgeois State'.21 The problem of reproducing a 
reactionary ideology is not merely a question of the level of class consciousness, of 
inadequate theory or deviating from the party line but is inherent in the materiality of the 
organisational structure, specifically in the separatipn between the party hierarchy and its 
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rank and file. In his final, and as Gregory Elliott states 'in some respects his finest,'22 essay 
Althusser observes that the Communist party's 'structure and mode of functioning were 
closely modelled at once on the bourgeois State apparatus and military apparatus'.23 In 
tones that echo Althusser's old adversary Sartre, he notes that in this situation the 
maintenance of the party structure takes precedence over the revolutionary struggle itself; 
as Sartre would say, the revolutionary group begins to ossify. Communist parties have 
traditionally been modelled on a vertical structure with each party cell being accountable 
to the next level in the hierarchy rather than horizontally, to the broad base of the party. 
Again, notes Althusser, there have been good historical reasons for this, particularly when 
Communist parties have had to organise clandestinely. However, in terms of a capitalist 
and politically social democratic state this form of organisation only serves to isolate the 
rank and :file of any mass movement from each other and to draw a line between the 
leadership and the militants. That is to say decisions are made at the top and in secret and 
then passed down rather than openly and democratically discussed at the bottom and 
passed up. Thus, the party rather than being an instrument or vehicle for change becomes 
a barrier to change: 
In so combining the military model of partitioning with the model of 
parliamentary democracy, the Party cannot but reproduce and strengthen 
the bourgeois mode of politics. 24 
For the generation of French intellectuals that emerged out of the events of May '68 the 
-' 
urgent political tasks no longer appeared to centre upon the struggle for power, as this 
only appeared to reproduce the existing order. The emphasis shifted from an attack on 
coercive and repressive state structures to an analysis of the way in which the ostensibly 
repressed subjects invest and maintain those very structures and to the reconceptualization 
ofnon-repressive forms ofpolitical organisations and activities. As Peter Dews states: 
Social systems are both imposed by force from above - they embody 
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relations of power - and are adhered to or rejected from below - they are 
invested or disinvested with desire. 1.5 
In short, through our own support and investment in the existing political structures and 
organisations we are complicit in our own subjugation. We therefore, as Foucault says, 
need to rid ourselves of that 'fascism in us aIL in our heads and in our everyday 
behaviour'. 16 
Terry Eagleton, however, has given a rather more sober analysis of the situation. From a 
position of defeat and disillusion, he argues, evolved the post-structuralist critique of 
totalizing thought and the rejection of' all forms of political theory and organization which 
sought to analyze, and act upon, the structures of society as a whole'.17 Unable 'to break 
the structures of state power, post-structuralism found it possible instead to subvert the 
structures oflanguage'.lS From the subversion of political structures to the subversion of 
structure per se seems to have been a very short step and the project of molecular politics 
to disinvest traditional forms of oppositional politics and formulate new political structures 
migrated into a general disinvestment of all forms of structure. 
Unlike Barthes's retreat into a non-discursive hedonism of the text, Deleuze and Guattari's 
politics of desire seeks to redefine some form of collective subject or historical agency. As 
Jameson points out their principal theoretical antagonistic is not so much Marx as Freud 
and those 'poor technicians of desire'29 the psychoanalysts and semiologists. For Deleuze 
and Guatta~ Freud is at once the discoverer of that realm offree synthesis where anything 
is possible and is subject only to the motivation of desire - the polymorphous perversity of 
the pleasure principle - but at the same time he sought to restrict this liberating force 
through the law of Oedipus Complex. According to Deleuze and Guatta~ then, the 
Oedipus complex is not so much a psychic crisis as it is a structure imposed on 
unconscious desire by social forces, channelling the free flows of desire into a 
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predetermined structure. Deleuze and Guattari ask: 
what does it mean to say that Freud discovered Oedipus in his own self-
analysis? Was it in his self-analysis, or rather in his Goethian classical 
culture?30 
A materialist psychiatry interprets Oedipus as an "ideological form," it provides a 
referential axis, the invariant - 'daddy- mommy-me' - around which desire is orientated, 
channelled and above all domesticated. But for Deleuze and Guattari desire is not 
reducible to a given structure, it constitutes 'the Real in itself: beyond or beneath the 
Symbolic as well as the Imaginary'31 and remains a fundamentally transgressive force. 
Freud's Oedipalization of unconscious desire selVed to restrict an essentially orphan 
unconscious to the endless repetition of a Greek tragedy. Therefore Deleuze and Guattari 
pose the question: Was it the desire that begat the prohibition or the prohibition that 
begat the desire? This is perhaps the most fundamental question posed by the Anti-
Oedipus and concerns the nature of desire itself: as well as the relationship between desire 
and the socio-symbolic realm. For ifDeleuze and Guattari's desiring-production is not the 
incestuous desires of the Oedipus complex then neither is it the Lacanian desire as lack. I 
shall briefly outline the Freudian and Lacanian conceptions of desire before defining 
Deleuze and Guattari's more positive and productive conception of desire. 
In their dictionary of psychoanalysis Lap,lanche and Pontalis write that the 'Freudian 
conception of desire refers above all to unconscious wishes, bound to indestructible 
infantile signs'.32 Signs in this context refers to the memory traces of early experiences of 
excitation and satisfaction. Thus, write Laplanche and Pontalis, 'unconscious wishes tend 
to be fu1fi11ed through the restoration of signs which are bound to the earliest experiences 
of satisfaction'33 and which are governed by the primary process. In Freud's distinction 
between the two modes of functioning of the psychical apparatus,34 the primary processes 
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designates the unconscious mental processes and the secondary processes refers to the 
conscious and pre-conscious system The former functions according to what Freud 
called the pleasure principle and the latter by the reality principle. Laplanche and Pontalis 
summarise the primary process as the process whereby 'psychical energy flows freely, 
passing unhindered, by means of the mechanisms of condensation and displacement, from 
one idea to another and which are at the root of unconscious wishes'.35 For Freud, this 
psychical energy is what he termed heido or the sexual instincts, and which he opposed to 
the self-preseIVative instincts of the reality principle. In his 1905 paper 'Three Essays on 
the Theory of Sexuality' Freud offers this definition of libido: 
We have defined the concept of ' libido' as a quantitatively variable force 
which could seIVe as a meaSUre of processes and transformations occurring 
in the field of sexual excitation. 36 
In a paragraph added in 1920 Freud rejects Jung's attempt to 'water down the meaning of 
the concept of hoido itself by equating it with psychical instinctual force in general'.37 
Freud insists on the need to distinguish' sexual instinctual impulses'38 from other psychical 
forces and to restrict the notion of libido to designating sexual instincts. As is well known, 
Freud gave primacy to sexual desires in unconscious mental processes and in particular 
one specific sexual formation: 
the Oedipus complex is the nuclear complex of the neuroses, and 
constitutes the essential part of their content. It represents the peak of 
infantile sexuality, which, through its after-effects, exercises a decisive 
influence on the sexuality of adults. Every new arrival on this planet is 
faced by the task of mastering the Oedipus complex; anyone who fails to 
do so falls a victim to neurosis. 39 
At this stage in his thinking then, desire for Freud was essentially sexual in nature and 
incestuous, governed by the universal principle of the Oedipus complex. In 'Totem and 
Taboo' Freud greatly extended the significance of the Oedipus complex, insisting that the 
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incest taboo was both trans-historical and trans-cultural Furthermore, developing 
Darwin's theory of the primal horde Freud saw 'the beginnings of religion, morals, society 
and art converge in the Oedipus complex'.40 For Freud, then, the Oedipus complex 
delineates the structure of desire, setting out a complex set of interconnected relations. 
However, in the late text 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle' Freud developed a broader 
conception of desire. Reflecting upon the primacy he had always accorded to the pleasure 
principle Freud proposed a more archaic instinct beyond the pleasure principle in the form 
of the death drive and to which he now opposes Eros, or the life instincts. Freud writes: 
the libido of our sexual instincts would coincide with the Eros of the poets 
and philosophers which holds all living things together. 41 
In fact Freud's conception of Eros as that which 'combine organic substances into ever 
larger unities'42 would appear to include the sexual instincts rather than coincide with them 
and therefore to be proposing something larger and more inclusive than his original 
conception of hoi do. In consideration of the life instincts Freud writes: 
The repressed instinct never ceases to strive for complete satisfaction, 
which would consist in the repetition of a primary experience of 
satisfaction. 43 
Desire, for Freud, is not to be confused with need, as needs derive from somatic sources 
which can be satisfied through attainment of the specific object required, nourishment, 
sleep etc. Desire, as Laplanche and Pontalis make clear, is rather connected to wishes 
which 'are indissolubly bound to 'memory-traces', and they are fulfilled ... through the 
hallucinatory reproduction of the perceptions which have become signs of this 
satisfaction'.44 And in a formulation that will be picked up by Lacan, Freud notes that 'it 
is the difference in amount between the pleasure ~f satisfaction which is demanded and 
that which is actually achieved that provides the driving factor which will permit no 
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halting at any position attained'.4s The unfulfilled wish or desire is what keeps driving us 
forward as it can never be fully satisfied. 
In his influential essay' The Signification of the Phallus' Lacan picks up this conception of 
desire but significantly modifies it in his well known formulation: 
desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but 
the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second, 
the phenomenon of their spJitting'46 
Desire, according to Lacan, results from the subtraction of the satisfaction achieved from 
the demand made, to put it another way, desire is that which separates need and demand. 
As I shall make clear below, it is important for Lacan to distinguish desire from need 
because, as Freud pointed out, a need is object-directed and thus can be satisfied through 
the attainment of that object, whilst desire can never be satisfied. However, neither can 
desire be reduced to demand because desire 'seeks to impose itself without taking the 
language or the unconscious of the other into account, and insists upon absolute 
recognition from him',47 whereas a demand always presupposes an addressee; therefore 
must take the language of the other into account and, again as I shall argue below, no 
absolute recognition can be achieved through language. 
According to Lacan, a need must be articl$ted in the form of a demand; essentially Lacan 
is talking here about a demand for love. With respect to desire therefore the starting point 
for Lacan is not a need hut the demand through which that need is articulated and which 
annuls the need by transposing it in the intersubjective realm of the Symbolic: that is 
symbolising the need as language and language for Lacan is always intersubjective. A 
demand presupposes an "other", the other whom the demand is being made ot: thus desire 
is no longer a subjective concern (a question of need) hut exists in the intersubjective 
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realm in the relation between subject and other. As Lacan puts it: 
Demand constitutes the Other as already possessing the 'privilege' of 
satisfying needs, that is to say, the power of depriving them of that alone by 
which they are satisfied. This privilege of the Other thus outlines the radical 
form of the gift of that which the Other does not have, namely, its love. 48 
In other words, by making a demand upon the other (I shall limit myself to the lower case 
in order to indicate that 1 am not using the term in a Lacanian technical sense) we also 
make the assumption that the other can meet that demand. Thus, following Lacan's line of 
argument, the intersubjective, or linguistic, relation in the form of the demand for love 
constitutes the other but at the same time bestows upon the other the ability to meet a 
demand which they do not possess. That is to say, an essential mis-perception, or mis-
recognition, takes place. 1 shall return to this below but first 1 will briefly say something 
about Lacan's use of the term "Other". 
The distinction between the lower case and upper case "0" in other is significant for 
Lacan, although he never gives a clear and definitive definition of what the distinction 
entails, rather allowing the distinction to emerge through its usage. According to Peter 
Dews: 
Lacan's distinction between the 'other' and the 'other' is based on the 
assumption that, in the relation between subjects, each will attempt to 
discover a confirming image, a reinforcement of his or her own ego in the 
response of the other.49 
In other words, in any intersubjective relation each subject seeks an affirmation of his or 
her own self-image, the other merely becomes an echo of the self as one's own ego is 
projected, or imposed, upon the other. 50 If such a complete recognition were attainable, 
then each subject would be locked into a process of infinite regress as he or she seeks 
confirmation of their own image in the other. As both subject and other are seeking the 
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self-recognition regardless of the other the process would also entail the mutual 
cancellation of the other. That is to say, at the moment at which the subject achieved 
absolute confirmation of its image in the other, the other would be annulled to the extent 
that it could not be recognised by the first subject. Similarly, the subject, to the extent that 
it must recognise the other in order to have its own image confirmed by the other must at 
the same time negate its own subjectivity. Therefore, Lacan needs to avoid the possibility 
of mutual self-recognition, or as Dews puts it 'a possible coincidence ofself-conception'.'l 
Lacan achieves this through the related concepts of the Other and the object petit a, or the 
object of desire. Dews suggests that 'what Lacan wishes to signal by his distinction 
between the 'othet and 'Othet is that our preconceptions can never be replaced by a 
definitive grasp of who the other subject truly is'.'l The absolute Other is always 
unattainable, separated from the subject by language, which as we saw in the previous 
chapter always alienates the subject from itself. 
For Lacan, desire exists in the realm of the Other, in the sense that it is articulated as a 
demand for love, at the same time the Other only comes into being in the Symbolic, 
through language, the Other is constituted insofar as a demand is articulated. As Lacan 
writes: 
It is the demand of a presence or of an absence - which is what is 
manifested in the primordial relation to the mother, pregnant with that 
Other to be situated within the needs that it can satisfy. S3 
Whilst I remain unclear what the final clause of this sentence means, the first half is clear 
enough. The demand for love is that demand for recognition which I defined in the 
previous chapter in terms of the mirror stage. This process was characterised by the 
essential mis-recognition of the Ideal-ego and marks the transition from the Imaginary into 
the Symbolic realm. It also inaugurates the process of desire in the Symbolic, that is the 
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desire for the illusory unattainable sense of coherence and completion which the infant 
knew in the Imaginary. The lynch-pin between these two systems is what Lacan terms the 
phallus; somewhat perversely Lacan insists on the term phallus to signify the gender 
neutrality ofhis system The phallus does not refer to the male genital organ but rather to 
a signifier: 
For the phallus is a signifier, a signifier whose function. in the 
intrasubjective economy of the analysis, lifts the veil perhaps from the 
function it performed in the mysteries. For it is the signifier intended to 
designate as a whole the effects of the signified, in that, the signifier 
conditions them by its presence as a signifier. 54 
The phallus is not so much the signifier of a thing but of a process, as it can only operate 
as a signifier insofar as it is absent, or as Lacan says "veiled". It is this aujhebung, this 
presence as absence, writes Lacan that the phallus signifies and 'inaugurates (initiates) by 
its disappearance'.55 Lacan theorises the movement from the Imaginary into the Symbolic 
as one of castration, or rather symbolic castration. As the child emerges into the 
Symbolic, the mother/child dyad which constituted the relationship of the mirror phase is 
disrupted by the intervention of a third term, the father. The child discovers that it is not 
sole object of the mother's desire and does not fully satisfy that desire. Thus, according to 
Lacan, the child undergoes a series of identifications in which he (note that Lacan, as did 
Freud, only considers the male child here) attempts to complete the mother and fulfil her 
desire. However: 
the child will be obliged to accept the paradoxical nature of these efforts, 
and to come to terms with its own symbolic castration, with the loss of the 
imaginary phallus. This castration, equivalent to full entry into the 
symbolic order, takes place by means of what Lacan terms the 'paternal 
metaphor' or the 'Name-of-the-Father'.56 
The normal development of the child and transition into the Symbolic realm is predicated 
on the acceptance of the loss of the phallus. The notion of the phallus provides Lacan 
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with the cross over point between the Imaginary and the Symbolic, between the specular I 
and subject as constituted by the Symbolic. Lacan writes: 
The phallus is the privileged signifier of that mark in which the role of the 
logos is joined with the advent of desire. 57 
The phallus only functions as a sign, or signifier, and more importantly as a signifier that is 
always absent but desired, the phallus is the object of desire. 
The desire to possess the phallus, deriving from the illusory unity of the Imaginary stage 
prior to ascension into the Symbolic, provides Lacan with his model of signification. In 
his essay 'The agency of the letter in the unconscious or reason since Freud' Lacan 
challenged the prevailing Saussurean conception of the linguistic sign and the process of 
signification. For Saussure the diadic sign, the signifier/signified couple was indivisible, it 
cannot be separated, the two halves of the sign are as two sides to a single sheet of paper, 
or a moebious strip, always inextricably bound together. However, it was this very 
indivisibility of the sign that Lacan was to challenge and for some irrevocably split. Lacan 
dismissed the usual Saussurian illustration of the functioning of the sign, a picture of a 
tree, and replaced it with a picture of two doors with the word Ladies written above one 
and Gentleman written above the other. Then he tells his tale of two children pulling into 
a train station: 
'Look', says the brother, 'we're at Ladies!'; 'Idiot!' replies his sister, 'Can't 
you see we're at Gentlemen' . .s8 
What this illustration shows, argues Lacan, is the priority of the Signifier (which he now 
capitalises) "Ladies" and "Gentlemen" respectively, over the signified, that these doors 
lead to public toilets. In short. it is the context in which any given signifier is deployed 
that will determine its meaning rather than a specific signified or referent. What Lacan is in 
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effect proposing is a reversal of the priority Saussure bestowed upon the signified in the 
signifier/signified relation, whereby the signified is placed over the signifier. Lacan's 
reformulation now reads Signifier/signified whereby a capitalised signifier takes 
precedence over a lower case signified. At the same time Saussure's "bar", that indivisible 
link between signifier and signified, in Lacan's reformulation becomes a fundamental 
barrier to meaning. As Lacan writes in 'The agency of the letter': 
the primordial position of the signifier and the signified as being distinct 
orders separated initially by a barrier resisting signification . .59 
He goes on, 'no signification can be sustained other than by reference to another 
signification'. 60 In other words, for Lacan, what a signifier refers to is not a signified, as 
there is always this barrier between them., but rather to another signifier. One must rid 
onesel£ writes Lacan, of 'the· illusion that the signifier answers to the function of 
representing the signified, or better, that the signifier has to answer for its existence in the 
name of any signification whatever'. 61 A signifier, then, refers us not to a referent, not to a 
signified, but to another signifier, which in turn refers us to another signifier in an almost 
endless chain of signification. Only, argues Lacan, in the correlations between signifier 
and signifier does meaning reside as 'the signifier, by its very nature, always anticipates a 
meaning by unfolding its dimension before it' - 'it is in the chain of the signifier that the 
meaning 'insists' but that none of its elements 'consists' in the signification of which it is at 
the moment capable'.61 As with Derrida's theory of Difjerance, meaning is always 
anticipated and indefinitely deferred. In Lacan's famous slogan, there is 'an incessant 
sliding of the signified under the signifier'. 63 
The Lacanian capitalised Signifier dominates all his other terms, and above all, it is the 
Signifier and the continual displacements of the Signifier that determines the subject: 
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"The subject" is no longer a substance endowed with qualities, or a fixed 
shape possessing dimensions, or a container awaiting the multifarious 
contents that experience provides: it is a series of events within language, a 
procession of turns, tropes and inflections.64 
The problem for Lacan is what inaugurates this process of signification and what drives it 
forward. As I have already indicated, the phallus only operates insofar as it is a sign and 
moreover a sign that is present only in its absence. The phallus, for Lacan, is the one sign 
that is indivisible, in which signifier and signified are unified, a unity that one desires but 
can never obtain. The phallus provides the anchor for the signifying chain, the point at 
which it commences and comes to rest, except that it is always "veiled". As Malcolm 
Bowie puts it the phallus is the one 'signifier that holds all signifieds in thrall'.65 It is the 
notion of the phallus that maintains Lacan's structure, that originary moment. or structure 
from which all other structures grow. The phallus is, what we might call, a transcendental 
signifier, it is outside the signifying chain and pre-exists structure. One could well ask 
how it is possible for there to be a position outside the signifying chain, or pre-existing all 
structures, except insofar as it is necessary to give a semblance of coherence to Lacan's 
system? As Peter Dews points out such a signifier is impossible 'so that the phallus is 
destined to appear to the subject as eternally 10st'.66 
Whereas for Freud, desire was inextricably bound up with the restoration of unconscious 
signs. of unconscious wishes, these were signs of infantile experiences of satisfaction. For 
.; 
Lacan on the other hand, everything starts from an initial premise of a primary loss, what 
Lacan will theorise as manque-a-etre.67 This is the ultimate tragedy of the Lacanian 
subject. irretrievable, split, alienated and for ever in the thrall of an insatiable desire at the 
very heart of its being: 
The fact that the phallus is a signifier means that it is in the place of the 
Other that the subject has access to it. But ~ince this signifier is only veiled, 
as the ratio of the Other's desire, it is this desire of the Other as such that 
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the subject must recognize, that is to say, the other in so far as he is himself 
a subject divided by the signifying Spaltung [splitting]. 68 
I shall now try to summarise this rather complex argument. The emergence into the 
Symbolic is marked by the lack of self-coincidence between the subject and language, that 
alienating experience whereby the subject objectifies himlherself through symbolising 
themselves in language. For Lacan this process is equivalent to a symbolic castration 
whereby the child recognises itself as no longer being the object of its mothers desires and 
as lacking the object of desire. The object of desire is the phallus which is knowable for 
Lacan only in the Symbolic realm once it has been lost and only in so far as we recognise 
that it is lost and cannot be found but it is what we desire to find. This for Lacan is the 
process of signification: the continual attempt to find unity with that ultimate signifier but 
always frustrated and deferred. Thus it is desire that drives the signifying chain, the desire 
for the lost object, the object petit a, the phallus. As Bowie states, desire: 
is what keeps the chain of signifiers moving. It is the dynamo, everywhere 
in motion and no where at rest, that propels all acts of speech, all refusals 
to speak and all conscious and unconscious mental representations. 69 
It is this two fold law of Oedipal structure and phallic lack that Anti-Oedipus 
unequivocally rejects along with the primacy that Lacan accords to the Signifier (Phallus) 
and the Symbolic. Before considering Deleuze and Guattari's more positive conception of 
desire I shall just make two observations. Firstly, if desire is in everything and is 
; 
everywhere then the term ceases to have a great deal of theoretical value, its meaning is 
evacuated and it becomes too generalised a term to have any use beyond sloganeering. 
Secondly, if Jameson so strongly endorses Deleuze and Guattari's conception of desire 
which I will outline below, how is he to reconcile this with his equally strong endorsement 
of Lac an and his conception of History as that which refuses desire? 
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The Production of Desire 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's work Anti-Oedipus has been celebrated and disparaged 
in equal measure, Perry Anderson has described it as 'the expression of a dejected post-
lapsarian anarchism'.70 Subtitled Capitalism and Schi=ophrenia it provides, claim its 
authors, the first genuinely materialist form of psychiatry; what they term 
"Schizo analysis" : 
Schizo analysis foregoes all interpretation because it foregoes discovering 
an unconscious material: the unconscious does not mean anything. On the 
other hand the unconscious constructs machines, which are machines of 
desire, whose use and functioning schizoanalysis discovers in their 
immanent relationship with social machines. 71 
With this unambiguous rejection of interpretation, latent unconscious material and 
mediation in favour of an immanent relationship between desire and the social field, it 
would seem therefore a little strange, ifnot perverse, for Iameson to claim in The Political 
Unconscious that the 'thrust of the argument of the Anti-Oedipus is, to be sure, very much 
in the spirit of the present work' (PU, 22). Indeed, with the torrents of neologisms that 
stream across its pages, the scandalous abuse it makes of a multiplicity of discourses 
(psychoanalytic, political. scientific, historiographic, literary and anthropological to name 
just a few) and its subversion of traditional academic proprieties, this most transgressive 
and fluid of texts would appear to resolutely resist just the kind of co-optive strategy that 
Jameson's text proposes. 
For Jameson the usefulness of the Anti-Oedipus lies initially in its reintroduction of 
questions of history into those otherwise resolutely anti- or ahistorical moments of 
structuralism and poststructuralism. However, in The Political Unconscious, he is more 
specific in identifying particular affinities between his own doctrine of a political 
unconscious and the work of Deleuze and Guattari:' 
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to reassert the specificity of the political content of everyday life and of 
individual fantasy-experience and to reclaim it from that reduction to the 
merely subjective and to the status of psychological projection which is 
even more characteristic of American culture and ideological life today 
than it is of a still politicized France. (PU, 22) 
Jameson claims a threefold kinship with the Anti-Oedipus: firstly, that it reinstates the 
political nature of our everyday experience, secondly, that it reasserts the collective or 
political dimension of our fantasy-experience, and finally, that the situation Deleuze and 
Guattari are describing is even more characteristic of the experience of the subject within 
North American culture than it is of the more politicised climate of contemporary France. 
I shall initially examine the first two of these propositions before suggesting that the third 
is instrumental for Jameson's attempt to recite the Anti-Oedipus as a second-degree, 
critical philosophy in relation to his own Marxist discourse. 
The radicalism of De leuze and Guattari's project derives from their attempt to reformulate 
the relationship between unconscious desire and the social fiel<L or that nexus of forces, 
structures and sign systems that all subjects inhabit and traverse. According to Deleuze 
and Guattari, social repression not only presupposes psychic repression but social 
liberation can only be achieved when it is accompanied by psychic liberation, when we 
realise our own desire rather than accepting its prohibition. The failure of previous 
Marxist-Freudian syntheses, such as those of Wilhelm Reich or Herbert Marcuse, were 
that they retained a separation between the rational world of social production and the 
irrational domain of desire, therefore desire remained a fundamentally negative and 
subterranean force. Deleuze and Guattari on the other hand argue that both forms of 
repression are linked in a single process, thus their central concept of desiring-production 
encapsulates both the Freudian conception of desire and the Marxian emphasis on social 
production. Anti-Oedipus rejects any notion of desire as a negative force or as derivative 
of a primal lack: the authors insist on the contrary that desire is always positive and 
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productive. For Deleuze and Guattari desire is never the desire for something lacking but 
the object of desire is desire itself; in a kind of Nietzschean eternal return, as an endless 
cycle and return of the positive, desire seeks only its own affirmation and reproduction in a 
continual process of desiring-production. 
However, this is not to suggest that desiring-production and social production are the 
same thing, they are rather two poles of the same process: that is to say at one end of the 
process we find the "molecular" processes of desiring-production and at the other the 
"molar" formations, or aggregates, of social production. The unconscious, write Deleuze 
and Guattari, is not a classical theatre but a factory of production and there is only one 
kind of production - 'the production of the real'7Z: 
If desire produces, its product is the real If desire is productive, it can be 
productive only in the real world and can produce only reality. 73 
Schizophrenic desire is the universe of production in the "real" world and acts as the 
absolute 'limit of social production'. 74 In other words, there is 'ollly desire alld the social, 
and nothing else'7s coextensive in a single process of desiring-production, each directly 
investing the other without mediation. And according to Deleuze and Guattari to 
encourage the free-flow of desire is to encourage it to surpass, to overflow the final limits 
and constraints of the Capitalist order. 
Deleuze and Guattari's conception of productive desire, as hy/e or a material flow, 76 is 
clearly at odds with the Lacanian notion of desire as lack, and would seem to be more in 
the spirit of Freud's Eros as that life giving force which combines organic substances into 
ever greater unities. At the same time the unmediated. according to Deleuze and Guattari, 
nature of desiring-production directly challenges the secondary and subordinate role Lacan 
assigns desire in relation to the Symbolic as that which keeps the signifying chain moving. 
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For Lacan, the Symbolic is the dominant organisational category, it at once 'relentlessly 
pre-ordains and organises human experience' and at the same time' cancels experience'. n 
The pre-eminence that Lacan accords to the Symbolic and in particular to language is, as 
is well known, influenced by the work of the structural anthropologist Claude Levi-
Strauss; however, it is equally the result of his own discipline psychoanalysis. 
Psychoanalysis is above all else concerned with language and how unconscious wishes or 
desires manifest themselves in language, through such mechanisms as dreams, jokes and 
parapraxis. So Lacan was justified in his celebrated slogan "return to Freud" in stressing 
the centrality of language in psychoanalytic theory and practice. But as Malcolm Bowie 
has pointed out this was only to pick up one strain of Freud's thought: 
For Freud, language had as its crowning capacity that of ushering the 
theorist and the therapist to the threshold of another world. and that world 
- for which "the unconscious" was an appropriate shorthand designation -
mattered because it was the mute, unstoppable and unappeasable 
inwardness of human desire.78 
Language takes us up to the threshold of the unconscious but it does not cross that 
threshold, the unconscious is "mute," it is, as Freud said a world without syntax or 
grammar. For Lacan, on the other hand, we not only have access to the unconscious only 
through language but there can be no unconscious outside of language. The unconscious 
comes into being for Lacan as the subject is formed in the Symbolic, it is only through 
language that we can articulate unconscious desires and wishes and as language pre-exists 
the subject it can be seen to have a determining role on the form of that articulation. The 
unconscious only has meaning in so far as we can symbolise it. In his 1915 paper on 'The 
Unconscious' Freud addressed this question of desire and representation insisting that: 
An instinct [drive] can never become an object of consciousness - only the 
idea that represents the instinct can. Even in the unconscious, moreover, 
an instinct cannot be represented otherwise than by an idea.79 
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This appears clear enough and to support Lacan's thesis of the primacy of the Symbolic 
processes over unconscious processes. However, Freud then went on to distinguish 
between conscious and unconscious presentations or ideas: 
the conscious presentation comprises the presentation of the thing plus the 
presentation of the word belonging to it, while the unconscious 
presentation is the presentation of the thing alone. 80 
In other words, consciousness consists of "word-presentations" and the unconscious 
consists of "thing-presentations". Freud goes on: 
A presentation which is not put into words, or a psychical act which is not 
hypercathected, remains thereafter in the Ucs [unconscious] in a state of 
repression. 81 
Again this would appear to support Lacan's thesis that one only has access to the 
unconscious through language and that language structures the content, the thing-
presentations, of the unconscious, otherwise these thing-presentations remain repressed 
and therefore unknown. However, this is not the whole story. Freud writes: 
It is a very remarkable thing that the Ucs. of one human being can react 
upon that of another, without passing through the Cs. This deserves closer 
investigation, especially with a view to finding out whether preconscious 
activity can be excluded as playing a part in it; but, descriptively speaking, 
the fact is incontestable.8l 
> 
The unconscious is not only open to external excitation and perception but it can also 
affect another unconscious without, argues Freud, going through the systems pre-
conscious/conscious, that is to say, without being hypercathected through language or 
what Lacan terms the Symbolic. Before rushing headlong into an endorsement of De leuze 
and Guattari's unmediated desiring-production, however, we should note that Freud is 
talking here about the mutual affect between ~o "unconscious" systems and for 
unconscious desires to break through to consciousness they would still be mediated by 
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language. 
I will just say one more thing about the relationship between desire and the Symbolic and 
to once more question the prevailing Lacanian orthodoxy before returning to Deleuze and 
Guattari's Anti-Oedipus. Drawing on the work of Cornelius Castoriadis, Anthony Elliott 
argues that Lacan's theorisation of the relationship between the Imaginary and the 
Symbolic is, in short, the wrong way around. For Castoriadis, 'the production of images 
and forms actually is the work of the imaginary' 83 and it is upon the basis of the psyche's 
ability for representation, identification and affect that the subject gains its capacity for 
language. Furthermore, 'it is the psyche which invests the "mirror" with desire',84 desire is 
not the product of an ontological lack as this presupposes that the object was already 
present and invested by desire for it now to be a desired absent object. Essentially, Elliott 
is arguing for a more creative role to be ascribed to the imaginary: 
the imaginary comprises a good deal more than just specular images, 
illusions, traps. As a psychic mode of elaborating self and objects, the 
imaginary is a constitutive feature of human subjectivity. It is the creation 
of a certain relation of the individual subject to itself: forged through 
phantasy, drives and affects. 85 
The transition from the Imaginary to the Symbolic does not simply take place through 
some supra-individual superego, some all encompassing notion of the Symbolic or uniform 
law but 'rather through the psychical investment in social conditions (which are external) 
deriving from the representational capacity of the psyche - each of which is irreducible to 
the other'.86 The Symbolic is not simply imposed upon the Imaginary, but argues Elliott, 
is more an 'enabling medium through which a shared reality is experienced'. 87 The: 
imaginary investment in shared symbolic forms is important since it 
highlights that the human subject is not merely an "effect" of the signifier, 
but actively engages with and transforms the social field. 88 
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lIDs view ascribes to the unconscious and the imaginary a more active and a more creative 
role, something that is very different from but more in the spirit of Deleuze and Guattari's 
positive and productive desire. Essentially, what Deleuze and Guattari are opposed to in 
the Freudian model is the allegorical reductionism of the Oedipal myth; thus whatever the 
analysand says, Freud always reads Oedipus. The authors cite the case of Dr. Schreber, a 
paranoid-schizophrenic whom Freud diagnosed as being a repressed passive homosexual 
In his analysis Freud dwelt heavily on two of Schreber's delusions: that he was being 
persecuted by his Doctor, Dr. Flechsig, and that he had been transformed into a woman 
and then impregnated by celestial rays. Freud concludes that: 
If the persecutor Flechsig was originally a person whom Schreber loved, 
then God must also simply be the reappearance of some one else whom he 
loved, and probably some one of greater importance .... we shall be driven 
to the conclusion that this other person must have been his father; this 
makes it all the clearer that Flechsig must have stood for his brother,89 
Deleuze and Guattari argue that such an interpretation can only be achieved through a 
very selective reading of the Schreber case: 
From the enormous political, social, and historical content of Schreber's 
delirium, not one word is retained, as though the h'bido did not bother itself 
with such things. 90 
The price of Oedipus is the suppre.ssion of the historical, the social and the racial; in other 
words the suppression of the collective fantasy experience that is a part of all delusions. 
Deleuze and Guattari do not deny the significance of familial investments - families are 
after all part of the social nexus - but insist that these investments are secondary in relation 
to, what they call, the world-historical dimension of all fantasy experience. Whatever the 
content of a given fantasy, its social and historical resonances, the number of times one 
encounters a Napoleon or a God, Freud always invokes the individual sexual fantasy and 
confines this fantasy within the Oedipal structure. Deleuze and Guattari reject the 
164 
privileging of individual fantasy-experience, insisting that all fantasies are first and 
foremost "group fantasies". 
However, if desire directly invests the social field without mediation then it invests both 
repressive and hoeratory structures, which raises the dilemma of how do we distinguish 
between reactionary and revolutionary investments, or fascistic and non-fascistic desire. 
According to Deleuze and Guattari we must first distinguish between two forms of 
groups, the "subject group" and the "subjugated group". Whereas the subject group seeks 
to impose its fantasy on the social field, the subjugated group intemalises the social 
structures and imposes them on its own fantasy. The definition of a particular form of 
group fantasy will depend on the kind of investment involved. For example, the individual 
fantasy experience rests on assumptions of the "self' and the "ego" which then enacts its 
own particular drama; what it fails to recognise is that the ego is itself institutionally 
determined. Thus in taking the ego as a given, it at the same time assumes the givenness 
of the institutional structures that determine it. The individual fantasy, in effect, ascribes 
to existing social structures 'a kind of transcendence or immortality'91 within which the 
subject enacts its own isolated drama. Far from testifying to the individual ego's integrity 
and autonomy, the individual fantasy highlights one's subjugation to apparently unalterable 
social and psychic structures. The individual fantasy experience, that of the subjugated 
group, is therefore always reactionary and repressive in that it confers legitimacy on the 
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existing social order and carries over to the unconscious the mechanisms of social 
repression. in tum legitimating them as forms ofpsychic repression. 
The subject group on the other hand does not intemalise the existing social formations, in 
the sense of defining itself against a series of prohibitions and repressions, but rather 
reveals the mortality of the existing institutions ~ough the possibilities to 'change them 
according to the articulations of desire'. 92 Through its recognition of the direct investment 
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of the social field by desire the subject group is not institutionally determined but 
determines its own institutions and social formations. Herein lies the revolutionary, or 
emancipatory, potential of the collective fantasy experience for Deleuze and Guattari: 
through a recognition of our own libidinal investments in the structures of repression we 
will be able to disinvest these structures, and indeed all structures, and redefine the social 
field. 
For Deleuze and Guattari the ultimate fallacy of the individual fantasy resides in its 
adherence to a conception of the ego or subject as retaining an integrity or centredness, 
what they describe as the "global subject". According to Deleuze and Guattari we are first 
and foremost social beings: 
Private persons are ... images of the second order, images of images - that 
is, simulacra that are thus endowed with an aptitude for representing the 
first order images of social persons.93 
Deleuze and GuattarL therefore, do not endorse the now commonplace structural and 
poststructural dissolution of the subject but propose a conception of the subject that will 
be permanently displaced and decentred, what they call the residual or nomadic subject. 
The authors borrow from Kleinian theory the notion of "partial" objects; they use the term 
"partial" rather than "part of' or "part objects" as they insist there is no original unity to be 
part of Partial also has the connotation of "partiality" or the sense of being partial 
~ 
towards something. The partial subject, therefore, represents a certain balance of forces, 
the partiality or bias of desire at any given moment in time and as desire is constantly in 
flux, the partiality of the subject will be constantly changing from moment to moment. We 
should be clear though that desire is not something in the subject. As I shall discuss below 
in relation to Nietzsche, the subject is a by-product of the process itseI£: nomadic subjects 
are the products of desiring-production, the secretions of desire as it intersects, couples 
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and decouples with other forces of desire. The question that arises for an avowedly 
revolutionary and emancipatory politics is precisely what kind of subject is being liberated 
here? And can we say it is a subject in any meaningful sense of the term? 
This partial or nomadic subject is more commonly referred to as the schizophrenic subject, 
a subject whose identity changes from moment to moment as it lives in a series of 
intensive states of becoming. The authors' conception of schizophrenia is heavily indebted 
to Lacan's notion of Schizophrenia as a break-down in the signifying chain and a failure of 
the subject to fully accede into language. For Lacan, our experience of temporality is 
itself an effect oflanguage: 
It is because language has a past and a future, because the sentence moves 
in time, that we can have what seems to us a concrete or lived experience 
of time. 94 
The schizophrenic, suggests Lacan, does not have this experience oflanguage, he/she also 
does not have a sense of temporality but is condemned to live in a perpetual present: 
schizophrenic experience is an experience of isolated, disconnected, 
discontinuous material signifiers which fail to link up into a coherent 
sequence.95 
Our sense of having a personal identity is also contingent on our experience of 
temporality, on our sense of the "I" or "me" which persists over time. Therefore the 
schizophrenic will lack a sense of identity, as their identity will be renewed at any given 
moment. As a consequence of this unstable, transitory identity and living in a 
discontinuous and perpetual present the schizophrenic's experience of that present, of the 
world which they inhabit, will be very different from our own. According to Jameson, our 
sense of any given moment, 'our own present is always part of some larger set of projects 
which force us selectively to focus our perceptions': 96 We do not simply absorb the whole 
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as an undifferentiated mass of data but prioritise and order those perceptions. The 
schizophrenic on the other hand not only lacks a sense of identity but they will also be 
unable to focus selectively their perceptions as the sense of having a project (in a non-
Sartrean sense) presupposes a commitment over time and ifnot exactly a teleology then at 
least a provisional perception of some purpose or goal. Thus the schizophrenic will lack a 
sense of continuity over time and goal orientated behaviour but will have a greater sense 
of immediacy, the present will be far more intense: 
as temporal continuities break down, the experience of the present becomes 
powerfully, overwhelmingly vivid and "material": the world comes before 
the schizophrenic with heightened intensity, bearing a mysterious and 
oppressive charge of affect, glowing with hallucinatory energy. 97 
As Jameson states, whether or not this description is clinically accurate is besides the 
point, what it offers us is a good description of the position of the subject in what we will 
designate in the following chapter as Late Capitalism or Postmodernism. Deleuze and 
Guattari are also aware of this problem and contra to Jameson's persistent claims that they 
celebrate the 'schizophrenic as the true hero of desire', they insist that they have no 
interest whatsoever in schizophrenics as such. it is rather the process that they are 
concerned with. The schizophrenic. write Deleuze and Guattari, is not a revolutionary but 
the schizophrenic process 'is the potential for revolution'98: 
schizophrenia is the universe of productive and reproductive desiring-
machines, universal primary production as "the essential reality of man and 
nature. "99 
More specifically Anti-Oedipus equates the schizophrenic process with Capitalist 
production, in the sense of Capitalism's inexorable drive towards universalization and its 
accompanying appearance of fragmentation and dispersion. As Marx pointed out 
Capitalism is caught in a double-bind, what Dele~e and Guattari call the "counteracted 
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tendency": in order to survive Capitalism must continually expand and reproduce itself at 
ever greater levels of production, but at the same time there is a tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall as the proportion of value creating capital (variable capital invested in human 
labour) falls in relation to non-value creating capital (constant capital invested in the 
means of production). To counteract this counteractive tendency it is not enough simply 
to expan<L profits must be increased by the establishment of internal limits such as wage 
reduction or increased productivity. Capitalism, therefore, must continually expand but in 
order to do so must define certain limits which it subsequently sets about surpassing. For 
Deleuze and Guattari schizophrenic desire marks the absolute limit of this process, as it is 
the force that goes beyond all limits. However, according to Deleuze and Guattari the 
imperative is not to constrain the process but to encourage it to follow its own. logic to its 
ultimate conclusion, in other words to allow capitalism to go over the edge: 
To go still further, that is, in the movement of the market, of decoding and 
deterritorialization? For perhaps the flows are not yet deterritorialized 
enough, not decoded enough, from the viewpoint of a theory and a practice 
of a highly schizophrenic character. loo 
In other words, what Peter Dews describes as enrage politics: the anarchistic 
'determination to intensify contradictions rather than to resolve them and the refusal of 
any knowledge which would permit (the movement) to say in advance what it wants and 
what will happen'.lOl It would appear to be difficult to reconcile these voluntaristic and 
gesture politics with Jameson's systematic Hegelianism. Indeed Deleuze and Guattari's 
whole view of history as an essentially aleatory, contingent and heterogeneous series of 
intensive states experienced by partial, nomadic subjects secreted by schizophrenic 
desiring-production would seem to be totally incommensurable with Jameson's own 
conception of a single great adventure of class struggle. Jameson's capacity to incorporate 
such a Nietzschean and detotalizing text into his own Marxist discourse hinges on two 
principal manoeuvres: firstly to reveal how the former is a second-order philosophical 
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system and secondly to show how this ostensibly anti-interpretative text projects its own 
theory of interpretation. 
Jameson descnoes Anti-Oedipus as a second-degree or critical philosophy in the sense that 
it rests on prior, although unstated, assumptions and presuppositions. For example, the 
authors reject the concept of "totality" in favour of a theory of singularity, that is to say, 
the flux and pure multiplicity of desire. Deleuze and Guattari assert that they 'no longer 
believe in a primordial totality that once existed, or in a final totality that awaits us at a 
future date'.102 The authors propose instead the notion of "peripheral totalities" which are 
produced alongside the process of desiring-production and are themselves subject to flux; 
that is to say not totalization in the conventional and accepted sense but a totality that 
encompasses a set of forces at a given moment before once more dissolving into process. 
According to Jameson any assertion of heterogeneity or difference rests on a prior 
conceptualisation of homogeneity and identity. Thus Deleuze and Guattari's claims of 
partiality and "nomadism" rest on prior conceptions of unity or totality and a fixed 
structure. The Anti-Oedipus can be read as a reaction against overly totalizing thought 
and the infleXloility of our social and psychic structures but in reacting against them they 
paradoxically ratify and legitimate just these structures. Foucault encapsulates the 
problem well when he observes that 'if everything were absolute diversity, thought would 
be doomed to singularity, ... it would be doomed to absolute dispersion and absolute 
• 
monotony'.tOl In true dialectical fashion absolute diversity and singularity passes over into 
its opposite to become a totalizing conformity and endless repetition of the same as real 
difference is erased. Deleuze and Guattari's celebration of the pure multiplicity and flux of 
schizophrenic desiring-production only bas meaning when it is defined against a 
background of enduring structures and an initial totality. 
Jameson continually insists on the need to maintain a distinction between different levels of 
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abstraction. In the present instance we must distinguish between Anti-Oedipus as a 
"theory of history" and History itselt: According to Jameson, theories of history: 
merely offer alternate ways to "punctuate" the rise of the middle-class 
world itself and the various cultural and psychic metamorphoses or 
"coupures epistemologiques" which accompanied it. (MF, 321) 
For Jameson, the strength of such theories and also their weakness is their limitation to a 
single cultural sphere. They therefore provide invaluable synchronic analyses of their 
given sphere but lack the conceptual framework with which to give a full diachronic 
account of historical development. As a consequence theories of history tend to identify 
their own object of study as the actual motor of social and historical change. In the case 
of the Anti-Oedipus, the identification of the schizophrenic tendency of capitalism comes 
to be seen as an ideological absolute, schizophrenia, the authors tell us, 'as a process is the 
only universal'104 and desire is not simply seen as a force co-extensive with other forces 
but becomes the ultimate determining instant: 'desire is always constitutive of a social 
field'.lO.5 Jameson reflects on the current proliferation of theories of history as a sign of 
some deeper cultural malaise, as 'an attempt to outsmart the present, first of all, to think 
your way behind history to the point where even the present itself can be seen as a 
completed historical instant' (MF, 320). It will come as no surprise therefore to discover 
Deleuze and Guattari proclaiming schizoanalysis as the end of history: 
It is our very own "malady," modem man's sickness. The end of history 
has no other meaning. 106 
Jameson's second gesture is to reveal how Deleuze and Guattari's anti-interpretative 
position can be seen implicitly to concea~ and rest upon, an initial act of interpretation. 
The authors claim to be developing an immanent and transcendent, although non-
transcendenta~ form of criticism which is founded upon a shift from the old interpretative 
operation: "what does it mean?" to an immanent analysis: "how does it work?", Immanent 
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criticism is concerned with the analysis of what is immediately present in a given text, it 
therefore brackets all extrinsic information such as the biographica4 historical or 
sociological and concentrates on what is verifiable within the limits of a given text. 
Criticism, for Deleuze and Guattari, will no longer be the search for an absent signified or 
the imposition of pre-existing structures of meaning but a question of "use": at the 
molecular leve4 how does a specific sign work within the text, what function does it 
perform, and at a molar leve4 what forces come into play, or use a particular text, and for 
what purposes at any given moment in time. Immanent criticism therefore will not be so 
much an interpretation of the text but a laying bare of its complex operations and 
functions. However, if this is not to be a purely descriptive exercise, there will be an 
implicit purpose behind this interrogation, a prior interpretative decision that there is 
something in the text to be extracted. According to Deleuze and Guattari the 'schizoid 
exercise ... extracts from the text its revolutionary force',107 in other words it uncovers the 
hoidinal investments that are always present in social production. Thus, suggests 
Jameson, Anti-Oedipus projects a new hermeneutic whereby: 
the object of commentary is effectively transformed into an allegory whose 
master narrative is the story of repressed desire itsel( as it struggles against 
repressive reality. (PU, 67) 
As Jameson writes elsewhere the schizophrenic process of productive desire provides 
Deleuze and Guattari with a degree zero, t1!eir bottom line against which all other forms of 
social and psychic production can be judged. lOS Desire provides the hermeneutic key with 
which we can reinterpret history and judge other forms of production. At such a juncture 
it may be worthwhile to recall Marx's remark on Hegel's doctrine of the state 'Hegel 
should not be blamed for describing the essence of the modem state as it is' writes Marx 
'but for identifying what is with the essence of the state '.109 
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The Anti-Oedipus may itself be one more symptom of our fragmented sensibility in what 
appears to be an increasingly confusing and disorientating realityllo but therein also lies its 
value, as an attempt to articulate the existential experience of the subject within advanced 
capitalism. Deleuze and Guattari have not so much discovered the absolute contradiction 
and conclusive death of capitalism but rather have described our fractured and dislocated 
experience of it. or as Jameson puts it 'the realm of separation. of fragmentation. of the 
explosion of codes and the multiplicity of disciplines is merely the reality of the 
appearance' (PU, 40). The political unconscious of Anti-Oedipus is nothing less than the 
englobing and totalizing force of North American capitalism itself: 
the more [the social machine] breaks down. the more it schizophrenizes, 
the better it works, the American way. I II 
It would appear that Jameson is correct to assign Anti-Oedipus a secondary position with 
respect to more totalizing and holistic modes of thought. However, it remains difficult to 
see exactly how Anti-Oedipus is very much in the spirit of Jameson's text, especially with 
regard to its detotalizing and schizophrenic impulse. For Jameson, Marxism's ability to 
subsume other theoretical discourses assigns a priority to Marxism both through its 
"semantic richness" or sheer capacity to deal with other theoretical material and the 
legitimation of its own primary concerns as other discourses are seen as essentially 
reactive. This being said, Anti-Oedipus still appears to be reacting in the opposite 
direction to Jameson's totalizing and interpretative method. Thus, I would suggest that 
Jameson can only reconcile his text with that of the Anti-Oedipus through a very selective 
reading of the latter and further suggest that the degree of selectivity Jameson uses in his 
reading potentially undermines his whole project. 
In a stringent critique of Anti-Oedipus Manfred Frank reflects upon its claims to 'proffer 
a theory of liberation', noting that 'one cannot revolutionise existing relations without 
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referring to a "value" in the name of which what exists is negated'. 1 12 As observed above 
this value for Deleuze and Guattari is desire. However, argues Fr~ Deleuze and 
Guattari's insistence on the immanent presence of desire in the social field would appear to 
negate its ethical value: 
Such identification robs wish [desire] of the contra-factual character that 
would make possible its virtualization, ie., guarantee its displacement on 
the level of representation, and would make the fictions - constantly quoted 
by the authors - into a quasi-ethical authority as opposed to existing 
repression. Wishes transposed into the imaginary act against the happiness 
that real society has left behind. By emphatically denying the counter-real 
character of those phantasies, Deleuze and Guattari condemn wish 
production to a frenzied approval of existing power. III 
In other words, desire acquires its disruptive force and ethical value precisely by being 
"other"; by not being an element of the real and thus being able to project, at the level of 
representation, an alternative to the real Without such an alternative or counter-factual 
character desire will only be able to endorse, albeit in a reactive and critical fashion, 
existing power structures. However, Deleuze and Guattari's conception of immanent 
desire raises an even greater dilemma. Their appeal to the liberation of desire from all 
restrictions and prescriptions of structure and code implicitly conceals a conception of the 
subject who is to be liberated. However, 'through the categorical and epistemological 
framework of their investigation [Deleuze and Guattari] destroy the conditions under 
which a free subject can be considered'.1l4 Deleuze and Guattari insist that the 
.' 
unconscious is an orphan, it has no parents, therefore the productions of the unconscious 
or desiring-production are autoproductive; desire produces under its own momentum and 
seeks its own affirmation, it is a molecular phenomenon 'devoid of any goa] or 
intention'.115 Clearly there is no necessity for a subject in this process, not even as a by-
product of the process, Deleuze and Guattari's residual or nomadic subject, as the process 
has its own logic and momentum. A subject requires a degree of consistency and 
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continuity over time if it is to be able to resist rather than be subjugated to existing 
repressive structures at each discontinuous moment. According to Frank subjectivity can 
'be constituted only on the level of reflection and the latter presupposes representation',116 
In destroying the conditions of possibility for a renewal of the subject it would be 
appropriate to ask in whose name hberation is called for, 
Jameson's doctrine of a political unconscious as the uninterrupted narrative of collective or 
class struggle to wrest the realm of freedom from the realm of necessity also requires this 
kind of commitment and identification over time: that is to say, the ability to conceptualise 
oneself as not merely an isolated and fragmented identity subjugated to the autoproduction 
of external forces but as a subject, determined by social and historical forces. who at the 
same time through filiation with other subjects can actively transform and change those 
material forces, Deleuze and Guattari, though, reject any notion of class affiliatio~ for 
them 'there is only one class',117 those that accept the axiomatics of capitalist society, be 
that positively or negatively, They insist that the theoretical problem is not the struggle 
between classes but the struggle 'between the class and those who are outside the class',118 
Indeed they go so far as to endorse Sartre's notion of "seriality", which they identify v.ith 
the state and the party, and the "fused group", Thus, Deleuze and Guattari distinguish 
between class interests that are merely preconscious and group desires that are 
unconscious, or as Freud defines the distinction: ideas that are latent but can emerge into 
.~ 
consciousness as they increase in strength and ideas 'which do not penetrate into 
consciousness, however strong they may become',1l9 So just as Reich pointed out the 
masses were not fooled into believing in fascism but actively desired it, Deleuze and 
Guattari declare that: 
It happens that one desires against one's own interests: capitalism profits 
from this, but so does socialism, the party, and the party leadership, 1::0 
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It would appear therefore that the Anti-Oedipus while offering a description of our present 
predicament does not provide real answers. Indeed, while the projection of a new 
molecular politics of autonomous groups may bear superficial resemblance to Jameson's 
endorsement of "alliance politics" (PU, 54), the Anti-Oedipus undermines the very 
conditions on which such alliances could be forged and one can only conclude that a full 
conception of the schizophrenic subject has nothing in common with Jameson's project of 
a retheorization of the collective subject, or what we used to call "class". 
The problem here is of a dual nature: firstly, the use Jameson makes of other discourses 
and secondly, the claim for the theoretical primacy of Marxism To take the latter first, 
clearly one text cannot say everything, or cover every aspect of its area of study: thus to 
criticise Jameson for not addressing particular concerns would seem to be rather overly 
scrupulous. On the other hand Jameson's claim for Marxism's priority on the grounds of 
"semantic richness" and that final untranscendable horizon, as well as his eclectic method 
leaves him open to accusations of selectivity. In other words Jameson leaves out those 
areas of other discourses that do not fit quite so comfortably with his own perspective and 
narrative. Kenneth Burke has made just such claims with Jameson's reading of his own 
work. III However a more telling example is Jameson's use of Nietzsche. 
Throughout the 1970s and 80s poststructuralism in general trod a path through and 
beyond both Marx and Freud with the guidance of Nietzsche. Anti-Oedipus was no 
exception to this trend, although Deleuze's previous emphasis on the "will-to-power" in 
Niet=sche and Philosophylll had now been replaced by self-affirmative desire as the 
quality of the strong. The Political Unconscious is also sensitive to the pervasive cultural 
presence of Nietzsche. More than any other of Jameson's texts, it is suffilsed with 
Nietzschean overtones. As Jonathan Arac has p,ointed out, the presence of Nietzsche 
plays an important strategic role for Jameson in that it enables him to build bridges with 
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poststructuralist theory: 'Nietzsche [is] a way of maintaining contact with contemporary 
poststructurali~ while shifting the grounds of argument'. 123 In particular Jameson uses 
Nietzsche to offer a critique of the binary opposition and to transcend ethics: 
To move from Derrida to Nietzsche is to glimpse the possibility of a rather 
different interpretation of the binary opposition, according to which its 
positive and negative terms are ultimately assimilated by the mind as a 
distinction between good and evil Not metaphysics but ethics is the 
informing ideology of the binary opposition; and we have forgotten the 
thrust of Nietzsche's thought and lost everything scandalous and virulent 
about it if we cannot understand how it is ethics itself which is the 
ideological vehicle and the legitimation of concrete structures of power and 
domination. (PU, 114) 
Jameson goes on to say that the concept of good and evil is itself "positional" and as 
Nietzsche taught us evil is associated with "Otherness" and radical difference which 
'seems to constitute a real and urgent threat to my existence' (PU, 11S). However, this 
reading of Nietzsche is by no means uncontentious and Arac identifies two specific 
problems with it: firstly, for Nietzsche ethics' even as a means of legitimating domination, 
... was not imposed from above',124 ethics are in fact a tool of the slaves and not masters. 
Secondly, 'the positional analysis in the original situation did not for Nietzsche depend 
upon a fallacious "seems." ... the masters did unquestionably threaten the existence of the 
slaves'. 125 
The critique of ethics, suggests Jameson, "is inextricably tied up with the problem of the 
individual subject, in the 'sense that if we are to transcend the categories of the individual 
subject then we must go "beyond good and evil": 
as Nietzsche taught us, the judgmental habit of ethical thinking, of ranging 
everything in the antagonistic categories of good and evil (or their other 
binary equivalents), is not merely an error but is objectively rooted in the 
inevitable and inescapable centredness of every individual consciousness or 
individual subject: what is good is what belongs to me, what is bad is what 
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belongs to the Other. (PU, 234) 
For Jameson we can only resolve this ethical double bind by historicizing both the ethical 
categories and our categories of the individual subject: in other words, to transcode the 
ethical categories of good and evil to the political and historical categories of "regressive" 
and "progressive" or as I shall discuss below by the terms "ideological" and "utopian". 
However, according to Arac, Nietzsche did not define all binary oppositions as ethical but 
in the first essay of The Genealogy of Morals considered 'the difference between two 
binary systems, that of good/bad and that of good/evil',126 only the second being 
considered ethical On the other hand, both of these opposition were considered by 
Nietzsche to be "class-positional", that is to say they were '''political'' notions, deriving 
from the domination or subjugation of one group by another'127 and in this sense ethics 
constitutes a class weapon of the slaves against the masters. As in the Anti-Oedipus the 
place of the subject in relation to this "ethical class warfarell is as a by-product of the 
process, a fiction added after the fact: 
The notion of individual responsibility allowed for blame to be accorded to 
the activity of the strong and praise to the impotence of the weak: "The 
subject ... has perhaps been believed in hitherto more firmly than anything 
else on earth because it makes possible to the majority of mortals, the weak 
and oppressed of every kind, the sublime self-deception that interprets 
weakness as freedomll.128 
In other words Arac's reading of Nietzsche runs counter to Jameson's and whilst he 
~ 
acknowledges Nietzsche's revulsion for the herd he goes on to suggest that Nietzche's 
'genealogical analyses demonstrated precisely the IItransindividual" concerns desired by 
Jameson'.129 As with Jameson's tendency to suppress the presence of history and human-
labour in texts, we once more, suggests Arac, find in Jameson that tendency to repress the 
political in order to find it somewhere else. Thus it would appear that taken on its own 
terms Jameson's strategy of co-option works but that it can do so only through the elision 
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of real differences: just as Deleuze and Guattari leave no space for the reconceptuaIization 
of the subject, of class or Socialism, 'Nietzsche disrupts every "totality"'130 and cannot be 
reincorporated into a new form of totalizing thought. These are more than simple 
inconsistencies, they signify an incoherence in Jameson's text which I believe to be 
irresolvable. 
Versions of a Libidinal Apparatus 
So far I have concentrated on two uses to which Jameson puts Anti-Oedipus: the 
historicization of poststructuralism and the formulation of a concept of group fantasy. 
However, there is a third way in which Jameson reads Anti-Oedipus, that is as an 
aesthetic. Deleuze and Guattari reject orthodox barriers and distinctions between 
academic disciplines, drawing freely on literature to substantiate their ideas and insights, 
particularly writers such as Antonin Artaud, Henry Miller, Malcolm Lowry and D.H 
Lawrence. They see in such writers' a violence against syntax, a concerted destruction of 
the signifier'131 as they attempt to break with accepted codes and conventions, facilitating 
an uninhibited flow and circulation of desire. Deleuze and. Guattari are concerned not with 
the text as expression, in terms of what it signifies, but how it works, what is motivating 
the text. In this sense they suggest literature is inherently schizophrenic, it is 'a process 
and not a goal, a production and not an expression'.132 Literature though is not only a 
.> 
process of production but also an object of consumption and as such conforms to certain 
conventions and established practices. Deleuze and Guattari attribute to the 
commodification of literature the tendency towards ossification, or oedipalization, of the 
texts' libidinal investments: 
It is not a question here of the personal oedipalization of the author and his 
readers, but of the Oedipal/orm to which o~e attempts to enslave the work 
itself: to make it this minor expressive activity that secretes ideology 
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according to dominant codes.133 
In other words a text's "form" attempts to check and restrain the free flow of desire, 
imposing upon the multiplicity of hoidinal investments a structure whlch is inherently 
ideological 
Jameson further develops Deleuze and Guattari's distinction between the molecular and 
molar levels of form production. Thus for Jameson: 'the molecular level designates the 
here-and-now of immediate perception or of local desire, the production-time of the 
individual sentence, the electrifying shock of the individual word or the individual brush-
stroke,' whilst the molar level 'designates all those large, abstract, mediate, and perhaps 
even empty and imaginary forms by whlch we seek to recontain the molecular: the mirage 
of the continuity of personal identity, the organising unity, of the psyche or the personality, 
the concept of society itself: and, not least, the notion of the organic unity of the work of 
art' (F~ 8). Particularly since the advent of Modernism, suggests Jameson, a gap has 
emerged between individual styles and the narrative systems or generic structures within 
which the isolated words and sentences are recontained. Thus we are able to read texts 
and view paintings from two distinct perspectives: either focusing upon sentence 
construction and individual brush strokes or standing back and reading or viewing from a 
distance in terms of narrative and generic conventions or the painting as itself one element 
in a hlstory of forms. According to Jameson, Deleuze and Guattari's distinction allows 
~ 
one to respect the specificity of both levels of the text whilst at the same time subjecting 
them to different kinds of analysis, in particular psychoanalytic and ideological analysis. 
Indeed, psychoanalysis provides a good model for thls process whereby we shift from the 
molecular properties of an individual style to larger, molar. formal unities: 
I would rather see its enlargement as a process that drives the personal 
beyond itself: in much the same way that the x-ray process of 
psychoanalysis blows your private thoughts and fantasies up to the point at 
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which they become impersonal agam, the algebra or syntax of the 
unconscious. 134 
Jameson's recourse to psychoanalysis is by no means a purely arbitrary gesture, the 
incorporation of yet one more discourse in Jameson's own will-to-style. On the contrary, 
the various antitheses which psychoanalysis projects between the sexual and the political, 
between childhood and society, archaic fantasy and ideological commitment, for Jameson, 
reflect 'an objective dissociation in contemporary experience' (F~ 9). This dissociation 
finds cultural expression through the modernist emphasis on indMdual style and in 
particular the fragmentation of the surface of the canvas or the narrative structure. We 
experience, suggests Jameson, 'a kind of psychic "division oflabour," the advanced form 
of which can be observed in just this reification and autonomization of the various senses 
from one another'.135 However, psychoanalysis has also been used to legitimate forms of 
psychologizing and subjectivizing ideology which seek to explain all forms of political 
commitment and engagement as merely psychological projections. Jameson wishes to 
avoid this kind of psychological reductionism and at the same time not to go down the 
path of Anti-Oedipus and simply repudiate the findings of psychoanalysis. Therefore 
contrary to the whole thrust of Anti-Oedipus Jameson proposes to isolate from the 
psychoanalytic material proper an autonomous narrative moment with its own specificity 
and dynamism, the function of which 'in psychic life is then to win some distance from the 
ruses by which the unconscious can be seen to make use of it' (F~ 9). What Jameson is 
proposing is, following Jean-Fran90is Lyotard, the formulation of a "hbidinal apparatus," 
or: 
an empty form or structural matrix in which a charge of free-floating and 
inchoate fantasy - both ideological and psychoanalytic - can suddenly 
crystallize, and find the articulated figuration essential for its social 
actuality and psychic effectivity. (F~ 95) 
For Jameson, this "empty form" or "structural matrix" is essentially a narrative structure 
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and in particular an outmoded narrative structure which allows for the articulation of 
desire, or libido, through the reinvestment of the symbolically empty co-ordinates of a now 
redundant narrative system Such a mode~ suggests Jameson, marks an advance over 
previous psychologizing approaches to literature in that 'it endows a private fantasy-
structure with a quasi-material inertness' (FA, 10) which can then be seen to have its own 
logic and dynamism This would also serve to restore the counter-factual dimension to 
desire and the unconscious that Anti-Oedipus would erase. However, Jameson's use of 
the libidinal apparatus diverges from Lyotard's in one important sense: 
For Lyotard the "dispositif' is what captures and immobilises desire, rather 
than as in my use, what allows it investment and articulation. Lyotard's 
emphasis is on the ways in which "desire" breaks through such 
"dispositifs," rather than on the social and historical conditions of 
possibility of the h"bidinal apparatus. (FA, 10,n8) 
There is no adequate translation for dispositif, Geoffrey Bennington translates it as a "set-
up" in the sense of the structures and representations through which libidinal energy is 
channelled and regulated, although it is not a particular "set- up" which defines a given 
desire 'but a certain desire which produces a set-up'.136 Libidinal analysis is not the same 
as psychological or psychoanalytic analysis, in the sense that 'h"bidinal investments are 
essentially matters of shifting relationships, whose content is not fixed: the 
representational frame, however ... seeks to freeze this mobility and to endow it with some 
more permanent, quasi-material symbolic value'.137 Thus the libidinal apparatus can be 
seen as an independent structure for which we can write a history and in terms of a given 
fantasy, it structures its various permutations, forms of closure and intemallimits. The 
process of libidinal analysis will therefore entail the mapping of these relationships as they 
find figuration in the text. This, suggests Jameson, would 'allow us to reverse the 
traditional priorities of psychoanalytic and psychologizing interpretation' (FA, 11), in that 
one is no longer reducing textual material to a particular psyche or psychic structure but 
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rather analysing the way in which certain relationships, impulses and responses can achieve 
figuration through the text. As with other of Jameson's formulations, most notably the 
notion of "national allegory" and "cognitive mapping", it is difficult, beyond the immediate 
examples he himself gives, to apply these notions. There is an inherent imprecision in the 
concepts themselves, for example, the notion of a hoidinal apparatus explicitly draws upon 
Lyotard's conception of a hoidinal economy but at the same time Jameson does not use the 
term in Lyotard's sense. Also, is it only narrative structures that can be invested in the 
way Jameson outlines? And is it only particular outmoded narrative paradigms that are 
open to libidinal investment? Surely all narratives are invested with desire and not just 
redundant forms?138 These are recurrent questions with Jameson's work and appear to be 
symptomatic of his particular methodology, I shall leave these questions in abeyance for 
the present and give an exposition of two versions of Jameson's hoidinal analysis, the first 
which he describes as a hoidinal apparatus, the second he does not. 
Jameson sees in the narrative system of Wyndham Lewis' 1918 novel Ta" a formal break 
from which a whole new hoidinal apparatus and ideological dynamic of Lewis' later work 
will emerge. According to Jameson, Lewis, unlike the other modernists - Pound, Eliot, 
Joyce and Yeats - was 'essentially a political novelist' (FA, 87). However, writes 
Jameson, unlike that other great political writer - George Bernard Shaw - 'Lewis was an 
internationalist, the most European and least insular of all the great contemporary British 
j 
writers' (FA, 88). Lewis was acutely aware ot: and responsive to, not only Parisian and 
Mediterranean culture but also Russian and German culture and this internationalism 
forms the background for Lewis' early work, constituting what Jameson calls a national 
allegory: 
Lewis is indeed so keenly aware of these various national traditions that 
they constitute the very backdrop and organizational framework of the 
works written before World War I: the stories of The Wild Body and Tarr 
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itself: with its portrait gallery of international Bohemia in the pre-war City 
of Light. (FA, 90) 
What Jameson is referring to as a national allegory is that 'the use of national types 
projects an essentially allegorical mode of representation, in which the individual 
characters figure those more abstract national characteristics which are read as their inner 
essence' (FA, 90). Such a narrative system though will have certain preconditions, in the 
sense that I have previously designated as "the logic of content," that is to say conditions 
which are not causal in a crudely deterministic way but which must exist prior to the text 
and without which the emergence of the text is inconceivable. Thus Ta" can be said to 
'presuppose not merely the nation-state itself as the basic functional unit of world politics, 
but also the objective existence of a system of nation-states, the international diplomatic 
machinery of pre-World-War-I Europe' (FA, 94). However, it is precisely this system of 
nation-states which the first World War marks the end of; after World War I the subjects 
of history were no longer nation-states as such but the transnational forces of Communism 
and Fascism and the emergence of the Superstate. Thus suggests Jameson, the national 
allegory can be seen as a formal attempt to bridge the gap between existential experience 
and the tendency of monopoly Capitalism to develop on a global, transnational scale. 
With the decline of the older diplomatic and political system the form itself will become 
redundant thus freeing-up the older narrative system for new ideological and hbidinal 
investments: 
.' 
the empty matrix of national allegory is then immediately seized on by 
hitherto unformulable impulses which invest its structural positions and, 
transforming the whole narrative system into a virtual allegory of the 
fragmented psyche itself: now reach back to overdetermine the resonance 
of this now increasingly layered text. (FA, 96) 
In this second-level allegory, the characters which previously stood as figures for national 
types will now be seen as figures for the psyche,. its impulses and drives, and project a 
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whole new sexual ideology. However, Lewis' sexual ideology is peculiar in the sense that 
'while openly misogynist, and sexist in the obvious senses of the word, it is not for all that 
phallocentric' (FA, 97). Whilst women clearly denote negative terms in Lewis' narrative 
system the corresponding positive term is not, as one would expect, the male but rather 
"art," 'which is not the place of a subject, masculine or otherwise, but rather impersonal 
and inhuman, or, ... "dead," spatial rather than temporal and existential' (FA, 97). This 
dichotomy will present obvious difficulties for any form of resolution of the narrative, for 
its success will be the effacement of the narrative itself. Jameson suggests the male axis of 
the text is similarly incomplete in that it is split between the German Kreisler, who 'is 
clearly enough the place of the instincts' (FA, 98) or id and the Briton Tarr, who fulfils the 
structural position of the ego. What is lacking from this topology however is the position 
of the superego without which no psychic resolution can be achieved. Thus suggests 
Jameson Tarr is locked into a series of static binary oppositions from which no resolution 
can be achieved, be that in terms of a national allegory or h'bidinal apparatus. Lewis offers 
but one version of a h'bidinal apparatus: for each artist and writer it would be possible to 
map in their formal systems and mode of representation similar libidinal investments. 
Jameson's own analyses range from Flaubert to the paintings of De Kooning and Cezanne, 
but I should now like to consider how libidinal analysis works on a pre-modem author. In 
a series of brilliant studies139 Jameson argues that the motivating device behind Honore, 
de Balzac's narrative production· is not so much the desire for money or wealth but 
~ 
"desire" itself However, Jameson insists that this is not so much a psychological insight 
as recognition of a formal convention that enables Balzac to construct his narratives: 
the novelistic creation of Balzac rests in general on the premise that human 
existence is at all times motivated by appetency, that is, by a clear desire 
that always poses a precise object before itself. 140 
In The Political Unconscious Jameson examines two of Balzac's texts, The Old Maid and 
185 
The Black Sheep, specifically in terms of the relationship between desire and Realism, and 
the problems that consequently arise with the positing of an object of desire in relation to 
the status of the "subject" within classical realist narrative structures. Classical Realism is 
irredeemably associated with the notion of an "omniscient narrator;" for Jameson, the 
significance of this form of narration lies in fact that it operates posthumously, after the 
fact. In other words, it is an after-effect of classical narration, signifying a closure of the 
narrative. This sense of closure thus 'projects something like an ideological mirage in the 
form of notions of fortune, destiny, and providence' (PU, 154). It is this narrative 
structure which Balzac inherits and at the same time invests with new forms of hoidinal 
energy. 
If the constitutive features of Balzac's narratives are libidinal investment or authorial wish-
fulfilment, then the positing of an 'object of desire' will present a particular dilemma for his 
narrative system, in the sense that: 
the signifying value of such objects is determined by their narrative 
position: a narrative element becomes desirable whenever a character is 
observed to desire it. (PU, 156) 
However Balzac's texts, writes Jameson, predate notions of the centred subject, thus we 
are not presented with a single privileged perspective but a multiplicity of perspectives. 
Balzac's narratives lack an identifiable herg as such and therefore the subject is decentred 
through 'a rotation of character centres which deprives each of them in turn of any 
privileged status' (PU, 161), or what Jameson calls a "character system". Thus in Balzac a 
structural reversal takes place whereby an object becomes desirable not because it is 
desired by a particular character but because it is desirable in its own right. Balzac must 
'validate or accredit the object as desirable, before the narrative process can function 
properly' (PU, 156). This is clearly evident in Balzac's short story The Old Maid where 
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the narrative centres around the struggle between two suitors for the hand of an unwed 
heiress, and in particular for her property, the Cormon townhouse. The townhouse, 
suggests Jameson, is 'quintessentially an object of desire' but it is an object of desire that 
we cannot attribute to anyone character in particular, or indeed to the author, implied or 
biographical. According to Jameson the desire 'here comes before us in a peculiarly 
anonymous state which makes a strangely absolute claim on us' (PU, 156). In this sense 
the desire for a particular object is not so much an individual psychological matter but can 
be seen as a figure for desire in general and in particular for what Jameson calls the 
"Utopian Impulse".. However, the peculiarity of this particular desire is all too evident 
when we shift from its landed manifestation to its actantial figuration in the character of 
Mademoiselle Cormon herself: who is 'comic, grotesque, and desirable all at once' (PU, 
158). Therefore, suggests Jameson: 
to insist on the Utopian dimension of this particular desire is evidently to 
imply that this particular comic narrative is also an allegorical structure, in 
which the sexual "letter" of the farce must itself be read as a figure for the 
longing for landed retreat and personal fulfillment as well as for the 
resolution of social and historical contradiction. (PU, 158) 
In other words the wish-fulfilling fantasy or daydream functions at two levels 
simultaneously: as the imaginary resolution of the specific individual fantasy as well as the 
symbolic resolution of a real social and historical contradiction. As noted above, The Old 
Maid is structured around a specific binary opposition, or agon. At the first level of 
interpretation the two suitors, Du Bousquier and Chevalier, represent Napoleonic energy 
and aristocratic elegance respectively, whereas at the second level they figure the struggle 
between the new bourgeoisie and the Ancien regime. As Jameson points out, such a 
character system (which, for reasons of space, I am unable to outline in full) does not 
exhaust the political and ideological possibilities objectively present at the time of the 
Restoration, but should rather be understood 'as' the structure of a particular political 
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fantasy, as a mapping of that particular "libidinal apparatus" in which Balzac's political 
thinking becomes invested' (PU, 48). Jameson's formulation of the hl>idinal apparatus 
does not imply that a separation exists between such wish-fulfilling fantasies or narrative 
structures and the Real but rather that the narrativization provides 'the vehicle for our 
experience of the real' (PU, 48). Balzac's dual allegory of sexual comedy and political 
struggle can be seen to correspond to Jameson's first two horizons of interpretation: the 
text as a symbolic act or imaginary resolution and at the same time the parole of a class 
discourse. I have as yet though to define the position of that third and final horizon, the 
Real, or History itself 
As I suggested at the end of the last chapter, Jameson nowhere gives a clear exposition of 
the nature of the relations between his three horizons or how to read a text as all three at 
once. His analysis of Balzac however does suggest how a text can be read in terms of all 
three horizons simultaneously, although Jameson's inconsistent use of terminology makes 
this a rather difficult and oblique route to follow. Jameson's defence of his use of 
biographical material in the formulation of hbidinal apparatuses does serve to make the 
situation a little clearer though. Jameson distinguishes his use of biography from previous 
forms of biographical criticism, that is to say: the genetic and the existential 
psychobiography. The former, writes Jameson, treated the authors biography as 
essentially an archive within which to discover 'the source, model, or original of this or 
that character, event, or situation', whilst the latter saw the "life" as 'yet one more text by 
the same author, no more, but no less privileged than his other works' (PU, 179). 
Jameson, on the other hand, uses the "life" as 'the traces and symptoms of a fundamental 
family situation which is at one and the same time a fantasy master narrative' (PU, 180). 
This unconscious master narrative is not a fixed form but an unstable and contradictory 
structure which will constantly be re-enacted in th~ author's narratives as he/she attempts 
to find some form of resolution. The biographical details therefore provide the matrix or 
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set of co-ordinates within which the narrative will be produced and positioned. However, 
as Deleuze and Guattari insisted, the familial situation is not merely a private, 
psychoanalytic or psychologica~ affair but also a social one and we must grasp 'the family 
situation as the mediation of class relationships in society at large, and ... the parental 
functions as socially 'coded or symbolic positions as well' (PU, ISO). Thus the fantasy 
master narrative can be seen to function as a symbolic act in the same way as other 
cultural artefacts and requiring the same kind of imaginary resolution. However, such 
imaginary resolutions are only the first stage whereby the unconscious master narrative 
seeks its impossible resolution through the production of an ideology, in the sense that 
Althusser defined it as 'the imaginary representation of the subject's relationship to his or 
her real conditions of existence'141 - that is to say at Jameson's second horizon. However 
Jameson then insists on the need to refine Althusser's definition of ideology by 
distinguishing between the "imaginary representation" itself (the wish-fulfilling texts of 
Balzac as fragments of the underlying fantasy master narrative) and its narrative conditions 
of possibility (the empirical preconditions which must exist, or one must believe in. to 
enable one to desire such things in the first place). Thus, according to Jameson it 
'becomes a significant political "principle," [that] the production of the fantasy-text knows 
a peculiar "unconscious" reflexivity, as, in the process of generating itself: it must 
simultaneously secure its own ideological positions' (PU, IS2). In other words, a text 
must produce, or presuppose, a complex ideological system in order to indulge its o\w 
specific wish-fulfilling fantasy or daydream. Jameson goes on to suggest that the former 
provides something like a reality principle or censor for the latter, whereby the text must 
first enumerate the obstacles to fulfilment before that ful1llment can be realised. Jameson 
describes this situation as the first level of wish-fulfilment. in the sense that, 'the subject 
wishes for the realization of the ideological axiomatic in order to be able then to wish the 
fantasy narrative' (PU, IS3). At the second leve~. the desiring subject attempts to move 
beyond the contingent desires of a specific wish-fulfilling fantasy in order to satisfy the 
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reality principle or censor itself Jameson designates this second level narrative, as he says 
according to his earlier distinction: "Symbolic texts". However this is not consistent with 
his earlier formulation of the three horizons and indeed he has shifted completely into a 
Lacanian terminology, descnoing the three levels as: Imaginary, Symbolic and Real As 
Jameson is concerned with the analysis of literary texts, one could insist that all three of 
his horizons of interpretation only exist at the level of the Symbolic, but the whole point of 
Jameson's methodology was to distinguish between different interpretative operations, and 
distinct objects of study. Thus he designates his object of study at the first level, Lacan's 
Imaginary, the text as "symbolic act" and according to his initial formulation the second 
level narrative is not read as a symbolic act but as an "ideologeme," which: 
it is true, exists nowhere as such: part of the "objective spirit" or the 
cultural Symbolic order of its period, it vanishes into the past along with 
the latter, leaving only its traces - material signifiers, lexemes, enigmatic 
words and phrases - behind it. (PU, 20 I) 
At this level the narrative is read in terms of its conceptual antinomy or aporia, its 
ideological production, rather than as either a symbolic act or a determinate historical 
contradiction. However, at the third level the text is confronted by far greater obstacles to 
its fulfilment and resolution: 
The Real is thus - virtually by definition in the fallen world of capitalism -
that which resists desire, that bedrock against which the desiring subject 
knows the breakup of hope and can finally measure everything that refuses 
its fulfillment. Yet it also follows that this Real ... can be disclosed only by 
Desire itself: whose wish-fulfilling mechanisms are the instruments through 
which this resistant surface must be scanned. (PU, 183-4) 
Which, as I argued in the previous chapter, is a position that is inconsistent with his 
Althusserianism and in this chapter as being inconsistent with his endorsement of Deleuze 
and Guattari's conception of desire. 
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The Dialectic of Utopia and Ideology 
As I suggested in the previous chapter Jameson's formulation of the role of "contradiction" 
in his interpretative system is very similar to Lacan's formulation of "desire". So in 
conclusion I will now re-examine this correlation, specifically in relation to Jameson's 
conception of"ideology" and the status of the subject. Michael Clark writes that: 
For Lacan, desire is born in the imaginary relation between the self and the 
other that constitutes the illusion of the autonomous ego, and it is the 
catalytic factor in the oedipal drama by which the individual is constituted 
as a subject within the Law of the Symbolic at the same time that the 
signifier is cut off from the signified and the Real banished from 
signification. 142 
Thus for Lacan desire operates as a "term limit" marking the threshold of the Real upon 
the Symbolic and the threshold between the individual subject and the social For 
Jameson, the value of Lac an's doctrine of the decentred subject is that it provides a model, 
not for the renunciation or repression of the subject, but rather for the realisation of desire. 
According to Jameson, human consciousness is situation ally specific and historically 
produced, the notion of an autonomous centred subject is not merely a fiction or mirage 
but has a 'quasi-institutional status' (PU, 153) as well as performing particular ideological 
functions. Jameson argues that the logic of reification, with its relentless drive towards 
fragmentation and specification, provides us with the conceptual instrument with which to 
.. 
understand 'the emergence of the ego or centred subject' (PU, 153). Jameson compares 
the figuration of desire in Balzac with a modem writer 'whose commodity lust and 
authorial investments' (PU, 159) are most reminiscent of Balzac, that is to say Theodore 
Dreiser: 
Commodification is not the only "event" which separates Dreisers text 
from Balzac's: the charges it has wrought in the object world of late 
capitalism have evidently been accompanied by a decisive development in 
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the construction of the subject as welL by the constitution of the latter into 
a closed monad, henceforth governed by the laws of "psychology." (PU, 
160) 
Dreiser's texts present us with a "point of view," an object is no longer desirable in-itself 
but desirable because it is an object of a particular desiring-subject, 'and the Utopian 
impulse itself: now reified, is driven back inside the monad, where it assumes the status of 
some merely psychological experience, private feeling, or relativized value' (PU, 160). 
Jameson suggests that the only way beyond the aporias of the bourgeois subject or the 
anarchism of the schlzoid-subject lies: 
in the renewal of Utopian thinking, of creative speculation as to the place 
of the subject at the other end of historical time, in a social order which has 
put behind it class organization, commodity production and the market, 
alienated labor, and the implacable determinism of an historical logic 
beyond the control of humanity. 143 
Such a situation would allow for the current fetishlzation of the subject to be placed in its 
proper historical perspective but this in tum, writes Jameson requires the formulation of a 
'properly Marxist "ideology"'l44 
The place of ideology in Jameson's interpretative system is within his second horizon, that 
point whereby one moves beyond the isolated cultural artefact as a symbolic act to grasp it 
as a fragment of a larger class discourse: in other words that threshold between the 
individual and the social which for Lacan IS the realm of desire. In the first version and 
reprints of Jameson's essay on Lacan, 'Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan: Marxism. 
psychoanalytic Criticism and the Problem of the Subject', the correspondence between 
Jameson's three horizons and Lacan's three registers is quite explicit: 
Ideology conceived in this sense is therefore the place of the insertion of 
the subject in those realms or orders - the Symbolic (or in other words the 
synchronic network of society itself: with its Kinship-type system of places 
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and roles), and the Real (or in other words the diachronic evolution of 
History itself: the realm of time and death) both of which radically 
transcend individual experience in their very structure. But if this is how 
ideology is understood, then it is clear that it has a function to play in every 
conceivable social order, and not merely those of what Marx called "pre-
history" or class societies: the ideological representation must rather be 
seen as that indispensable mapping fantasy or narrative by which the 
individual subject invents a "lived" relationship with collective systems 
which otherwise by definition exclude him insofar as he or she is born into 
a pre-existent social form and its pre-existent language. 14S 
As Michael Clark points out this conception of ideology is . entirely consonant with the 
traditional concept of ideology as mystification' and an 'instrumental notion of culture as a 
superstructure designed and used to further the ends of that social unitY. 146 However, as I 
pointed out in the last chapter, this conflation of Althusserian and Lacanian ideas is 
radically inconsistent, and although Althusser and Jameson may trail Lacanian resonances 
they are talking about entirely different processes. 147 Indeed for Jameson, Marxism's 
conception of ideology as "false consciousness" or as "structural limitation," is the 
historical originality of its negative dialectic, that is to say its negative demystifying 
hermeneutic. But at the same time Marxism also has a tradition of a positive or 
redemptive hermeneutic and it is, suggests Jameson, within this arena that 'some non-
instrumental conception of culture may be tested' (PU, 286). Jameson identifies in this 
tradition Bahktin's notions of dialogism and the carnivalesque, and the Frankfurt School's 
concept of "strong memory", but what he is particularly concerned with is Ernst Bloch's 
ideal of hope or "Utopian Impulse". According to Jameson, we must grasp that the 
ideological is at one and the same time the Utopian. If this seems somewhat paradoxica~ 
Jameson cites the ethical dilemma of good and evil to which he has had frequent recourse 
in his text. Jameson argued that the only way to resolve this dilemma was dialectically to 
transcend both categories in the form of a collective logic that was beyond good and evil. 
Thus ifwe grasp dialectical thought as the anticipation of a new form of collective logic: 
In this sense, to project an imperative to thought in which the ideological 
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would be grasped as somehow at one with the Utopian, and the Utopian at 
one with the ideological, is to formulate a question to which a collective 
dialectic is the only conceivable answer. (PU, 286-7) 
At its most basic level this paradox operates as a "compensatory exchange." For instance, 
if one considers the widespread theories of the manipulatory aspects of the media and of 
"mass" culture in general, unless these theories posit a completely passive addressee then 
the addresser must offer some form of gratification in return for the addressee's 
acquiescence. In other words, ideological manipulation and some form of Utopian 
gratification are inseparable aspects of any cultural text. The problem however remains, 
how can this be so? For Jameson there is only one solution: 
it is the proposition that all class consciousness - or in other words, all 
ideology in the strongest sense, including the most exclusive forms of 
ruling-class consciousness just as much as that of oppositional or oppressed 
classes - is in its very nature Utopian. (PU, 289) 
This proposition rests on the central notion that class consciousness emerges from the 
struggle between various groups or classes and therefore, class consciousness is always 
defined in relation to another class. In this sense class consciousness, of whatever class, is 
Utopian to the extent that it expresses the unity of a collectivity. However, Jameson 
insists that this proposition is allegorical as \ all such collectivities are themselves figures 
for the ultimate concrete collective life of an achieved Utopian or classless society' (PU, 
291). 
Now we are in a better position to understand how even hegemonic or 
ruling-class culture and ideology are Utopian, not in spite of their 
instrumental function to secure and perpetuate class privilege and power, 
but rather precisely because that function is also in and of itself the 
affirmation of collective solidarity. (PU, 291) 
Terry Eagleton argues that 'Jameson's startling claim to discern a proleptic image of 
utopia in any human collectivity whatsoever, which would presumably encompass racist 
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rallies',148 is ridiculously gullible or faintly perverse. Whilst Jameson would insist that a 
racist rally is indeed Utopian to the extent that it projects a [white] collectivity, this must 
be seen as a compensatory projection rather than an "anticipatory" one. In other words, 
racism could be said to offer forms of compensation and gratification for present social 
problems: unemployment, bad housing, lack of services etc., but insofar as it does not 
project a fully classless society it is not a positive anticipation of Utopia. The problem of 
distinguishing between compensatory and anticipatory projections though, as Ruth Levita~ 
points out, is that it eventually comes down to questions of content. Bloch's notion of 
Utopia as "anticipatory consciousness' rests on the definition of Utopia as a function rather 
than a- matter of a particular form or content. However, the distinction between what is an 
anticipatory and what is a compensatory projection of Utopia can only be made by 
reference to its content. As Ruth Levitas suggests: 
The abandonment of form as a criterion leads to a broadening of the field 
of study - which is narrowed again by the distinction between abstract and 
concrete utopia. This distinction, while ostensibly made in terms of 
function, in practice relies upon content. 149 
With the elision of the functional property of Utopian thought, one can easily conceive of 
a situation whereby Jameson may interpret a racist rally as compensatory, but the racists 
themselves would see it as being anticipatory . 
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POSTMODERNISM, OR, 
THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE CAPITALISM 
particularly in the United States, the development of postindustrial 
monopoly capitalism has brought with it an increasing occultation of the 
class structure through techniques of mystification practiced by the media 
and particularly by advertising in its enormous expansion since the onset of 
the Cold War. In existential terms, what this means is that our experience 
is no longer whole: we are no longer able to make any felt connection 
between the concerns of private life, as it follows its own course within the 
walls and confines of the aflluent society, and the structural projections of 
the system in the outside world, in the form of neocolonialism, oppression, 
and counter insurgency warfare. In psychological terms, we may say that 
as a service economy we are henceforth so far removed from the realities 
of production and work on the world that we inhabit a dream world of 
artificial stimuli and televised experience: never in any previous civilization 
have the great metaphysical preoccupations, the fundamental questions of 
being and of the meaning of life, seemed so utterly remote and pointless. 
(MF, xvii-xviii) 
Reading the above quotation, one would be inclined to identify it as a description of what 
we now call postmodernism. Indeed, this description contains all the essential references 
that now characterise the postmodem debate: the development of the postindustrial 
society, the concealment of class structure through an expanded media, the fragmentation 
of the subject, the disjunction between our existential or quotidian experience and the 
global expansion of the capitalist system, t!Ie effacing of the final traces of production by 
an increasingly image-dominated society, and finally the decline and dissolution of 
metaphysics. However, this quotation was written in 1971, in the 'Preface' to Alarxism 
and Form, a decade before the term postmodernism became such a focus for theoretical 
and cultural controversy. Thus it could be said to provide a description of the situation of 
postmodernism avant fa lettre. Douglas Kellner gives just such a reading of this passage 
in his 'Introduction' to Jameson, Postmodernism, Critique,l suggesting that such 
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passages in Jameson's earlier work provide 'anticipations' of 'lacunae' in his theoretical 
project and of his later theoretical concerns. A strong case for such a reading can clearly 
be made. As we have already seen, Marxism and Form was essentially concerned with 
familiarising a North American academic readership with an unfamiliar tradition of 
European Marxist cultural theorists. The Prison House of Language provided a similar 
critical survey of an alternative tradition of Russian Formalism and French Structuralism. 
A decade later The Political Unconscious provided Jameson's most sustained intervention 
in contemporary theoretical debates; specifically the contemporary French theories of 
Althusserian Marxism, Poststructuralism and Deconstruction. What was missing from all 
these texts was the analysis of the contemporary situation which Jameson appeared to be 
calling for in his 'Preface' to Marxism and Form. In particular The Political Unconscious 
and Fables of Aggression could be seen, as Kellner writes to 'knock on the door of the 
present but neither crosses the threshold of our own historical milieu',2 both texts being 
specifically concerned with literary Modernism. This is not to say that Jameson was 
unconcerned, at this juncture, with other forms of cultural practice or contemporary 
culture, as his continuing writings on film, painting and science-fiction testify. In short, 
until the early 1980s, the absent centre of Jameson's theoretical project was "modernism", 
whilst his political priority remained the need to establish Marxism as a viable, indeed pre-
eminent, theoretical discourse in the American academy. 
Ifwe follow this intellectual and theoretical trajectory a little further it would be feasible to 
argue that with the publication of The Political Unconscious Jameson's aim of establishing 
a strong Marxist presence in the American academy had been achieved. Therefore, no 
longer needing to argue the very legitimacy of his own discourse, Jameson could pursue 
that long deferred project of theorising the contemporary cultural scene, as he did with 
characteristic bravura and style in his influential. 1984 essay 'Postmodernism, or, The 
Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism'3, For Kellner, this text presents: 
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the culmination of a series of historical and theoretical studies which 
provide part of the methodology, framework, and theoretical analyses 
requisite for a theory of contemporary society which Jameson 
conceptualizes as a product of a specific historical trajectory: the transition 
from a discrete national system of state/monopoly capitalism to an 
interlocking system multinational corporate capitalism 4 
Thus, far from being a radical departure for Jameson his conceptualisation of 
postmodemism, according to Kellner, represents the culmination of 'his efforts to 
introduce, defend, and develop the Marxian theory in a climate and situation often 
ignorant of or hostile to the radical tradition of which Marxism is a key component'.' 
Kellner provides one narrative, and a persuasive one, of Jameson's theoretical evolution, I 
should like, however, to add another dimension to this story and to complicate it a little. A 
problem with any history of ideas is that all too often they leave out, what Jameson calls, 
History itself Kellner writes: 
to understand any of Jameson's texts one needs to grasp their place in the 
history of the Jamesonian oeuvre, as articulations of a relatively stable and 
coherent theoretical project. 6 
We should, however, make a distinction between a "relatively" stable and coherent 
intellectual project and the rather linear and continuous narrative that Kellner himself 
provides. Jameson's evolving project did not take place in isolation but also represents his 
response to changing theoretical, political and cultural demands. The 1971 'Preface' 
identifies the particular context within whtch Marxism and Form was written and at the 
same time what differentiates this particular situation from the pre-World War IT era of 
class struggle and Popular Front cultural politics. Within this context, here defined as 
postindustrial rather than late capitalism, Jameson called for a revitalised form of Marxist 
criticism, a Marxism of which: 
the great themes of Hegel's philosophy - the relationship of part to whole, 
the opposition between concrete and abstract, the concept of totality, the 
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dialectic of appearance and essence, the interaction between subject and 
object - are once again the order of the day. (MF, xix) 
As we shall see below, those "great themes" that seemed so much the order of the day in 
1971 no longer appear in the least appropriate for the analysis of post modern culture. To 
put it another way, we no longer have recourse to that older language of the classical 
dialectic. Jameson himself acknowledges that to descn'be the dialectic in terms of self-
consciousness or reflexivity, as he did in Marxism and Form, is one way of doing so; but: 
its effectiveness depends very much on the freshness of this rhetoric of self-
consciousness, which, at a time when 'consciousness' itself has been called 
back into question, as a concept or a category, has apparently ceased, to 
convey very much. Reflexivity ... is part of the baggage of a modernist 
thinking no longer very authoritative in the postmodernist era. (LM, 25) 
Superficially, there may seem to be a certain symmetry, or continuity, to Jameson's return 
to Adorno and dialectical aesthetics after two decades of skirmishes with Structuralism, 
Poststructuralism and Postmodernism; but for Jameson the Adorno of the 90s is 
unambiguously not the Adorno of the 60s and 70s.7 This is not merely a question of 
language or terminology but the problematique itself has radically altered. In his 
introduction to Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism Jameson 
enumerates the four principal themes of his book: 'interpretation, Utopia, survivals of the 
modem, and returns of the repressed of historicity' (PLLC, xv); these are all familiar 
Jamesonian themes, what is new is that they have now been, supposedly, invalidated by 
the very concept of the postmodem. It is not only Jameson's rhetoric but his very 
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concepts and theoretical concerns that have been delegitimated by the new phenomena of 
postmodernism Furthermore, if as Jean-Fran90is Lyotard has suggested: 
The grand narrative has lost its credibility, regardless of what mode of 
unification it uses, regardless of whether it is a speculative narrative or a 
narrative of emancipation, 8 
the postmodern condition signals the end of Marxi~'s traditional historical narrative and 
throws into question not only Jameson's own theoretical project but the very status of 
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Marxism itself In other words, the significance for Jameson of the encounter with 
postmodernism must not be understated or, indeed, be reduced to an individual intellectual 
project. The founding premise of many versions of postmodernism, that a structural break 
has taken place within the capitalist system, at a stroke invalidates or delegitimates all the 
older modernist discourses such as the Enlightenment, Psychoanalysis and above all 
Marxism Therefore, much of the Marxian analysis of postmodernism, from writers such 
as Jameson, David Harvey, Edward Soja, and the more occasional pieces by Terry 
Eagleton,9 focuses upon the nature of the transition that has been said to have taken place 
in the capitalist system since the end of the second World War, and whether or not one 
can actually theorise this as a structural break, or systemic transformation. In short, if a 
structural break has taken place, the path seems to lead inexorably to postmarxism. in one 
form or another; on the other hand, if no such break has taken place the Marxian critique 
of Capitalism and its emancipatory narrative retain their political and intellectual force. 
Jameson, characteristically, refuses both of these options, at once accepting that a 
structural transformation has taken place but one that does not invalidate the Marxian 
narrative. 
The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism 
Jameson's 1984 essay on postmodemism was itself a montage of two previous essays: 
'The Politics of Theory: Ideological Positions in the Postmodem Debate' and 
.. 
'Postmodernism and Consumer Society'.lO In the first of these essays Jameson sought to 
map the various ideological positions that were emerging around the concept of 
postmodemism For Jameson, the problem of post modernism was seen from the outset as 
both an aesthetic and a political one. He argued that all positions adopted in relation to 
postmodernism could be shown to project particular visions of history: 
Indeed, the very enabling premise of the debate turns on an initiaL 
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strategic, presupposition about our social system: to grant some historic 
originality to a postmodernist culture is also implicitly to affirm some 
radical structural difference between what is sometimes called consumer 
society and earlier moments of the capitalism from which it emerged. 11 
In other words, defining a position on postmodernism necessarily involves one in taking a 
position on the modernism that preceded it as well as a conception of the nature of the 
relation between these moments and the transition from one to another. Jameson 
identified four principal positions to have emerged in the postmodem debate: the pro-
postmodernist/anti-modernist stance associated with the architects Charles Jencks and 
Robert Venturi, as well as writers such as Tom Wolfe; the anti-postmodernistlpro-
modernist stance associated with the American critic Hilton Kramer and the journal New 
Criterion and also the work of Jiirgen Habermas; the pro-modernistJpro-postmodernist 
position articulated by Jean-Francios Lyotard; and finally the rather bleak: and pessimistic 
anti-modernistlanti-postmodernist view exemplified by the work of the Venetian 
architectural historian Manfredo Tafuri. The first two of these positions, argues Jameson, 
are characterised by their acceptance, be it positively or negatively, of the new term, 
postmodernism, which is itself tantamount to an acceptance of a break between the 
moments of modernism and postmodernism. The latter two however call into question the 
category of postmodernism by repudiating any notion of an historical break and seeing the 
present moment as a continuation of modernism; or, in the case of Lyotard projecting 
postmodernism indefinitely backwards. At this juncture however Jameson eschews what 
he sees as these essentially moralising positions, either stigmatising postmodernism as 
corrupt and hedonistic, the latest form of cultural degeneration, or alternatively hailing it 
as a positive form of innovation and as culturally and aesthetically healthy. In place of 
such ahistorical moralising Jameson calls for a genuinely historical and dialectical analysis. 
He writes: 
The point is that we are within the culture of postmodernism to the point 
where its facile repudiation is as impossible "as any equally facile celebration 
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of it is complacent and corrupt. . .. it seems more appropriate to assess 
the new cultural production within the working hypothesis of a general 
modification of culture itself within the social restructuration of late 
capitalism as a system. 12 
Jameson defers such an analysis in the present context. However, Jameson's initial 
position raises two of the recurrent themes and persistent question marks over his 
theorisation of the postmodem. Taking into consideration that this essay was written in 
1982, before the term "postmodemism" was quite as ubiquitous, and generally accepted, 
as it is today; one could legitimately ask to what extent are we already "within" the culture 
of postmodemism and how pervasive is this new cultural production? Or, to anticipate 
Jameson's later terminology, to what extent is postmodemism a cultural "dominant"? The 
second issue is the rather more difficult question of the nature of the relationship between 
this new cultural production and the general modification of culture and social 
restructuration of the capitalist system. I shall return to these questions below but for the 
present would note that Jameson's acceptance of the term postmodemism, following his 
own criteria. implicitly posits a 'a radical structural difference' from the preceding moment 
of capitalism. 
Jameson's characterisation of the postmodem at this stage amounts to little more than a 
heterogeneous list of names, styles, and forms; a problem of definition, he notes, that is 
inherent to the very concept of the postmodem, of which there will be as many local 
variants as there were of modernism itsel£ His first, acknowledgedly limited, attempt at a 
description of key features of postmodemism is to be found in 'Postmodemism and 
Consumer Society'. For Jameson, the term postmodemism does not designate a particular 
style but it is a periodizing concept which serves to 'correlate the emergence of new 
formal features in culture with the emergence of a new type of social life and a new 
economic order'.13 Jameson dates the emergenc~ of this new economic order as post-
World War II, that is to say, somewhere around the late 1940s or early 1950s for the 
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United States, and in the late 1950s for Europe. The key transitional decade though is 
seen to be the 1960s. Jameson substitutes for the actual analysis of this new economic 
order a list of epithets: 'modernization, postindustrial or consumer society, the society of 
the media or the spectacle, or multinational capitalism'.14 However, as his title indicates, 
one of the strongest currents underlying Jameson's conception of a new economic order is 
Baudrillard's work on "consumer society", in particular his early texts: 'The System of 
Objects', 'Consumer Society' and 'For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign'.15 
In these texts Baudrillard developed a critique of Saussurean linguistics, more specifically 
Saussure's conception of the binary nature of the sign and its implicit assumption of a 
referent as the sign's ultimate ground or meaning. Baudrillard proceeded from this critique 
of Saussure to advance his own critique of the Marxian distinction between use value and 
exchange value. Baudrillard argued that such a distinction as that between use value and 
exchange value was based on a latent assumption of an anthropological conception of 
"need". However, such a conception of need is no longer appropriate for our 
understanding of contemporary consumer society, or an order of discourse in which the 
subject as an autonomous self-centred ego has been dissolved. According to BaudriDard, 
consumption - as it is understood in "consumer societies" - is nothing to do with the 
satisfaction of needs but is rather an \ active mode of relations ... a systematic mode of 
activity and a global response on which our whole cultural system is founded'.16 In other 
words, the objects of consumption are not material goods but rather "signs". 
J-
Consumption, writes Baudrillard, 'in so far as it is meaningfuL is a systematic act of the 
manipulation of signs'. 17 The transformation of the object into the systematic status of 
signs entails a correlative transformation in human relations and it is this new relation, 
suggests Baudrillard, that is the relation of consumption. In this sense, the system of 
consumption functions like a language. Baudrillard, therefore, argues that the only way to 
move beyond a political economy which is grot,mded in need and to understand the 
commodity structure of consumer society is to see that use value no longer corresponds to 
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human need, indeed there is no longer use value as such, just exchange value. Jameson 
does not fully endorse this complete eclipse of use value but does suggest that 
postmodemism represents a further intensification of exchange value over use value. 
Jameson returns to this theme of a new economic order, or as he now says, moment, at 
the end of the present essay, including the new epithet of "late capitalism", but he gives no 
more than the same elliptical description of what this new order may entail or how this 
correlation between the cultural and the economic may be articulated. 
The essay as a whole is much more concerned with the characterisation and description of 
postmodernism, emphasising postmodemism's new experience of space and time in 
relation to pastiche and schizophrenia. In the case of the former he contrasts modernism's 
use of parody and quotation with the postmodern practice of pastiche; parody he suggests 
plays on the uniqueness of a style; it 'seizes on [its] idiosyncrasies and eccentricities to 
produce an imitation which mocks the original'18 but in doing so it retains an implicit 
linguistic norm against which the original is being judged: above aIL parody retains a 
subversive "other" voice. As an imitation of a particular unique individual or personal 
style parody also rests on assumptions about the nature of the subject which, since the 
post-structural dissolution or decentring of the subject, are no longer held to be tenable. 
Pastiche, on the other hand, whilst sharing many of these features, is in a sense a neutral 
practice; it lacks parody's "ulterior motive", its satirical impulse and any sense of a norm 
. 
against which the original is to be compared; language has now disintegrated into a 
proliferation of private languages and discourses. Postmodern literature, suggests 
Jameson, does not simply "quote" popular texts as a modernist such as Joyce may have 
done but rather it incorporates those texts within itself to the extent that the boundaries 
between them are effaced. This effacing of key boundaries between previously distinct 
cultural realms, specifically between "high art". and "mass" or "popular" culture is 
frequently cited as one of the most significant democratising and popularising features of 
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postmodernism "De-differentiation", as the process has been called, can most explicitly 
be seen in the field of architecture, to which I will return below. For Jameson the full 
aesthetic realisation ofpostmodern pastiche is to be found in what he defines as "Nostalgia 
films". These are films that in the narrowest sense are about the past and specific 
generational pasts but more broadly would seem to comprise a whole range of 
metageneric films, remakes, and big budget glossy productions; the notion is as much to 
do with form and the quality of image as it is with any ostensible content: 
the classical nostalgia film [according to Jameson] while evading its present 
altogether, registered its historicist deficiency by losing itself in mesmerized 
fascination in lavish images of specific generational pasts. (PLLC, 296) 
The privileged generational moments are the 1930's and particularly at the moment the 
1950's. Postmodernism's aesthetic of pastiche is then, for Jameson, symptomatic of a 
general loss of historicity, and our incapacity to achieve aesthetic 'representations of our 
own current experience' (PLLC, 21). Spatial disorientation and the inability of individual 
subjects to represent or place themselves in relation to the new global network of 
multinational capitalism is a key theme of Jameson's analysis of post modernism; however, 
as I suggested in the previous chapter the problem that arises through such appeals to 
experience: is just "whose" experience is being appealed to here? From his analysis of 
postmodem cultural artefacts such as architecture, sculpture and literature Jameson is 
clearly describing his own experience of these works but, as I shall argue below, it is 
questionable just how generalisable this experience is. 
The latter half of 'Postmodernism and Consumer SocietY is concerned with our new 
experience of temporality, specifically in relation to Lacan's notion of schizophrenia. As 
we saw in the preceding chapter, Laean sees schizophrenia as essentially a language 
disorder, a failure to accede fully into the symbolic order, the realm of speech and 
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language; it therefore represents a break in the chain of signification. For Lacan our 
experience of temporality is also an effect of language: as words and sentences move in 
time, they have a past and a future, as well as a present. The schizophrenic's failure to 
fully grasp language articulation will therefore affect their experience of temporality, or, 
more accurately they will experience a lack of temporal continuity. The schizophrenic is 
condemned to a perpetual present, an . experience of isolated, disconnected, discontinuous 
material signifiers which fail to link up into a coherent sequence'.19 The schizophrenic's 
lack of temporal continuity has the corresponding effect of making the present more 
intense and vivid, the signifier in isolation becoming ever more material or "literal". This, 
suggests Jameson, is the condition we now culturally find ourselves in, a situation not 
dissimilar to Baudrillard's world of simulacra and free-floating signs: 
the referent does not constitute an autonomous concrete reality at all; it is 
only the extrapolation of the excision ... established by the logic of the sign 
onto the world of things (onto the phenomenological universe of 
perception). It is the world such as it is seen and interpreted through the 
sign - that is, virtually excised and excisable at pleasure. The "real" table 
does not exist. 20 
According to Baudrillard, sign systems and textuality have now taken precedence over 
"real" objects and, what he calls, symbolic exchange is given priority over exchange value. 
Consumer society represents a system beyond the commodity law of value and therefore a 
realm in which our old terminology and methods of critique are no longer appropriate: 
Today, the entire system is fluctuating in indeterminacy, all of reality 
absorbed by the hyperreality of the code and of simulation. It is now a 
principle of simulation and not reality, that regulates social life. 21 
However, to say that one only has access to phenomena through signs is not the same 
thing as saying that phenomena only exist as signs, that they have no independent 
existence beyond those signs. This is simply. a category mistake, a confusion of 
epistemological and ontological issues and what I termed previously, following Roy 
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Bhaskar, the epistemic fallacy or the reduction of being to knowing. According to 
Bhaskar, the 'analysis of experimental activity shows that causal laws are ontologically 
distinct from patterns of events'22 and from the experience of those events. Bhaskar 
writes: 
The analysis of experimental activity shows, then, that the assertion of a 
causal law entails the possibility of a non-human world, that it would 
operate even if it were unknown, just as it continues to operate when its 
consequent is unrealised (or it is unperceived or undetected by human 
beings), that is, outside the conditions that permit its empirical 
identification. 23 
Bhaskar contends that it follows from this argument that statements about being cannot 
always be reduced to statements about knowledge, in other words, that ontological 
questions cannot always be reduced to questions about epistemology, or transposed into 
epistemological terms. It would seem therefore that Baudrillard's over-emphasis on the 
determining role of sign systems, that it is the sign systems themselves rather than a 
conception of an independent reality that regulates social life, rests upon a fundamental 
philosophical error. However, in a footnote to 'The Ecstasy of Communication' 
Baudrillard writes: 
all this does not mean that the domestic universe • the home, its objects, 
etc. - is not sti11lived largely in a traditional way - social, psychological, 
differential etc. It means rather that the stakes are no longer there, that 
another arrangement or life-style is virtually in place, even if it is indicated 
only through a technologistical discourse which is often simply a political 
gadget.24 
In other words, Baudrillard does not deny the existence of an independent reality beyond 
the immediate perception of signs and images, he is just not really interested in it. One 
could agree with Baudrillard to a certain extent that sign systems and image production 
now playa much greater role in our lives than previously. But to extrapolate from this 
and assign symbolic systems a determining role in relation to all forms of activity and 
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experience is an entirely different proposition. Equally Baudrillard's preference for opinion 
polls and advertising over other forms of empirical data provides far too general. 
unspecific and unsubstantiated material upon which to base a whole new theory of 
simulation and hyperreality. One could argue, therefore, that Baudrillard's analyses of 
postmodem consumer societies have a much more limited and local validity than the grand 
universalising claims ofBaudrillard's own texts. lbis, I shall argue, is a recurrent problem 
for Jameson's own theorisation of the postmodem. 
I shall return to the dilemmas of hyperreality and simulacra below. For the present we 
should note that the key features of these twin notions of pastiche and schizophrenia, are 
the flattening of space and the displacement of diachronic time with synchronic 
jmmanence. Ifwe recall the questions l~ft open at the end of the last essay and Jameson's 
call for a genuine historical and dialectical analysis, we must .concede that whilst pointing 
us in this direction Jameson has once more deferred the analysis itself. 
The third essay in this sequence 'Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late 
Capitalism' incorporates wholesale and largely unrevised the previous essay but it also 
assumes the work of 'The Politics of Theory'. However now Jameson wishes to propose 
something a little more than just a shift of debate from morality to politics or provide 
stylistic descriptions, rather he suggests that a fundamental mutation has taken place 'both 
.> 
in the object world itself - now become a set of texts or simulacra - and in the disposition 
of the subject' (PLLC, 9). This mutation can be characterised by what Jameson calls the 
"waning of affect", which is not to suggest that all affect, all emotion and feeling, or all 
subjectivity has vanished but that the old autonomous centred subject has now been 
displaced and fragmented and with it a shift has taken place in the emotional ground tone; 
such concepts as anxiety and "alienation" no lo~ger seem appropriate to describe the 
psychic experience of the decentred and fragmented subject, experiences which can best 
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be described as schizophrenic intensities. In terms of the object world, postmodernism is 
now for Jameson essentially a culture of the image and simulacrum, that is to say it is 
essentially deptbless. The theoretical correlative of this has been the discrediting of all the 
old depth models: the Hermeneutic of inside and outside, the Existential of authenticity 
and inauthenticity, and Freudian of latent and manifest, the Dialectic of essence and 
appearance, and more recently, that of the Semiotic signifier and signified. These older 
models have now been replaced by notions of textuality, which is not simply a movement 
from deep structure to surface but rather the play of multiple surfaces as well as the spaces 
that exist between surfaces or texts. 
I have already noted postmodernism's perceived lack of historicity and its effacement 
through the practice of pastiche, but here again Jameson wants to propose something a 
little fundamental Borrowing the term from the architectural debate, Jameson now 
identifies the project of "historicism", 'the random cannibalization of all the styles of the 
past, the play of random stylistic allusion, and in general ... the increasing primacy of the 
"neo'" (PLLC, 18) with postmodernism in general. In this sense the past has become 
nothing but 'a vast collection of images, a multitudinous photographic simulacrum'. 
Adopting Guy Debord's famous slogan "the image has become the final form of 
commodity remcation" Jameson suggests that the past as "referent" has been gradually 
bracketed until all that we are left with now are texts. In other words Jameson has 
substituted a spatial metaphor for a temporal one. 
We have still, as yet, to come to terms with the question of a structural break, or indeed, 
the theoretical underpinnings of Jameson's periodization. In this essay Jameson broadly 
defines postmodernism, using Raymond Williams' formulation, as a cultural dominant. 
The value of such a definition is that it allow~ for 'a range of very different, yet 
subordinate, features' (PLLC, 4); that is to say the residual characteristics of Modernism 
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as well as emergent characteristics of post-postmodem culture. It is a concept that allows 
for both continuity and difference. As we are repeatedly reminded postmodernism retains 
many of the features of high modernism - for example, its high level of self-consciousness, 
the disruption of narrative forms, its cultural eclecticism and sense of parody - but, argues 
Jameson, to see postmodernism simply as a continuation of modernism is to fail to grasp 
the restructuration that these features have undergone and above all to fail to take account 
of the social position of the older modernism For Jameson postmodernism and 
modernism 
remain utterly distinct in their meaning and social function, owing to the 
very different positioning of postmodemism in the economic system of late 
capital and, beyond that, to the transformation of the very sphere of culture 
in contemporary society. (PLLC, S) 
With modernism the sphere of culture was seen to have retained a degree of semi-
autonomy; whether from the left or right, it retained an oppositional stance, and critical 
distance, toward capital. However, with postmode~ culture has become fully 
integrated into commodity production in genera~ annulling oppositional stance whilst that 
pervasive flattening of the object world has abolished critical distance. 
Jameson's claim has been inspired and, paradoxically, confirmed by the work of Ernest 
Mande~ in particular Late Capitalism, in which Mandel identifies three distinct moments 
of capitalism: market capitalism, imperialism or monopoly capitalism, and our present 
moment which is often misleadingly called postindustrial capitalism, but which is more 
properly defined as multinational or late capitalism Mandel's periodization is based on a 
theory of "Kondratiev cycles"2.5 or "long waves", each wave evolving through 
approximately a fifty year cycle and representing a dialectical expansion over the previous 
stage. Each of these long waves encompasses a number of "business cycles", that is to say 
the periodic expansion and contraction of commodity production, or, what is commonly 
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known as capitalism's cycle of Boom and Bust. According to Marxian economic theory, 
capitalism undergoes periodic "crises of over-production" every seven to ten years; these 
crises are by no means an unfortunate oversight or accident of the market but are 
necessary phases of capitalist production. As competition intensifies the average rate of 
profit has a tendency to decline as competitors attempt to undercut each other. 
Consequently, capitalists are unable to recuperate their full return on capital engaged in 
commodity production and there is a decline in investment and employment as 
commodities remain unsold. This crisis can only be overcome through an intensification 
of return on flexible capita4 that is to say labour, by increased productivity, lay-offs and an 
erosion of working conditions, or through an increased return on fixed capita4 that is 
machinery and buildings. Crises of over-production, therefore, are necessary in the sense 
that capitalism must continually revolutionise its own processes of production; must 
develop new forms of machinery and technology to increase productivity and restore 
profits, implying a renewal of fixed capital at a higher level of technology than previously 
realised. However, Mandel notes that: 
Under 'normal' conditions of capitalist production the values set free at the 
end of one 7- or lO-year cycle are certainly sufficient for the acquisition of 
more and more expensive machines than were in use at the outset of this 
cycle. But they do not suffice for the acquisition of a fundamentally 
renewed productive technology, particularly in Department 1 [that is the 
branches of capitalist production producing means of production, such as 
raw materials, energy, machinery and tools, buildings], where such a 
renewal is generally linked to the creation of completely new productive 
installations.26 
A complete renewal of fixed capital can only take place over a period of successive cycles, 
or long wave; each long wave or cycle of extended reproduction 'begins with different 
machines than the previous one'. 27 Thus, argues Mandel, the history of capitalism on a 
global scale can be seen as the succession of cyclical movements every seven to ten years 
and at the same time the succession of longer periods of approximately fifty years 
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duration, of which we have experienced four to date: the period from the end of the 18th 
century to 1847, from the crisis of 1847 to the early 1890s, from the 1890s to the second 
W orId War and finally our present moment from the second World War to the present. 
Each of these long waves can be characterised by the form of technology specific to it: the 
first wave was the period of the industrial revolution itself: characterised by the gradual 
spread of the 'handicraft-made or manufacture-made steam engine to all the most 
important branches of industry and industrial countries';28 Mandel identifies this as the first 
technological revolution. The second long wave was characterised by the generalisation 
of the 'electric and combustion engines'. Finally, our own moment can be characterised by 
the 'electronic apparatuses' and nuclear power, and represents the third technological 
revolution. 29 It is these last three phases that Jameson is primarily interested in and which 
we will see in the following section that he identifies with the aesthetic moments of 
Realism - Modernism - Postmodernism respectively. 
I have dwelt on Mandel's theory of Long waves at some length as this remains the primary 
economic underpinning for Jameson's conception of post modernism as the cu1turallogic of 
late capitalism.30 The significance of Mandel's proposition is that late capitalism, far from 
invalidating Marx's analysis of capital, rather presents o~ current historical moment as a 
purer form of capitalism. Mandel writes: 
late capitalism is necessarily defined by intensified competition among large 
concerns and between these and the non-monopolized sectors of industry. 
But on the whole, of course, this process is not qualitatively different from 
that of' classical' monopoly capitalism. 31 
According to Jameson, late capitalism also represents the final colonisation of the last 
enclaves of resistance to commodification: the third world, the unconscious and the 
aesthetic (at least in its modernist guise). Therefore, following the example of Lenin's 
identification of imperialism as a new stage in global development of capitalism, Jameson 
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can argue that a modification of the system has taken place, indeed even a structural 
transformation, but that fundamentally, the system itself remains the same. Consequently, 
for Jameson, the Marxist critique, adapted to meet the current historical situation, remains 
intact and unscathed by all Baudrillardian hyperbole ofpostmodernism and Lyotard's much 
heralded end of grand, universal, narratives. 
Jameson's project is audacious but at the same time somewhat precarious. As one 
examines his periodization and phenomenology of postmodernism a little more closely, 
certain problems begin to recur which the initial brawra of the performance selVed to 
mask. Here I shall examine Jameson's periodization in more detail and in the following 
section analyse two specific examples of his characterisation of the postmodem cultural 
artefacts. One's initial uncertainty with Jameson's notion of postmodernism as a cultural 
logic arises from an apparent discrepancy between his own periodization and Mandel's. 
For Mande~ the term "late capitalism" designates that period of economic history 'which 
clearly began after the Second World War'. 32 As with the shorter business cycle, the long 
wave is characterised by a period of accelerated capital accumulation, over-accumulation 
and deceleration or recession. For Mandel the increasing frequency of recessionary 
periods in the advanced capitalist states since the mid-1960s confirms his thesis that we 
are now in the second phase of the present long wave, that is, the period of decelerating 
growth. Indeed, the end of the post-war boom can be identified with the OPEC oil crisis 
.J> 
of 1973 and the world wide recession that followed thereafter. This raises the question, 
for Mande~ whether or not 'a new long wave can be predicted from the second half of the 
1960s onwards - the ebb after the flow'.33 As we have already seen, Jameson's 
periodization of postmodernism is somewhat equivocal: defining it both as the period 
Post-second World War - thus identifying it with Mandel's periodization oflate capitalism 
_ and the moment emerging from the late 1960s and early 1970s - thus identifying it with 
Mandel's second phase of decelerated accumulation or possibly a new long wave. In his 
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'Introduction' to Postmodemism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism Jameson 
sought to clarify this situation: 
Thus the economic preparation of postmodernism or late capitalism began 
in the 1950s, after the wartime shortages of consumer goods and spare 
parts had been made up, and new products and new technologies (not least 
those of the media) could be pioneered. On the other hand, the psychic 
habitus of the new age demands the absolute break, strengthened by a 
generational rupture, achieved more properly in the 1960s (PLLC, xx) 
Jameson goes on to argue that the crystallising moment of crisis for both the economic 
and the cultural spheres was the oil crisis of 1973. In other words, Jameson is proposing 
that we respect the "semi-autonomy" of each distinct level: the economic, the psychic and 
the cultural. But it: as Jameson insists, late capitalism marks the final colonisation of our 
psyche, postmodernism represents the completion of the process of modernisation and the 
final erosion of aesthetic autonomy or distance as culture becomes fully integrated into the 
commodity system in general; then how does this economic, psychic and cultural 
autonomy persist? I am not suggesting that we return to a reductive form of mechanical 
causality but I am asking how, if the logic of postmodernism is as totalizing as Jameson 
argues, he is to achieve the non-synchronicity that his periodization requires. 
This ambiguity in Jameson's periodization seems to arise from his use of the term 
"postmodernism" itself. As I outlined above, in his early essays Jameson argued that 
" 
postmodernism was not a style, in the old modernist sense, but a "cultural dominant". The 
value of such a definition, for Jameson, is that while it does not rule out difference, in the 
sense that it presupposes the coexistence of residual and emergent forms of culture, it 
does stave off complete heterogeneity and relath-ism through privileging or prioritising 
one particular sphere of culture. Furthermore, it facilitates Jameson's use of the term 
postmodernism as a periodizing concept.34 In this. sense, then, postmodernism designates 
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a cultural rather than an economic category. However, as Peter Nicholls has pointed 
out,3S Jameson also identifies postmodemism with 'capitalism itself (PLLC, 343) and as a 
'mode of production' (PLLC, 406). Clearly, the term "postmodernism" in these latter 
senses designates more than merely a cultural category, it is an historical, social and 
economic one. In short, Jameson uses the term postmodernism to designate both, what he 
calls a cultural logic, or the cultural expression of ' the inner truth of that newly emergent 
social order of late capitalism',36 and that social order itseI£: that is to say, "late 
capitalism". One could also well ask how a phenomenon that lacks depth and for which 
the barrier between inside and outside have been dissolved can have an "inner truth"? 
If it seems somewhat contradictory to use a single term to designate both a system and its 
cultural manifestation, Jameson once more reminds us of the necessity of respecting 
different levels of analysis and abstraction: 
my own thoughts on "postmodernism" ... are therefore to be understood as 
an attempt to theorize the specific logic of the cultural production of that 
third stage [of capitalism], and not as yet another disembodied culture 
critique or diagnosis of the spirit of the age. (PLLC, 400) 
Jameson is not simply concerned with cultural analysis but with how specific cultural 
artefacts and practices interrelated with a determinate historical moment, or stage of 
development. Jameson's approach to postmodemism, then, is a "totalizing" one, which for 
him, 'often means little more than the making of connections between various phenomena' 
(PLLC, 403). The defence of the concept of "totality" has constituted, perhaps, the most 
sustained polemic of Jameson's career, and as Douglas Kellner pointed out, its unifying 
theme.37 For Jameson, the concept of totality does not designate a specific thing, in the 
sense that it is something we can know and grasp, but rather it is an abstract concept. 
Much of the confusion that arises around this concept, suggests Jameson, derives not so 
much from the notion of totality itselfbut from our aversion to abstract thinking, in other 
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words, the assumption that to name a phenomenon is at the same time to assert its 
concrete and empirically verifiable presence, or, to put it another way, to take its abstract 
representation for its substantive existence. Totality then comes to imply the nightmare 
scenarios of a Weberian "total system". For Jameson, on the other hand, the concept 
defines a problem, it marks the limit of thought, a boundary which thought constantly 
comes up against but cannot surpass. Totality is unrepresentable and as such defines that 
outer limit against which our representations and thoughts must define themselves. The 
crucial thing about the concept of totality, writes Jameson, is that there is only "one" -
'something otherwise often known as a "mode of production'" (PLLC, 403). 
But clearly postmodernism is more tangible than this unrepresentable abstract category: 
indeed Jameson's own influential analyses of postmodem artefacts would suggest it is a 
slightly more concrete phenomenon than this. We must add, therefore, one more 
qualification to the concept of totality before we can fully understand Jameson's use of the 
term postmodernism: that is, Althusser's notion of structure (which Jameson equates with 
mode of production). As I outlined in chapter 2 Althusser's conception of structure as an 
absent cause posits that we can only know of the structure's existence, not empirically, but 
through its effects. Equally, the concept of totality is not something that we can know in-
itself but only through its effects. At this level of abstraction, then, we can say that 
postmodernism is the system itself: that totality or mode of production Jameson designates 
, 
late capitalism, but as such we can only know it through its discrete effects. in other 
words, its cultural manifestations. 
However, Jameson's own formulation of the concept of mode of production insists that no 
mode of production exists in a "pure" state but always in co-existence with previous and 
newly forming modes of production. Therefore 'Ye cannot strictly say that there is just 
one mode of production but rather that there are a number of distinguishable modes of 
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production in existence at any given moment, whilst accepting that one of these modes 
will be the dominant mode. Thus, as Bahoar argued, there may not simply be one social 
totality but 'two or more such totalities within one society'.38 1bis, indeed, would appear 
to be the consistent conclusion of Jameson's formulation of mode of production, although 
a conclusion he does not draw. 
However, it still does not resolve the discrepancies between Mandel's periodization and 
Jameson's own. The problem may become a little clearer if we briefly look at two other 
Marxist accounts of the transition from modernism to postmodernism: those of David 
HaNey in The Condition of Postmodernity and Edward Soja in Postmodern Geographies. 
Both writers share Jameson's analysis that significant structural transformations have taken 
place in the economic sphere over the last few decades but that these changes do not 
constitute a complete break with, or end ot: the capitalist mode of production. Equally 
both writers subscribe to the economic consensus that the long post-war boom came to its 
final crashing halt with the oil crisis of 1973, at the very moment that postmodernism 
emerged as a full-blown concept. Harvey writes: 
Somewhere between 1968 and 1972, therefore, we see postmodernism 
emerge as a full-blown though still incoherent movement out of the 
chrysalis of the anti-modem movement of the 1960s.39 
For David Harvey the condition ofpostmodemity is not to be ascribed to developments in 
long waves of capitalist reproduction but rather through the transition in the nature of 
capital accumulation. That is in the transition from a system of "Fordist" production with 
its rather rigid and fixed system of capital accumulation to a more "fleXlole" system of 
accumulation in the 1970s and 1980s. In other words, postmodernism correlates with the 
ebb rather than the flow of Mandel's latest long wave. 
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Soja also locates the 'passage to postmodernity in the late 1960s and the series of 
explosive events which together marked the end of the long post-war boom in the 
capitalist world economy'.40 Like Harvey, Soja defines the transition in the economic 
realm as postfordist and draws on Mandel's theory of long waves to support the thesis of 
economic transformation. However, unlike Jameson, Soja identifies postmodernity not 
with the third technological revolution but with the fourth modernisation and 'most recent 
phase of far-reaching socio-spatial restructuring that has followed the end of the long 
post-war economic boom'.41 
What divides these otherwise mutually sympathetic analysts of postmodernism is 
essentially, which side of the economic crisis of the early to mid-70s they see as the 
economic pre-conditions for postmodernism itself Jameson argues that it is the pre-1970s 
boom, Harvey and Soja, on the other hand, locate postmodernism's economic basis as 
Thatcherite monetarism and Reaganomics. Postmodernism may have emerged in the 
1970s but it came of age in the 1980s and is now irredeemably associated with the 
conspicuous consumption of that decade, in other words, with the rise of that new breed 
of entrepreneurs and young high earning financial service workers. the so-called Yuppies. 
In criticising Jameson's notion of postmodernism as the cultural expression of the global 
logic of late capitalism, Frank Pfeil argues that postmodernism is much more of a local 
phenomenon, and more precisely the cultural practice of a specific group. Postmodernism 
j 
is, pfeil writes: 
a cultural-aesthetic set of pleasures and practices created by and for a 
particular social group at a determinate moment in its collective history. 42 
That particular social group being the "P-M-Cs" or professional-managerial-class that 
were the children of the post-war baby boom and who. like postmodernism, came of age 
in the ThatcherlReagan era. Jameson goes some way in endorsing this analysis: 
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one can also plausibly assert that "postmodernism" in the more limited 
sense of an ethos and a "life-style" ... is the expression of the 
"consciousness" of a whole new class fraction .... This larger and more 
abstract category has variously been labeled as a new petit bourgeoisie, a 
professional-managerial-class, or more succinctly as "the yuppies" 
(PLLC, 407) 
Or, again, Jameson acknowledges the repudiation of postmodernism's universalising 
tendencies by microgroups and various "minorities" as it 'is essentially a much narrower 
class-cultural operation serving white and male dominated elites in the advanced countries' 
(PLLC, 318). Jameson, even goes so far as to acknowledge that postmodernism is a 
specifically North American cultural phenomenon, but with the rider that it is the first truly 
"global" North American cultural phenomenon. Again, as with the discussion of 
Baudrillard above, I am suggesting that postmodernism may be a more limited 
phenomenon than Jameson suggests and that its status as a cultural dominant is seriously 
questionable. 
Having said this, Jameson still insists on seeing postmodernism as the cultural expression 
of the deep structure of global capitalism and more precisely as the cultural expression of 
the third machine age; he writes, we may 'speak of our own period as the Third Machine 
Age' (PLLC, 36). As we shall see below this will prove essential for Jameson's reworking 
of the postmodern debate in terms of a ternary scheme of Realism - Modernism -
Postmodernism. But if we reflect on Mandel's third machine age of electronic controL 
~ 
nuclear power and early generation computerised data processing systems. these hardly 
seem to characterise postmodern technology. Indeed postmodem technology is not 
thought of as electronic so much as computerised. the cumbersome and slow electronic 
machines associated with the sixties have given way to digital micro-technology, while the 
monolithic and megalomaniac visions of nuclear power have given way to privatised 
energy markets (it is worth remarking that since the mid-70s the development of nuclear 
224 
power for civilian uses, with the exception of India, has ground to a halt in all major 
industrial countries). As Baudrillard observes: 
Something has changed, and the Faustian, Promethean, (perhaps Oedipal) 
period of production and consumption gives way to the "proteinic" era of 
networks, to the narcissistic and protean era of connections, contact, 
contiguity, feedback and generalized interface that goes with the universe 
of communication. With the television image - the television being the 
ultimate and perfect object for this new era - our own body and the whole 
surrounding universe become a control screen. 43 
What could be more Faustian or Promethean than those early utopian visions of the 
nuclear scientists, of unlimited, inexpensive power, of a whole new potential universe 
being opened before us, which have now degenerated into international squabbles over 
nuclear waste and, post-ChernobyL the safety of nuclear installations. Baudrillard's 
ecstasy of communication represents the fourth technological revolution, the so-called 
information technology revolution, as the properly postmodem moment. This is the 
moment that Jameson so eloquently describes in his analyses of postmodem culture but it 
does not tie in with his Mandellian periodization. Indeed, such analyses as those of 
Jameson would seem to support Mandel's theory that late capitalism 'develops a 
permanent pressure to accelerate technological innovation'.44 But at the same time, we 
should perhaps return to the question Mandel himself posed and ask whether or not the 
mid-70s signalled the emergence of a new long wave, characterised by the new 
.. 
technologies of the micro-chip and cyberspace. Whether or not we call it late capitalism 
or some other name is immaterial but postmodernism appears to be irrevocably the 
cultural logic of the fourth technological revolution and not Jameson's third. 
The Phenomenology of Postmodernism 
As Jameson has observed there is something of a \:vinner loses' logic to postmodernism: if 
one identifies one's object of study and then submits it to analysis, one runs the risk of 
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canonising and prioritising texts which it is the very rationale of postmodernism to disrupt 
and undermine. One also risks bringing to play upon those texts modernist assumptions of 
depth, truth, subjectivity etc. which are no longer appropriate in the discussion of 
postmodern phenomena. Postmodemism is inherently disparate, heterogeneous and 
eclectic, its impulse is to resist fixed categorisation through a perpetual dissolution of 
boundaries. So while the possibility of posing alternative individual readings of texts to 
those of Jameson's is feasible, these would not in themselves undermine his central thesis 
of postmodernism as a cultural logic, as it is in the nature of that logic itself to generate 
and sustain a multiplicity of readings. Faced with this theoretical dead-end, in which to 
pursue either option, of advancing a critique or abandoning the terrain altogether, ensnares 
one in the discourse of postmodernism, I shall take the former course. However, I shall 
not propose alternative or oppositional readings to individual texts but rather take generic 
categories and show how Jameson's own discourse is internally self-contradictory and 
begins to undermine his own thesis. The areas I intend to analyse in more detail are video 
and architecture, both of which are central forms in the postmodern debate. 
As was briefly indicated above, the television screen has come to epitomise the new 
technology of the fourth technological revolution. According to Baudrillard it represents 
'the ultimate and perfect object for this new era'.4~ Baudrillard argues that in the 
postmodern world the depth and reflexive transcendence which are irredeemably 
; 
associated with the image and symbol, the mirror and the scene, have been replaced by the 
pure immanence of the unreflecting surface of the television screen. Today, the television, 
writes Baudrillard: 
is the very space of habitation that is conceived as both receiver and 
distributor, as the space of both reception and operations, the control 
screen and the terminal which as such may be endowed with telematic 
power - that is, with the capability of regulating everything from a distance, 
including work in the home and, of course, consumption, play, social 
226 
relations and leisure.46 
Television, suggests Baudrillard, provides the perfect figure for that new world of 
communication networks and cyberspace in which isolated individuals are plugged into 
their own control panels and divorced from any contact with reality except, and insofar as, 
it is simulated on the screen in front of them 
I have dehoerately commenced this discussion of video with Baudrillard's reflections on 
television to foreground one of principal contradictions in postmodem theory, and 
particularly its universalising and totalizing discourse exemplified by Baudrillard above. 
That is the tendency, on the one hand, to celebrate heterogeneity and difference, whilst on 
the other, to refute determinate differentiation through an incessant dissolution of 
boundaries, reducing everything to a monotonous, homogenised plane. Although both 
video and television share the same channel of communication, and both come to us 
usually through a small screen in a black box and most frequently in our own homes, they 
are not the same thing. Furthermore, video itself is by no means a single unified form but 
designates a number of different activities and modes of reception. For example: the 
playing of video games, the renting of video films, what I will be examining here as more 
precisely called video art and most recently as interactive television. The dialectic of 
heterogeneity and homogeneity will persistently recur, in different forms, in the analyses 
that follow and would, I suggest, mark one of the unacknowledged limits, or inherent 
contradictions of postmodemism - a contraCiiction that Jameson's thesis wrestles with on a 
theoretical level but reduplicates in his own phenomenology. 
For Jameson, video is the hegemonic cultural form today and 'is rigorously coterminous 
with postmodemism itself as a historical period' (PLLC, 73) - although one may well ask 
which historical period this is? Jameson does make the distinction between commercial 
television and experimental video or "video art" but he does not pursue this distinction any 
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further. Indeed, he immediately blurs the distinction by borrowing Raymond Williams' 
notion of television as "total flow" (PLLC, 70) whilst discussing experimental video for 
the rest of his chapter. Jameson sees video as characteristically postmodem in a number 
of key respects. Firstly, the concept of total flow seems to render obsolete any possibility 
of "critical distance", as the viewer is immersed in the continuous production of images. 
Secondly, according to Jameson, memory plays no role in video and therefore it can be 
said to lack historicity or a sense of history. The former claim. as I have said, rests on a 
proposition about television rather than video itself and thus, I would argue, has uncertain 
value for a theory of video. Whilst the latter claim, as I shall contend below, appears to be 
demonstrably wrong. For Jameson, though, these dual features produce that fundamental 
paradox for any theory of postmodemism with which I began this discussion, that is, that 
postmodernism is untheorisable. Jameson writes: 
A description of the structural exclusion of memory, then, and of critical 
distance, might well lead on into the impossible, namely, a theory of video 
itself· how the thing blocks its own theorization becoming a theory in its 
own right. (PLLC, 71) 
In other words, it is impossible to have a theory of video, except, and insofar as, we can 
theorise this impossibility of the oris at ion. I shall, therefore, follow Jameson's theorisation 
of this aporia in some detail. Jameson argues that the process ofmodemisation marks the 
end of the sacred and the spiritual and the ascendance of brute materiality: 
., 
Capitalism, and the modem age, is a period in which, with the extinction of 
the sacred and the "spiritual." the deep underlying materiality of all things 
has finally risen dripping and convulsive into the light of day; (PLLC, 67) 
Culture has not suddenly become "material" in late capitalism but it always was so, only 
now we can recognise it as such. Video, according to Jameson, holds a privileged 
position in. this respect because with long and repetitive experimental videos our 
traditional notions of deciphering and interpretatioB • of intention, meaning and message· 
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no longer seem to apply. What is foregrounded in contemporary video art and video 
installations, argues Jameson, is the machine and technology rather than an underlying 
hidden message. 
Behind Jameson's insistence on the materiality of the medium lies a related but slightly 
different sub-text. For Jameson, post-structuralism, along with structuralism, 
deconstruction and literary theory in general have become grouped under the more general 
rubric of "theoretical discourse" and designated a postmodem phenomenon. That such 
disparate methodologies can simply be lumped together is by no means self-evident as it 
appears to elide fundamental differences of method as well as objects of study. At the 
same time, it would seem to suggest that postmodernism has become a catch-all term for 
any contemporary discourse and therefore its theoretical value is somewhat diminished. 
For Jameson, though, the subsumption of theoretical discourse into postmodernism allows 
him to draw on post-structuralist theory without addressing the contradictions of such a 
procedure. Specifically Jameson is drawing on the post-structuralist dissolution of the 
subject. I have already indicated in the previous chapter how, for Lacan, the subject is 
irredeemably split and fractured; whilst for Deleuze and Guattari the subject has become 
some kind of nomadic, schizoid process constantly remaking and renewing itself Jameson 
accepts that, what he calls, the centred, autonomous, bourgeois subject has disappeared, 
that our sense of ourselves as subjects has become more fragmented and decentred. The 
.. 
correlative of the eclipse of the unified subject for cultural practice and production, argues 
Jameson, is that one can no longer see the "signature" of the individual artist upon given 
works. What Jameson means by this is that with modernism one could recognise a 
particular individual style, specific to the work of an individual artist, the works of a Joyce 
or a Wyndham Lewis, for example. With postmodemism, on the other hand, there is no 
longer a unified subject to articulate or give voice to that singular vision, to unify a 
particular style. Moreover the eclecticism of postmodemism seems to have led to a 
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blurring not only of the boundaries between high and low culture but also between the 
cultural artefacts of distinct artists. As I shall argue below this appears to be a peculiar 
and contradictory position for Jameson to maintain and, in terms of literature, one needs 
only to think of the very different styles of Thomas Pynchon and Toni Morrison to see that 
individual signatures are still very evident in contemporary cultural artefacts. 
To return to video, thou~ Jameson argues, that it is no longer possible in video 
production to see the hand of the individual creative artist. Consequently, there can be no 
video canon as there will be no individual works which can be isolated, attnouted to 
particular artists, and prioritised. There is only an intertextual video plane in which all 
texts exist in coextension with one another. Thus, Jameson asserts, there can be no great 
monuments of postmodem culture in the sense that we have the great monuments of 
modernism: 
there are no video masterpieces, there can never be a video canon, and 
even an auteur theory of video (where signatures are still evidently present) 
becomes very problematical indeed. (PLLC, 78) [My italics] 
Jameson follows these pronouncements with an analysis of a video text called 'Alien 
NATION and, somewhat perversely, after what he has just said, poses the question: what 
is the text about? Not surprisingly the question, or theme, of "alienation" arises but as this 
is a modernist rather than a postmodernist psychic experience, it proves too weak a 
i 
candidate to carry the meaning of the text. Indeed the postmodem video text does not 
mean anything: 
If interpretation is understood, in the thematic way, as the disengagement 
of a fundamental theme or meaning, then it seems clear that the 
postmodernist text - of which we have taken the videotape in question to 
be a privileged exemplar - is from that perspective defined as a structure or 
sign flow which resists meaning, whose fundamental inner logic is the 
exclusion of the emergence of themes as' such in that sense, and which 
therefore systematically sets out to short-circuit traditional interpretative 
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temptations, (PLLC, 91-2) 
Insofar as the interpretation of a postmodem text is possible, argues Jameso~ that text 
must be considered bad or flawed. 
One cannot help but feel that there is a certain self-fulfilling momentum to Jameson's 
analysis of postmodernist texts. Theoretically he rules out the posSIbility of their 
individuation or their possession of a latent meaning, through the contemporary 
fragmentation of the subject and the collapse of critical distance and depth. He then 
proceeds to analyse a text, the very title of which inscribes the kind of superficial 
interpretation that one immediately knows must be rejected and cannot provide (to use 
Baudrillard's term) the ahbi for the text, only to discover that the text - which we have 
already been told cannot have a meaning - does not have a meaning and if it did it would 
not be good example to take in the first place. In short, if specific cultural artefacts are to 
be interpreted as the expression of a universal cultural logic, this would appear, a priori, 
to rule out certain aesthetic and interpretative possibilities. 
In his essay 'Jameson's Complaint: video-art and the intertextual "time-wallIll47 Nicholas 
Zurbrugg persuasively argues against Jameson's reading of video and in particular the 
meaningless anonymity which Jameson insists on as such a crucial feature of its aesthetic. 
The crux of Zurbrugg's argument is that Jameson is trapped behind an intertextual"time-
wall", that is to say, his formative intellectual background is essentially that of a 
literary/printed culture and, in his analysis of visual and multi-media culture, he brings 
these literary/printed cultural assumptions with him. Thus Jameson's insistence that there 
can be no auteur theory of video because the signature of the creative artist is necessarily 
absent from video productio~ is nothing more than an extension of Barthes's thesis of the 
death of the author, reworked with a couple of metaphors from Raymond Williams and 
Baudrillard. As with many contemporary intellectuals, argues Zurhrugg, who are faced 
231 
with the debilitating situation in which their traditional interpretative practices are not 
appropriate, Jameson projects his own 'conceptual confusion'48 onto the subject matter 
itself In other words, it is not video art that is caught in a postmodern malaise of 
meaningless, depersonalised, se1f.referentiality but it is rather symptomatic of Jameson's 
inability to come to terms with a new form which he does not fully understand and cannot 
appreciate. In place of Jameson's ahistorical, non-canonical and impersonal perspective of 
video, Zurbrugg suggests an alternative perspective in which the work ofNam June Paik 
(whom Jameson also cites) and Robert Wilson, have now become canonical Paik's work 
in particular contains a great deal more personal and biographical material than Jameson 
would deem permissible in video art, as well as having thematic content. Wilson's work 
similarly presents a much more "meaningful" version of postmodern multi-media 
performance than Jameson descn'bes. Video art, argues Zurbrugg, 'requires at least partial 
contemplation in its own terms, rather than those of other more familiar prior discourse'.49 
Jameson's analysis of video, writes Zurbrugg, lacks that sense of'renewed joy' before a 
significant discovery because he rules out the possibility of there being anything there 
beforehand. 
As I said above, there is no advantage to be gained by merely opposing one set of 
postmodernist readings against another. However, Zurbrugg's article does raise two 
important issues with respect to Jameson's analysis of postmodem cultural artefacts. 
Firstly, the textual nature of his analyses, of which I will say more below. The second 
issue is Jameson's ambivalence towards postmodem culture in general In the conclusion 
to Postmodemism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism Jameson assures his readers 
that he is an 'enthusiastic consumer of postmodernism' (one cannot help but think, if he 
was that enthusiastic about it there would be no need for such a reminder). Jameson 
further assures us: 
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I like the architecture and a lot of the newer visual work, in particular the 
newer photography. The music is not bad to listen to, or the poetry to 
read; the novel is the weakest of the newer cultural areas and is 
considerably excelled by its narrative counterparts in film and video.... My 
sense is that this is essentially a visual culture, wired for sound - but one 
where the linguistic element ... is slack and flabby, and not to be made 
interesting without ingenuity, daring, and keen motivation. 
(PLLC, 298 -9) 
Perhaps with the exception of architecture, one does not sense that enthusiasm when 
reading Jameson's analyses of postmodem culture, much of which is derived from 
secondary sources, and certainly not the sheer joy of the language that one feels when 
reading a Jamesonian analysis of Balzac, or Flaubert, or indeed any modernist writer. 
Once again Jameson seems to be adrift between his totalizing theory of postmodernism 
and his own existential experience, or phenomenology of postmodernism Theoretically 
Jameson emphasises the profoundly illiterate nature of late capitalism and the 
predominantly visual character of postmodem culture. This appears to preclude his 
enjoyment ofpostmodem fiction - with the exception ofE.L. Doctorow and Michael Herr 
- but at the same time, his interpretative practice remains literary and textually bound 
which precludes any genuine appreciation or analysis of other cultural forms in their own 
terms. Jameson's judgement upon postmodem fiction itself appears rather peculiar; one 
need only mention a few postmodem novelists such as Angela Carter, Ishmael Reed and 
Italo Calvino, to rebuff the charge of slackness and flabbiness. What is more significant is 
the writers that Jameson's own definition of postmodernism excludes: writers such as 
Toni Morrison or Gloria Naylor, writers whose work explicitly deals with issues of 
history, memory and narrative, the very thematics which are supposedly absent from 
contemporary culture. Unless, along with Jameson, and with good reason, we exempt 
these writers from postmodernism, in which case does this not once more problematize 
Jameson's notion of postmodernism as a cultural dominant, as these latter writers surely 
represent the main current of contemporary North American literature. 
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Jameson's ambivalence towards postmodemism is succinctly expressed in a 1984 review of 
Don DeLillo's The Names. Jameson writes: 
For many of us, Don DeLillo has been the most interesting and talented of 
American post-modernist novelists (which is to say finally, I suppose, of 
current white male novelists, although the category may also include a few 
individuals of other gender and racial specifications). 50 
However, as the notion of a postmodem masterpiece, or great work, is ruled out a priori, 
Jameson must qualify his assessment of DeLillo: 'you will be more satisfied if you read it 
as a determinedly minor work'.51 In other words, this is a great book, as long as you do 
not try to think of it as great literature. This confusion as to whether or not postmodem 
fiction can constitute great literature is only heightened when Jameson poses the question 
as to whether The Names 'was to have been the "major novel" and the great modernist 
statement (or the Book of the World, a la Pynchon)'. But, Jameson asks, 'do post-
modernists make major statements of that kind?,.52 The answer is implicitly No! 
Postmodemist authors do not, or can no longer, make grand statements and monumental 
works. If this is the case what is the status of Pynchon in the above statement? If 
postmodernist writers can no longer make major statements in the modernist sense, is 
Jameson trying to suggest that Pynchon is a modernist writer, as he has written a Book of 
the World? One must either draw the conclusion that Pynchon is not a postmodernist 
writer or that he is a postmodernist writer and that postmodernists can produce 
monumental works in the modernist tradition - if not in the same way. Pynchon is 
assuredly a, if not "the," postmodernist author and the Book of the World in question 
(presumably Gravity's Rainbow) the paradigmatic postmodem work of fiction. Indeed 
Gravity's Rainbow stands in relation to postmodernism in general in much the same way 
that Joyce's Ulysses stands to modernism Furthermore, Gravity's Rainbow would appear 
to be just the kind of text - one which attempts to map individual existential experience to 
the new spatial logic of post-second World War' global capitalism - which Jameson is 
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calling for under the slogan of "cognitive mapping" but which he insists does not yet exist. 
On the one hand, Jameson's argues that postmodemism is utterly distinct from modernism 
with its individual styles and monumental character, but on the other, he persistently 
exhibits this non-monumentalism as a sign of postmodemism's political and aesthetic 
itDpoverishment. 
The second area of Jameson's phenomenology I shall examine is his analysis of 
postmodern architecture. Jameson's analysis of the Bonaventure Hotel in Los Angeles has 
proved to be one of the most persuasive aspects of his analysis of postmodemism in 
general, but once again we find a number of theoretical issues that seem to remain 
suspended in the analysis. Jameson writes: 
I believe that, with a certain number of other characteristic postmodem 
buildings, such as the Beaubourg in Paris or the Eaton Centre in Toronto, 
the Bonaventure aspires to being a total space, a complete world, a kind of 
miniature city; to this new total space, meanwhile, corresponds a new 
collective practice, a new mode in which individuals move and congregate, 
something like the practice of a new and historically original kind of 
hypercrowd. (PLLC, 40) 
Jameson endorses the Bonaventure's populism or "populist aspect": it is he informs us, 
tourist attraction. However, that other characteristic of postmodern architecture, the 
'respect [for] the vernacular of the American city fabric' (PLLC, 39) is a little more 
difficult to substantiate: you actually enter the hotel around the back and three stories up, 
J 
whilst its skin of reflective glass "repels" rather than embraces the surrounding 
environment. Jameson does not feel that this reading is incompatible with assertions of 
integration with the vernacular though, insisting that 'ideally the minicity of Portman's 
Bonaventure ought not to have entrances at all, since the entryway is always the seam that 
links the building to the rest of the city that surrounds it' (PLLe, 40). Jameson goes 
further to suggest that the Bonaventure does not want so much to be part of the city as its 
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'replacement or substitute' but he does not explain how such a substitution constitutes a 
respect for the vernacular of the city. What Jameson wishes to stress about the new sense 
of space encapsulated in the Bonaventure is its disorientation: the confusion of inside and 
outside, of front and back, of height and depth, that the Hotel creates. 
The modernist overtones of Jameson's description are very clear and therefore he needs to 
make a distinction between modem and postmodem spatiality. Modernism's new utopian 
space, suggests Jameson, was radically separated from the degraded and fallen city fabric 
which it repudiated; it was like an alien form inserted into an environment which 'would 
fan out and eventually transform its surroundings by the very power of its new spatial 
language' (PLLC,41). Postmodem spatiality, on the other hand, 'is content to let the fallen 
city fabric continue to be in its being . . . no further effects, no larger protopolitical 
Utopian transformation, is either expected or desired'. This new sense of spatiality is what 
Jameson calls, borrowing the term from Baudrillard, "hyperspace". Hyperspace is a space 
for which no originary space exists, it is a simulation of a space; like its correlative 
"hyperreality", it is a space that is reproduced and reduplicated. But it is not simply 
something, a space or an object that can be reproduced, it is that which must be 
reproduced. Hyperspace and hyperreality is, so to speak, more real than Real, it conveys 
the sense of the thing, its thinginess, without the sordid materiality of the thing itsel£ We 
can therefore have the tropical"ness" of Hotel atriums in Los Angeles or Chicago without 
the inconvenience of the tropics, 1930"ness" without the great depression. 
This new sense of space is further developed in Postmodemism, or, The Cultural Logic of 
Late Capitalism through an analysis of the postmodem architect Frank Gehry's house. 
This building explicitly plays with different kinds of space and materials, it collapses our 
sense of inside and outside and it exudes Californi~ness. The older parts of the building 
are, says Jameson, 'a present reality that has been transformed into a simulacrum by the 
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process of wrapping, or quotation, and has thereby become not historical but historicist -
an allusion to a present out of real history which might just as well be a past removed from 
real history' (PLLC, ll8). This building would seem to be exemplary of everything 
Jameson wishes to attn'bute to postmodem hyperspace. The dilemma is that Gehty's 
house is not only not exemplary of postmodem architecture generally, it is not even 
exemplary of Gehty's own architecture. Jameson is clearly aware of this - he notes 'the 
more original Gehty's building turns out to be, the less generalizable its features may be 
for postmodernism in general' (PLLC, 108) - but still he wishes to examine this building as 
'one of the few postmodem buildings which does seem to have some powerful claim on 
revolutionary spatiality' (PLLC, 107). As I mentioned a moment ago postmodernism's 
inherent heterogeneity will always raise such problems of what can be said to be 
characteristic but this statement does seem to resonate within Jameson's texts. The 
opening sentence of Jameson's analysis of the Bonaventure Hotel describes it as: 
a work which is in many ways uncharacteristic of that postmodem 
architecture whose principal proponents are Robert Venturi, Charles 
Moore, Michael Graves, and, more recently, Frank Gehry, but which to my 
mind offers some very striking lessons about the originality of 
postmodernist space. (pLLe, 38) 
If Jameson's examples ofpostmodem architectural space are by his own acknowledgement 
not exactly representative of postmodernism, then what we could ask would be? David 
Shumway has pointed out that '[p ]ostmodem architecture as defined by Jencks and 
Venturi does not fit any of Jameson's claims for postmodernism, except one: its historical 
reference, or historicism's3 but, he adds, so does just about every other' suburban dwelling 
above the economic level of Levitt's first developments of the 50s'. Even in this respect 
Jameson's choice of the Bonaventure would seem to be rather strange as it displays none 
of the historicism that is so characteristic of postmodernism The Bonaventure is 
according to Shumway 'an almost perfect example of what Charles Jencks calls late 
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modernism',.54 and as for Jameson's description of hyperspace Shumway comments that it 
is simply wrong: 
What the lobby of the Bonaventure contains is enormous depth; what it 
lacks are precisely the surfaces which are normally significant in hotel 
lobbies : walls which divide eating spaces from waiting spaces, which 
advertise services, or which display merchandise . .5.5 
Even Jameson's rhetoric, the sense of 'plummeting to splashdown' on the elevators is a 
classic modernist trope of the exhilaration of speed. The disorientation of space, of which 
Jameson makes so much, the concealed entrances and the Hotel's flat reflective skin of 
mirror glass, has as much to do with keeping out the populace - the indigenous downtown 
Angelenos, the poor, the homeless, the blacks and the hispanics - as it has with evading 
modernist utopian aspirations. Indeed, postmodem architecture's obsession with security 
and swveillance would seem to be as protopolitical as any modernist utopian vision. In 
City of Quartz: Excavating the Future of Los Angeles Mike Davis describes Frank Gehry 
as the Dirty Harry of postmodem architects, whose work 'clarifies the underlying relations 
of repression, surveillance and exclusion that characterize the fragmented, paranoid 
spatiality towards which Los Angeles seems to aspire' . .56 Whilst not wishing to endorse 
Davis' rather apocalyptic rhetoric and reductive assessment of Gehry's relationship to 
postmodernism, there does appear to me to be something rather paradoxical about a 
populist and democratic architecture, the basic design feature of which is based upon 
prisons. 
." 
This confusion in Jameson's analysis of postmodem architecture once more raises those 
questions I considered in relation to video; does Jameson's theory of postmodernism rule 
out, a priori, certain interpretative options? And here I would like to return to Zurbrugg's 
notion of an intertextual "time-wall", that is to say, Jameson's interpretative and analytic 
practice remains textually constrained and delineated. To give an example, Jameson 
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makes a strong distinction between modernist and postmodernist architecture. He writes: 
[The newer buildings] no longer attempt, as did the masterworks and 
monuments of high modernism, to insert a different, a distinct, an elevated, 
a new Utopian language into the tawdry and commercial sign system of the 
surrounding city, but rather they seek to speak that very language, using its 
lexicon and syntax as that has been emblematically "learned from Las 
Vegas". (PLLC, 39) 
Jameson reads space as a text and the semiotics of space as its grammar. Indeed, Jameson 
goes so far as to suggest that we read the urban cityscape as the text, rooms as its minimal 
units, buildings as sentences, corridors, doorways, staircases as adverbs and furniture, 
paintings etc. as adjectives (PLLC, 105). I shall examine in greater detail the 
representation of space in the following section; what I wish to emphasise here is once 
more the textual nature of Jameson's practice. I am not suggesting that Jameson has never 
seen the Bonaventure Hotel and has only read descriptions of it,57 but that the 
disorientation of space that Jameson locates in his object of study is more to do with his 
own sense of confusion and disorientation than an inherent feature of postmodem 
spatiality. It would appear that Jameson has forgotten his own first lesson of dialectical 
criticism: that the critic attempts to think herlhimself back into the process of criticism, 
that they account for their own historical situation. Theories of textuality are, according 
to Jameson, themselves a postmodem phenomenon and as such an aspect of Jameson's 
object of study. For Jameson, however, they also provide the method of analysis, as he 
reads all postmodem phenomena as a text in relation to an intertextual field. In short, 
there is an inherent circularity to Jameson's project. 
The Spatial Logic of Late Capitalism 
As I outlined above, one of the principal characteristics of postmodernism, according to 
Jameson, is that it entails a new conception of space. For Jameson, this new postmodem 
space represents an 'alarming disjunction' between our sense and perception of our own 
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bodies and their immediate situation on the one hand and the built environment on the 
other. What is particularly distinctive about postmodem space, as opposed to modernist 
conceptions of space, is its apparent depthlessness and the disappearance of all forms of 
distance, be that critical, metaphysical, political or economic. Postmodem space is, 
therefore, in Baudrillard's terms, hyperspace: the space of simulacra and simulation, a 
space of pure immanence and multiple surfaces. What Jameson wishes to emphasise about 
this new sense of space is its disorientating and saturated quality. Thus writes Jameson, 
this new sense of space: 
involves the suppression of distance ... and the relentless saturation of any 
remaining voids and empty places, to the point where the postmodem 
body ... is now exposed to a perpetual barrage of immediacy from which all 
sheltering layers and intervening mediations have been removed. 58 
In this realm of chaotic immediacy, argues Jameson, our bodies are 'bereft of spatial co-
ordinates' and 'incapable of distantiation' while 'the prodigious new expansion of 
multinational capital ends up penetrating and colonizing those very precapitalist enclaves 
(Nature and the Unconscious) which offered extraterritorial and Archimedean footholds 
for critical effectivity' (PLLC, 49). In Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late 
Capitalism Jameson developed this spatial theme with analyses of video, film and 
television, as well as sculpture and architecture, media which particularly offer themselves 
to spatial analysis. Equally, the current lack of sophistication of video graphics lends 
itself to an analysis in terms of its depthl~sssness and surface play. At the same time, 
Jameson's book exhibited a marked decline of interest in literature, which, as I indicated 
above, Jameson sees as the least satisfactory component of post modem culture. Narrative 
is, of course, a temporal medium which Jameson and other Postmodernists insist has had 
its day. 
The overriding problem with postmodem hyperspace, for Jameson, is our inability, or 
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indeed the impossibility, to conceive of our situation as individual subjects within this new 
global network of multinational capital This space has become unrepresentable and we 
are left with only the ability to grasp our most immediate surroundings. Therefore, 
suggests Jameson, what we require is a new form of political aesthetic or what he terms 
"cognitive mapping". The notion of cognitive mapping hinges on a dialectic of immediate 
perception and imaginative or imaginary conception: that is to say, our ability to 
extrapolate from the mental map we have of our immediate perceptible situation to a 
larger imaginary spatial context; in other words, from our immediate urban and city 
environment to 'that mental map of the social and global totality we all carry around in our 
heads in variously garbled forms'.~9 We all necessarily, writes Jameson, cognitively map 
our individual social relations locally and nationally but now must attempt to map them in 
terms of the 'totality of class relations on a global (or ... multinational) scale'.60 The failure 
to achieve such cognitive maps, argues Jameson, will have crippling effects on political 
experience and any socialist project in the postmodern world. 
Here again though, Jameson's spatial analysis is working on two levels simultaneously. On 
the one hand, he descnoes the existential experience of postmodem spatiality, and on the 
other, he wishes to correlate specific types of spatiality with particular modes of 
production. And as we shall see in the following section, each type of spatiality will 
engender its own aesthetic or specific regime of representation. Jameson writes: 
I have tried to suggest that the three historical stages of capital have each 
generated a type of space unique to it, even though these three stages of 
capitalist space are obviously far more profoundly interrelated than are the 
spaces of other modes of production. The three types of space I have in 
mind are all the result of discontinuous expansions or quantum leaps in the 
enlargement of capitaL in the latter's penetration and colonization of 
hitherto uncommodified areas.61 
Jameson defines the first type of space, that generated by market capitalism, as the logic of 
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a grid, that is, a geometrical space of ' infinite equivalence and extension'. The second type 
of space corresponds to monopoly capitalism. or imperialism, and can be characterised as 
structural disjunction, that is, the increasing discrepancy between individual experience 
and 'a more properly structural model of the conditions of existence of that experience'.62 
The third type of space is the postmodem spatiality of late capitalism which has been our 
object of study here. What we have yet to determine, though, is what Jameson means by 
"space" itself and "spatiality"; indeed are the two terms synonymous as they appear to be 
in Jameson's own texts. 
The authority and theoretical foundation for Jameson's conception of spatiality is the work 
Henri Lefebvre and in particular his seminal text The Production of Space. 63 The central 
thesis of The Production of Space is encapsulated in its title, that is to say, that space is 
not given but is produced. In other words, space is not a neutral category, an objective 
and innocent realm, but it is a social construct, constituted through social and material 
practices. However, the two halves of Lefebvre's central concept need further clarification 
for although space, and specifically social space as it will be defined below, may be 
produced, it cannot be said to be a product in the sense that we generally think of other 
commodities or products· that is to say, as a finite thing, the end result of a particular 
process or action. Lefebvre notes that Marx uses the term production in two distinct 
senses. Initially Marx maintained a very broad definition of production to indicate the 
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ways in which 'human beings are said to produce their own life, their own consciousness, 
their own world'. 64 It was only in the later work that Marx came to narrow down his 
definition to refer to purely economic production. Lefebvre takes Marx's broad definition 
as his starting point and then seeks to further refine it through a distinction between 
"production" and "creation", "product" and work. For Lefebvre, a work is something that 
is irreplaceable and unique whilst a product 'can be, reproduced exactly, and is in fact the 
result of repetitive acts and gestures'. 65 Thus nature could be said to create but not, 
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strictly speaking, to produce; production is the result of human agency which can impose 
order and repetition on aleatory processes. At the same time, human agency also creates 
works as well as producing products; the distinction between the two according to 
Lefebvre, is that labour is secondary in the former and predominant in the latter. It is 
possible therefore to posit the notion of natural space, a primordial nature that is given and 
not produced. Space is not a product in the sense that other objects of production are 
products because Space is not reducible to the status of an object, space is not a thing. 
Space can be reproducible and repetitious, indeed these will be central characteristics in 
the control of space and the perpetuation of particular social formations. But to reduce 
space solely to these terms is to see space only in terms of the representations of space. 
Space, argues Lefebvre, is not a thing amongst other things but 'it subsumes things 
produced, and encompasses their interrelationships',66 in other words, space is a set of 
relations between things. Lefebvre writes: 
space is neither a 'subject' nor an 'object' but rather a social reality- that is 
to say, a set of relations and forms. 67 
More specifically, social space embodies the social relations of a given society and the 
forms which those relations take; to use Lefebvre's phrase: social space 'is at once a work 
and product - a materialization of" social being"', 68 
But we have yet to define what we actually mean by space itself: or what Edward Soja 
calls "spatiality", that is, socially constructed space. Traditionally, argues Lefebvre, there 
have been two ways of perceiving space: Euclidean or geometric space and mental space. 
The discourse of Euclidean space and classical perspectivism, according to Lefebvre, 
prevailed from roughly the sixteenth century, or the Renaissance, through to the end of 
nineteenth century. Mental space, on the other hand, is the space of philosophers and 
epistemologists. Mental space is produced by theo~etical practice and in tum becomes the 
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site of theoretical practice separated from real space: 
The quasi-logical presupposition of an identity between mental space ... 
and real space creates an abyss between the mental sphere on one side and 
the physical and social spheres on the other. 69 
However, both of these conceptions of space rest upon a dual fallacy or illusion, that is to 
say, the illusion of opacity and transparency. The illusion of opaqueness sees space only in 
terms of immediate surface appearances, refusing to see beyond these appearances. In this 
sense space is 'comprehended only as objectively measurable appearances grasped through 
some combination of sensory-based perception'. 70 Space is reduced to physical objects 
and forms that then 'become susceptible to prevailing scientific explanation in the form of 
orderly, reproduceable description and the discovery of empirical regularities'. 71 We have, 
in other words, a neutral and depoliticised space which submerges any sense of social 
conflict. The illusion of transparency, on the other hand, obfuscates space not by focusing 
on appearances but by ignoring physical objects and concrete space altogether, reducing 
space to: 
a mental construct alone, a way of thinking, an ideational process in which 
the 'image' of reality takes epistemological precedence over the tangible 
substance and appearance of the real world.72 
Space is once more reduced to a depoliticised sphere in which social realities and social 
conflicts are erased. Traditional conceptions of space, therefore, either see space as 
objectively measurable and reducible to the objects and forms in space, or as an ideal 
construct, but both presuppose a conception of space as innocent and neutral. Lefebvre, 
on the other hand, argues that both conceptions are the product of a particular form of 
spatiality, what he terms "abstract space", Abstract space is coextensive with the rise of 
capitalism and is to be distinguished from "absolute space". Absolute space, space as 
given, is the space ofprimordial nature that I have already spoken ot: it is also the space of 
all religions as it is a conception of space as an 'empty form that is filled with things. 
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Abstract space, according to Lefebvre, has three essential formants: the geometric 
formant, be that Euclidean space or a philosophical absolute; the optical or visual 
formant, that is the reduction of space to an image and finally what Lefebvre calls the 
phallic formant or the brutality of political power. Abstract space is essentially the 
product of the division and abstraction of labour and therefore the product of violence; it 
is a political space instituted and controlled by a state. Abstract space, then, is itself 
institutional and functions objectally, that is to say las a set oftbings/signs and their formal 
relationshipsl73 and in this sense it is a space of political power that seeks to mask its 
power by an illusory transparency. Abstract space is contradictory in the sense that it is 
at once homogeneous and fragmentary, or to be more precise, it can be characterised by 
its drive towards homogeneity but it singularly fails to achieve this goal: 
The dominant form of space [writes Lefebvre], that of the centres of wealth 
and power, endeavours to mould the spaces it dominates (ie. peripheral 
spaces), and it seeks, often by violent means, to reduce the obstacles and 
resistance it encounters there. 74 
Thus, abstract space seeks to eradicate difference and in so doing sows the seeds of a new 
conception of space, a space that emphasises difference rather than eradicates it. This 
differential space is what we would now call the space of the postmodem. It is worth 
noting at this point that Jameson appears to associate abstract space, not so much with the 
space of capitalism per se but more precisely with a specific stage of capitalism, that is the 
space of "late" capitalism. 75 At the same ~time, Jameson does not refer to the notion of 
differential space, although this clearly would have much in common with his conception 
ofpostmodem spatiality. 
The problem with traditionaL and many contemporary, conceptions of space is that they 
fail to conceive space in its full complexity, they reduce space either to a representation of 
space or to a transcendental absolute. That is, space as a text or mental representation and 
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space as simply given. However, as I have indicated, space is not simply given, it is not 
objective, neutral and empty but is produced, it is the product of a social practice. What is 
required, according to Lefebvre, is a "unitary theory" of space, a theory that encompasses 
physical space, mental space and social space, or what Lefebvre terms: the perceived, the 
conceived and the lived. Lefebvre returns time and again to this triad but never as a rigid 
formula or schema by which space can be divided up and partitioned of[ For Lefebvre the 
production of space is always a process, each moment in that process feeding into and off 
the others. As soon as the perceived - conceived - lived triad is taken as an abstract model 
and imposed upon space it loses its explanatory force. Lefebvre transcodes this overly 
anthropological terminology into more properly spatial terms as: spatial practice, 
representations of space and representational spaces. Spatial practice refers to the 
production, reproduction, particular locations and spatial sets characteristic of any given 
social formation. Representations of space refers to 'the relations of production and to the 
'order' which those relations impose',76 in other words to the regime of signification, the 
signs, codes and knowledge which a given formation utilises. Representational spaces, on 
the other hand, refers to the deep structures, the 'complex symbolisms, sometimes coded, 
sometimes not, linked to the clandestine or underground side of social life' . 77 
To return to Jameson after this rather lengthy digression, we could perhaps note that 
Jameson's typology of space shares a certain family resemblance with Lefebvre's but it 
'" 
would be unproductive to follow this train of thought any further. What I wish to come 
back to one more time, however, is the que~ion oftextuality, and the reading of space as 
a text. 78 Jameson makes the familiar defence of this transcoding operation, in that it 
throws a given problematic into a new light and opens up new perspectives upon the 
issues involved. Jameson writes '[s]uch a rewriting program may be useful in our present 
architectural context, provided it is not confused ~th a semiotics of architecture ... but 
rather to awaken the question of the conditions of possibility of this or that spatial form' 
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(PLLC, 105). Lefebvre argues to the contrary that this kind of trans coding operation can 
reveal nothing about the genesis of spatial forms: 
the notions of message, code, information and so on cannot help us trace 
the genesis of a space; the fact remains, however, that an already produced 
space can be decoded, can be read. 79 
In other words, we can read space as a text in the way that Jameson is suggesting but we 
cannot derive from that reading the information he proposes for the justification of the 
operation in the first place. Linguistic and semiotic analysis of space can be made, but it 
can be made only on spaces that have already been produced; they are therefore limited to 
just one level of Lefebvre's unitary theory, that is: the conceived or representations of 
space. Indeed, space cannot be reduced to the language of texts because those signifying 
practices, themselves, exist within space. It is true to say that space signifies, but, argues 
Lefebvre, as to what it signifies is unclear, confused and jumbled, he writes: 'social space 
can in no way be compared to a blank page upon which a specific message has been 
inscribed',80 because it is infact over-inscribed, or over-determined. By transcoding his 
spatial analyses into linguistic and textual terms, Jameson has reduced the complexity of 
space to its representations, a position from which he will thus propose the deptblessness 
of this new spatial configuration. But as Lefebvre consistently reminds us: 
It is clear, therefore, that a spatial code is not simply a means of reading or 
interpreting space: rather it is a means of living in that space, of 
understanding it, and of producing it.81 
Once again, therefore, Jameson appears to be reduplicating problems in his 
phenomenological analysis which he has attempted to resolve through his theoretical 
framework. Ifwe recall our first encounter with space, in 'Postmodernism and Consumer 
Society', it was conceived as "a" feature of contemporary experience that had undergone 
restructuration with the advent of postmodernism, in conjunction with a corresponding 
change in our sense of temporality. When these notions were subsumed in the following 
247 
essay the formulation had been modified to the extent that it was now 'empirically 
arguable' that space was a cultural dominant. By the time we reach Postmodernism, or, 
The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism the need for empirical verification and argument 
appears to have been abandoned, postmodernism is unequivocally spatial 
Postmodernism, writes Jameson 'eschews temporality for space' and if temporality has any 
place left at all 'it would seem to be better to speak of the writing of it than of any lived 
experience'. The majority of Jameson's text. therefore, is devoted to spatial analysis with 
only one of the ten chapters concerned with time, and that concerned with an analysis of a 
nouveau roman. a form Jameson alone persists in describing as postmodern. The category 
of space would seem to have evolved from "a" feature of the postmodern. then, to the 
constitutive feature ofit, 'an existential and cultural dominant' (PLLC, 365). 
On the one hand, Jameson's concern to reassert the category of space has developed into 
what David Harvey calls "spatial fetishism". In a critique of Lefebvre, Harvey dissents 
from Lefebvre's insistence on the "decisive" and "pre-eminent" 'role of spatial structural 
forces in modem capitalist society'.82 The problem essentially revolves around the status 
one accords to spatial determinants within specific social formations and more generally in 
the process of historical and social transformation. I have already noted how, for 
Lefebvre, space has a unique status, what he called the materialisation of social being. 
Everything exists "within" space and yet space does not exist without a subject or a body 
~ 
to live, perceive and conceive that space. Therefore space becomes a kind of social 
morphology: 'it is to lived experience [writes Lefebvre] what form itself is to the living 
organism, and just as intimately bound up with function and structure'. 83 Lefebvre 
frequently alludes to a spatio-temporal dialectic, in the sense that time can only be known 
and actualised in space and through spatial practice whilst, at the same time, space can 
only be known in and through time. However, Le,febvre never fully works through this 
dialectic and temporality is marginalised within his work in much the same way as space 
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was ignored in earlier social theory. Indeed, Lefebvre appears to suggest at one point, 
what Jameson terms, a new theory of history with space as the primary force behind social 
transformation: 
The space of capitalist accumulation thus gradually came to life, and began 
to be fitted out. This process of animation is admiringly referred to as 
history, and its motor sought in all kinds of factors: dynastic interests, 
ideologies, the ambitions of the mighty, the formation of nation states, 
demographic pressures, and so on. This is the road to a ceaseless analysing 
ot: and searching for, dates and chains of events. Inasmuch as space is the 
locus of all such chronologies, might it not constitute a principle of 
explanation at least as acceptable as any other?84 
For critics like Harvey, Lefebvre goes too far in this direction and rather than seeing space 
as 'a separate structure with its own laws of inner transformation and construction' it 
should be seen as 'the expression of a set of relations embedded in some broader structure 
(such as the social relations ofproduction)'.8.5 I shall return to the question of the spatio-
temporal dialectic in relation to Jameson's distinction between modernism and 
postmodernism in the following section. What I shall highlight here is the contradictory 
nature of Jameson's spatial fetishism 
Jameson's reassertion of the category of space must be seen in the wider context of the 
renewed interest in space in the social sciences, generated by the work of Lefebvre 
amongst others, and crystallising in deba .. tes within Marxist geography in the 1970s. 
Historically space has been accorded a subsidiary position within social theory, and has 
generally been taken to be a realm of stasis, a realm utterly opposed to time and in more 
sophisticated versions of this theory, a realm of closure in which meaning is fixed. Time, 
on the other hand, has been seen as dynamic, disruptive and transformative. Thus time 
and history has been considered of significance whilst space and geography are peripheral 
concerns. Edward Soja writes: 
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For at least the past century, time and history have occupied a privileged 
position in the practical and theoretical consciousness of Western Marxism 
and critical social science. 86 
Space has always been assumed to be a neutral objective category, in other words, space 
is simply given, a void in which phenomena exist and events take place. Quoting one of 
Foucault's occasional references to space, Soja notes that: 
Space still tends to be treated as fixed, dead, undialectical; time as richness, 
life, dialectic, the revealing context for critical social theorization. 87 
The great appeal of the historical imagination has been its emancipatory potential, history 
is dynamic, it is about change and transformation. Historical explanation holds the seeds 
of a qualitatively different future, the utopian transformation of the present social 
conditions. Modem geography, on the other hand, was 'reduced primarily to the 
accumulation, classification, and theoretically innocent representation of factual material 
descnoing the areal differentiation of the earth's surface'.88 The new Marxist geographers 
of the late 60s and early 70s focused upon the relation between space and society and how 
this relation should be conceptualised. The argument ran that all 'so-called spatial 
relations and spatial processes were actually social relations taking a particular 
geographical form'.89 Geographical issues, therefore, 'could .,. not be explained without a 
prior understanding of the economy and of wider social and political processes'.90 
This, then, is the context in which Jameson's reassertion of the importance of spatial 
analysis has taken place. However, whllstiameson appears on the one hand to be guilty 
of a spatial fetishism, on the other, he simply reduplicates the old problematic that the 
Marxist geographers were attempting to get away from. As we have seen, Jameson sees 
postmodemism as marked by a general loss of temporality, or more precisely by a waning 
of narrative and the historical imagination. But rather than seeing this as providing new 
possibilities for new forms of politics, Jameson appears to see the postmodem world as a 
realm in which no meaningful politics can exist. This situation is exacerbated by Jameson's 
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high level of abstraction, and broad generalisation, which has an inherent tendency to 
become overly schematic. Thus: temporality, narrative and historical thought have 
become almost exclusively associated with modernism, whilst space, free floating surfaces 
and an ahistorical imagination signify our postmodem experience. More importantly 
though they remain locked within a particular form of dualistic or dichotomous thought 
which, either overtly or covertly, stigmatises one side of the debate whilst valorising the 
other. In short, modernism, temporality, history are seen as positive terms whilst 
postmodernism, space, immanence are once more taken to be negative terms. I have 
already mentioned how Jameson finds postmodem space "alarming" and "disorientating", 
but more than this he sees it as essentially unrepresentable, as chaotic depthlessness. In 
her essay 'Politics and Space/Time' Doreen Massey argues that such a conception of space 
deprives it of any meaningful politics. Despite Jameson's ostenSIble intentions space has 
once more become defined negatively in relation to time. Space is defined as the absence 
of time, as stasis or atemporality, whilst time once more is defined positively as the realm 
of change and transformation. Massey notes how in Jameson this kind of dichotomous 
thinking clearly relates to another of Jameson's dualisms: that between transcendence and 
immanence, 'with the former connotationally associated with the temporal and immanence 
with the spatia191 Consequently, Jameson's views on postmodernism and the possibility of 
any new cultural politics are extremely pessimistic. Faced with the 'horror of multiplicity' 
of postmodem space Jameson can only call for new forms of cognitive mapping. What is 
.. 
particularly strange about this situation though is the profoundly undialectical character of 
Jameson's thought. He also appears not to have learnt the lessons of Lefeb"Te and Soja 
whom he constantly invokes as the authority behind his spatial analysis. Jameson's 
conception of postmodem space as deptbless, chaotic and atemporal is a far cry from 
Lefebvre's conception of social space as differentia~ contradictory and conflictual; as a 
space not reduced to its representations but a social reality occupied by bodies in a 
constant state of struggle. I shaa therefore, conclude this section with one of the salutary 
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lessons of The Production of Space, the need to constantly resist all forms of 
reductionism: 
reductionism entails the reduction of time to space, the reduction of use 
value to exchange value, the reduction of objects to signs, and the 
reduction of 'realitY to the semiosphere; it also means that the movement 
of the dialectic is reduced to a logic, and social space to a purely formal 
mental space.92 
Realism - Modernism - Postmodernism 
The second chapter of Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, is a 
slightly revised reprint of Jameson's early essay 'The Politics of Theory: Ideological 
Positions in the Postmodem Debate'. As I outlined above, Jameson concluded this essay 
with an assertion of the need to eschew the adoption ofmoralising positions in favour ofa 
fully dialectical and historical analysis of the contemporary cultural scene. Jameson argues 
that the only way to avoid that particular postmodem paradox - 'where all seemingly 
cultural positions turn out to be symbolic forms of political moralising, except for the 
single overtly political note [that is, postmodernism's "populism"], which suggests a 
slippage from politics back into culture again' - is to grasp the present as history. 93 
However, this historical analysis remained deferred. 
In the revised version of this essay Jameson extends these observations, noting that there 
is an inherent reversibility to postmodem-'theory whereby its various binary oppositions 
tend to fold back into each other and 'the position of the observer is turned inside out and 
the tabulation recontinued on some larger scale' (PLLC, 64). Consequently, to reflect 
upon the nature of postmodem political art in a situation which rules out its possibility 
beforehand may not be the best way of addressing the dilemma. A more productive 
approach is to reflect upon the conditions of possibility of the problem itseI.t: that is, why 
is it no longer possible to conceive of political art in the older sense, of Brecht say, and in 
252 
what conditions would a renewed political art once more become possible. To stage the 
problem in this way is to begin to move away from the inherent circularity of postmodem 
theorising, or alternatively the static presentation of its various dichotomies. Jameson 
suggests that this can be achieved and the whole problem articulated by a more genuinely 
historical schema if modernlpostmodem dualism is lifted onto a higher level of abstraction 
through the addition of a third term - realism - although, Jameson writes, this option 
remains 'absent from the present work'.94 
In fact Jameson has hinted at this dialectic of realism - modernism - and as yet-to-be 
theorised post-second World War culture since his earliest writings. In 'On Politics and 
Literature' (1968) Jameson described the psychological fragmentation of the subject in 
post-war North American society, suggesting that 'I can best do this by suggesting three 
general stages that political literature has undergone'.9' These three general stages are the 
realism of Balzac, the modernism of Brecht or Aragon and, what we would now call, the 
postmodern decentred subject of contemporary capitalism. Similarly, in 'On Raymond 
Chandler' (1970), Jameson sketches a loose version of this dialectic, and in his first 
discussion of "nostalgia" in film gives an early formulation of his later periodization of 
genre - auteur - nostalgia films, with the final term remaining a vacant slot: 
This evolution in the movie industry parallels the movement in serious 
literature away from the fixed form of the nineteenth century towards the 
personally invented, style conscious'individual forms of the twentieth. 96 
However, we should note that these reflections are situated in a particular national 
context, rather than the later global theorising on postmodernism and underwritten by the 
sociology of C. Wright Mills rather than Marxian economics. 
The fullest exposition of Jameson's dialectic of realism - modernism - postmodernism is 
given in the long concluding chapter, 'The Existence of Italy' to Jameson's work, 
253 
Signatures of the Visible. Here, Jameson suggests that film history can be clarified by 
'period theory,'97 that is, that specific formal and aesthetic tendencies can be correlated to 
particular historical stages. The historical periodization in question is the famj]jar 
Mandellian one of: market, monopoly and late capitalism which Jameson proposes to 
correlate with the aesthetic moments of: realism, modernism and postmodernism 
respectively. However, Jameson immediately qualifies this periodization with the warning 
that: 
These stages '" are not to be grasped exclusively in terms of the stylistic 
descriptions from which they have been appropriated; rather, their 
nomenclature sets us the technical problem of constructing a mediation 
between a formal or aesthetic concept and a periodizing or historiographic 
one.98 
The cultural component of this historical schema must be considered not as a set of 
stylistic features or practices but as, what I have described above, a cultural "dominant". 
At the same time, the historical period designates a "mode of production" which Jameson 
defines in its broadest sense as the unity of both the forces and relations of production. 
Furthermore, such a periodization, with the qualifications just enumerated, does not 
represent a simple chronology, or linear narrative, in which each moment inevitably 
follows on from the previous one but rather a situation in which each moment dialectically 
presupposes all the others: 
the three "stages" are not symmetrical, but dialectical in their relationship 
to each other: the later two now build on the accumulated cultural capital 
of the first and no longer "reflect" or "correspond to" a social public with 
the same immediacy, although clearly the various modernist and 
postmodemist moments in such a dialectic then reach back to create new 
publics in their own right. 99 
The initial problem that any discussion of realism and modernism now faces is our deeply 
embedded preconceptions of what each of these aesthetics entails. lOO We celebrate 
modernism, writes Jameson, 'as an active aesthetic praxis and invention, whose excitement 
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is demiurgic, along with its hoeration from content; while realism is conventionally evoked 
in terms of passive reflection and copying, subordinate to some external reality'. 101 
Jameson, therefore, proposes to "estrange" these traditional views of modernism and 
realism respectively in order to throw the problematic, of an aesthetic moment's 
correlation to a specific historical period, into a whole new light: in other words, to view 
realism as a praxis and modernism as "scientific representation". However, such an 
experiment, writes Jameson: 
at once confronts us with two fundamental methodological problems: what 
is the nature of the "world" thus produced by realism (it being understood 
that the very concept of world or worldness is itself a modernist, or 
phenomenological, one); and how, once we talk ourselves into a positive or 
productive concept of the realist aesthetic, are we to restore its negative 
and ideological dimension, its essential falseness and conventionality (as we 
have learned such structural lessons from the contemporary critique of 
representation )?102 
According to Jameson, the way to resolve this dilemma is to conflate the two questions by 
providing a single answer, that is to say, we must at once acknowledge that the world 
produced by realism is false but at the same time insists that it is objectively false. The 
model for such a theoretical resolution, suggests Jameson, derives from Marx's analysis in 
Capital. In chapter 2, following Colletti's analysis of contradiction and opposition, I have 
already suggested how this paradoxical situation of the unreality, or objectively false 
nature of capitalism can be understood. To this analysis Jameson simply adds that 'the 
peculiar object of realism (and its situation of production) is ... the historically specific 
capitalist mode of production' .103 The second stage in resolving this dilemma is to 
substitute the term "narrative" for "representation". For Jameson, the notion of narrative: 
has the initial advantage of at once dispelling forever the temptations of the 
copy theory of art, and of problematizing beyond recognition many of the 
assumptions implicit in the notion of representation itself. 1 04 
Narrative, or rather the act of narration takes place after the event so to speak, it is a 
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retelling of events that have already taken place. In the act of retelling the gap betwe~ to 
use the Russian Formalist terms,tabula and szujet is foregrounded. The act of narrating 
transforms and restructures the materials of the story and this suggests Jameson may be 
the ideological aspect of narrative. To speak of narrative, th~ rather than representation 
avoids the debate over realism sliding into problems of reflection theories of art as well as 
questions of verisimilitude or realistic copying which seeks to identify the object in 
question with its representation. The negative ideological aspect of realism can then be 
restored, suggests Jameson, when the question of "populism," which he identifies with the 
"social realism" of Hollywood or the "socialist realism" of the Soviet Union, is brought 
into the discussion. 
What Jameson is proposing, therefore, is that we can only begin to understand the 
significance of cultural production when we see it in terms ot: what has been described in 
a previous chapter as, cultural revolution. In short, Ithe function of any cultural revolution 
... will be to invent the life habits of the new social world, to "de-program" subjects trained 
in the older onel.10S Jameson's thesis proposes that all great transitions from one mode of 
production to another have entailed at one and the same time an equally momentous 
aesthetic transformation. This is not to suggest that cultural artefacts merely "reflect" 
changes in the economic base but as Jameson writes: 
In a more general way, the relationship between art and its social context 
can be freed from inert conceptions of reflection by the proposition that the 
social context ... is to be grasped as the situation • the problem, the 
dilemma, the contradiction, the "question" - to which the work of art 
comes as an imaginary solution, resolution, or "answer."J06 
In other words, we have the formulation familiar from The Political Unconscious, that the 
work of art functions as myth does for Levi-Strauss as the imaginary resolution to real 
social contradictions. However, in the present context Jameson cites not the work of 
Levi-Strauss but the work of Sartre and Lukacs' attack on reflection theory in History and 
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Class Consciousness. I07 Unfortunately, the precise nature of the relationship between the 
work of art and its social context remains in the most 'general way' as Jameson, rather than 
moving closer to a definition, moves further into abstraction and generalisation. 
Each aesthetic moment, according to Jameson, will not only be seen to presuppose a 
particular economic stage of development but also a specific conception of the subject and 
the subject's relations to herlhis life world We are now in a position, therefore, to identify 
the situation to which realism provides the imaginary resolution and which I have already 
alluded to in the phenomenology of postmodernism above: that is to say, the 
materialisation and corresponding desacralisation of the life world under the process of 
modernisation. In other words, realism served to deprogram the older providential and 
sacred narratives and to construct new narrative paradigms of the subject's relations to 
'what will now come to be thought of as reality'. lOS Realism's particularly privileged 
cultural position, for Jameson, derives not from its narrative structure, nor its acute 
representation and analysis of classical capitalism, but in its particular epistemological 
claim: that is, that we can have access to reality and that specific representations of reality 
can be said to represent the "truth" of that reality. However, as Jameson observes, the 
position is not quite as simple as contemporary debates over "representation" would 
suggest. On the contrary, realism is 'a peculiarly unstable concept owing to its 
simultaneous, yet incompatible, aesthetic and epistemological claims'.109 Whichever side 
of the dualism we emphasise we simultaneously undermine the claims of the other side: 
Thus, where the epistemological claim succeeds, it fails; and if realism 
validates its claim to be a correct or true representation of the world, it 
thereby ceases to be an aesthetic mode of representation and falls out of art 
altogether. 110 
Realism, according to Jameson, is unique in its epistemological claim. Whatever we assert 
as the 'truth content, or the "moment of truth," of modernism, or postmodernism, ... those 
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versions of aesthetic truth do not, except in very indirect or supplementary or mediated 
ways, imply the possibility of knowledge, as "realism" emphatically does'.111 At the same 
time, argues Jameson, it is the very instability of realism's epistemological claim. that 
endows the concept with its historic significance and facilitates the understanding of the 
situation in which such claims are no longer feasible. To put it another way, realism is 'a 
historical phenomenon, rather than an eternal formal possibility'.112 Just as the social and 
historical conditions must exist in the first place for realism to emerge, argues Jameson, 
once those conditions have passed realism is no longer an aesthetic possibility. That is. its 
narrative structures will be seen to be outmoded and redundant, as no longer capable of 
adequately "representing" the world. 
Ifrealism, then, inscribes within itself its own conditions of impossibility, the conditions in 
which it can no longer provide the imaginary resolution to its social context, as much may 
be said for the concepts of modernism and postmodernism. As Jameson writes: 'most 
anti-realistic or anti-representational positions still do in some sense require a concept of 
realism, if only as an empty slot, a vacant preliminary historical "stage", or secondary (but 
essential) aesthetic counterposition'.113 The schema here is the now familiar one of the 
reification of the sign and the commodification of the aesthetic, which is at one and the 
same time, the aestheticisation of the commodity. In these terms, realism's epistemological 
claims can be said to presuppose a correspondence, or, to use Baudrillard's term. a logic 
of equivalence between the sign and its ground or referent. So in a sense, the sign could 
be said to be "natural" and self-validating. As capitalism's modernising project evolved, 
with its corresponding intensification of the process ofreification, the sign's self-validating 
quality was undermined, the real is bracketed as the arbitrary nature of the sign becomes 
visible. Modernism, then, will be seen to inscribe within its own form the separation of the 
sign and its referent, the real will be bracketed and.the autonomy of the sign, or the work 
of art itself: will be emphasised. 
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What Jameson proposes, therefore, is that the concept of realism is estranged through the 
notion of praxis, and similarly that the concept of modernism is estranged through the 
notion of autonomy. Jameson writes: 
Many of the now conventional descriptive features of modernism - such as 
style, plotlessness, irony, and subjectivity - can be productively rewritten or 
defamiliarized by rethinking them in terms of the problematic of artistic or 
aesthetic autonomy, provided this last is suitably enlarged. 114 
The concept must be suitably enlarged because the value of such a transcoding operation 
depends on what we mean by the concept of artistic autonomy in the first place: that is, 
the autonomy of the aesthetic experience, of the work of art or of culture in general 
Indeed, just as structural linguistics presupposes a structure or system against which the 
isolated and arbitrary sign is differentiated, Saussure's langue to parole, the notion of 
artistic or aesthetic autonomy always turns out to mean semi-autonomy, in the 
Althusserian sense: 
that is to say, the independence and self-sufficient internal coherence of the 
object or field in question is generally understood dialectically to be relative 
to some greater totality (in relation to which alone it makes sense to assert 
that it is autonomous in the first place). 115 
Just as with realism, therefore, what is of most interest to Jameson about modernism is not 
so much the solutions to the problem, the individual interpretations, or meaning-effects, 
generated by each text, but the conditions of possibility for those meaning-effects to exist 
in the first place. Thus, Jameson proposes a neologism. "autonomization", for an as yet 
untheorised theory of modernism which would seek to identify 'the traces of "autonomy" 
within the structural processes'116 of modernist artefacts. In short, modernism can be 
characterised as 'the process of autonomization of the sign (and of culture itself)' .117 
However, the full autonomy of the sign will not be achieved until the advent of 
postmodernism, when reification enters the sign itself; asserting, not only the arbitrary 
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relationship between the sign and referent but also between the signifier and the signified. 
Therefore, the differential logic of the various modernisms gives way to the complete 
dispersion and schizophrenic logic of postmodernism proper. The punctual or episodic 
elements of Joyce's texts or Hitchcock's fiIms no longer have to be co-ordinated by some 
principle of totality but exist in their own right as free-floating material signifiers. The 
subject of this new cultural logic is no longer the centred ego posited by realism, or the 
alienated subject of modernism but the decentred fragmented subject celebrated in much 
poststructuralism. At the point at which the aesthetic is finally fully integrated into the 
commodity system in general, at the same time, it achieves 'genuine autonomy in the form 
of the materiality of the signifier: 
The concept of the autonomy of culture, therefore, allows us to witness 
with greater precision its historical dissolution, and at the same time to 
register the paradox of a thing that disappears by becoming universal, 
rather than by extinction. I IS 
As I demonstrated above, one problem with Jameson's historicizing project is the 
non synchronicity of his own periodizations and Manders. In 'The Existence of Italy 
Jameson tries to circumvent this problem through his use of the concept of a cultural 
dominant and insistence on the non-chronological, non-narrative, nature of his historical 
schema. Responding to the postmodem suspicion of"master narratives," Jameson writes: 
I have come to feel that the Marxian sequence of modes of production is 
not a narrative of that kind, nor even a narrative at all; on the other hand, I 
have also come to feel that some deeper unconscious narrative does 
subtend a great many Marxian histories and discussions, and not only 
Marxian ones. 1l9 
That deeper unconscious narrative is none other than the transitionary moment of 
"modernity" itself: the transition from feudalism to capitalism and the emergence of the 
modem world. This being said Jameson's periodization can be recapitulated at different 
levels and historical stages with a well nigh Hegelian obession for ternary schema. Thus: 
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market capitalism, imperialism, and late capitalism can be correlated to the literary 
moments of Realism, Modernism and Postmodernism respectively; or, in the case of film, 
to the genre films of the 30's and 40's, the "auteurs" of the 50's and 60's, and the nostalgia 
and punk films of the 70's or 80's; or, even more recently with popular music we get the 
distinction between the old rhythm and blues, the auteurs of "classic" rock and the 
postmodem punk; or at even more "microcbronological" levels of 'semi-autonomous 
sequences of cultural history such as American Black literature, where Richard Wright, 
Ralph Ellison, and Ishmael Reed can be taken as emblematic markers'.120 At this level 
Jameson's periodization is at risk of collapsing into absurdity. Real difference and 
differentiation is conflated in overly abstract and generalised categories, but at the same 
time, continuity and identity must be understated in order to differentiate the larger 
categories themselves. Jameson appears to doing precisely what he proscnbed in The 
Political UnconsciOUS, that is, using the periodizing categories as slots to drop the 
particular cultural artefacts into. One has no sense of the "determinate contradiction" at 
the heart of the work or the schema which in Jameson's previous work provided the mark 
of a genuine Marxist criticism. If we return one last time to the question of temporality 
and space in the modernlpostmodem debate this contradiction in Jameson's theorising will 
become clearer. 
In his article 'Divergences: modernism, postmodernism, Jameson and Lyotard' Peter 
, 
Nicholls argues that many of Jameson's confusions over postmodernism, and in particular 
over postmodem literature, derive from too rigid a demarcation between modernism and 
postmodernism. a demarcation which is grounded in the association of modernism with 
temporality, narrative and above all memory, whilst postmodernism is associated with 
space, non-narrative structures and jmmanence. Using Lyotard's distinction between 
"discourse" and "figure" Nicholls proposes a perspective on postmodernism that allows us 
to register continuities as well as divergences between the modem and the postmodern. 
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Nicholls writes: 
Lyotard's proposals have the ... advantage that they do not suppose any 
'retreat' of language in the postmodem but rather conceive of the 
postmodem as a disruption of the discursive systems on which modernity 
depends. 121 
For Lyotard then postmodernity is a "mode" and not an "epoch", although to be fair to 
Jameson, he would not dissent from this and his theorisation of post modernity as a "mode 
of production" (PLLC, 408) explicitly allows for this, seeing postmodernity not as an 
epochal rupture but as a restructuration of a previous mode of production. At the same 
time, one must acknowledge that Lyotard's 'stylish reversal of the postmodem 
problematic',122 as Nicholls descnoes it whereby the modem is that which is first 
postmodem simply avoids many of the issues of postmodernity which we have addressed 
with Jameson above and in particular the historical significance and ground of 
postmodernity. In other words, Lyotard's work presupposes some form of epochal break 
but by projecting the problem backwards. or reversing it, he avoids the necessity of 
theorising this break. In short, we are always-already in the postmodem. 
But to return to Nicholls's criticism of Jameson's reading of modernism. Nicholls insists 
that Lyotard's distinction between discourse and figure does not propose a binary system 
in the sense that Scott Lash utilises them. For Lash, Lyotard's distinction represents 
"counterp ositions" 123 which facilitates ~a distinction between modernism and 
postmodemism, along the lines of Jameson, according to differing regimes of signification. 
Thus, according to Lash, modernism signifies "discursively," giving priority to words over 
images, whilst postmodernism signifies "figurally," it is a predominantly visual rather than 
a literary sensibility.124 As Nicholls points out, however, the figural and the discursive are 
not polar opposites but rather the figural represents 'the resistant or irreconcilable trace of 
a space or time that is radically incommensurable" with that of discursive meaning'.12j 
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Lyotard's categories, therefore, are not mutually exclusive, designating different regimes 
of signification but, dare one say it, operating dialectically within all regimes of 
signification. Nicholls writes: 
it is not that the figural is absent from [modernist] writing - indeed it is 
characteristic of imagism and its derivatives (like the Hemingway style) to 
seek to make the reader' feel' something which eludes understanding. 126 
In his analysis of Baudelaire, Pound and Eliot, Expressionist theatre, or, modernist 
painting Nicholls reveals this dialectic of discourse and figure to be at wor~ whereby the 
figural dimension constantly disrupts the order of discourse. Nicholls acknowledges that 
"textuality" provides the dominant view of postmodernism and that 'it seems to have some 
connection to the earlier "discursive" moments of modernism'. 127 However, Nicholls also 
proposes an alternative perspective on postmodernism: 
the spatial model used by Baudrillard and Jameson is closely tied to the 
synchronic order of signification, to sign-systems. In contrast, another 
form of postmodernism has turned its attention very deliberately to 
questions of temporality and narrative, and specifically to what Lyotard 
has called the 'event', the singular moment which can be spoken about only 
after it is over, and which is composed of' simultaneous and heterogeneous 
temporalities'. 128 
That is to say, in the contemporary literary work of those writers I have already 
mentioned, Toni Morrison, Gloria Naylor or indeed, E.L. Doctorow, but whom, with the 
exception of Doctorow, Jameson is compelled to exclude by his very definition of 
postmodernism. Commenting on these writers, Nicholls writes: 
narrative becomes the medium in which a number of histories can be 
thought simultaneously. Here a lost history is literally unpresentable and 
can be worked through only in the jarring moment when discourse, 
confronted by what [Jayne Anne] Phillips calls 'some lost place still existing 
alongside this one', is unable to give a full account. 129 
Postmodernism, in this sense, is not so much the loss of the historical imagination as its 
renewal and revitalisation in the attempt to retrieve the multiplicity of temporalities that 
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capitalism's modernising project seeks to flatten out. It also once more raises the issue 
that the problem of postmodernism is inextricably entwined with the problem of modernity 
itself 
In a recent article130 Peter Osborne has reassessed the debate over Modernity's spatio-
temporal dialectic, taking as his starting point the exchange between Perry Anderson and 
Marshal Berman. The occasion for the exchange was the publication of Berman's book 
All That is Solid Melts Into Air, in which Berman argued that modernity was essentially a 
mode of experience, a particular historical experience of space and time that mediated 
between modernisation as a socio-economic. process and modernism as a cultural and 
aesthetic vision. Anderson criticised Berman's account of modernity as it rested on an 
essential "planar" conception of historical time, that is to say, as a continuous flow process 
in which each epoch succeeds the next without any real differentiation between them, 
except chronologically. Anderson argued, following Althusser, for a differential 
conception of historical time and conjunctural analysis. Anderson also finally drew the 
rather bleak conclusion that 'Modernism as a notion is the emptiest of all cultural 
categories .... it designates no descn'bable object in its own right at all: it is completely 
lacking in positive content ... its only referent is the blank passage of time itself. 131 
Osborne, on the other hand, argues against both of these positions on the grounds that 
j 
they take Modernity to designate an essentially chronological category: 
The key to the matter will be seen to lie in the relation between the 
meaning of' modernity' as a category of historical periodization and its 
meaning as a distinctive form or quality of social experience - that is to say, 
in the dialectics of a certain temporali=ation 0/ history. 132 
According to Osborne what is unique about modernity as a category of historical 
periodization is that it is defined solely in terms of temporal determinants. For Osborne 
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postmodernism is not a new historical epoch but only the most recent transformation in a 
continuing process of modernity (a position Harvey, Soja and Jameson would all endorse). 
What is peculiarly unique to the temporality of modernity is its contemporaneity; 
modernity designates what is new and what is new must be distinguished from even the 
most recent past, which would appear to contrast with postmodernism's historicism, or 
eclecticism and pastiche, which takes the form of a raiding of previous aesthetic styles but 
lacks any real sense of history or future transformation. As a periodizing category 
modernity serves a dual function: 
it designates the contemporaneity of an epoch to the time of its 
classification, but it registers this contemporaneity in terms of a 
qualitatively new, self-transcending temporality, which has the 
simultaneous effect of distancing the present from even that most recent 
past with which it is thus identified. 133 
In other words, "modernity is a qualitative and not a chronological category". Modernity 
can not be reduced to a simple opposition between homogenous (Berman) and differential 
(Anderson) historical time but must be grasped as a dialectic of homogenisation (its 
contemporaneity) and differentiation (its distancing of itself from other historical epochs). 
This dialectic is not only constitutive of the temporality of modernity but is inextricably 
tied to its spatial relations: that is to say, the geopolitics of modernity or the history of 
colonialism As Osborne writes: 
the concept of modernity was first'1.lniversalized through the spatialization 
of its founding temporal difference, under colonialism; thereafter, the 
differential between itself and other 'times' was reduced to a difference 
within a single temporal scale of 'progress', 'modernization' and 
, development'. 134 
Without pursuing this line of thought any further, if we accept that modernity is a 
particular form of spatio-temporal experience then we can begin to understand 
postmodernity as a further development or modification of this form of experience: what 
David Harvey describes as an acceleration of "time-space compression"}35 
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What appears to be lacking in Jameson's conception of space is any real sense of this 
spatio-temporal dialectic. Harvey's conception of "time-space compression" provides an 
alternative way to theorise the transition from modernism to postmodernism and the 
changing relationship between time and space. For Harvey, 'the history of capitalism has 
been characterised by the speed-up in the pace of life' whilst simultaneously in 'overcoming 
spatial barriers the world sometimes seems to collapse inwards upon US'.136 What has 
taken place over the last two decades, argues Harvey, is that the pace of speed-up has 
once more accelerated, that is, production times have accelerated which have in turn 
brought about an acceleration in exchange and consumption. The throw-away society has 
increased to the extent that now not only are our commodities disposable but so too are 
our values. Whether we think in terms of art, music, fashion or life-styles in genera4 the 
turn over and built in obsolescence of particular commodities and styles seems to have 
increased considerably. In other words, writes Harvey, we have: 
witnessed another fierce round in that process of annihilation of space 
through time that has always lain at the center of capitalism's dynamic. 137 
But does this not contradict the assertion that space is the new cultural dominant? On the 
contrary, the collapse of spatial barriers does not imply that the significance of space is 
decreasing but that its significance will increase. As the spatial barriers diminish we 
become increasingly sensitised to those spaces that remain and to what happens "to" and 
"within" those spaces. Therefore, writes Harvey, the struggle over and within space will 
.• 
become an increasingly important issue in future political struggles: 
Superior command over space becomes an even more important weapon in 
class-struggle. It becomes one of the means to enforce speed-up and the 
redefinition of skills on recalcitrant work forces. 138 
The problem with Jameson's description of postmodem spatiality is his tendency to over-
emphasise what is unique about this spatiality and .exaggerate the significance of this new 
spatial experience over temporal concerns. 
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As we have seen Jameson's proposition that modernism and postmodernism are utterly 
distinct in their social position and function has led increasingly to his insistence on what 
distinguishes one from the other. Whilst he concedes that there is a great deal of 
continuity between modernist and postmodernist cultural practice, Jameson argues that 
these elements are restructured within the works themselves and have a distinct function. 
However, the problems ofperiodization that Jameson seeks to banish at the level of theory 
invariably appear to recapitulate themselves in his analysis of specific cultural artefacts. At 
its most abstract, therefore, Jameson has come to characterise modernism as dealing with 
themes of temporality, narrative and history, whilst postmodernism, despite all his 
professed enthusiasm for it, is defined negatively against this, as being concerned with 
space, the play of surfaces and immediacy. 
Notes. 
1 Douglas Kellner, 'Jameson, Marxism and Postmodernism', in Postmodemism, 
Jameson, Critique, ed. D. Kellner (Washington: Maisonneuve Press, 1989). 
2 Ibid., p. 19. 
3 Fredric Jameson, 'Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism', in 
New Left Review, no. 146 (1984), rpt. as the first chapter to Postmodemism, or, 
The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1991). All quotations in 
this chapter are from the 1991 edition. 
4 Kellner, 'Jameson, Marxism and Postmodemism', pp. 2·3. 
5 Ibid., p. 3. 
6 Ibid., p. 5. • 
7 Whilst Marxism and Form focused upon the shorter essays contained in Notes To 
Literature alongside The Philosophy of New MusiC it had very little to say about 
Negative Dialectics or Aesthetic Theory, except to descn'be them as ambitious 
failures; Late Marxism on the other hand is devoted to precisely a rereading of 
these later works in relation to the current problematics of postmodernism 
8 Jean-Fran90is Lyotard, The Condition of Postmodemity: A Report on Knowledge, 
trans. G. Bennington & B. Massumi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1984), p. 37. 
9 David HaIVey, The Condition of Postmodemity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 
Edward W. Soja, Postmodern Geographies.: The Reassertion of Space in Critical 
Social Theory (London: Verso, 1989), Terry Eagleton, 'Capitalism, Modernism 
267 
and Postmodernism', in Against The Grain: Essays 1975-1985 (London: Verso, 
1986). 
10 'The Politics of Theory: Ideological Positions in the Postmodern Debate', in The 
Ideologies of Theory, Essays 1971-1986: Vol. 2 The Syntax of History (London: 
Routledge, 1988). This essay was first published in New German Critique, no. 33 
(1984) but according to note 2, p. 215, of the collected essays this essay was 
written in the spring of 1982. It is, therefore, prior to, or contemporaneous with, 
Jameson's better known early essay 'Postmodernism and Consumer Society'. First 
published in The Anti-Aesthetic, ed. H. Foster (Port Townsend: Bay Press, 1983) 
rpt. as Postmodem Culture (London: Pluto Press, 1985). This essay was 
originally delivered as a Whitney Museum lecture in the Autumn of 1982. 
11 Jameson, 'The Politics of Theory', p. 103. 
12 Ibid., p. 111. 
13 Jameson, 'Postmodernism and Consumer Society', p. 113. 
14 Ibid., p. 113. 
15 Jean Baudrillard, 'The System of Objects' and 'Consumer Society', in Jean 
Baudrillard: Selected Writings, ed. M. Poster (Oxford: Polity Press, 1988). 
16 Baudrillard, 'The System of Objects', in Selected Writings, p. 21. 
17 Ibid., p. 22. 
18 Jameson, 'Postmodernism and Consumer Society', p. 113. 
19 Ibid., p. 119. 
20 Jean Baudrillard, 'For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign', in Selected 
Writings, p. 87. 
21 Jean Baudrillard, 'Symbolic Exchange and Death', in Selected Writings, p. 120. 
22 Roy Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality: A Critical Introduction to Contemporary 
Philosophy (London: Verso, 1989), p. 17. 
23 Ibid., p. 17. 
24 Jean Baudrillard, 'The Ecstasy of Communication', in Postmodem Culture, p. 133, 
n.4. 
25 Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism, trans. J. De Bres (London: Verso, 1975), see 
chapter 4. 
26 Ibid., p. 114. 
27 Ibid., p. 110. 
28 Ibid., p. 120. 
29 Ibid., pp. 120-1. ~ 
30 In Postmodemism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism the chapter on 
economics is not on "economics" as such but rather on the ideology of the market 
and Stuart Hall's contention that during the 1980s the fundamental level of struggle 
was fought over the legitimation of concepts, it was in other words, "discursive". 
31 Mandel, Late Capitalism, p. 199. 
32 Ibid., p. 23. 
33 Ibid., p. 146. 
34 See page 9 above. 
35 Peter Nicholls, 'Divergences: modernism, postmodernism, Jameson and Lyotard', 
in Critical Quarterly, vol. 33, no. 3 (1991), p. 1. 
268 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
S9 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
Jameson, 'Postmodemism and Consumer Society', p. 113. 
Kellner, 'Jameson, Marxism and Postmodemism', pp. 4-5. 
See Gregory Elliott Althusser: The Detour of Theory (London: Verso, 1987), 
p.169. Bah"bar draws this conclusion from his distinction between mode of 
production and social formation but as I pointed out in chapter 2 Jameson refutes 
this distinction, retaining only the concept of mode of production and equating this 
with the social totality. 
Harvey, The Condition of Postmodemity, p. 38. 
Soja, Postmodem Geographies, pp. 60-1. 
Ibid., p. 61. 
Frank pfeiL Another Tale to Tell: Politics & Narrative in Postmodem Culture 
(London: Verso, 1990), p. 98. 
Baudrillard, 'The Ecstasy of Communication', in Postmodern Culture, p. 127. 
Mande~ Late Capitalism, p. 192. 
Baudrillard, 'The Ecstasy of Communication', in Postmodem Culture, p. 127. 
Ibid., p. 128. 
Nicholas Zurbrugg, 'Jameson's Complaint: video-art and the intertextual "time-
wall"', in Screen, voL 32, no. 1 (1991). 
Ibid., p. 17. 
Ibid., pp. 25-6. 
Fredric Jameson, 'Review article of Don Delillo', in Minnesota ReView, vol 22 
(1984), p. 119. 
Ibid., p. 119. 
Ibid., p. 119. 
David Shumway, 'JamesonlHermeneuticsIPostmodernism', m Postmodemism, 
Jameson, Critique, p. 195. 
Ibid., p. 192. 
Ibid., p. 193. 
Mike Davis, City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles (London: 
Verso, 1990), p. 238. 
See Soja, Postmodern Geographies, p. 63, n. 12. 
Fredric Jameson, 'Cognitive Mapping', in Marxism and the Interpretation of 
Culture, ed. C. Nelson (Chicago: University oflllinois Press, 1988), p. 351. 
Ibid., p. 353. 
Ibid., p. 353. 
Ibid., p. 348. 
Ibid., p. 349. 
Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. D. Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1991). 
Ibid., p. 68. 
Ibid., p. 70. 
Ibid., p. 73. 
Ibid., p. 116. 
Ibid., pp. 101-2. 
Ibid., p. 6. 
269 
70 Soja, Postmodern Geographies, p. 122. 
71 Ibid., p. 123. 
72 Ibid., p. 125. 
73 Lefebvre, The Production o/Space, p. 49. 
74 Ibid., p. 49. 
75 See 'Cognitive Mapping', p. 351. 
76 Lefebvre, The Production 0/ Space, p. 33. 
77 Ibid., p. 33. 
78 See pp. 239-40 above. 
79 Lefebvre, The Production 0/ Space, p. 17. 
80 Ibid., p. 142. 
81 Ibid., pp. 47-8. 
82 David Hatvey quoted in Soja, Postmodern Geographies, p. 76. 
83 Lefebvre, The Production O/Space, p. 94. 
84 Ibid., p. 275. 
85 David Hatvey quoted in Soja, Postmodern Geographies, p. 77. 
86 Soja, Postmodern Geographies, p. 1. 
87 Ibid., p. 11. 
88 Ibid., pp. 36-7. 
89 Doreen Massey, 'Politics and SpacelTime', in New Left Review, no. 196 (1992), p. 
70. 
90 Ibid., p. 70. 
91 Ibid., p. 73. 
92 Lefebvre, The Production 0/ Space, p. 296. 
93 Jameson, 'The Politics of Theory', p. 113. 
94 The full parenthesis reads - absent from the present work, but mobilised else\\'here 
in a related one (PLLC, 65) - however the accompanying note is also absent but I 
take the related essay to be 'The Existence of Italy' the concluding essay to 
Jameson's book on film Signatures o/the Visible (London: Routledge, 1990). 
95 Fredric Jameson, 'On Politics and Literature', in Salmagundi, nos. 2-3 (1968), p. 
23. 
96 Fredric Jameson, 'On Raymond Chandler', in Southern Review, no. 6 (1970), p. 
642. 
97 Fredric Jameson, 'The Existence ofItaly', in Signatures o/the Visible, p. 155. 
98 Ibid., p. 155. • 
99 Ibid., p. 157. 
100 As I suggested in chapter 1, p.16, Jameson uses the category of the "aesthetic" 
without clarification or definition. On the one hand, this raises the problem of the 
sense in which Jameson is using the term and on the other, it also facilitates its use 
as a very flexible category. Jameson uses the term aesthetic to designate both 
broad cultural movements such as modernism and postmodernism and at the same 
time to refer to the experience of specific cultural artefacts. In the latter sense 
Jameson also uses the term in the dual sense of the aesthetic experience or act of 
producing works of art as well as the. aesthetic experience of the works 
themselves. Once again it is the very imprecision of the term that affords it such 
270 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
III 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
versatility and usefulness for Jameson. Jameson can be seen to use the term in this 
diversity of senses in what follows, it will also become clear that the flexibility of 
the category enables Jameson to avoid the complicated issue of mediation as he 
slides from the isolated work of art as the imaginary resolution to real social 
contradictions, to a more abstract discussion of the correlation between historical 
and cultural periodization. 
Jameson, 'The Existence of Italy', p. 162. 
Ibid., p. 163. 
Ibid., p. 163. 
Ibid., p. 165. 
Ibid., p. 164. 
Ibid., p. 164. 
Signatures of the Visible, p. 240, n. 1, Jameson notes that the concept of 
"situation" is clearly Sartrean whilst the Lukacsean model 'is one of distinct, semi-
autonomous loops in which the subject and object develop without "representing" 
each other in any way, and yet continue to be related ... by their participation in the 
social totality'. Levi-Strauss' conception of imaginary resolution to a social 
contradiction is not referenced at all Jameson compares his own procedure to 
"something like" the Lukacsean modeL The problem is that Jameson once again 
simply conflates three distinct models for situating the cultural artefact in its social 
context but it is by no means self-evident that these three models are compatible or 
doing the same thing. Furthermore, simply to line up a series of potential solutions 
to a given problem is not the same as doing the work itself: it does not provide the 
solution to the problem 
Jameson, 'The Existence of Italy', p. 166. 
Ibid., p. 158. 
Ibid., p. 158. 
Ibid., p. 158. 
Ibid., p. 185. 
Ibid., pp. 158-9. 
Ibid., p. 201. 
Ibid., p. 201. 
Ibid., p. 205. 
Ibid., p. 214. 
Ibid., p. 202. 
Ibid., p. 226. 
Ibid., p. 156. 
Nicholls, 'Divergences: modernism, postmodernism, Jameson and Lyotard', p. 4. 
Ibid., p. 4. 
Scott Lash, 'Discourse or Figure? Postmodernism as a Regime of Signification', in 
Theory. Culture & Society, voL 5, nos. 2-3, ed. M. Featherstone (London: Sage, 
1988), p. 315. 
Ibid., pp. 313-4. 
Nicholls, 'Divergences: modernism, postmo~ernism, Jameson and Lyotard', p. 10. 
Ibid., p. 10. 
271 
127 Ibid., p. 14. 
128 Ibid., p. 14. 
129 Ibid., p. 15. 
130 Peter Osborne, 'Modernity is a Qualitative, Not a Chronological Category', in New 
Left Review, no. 192 (1992). 
131 Perry Anderson, 'Modernity and Revolution', in New Left Review, no. 144 (1984), 
pp.17-8. 
132 Osborne, 'Modernity is a Qualitative, Not a Chronological Category', p. 66. 
133 Ibid., p. 73. 
134 Ibid., p. 78. 
135 Harvey, The Condition of Postmodemity, p. 240 
136 Ibid., p. 240. 
137 Ibid., p. 293. 
138 Ibid., p. 294. 
272 
MARXISM, TOTALITY AND POLITICS. 
It goes without saying that to teach Marxism and tirelessly to demonstrate 
the nature of capitalism and of its consequences is a political act which 
needs no apologies. 1 
the extreme difficulty of language characteristic of much of Western 
Marxism in the twentieth century was never controlled by the tension of a 
direct or active relationship to a proletarian audience. On the contrary, its 
very surplus above the necessary minimum quotient of verbal complexity 
was the sign of its divorce from any popular practice. l 
Is the teaching of Marxism today self-evidently a political act which needs no justification? 
Indeed, why should students turn to Marxism rather than deconstruction, or Deleuze and 
Guattari neo-anarchist molecular politics, or Baudrillard's revolutionary quietism and 
radical otherness? What is it that distinguishes Marxism from the plethora of other, so 
called, radical theories today? To fully answer these questions is beyond the scope of this 
particular study but in concluding this critical analysis of the work of Fredric Jameson I 
will begin to suggest that, despite the theoretical problems I have raised, Marxism will 
continue to be a vital force in contemporary theoretical debates. It is, I believe, precisely 
as a result of the difficulty and complexity of the questions Marxism raises, that both 
opens Marxism up to criticism and at the same time testifies to its continuing relevance. 
That is, questions of the relationship between a cultural artefact and its socio-historical 
situation, of the relationship between individual and collective action, of agency and 
historical change. For, as Jameson writes, in a slightly different context in The Political 
Unconscious, however much we may like to forget these difficult problems they 'will not 
forget us' (PU, p.102). 
In the preceding chapters I have argued that Jameson has made a sustained attempted over 
the last two and a half decades to assert the priority of Hegelian Marxism over other 
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competing forms of interpretation. Jameson's claim rests, in Marxism and Form, on 
Hegelian Marxism's ability to encompass more and, in The Political Unconscious, on the 
grounds of its semantic richness. I have analysed Jameson's claim in four key areas of his 
work: form, history, desire and postmodernism; and particularly in the last three areas I 
have argued that Jameson's ability to encompass a multiplicity of opposing discourses 
within his own Marxian framework frequently results in a tendency to erase fundamental 
differences and conflate distinct and specific theoretical positions - in short, to enforce 
identity and homogeneity over non-identity and heterogeneity. 
What has been absent from the analysis so far is a direct engagement with probably the 
most contentious aspect of Jameson's work. that is, its holistic or totalizing character. In 
this concluding chapter I will examine Jameson's concept of totality and his claims for the 
necessity of totalizing thought. Related to the concept of totality is the notion of 
mediation. I will examine Jameson's key mediatory category of reification, arguing that 
Jameson has privileged this category at the expense of other forms of mediation. Finally, I 
will reflect upon the nature of the politics that Jameson's totalizing method entails and in 
the light of his more pessimistic conclusions with regard to radical politics in a postmodem 
age. 
Jameson and Totality 
" 
In the conclusion to Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism Jameson 
endorses Douglas Kellner's observation that it is the concept of totality that provides 
continuity between his earlier work on dialectical criticism and the later analysis of 
postmodernism (PLLC, 399). Indeed as Martin Jay points out in his exhaustive study of 
the concept of totality, Marxism and Totality, Jameson is one of the few major theorists 
writing today who wishes to retain the concept.3 However, as I argued in the previous 
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chapter, Kellner's reading of Jameson's oeuvre presents an overly continuous and linear 
narrative which fails to account for the nuances and changes of emphasis in his work. It is 
certainly true, as I shall discuss below, that Jameson's commitment to the concept of 
totality and the necessity of totalizing thought is as strong today as it was in the early 
1970s. Indeed, Jameson's most recently published work on contemporary film, The 
Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the World System, presents a stunning 
attempt to map the totality, or, to put it another way, the global system of multinational 
capitalism through a discrete collection of films from world cinema. But, I shall contend, 
Jameson's conception of the totality, or rather the emphasis he places upon it, has been 
significantly modified. 
There are four principal strands of totalizing thought evident in Jameson's work: firstly, 
that of Lukacs and through Lukacs that of Hegel; secondly Sartre's notion of 
"totalization"; thirdly Althusser's Spinozist formulation of history as an "absent cause"; and 
finally, Adorno's negative critique of identity theory and totality. Before examining each 
of these strands in turn I will briefly situate Jameson's insistence on the need to maintain 
the category of totality in relation to the post-structuralist and postmodernist critique of 
totalizing thought. 
In the concluding chapter of Marxism and Totality, entitled 'The Challenge of Post-
Structuralism', Martin Jay points out, that even on the Left there has 'been a general move 
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away from the totalistic emphasis that marked the earlier Anglo-American reception of 
continental Marxism'4 as many of the old New Left seek to accommodate the criticisms of 
post-structuralism What is perhaps unique about Jameson's project has been his attempt 
simultaneously to accommodate the detotalizing critiques of post-structuralism, 
particularly through the work of Deleuze and Guattari, whilst retaining the concept of 
totality itself. We will see how successful this project has been below. According to Jay, 
the rejection of all forms of holism, or totalizing thought, is the one issue that appears to 
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unite the otherwise disparate group of figures that are generally lumped together as post-
structuralist : 
if one had to find one common denominator among the major figures 
normally included in the post-structuralist category ... it would have to be 
their unremitting hostility towards totality . .5 
Following Foucault, Jay writes: 
Insofar as Marxism of whatever variety still insisted on the category of 
totality it was complicitous with the very system it claimed to oppose.6 
Foucault maintains that the very idea of the "'whole of society" is precisely that which 
should not be considered except as something to be destroyed'.' For post-structuralist'S 
such as Foucault the concept of totality is irredeemably tainted with the concept of 
totalitarianism, a term first used to describe the fascist regime of Italy and then later 
extended to include the Nazis regime in Germany and the Stalinist regime in the USSR. 
All totalizing thought has now tended to become characterised, or rather caricatured, as a 
surreptitious form ofwill to power. Linda Hutcheon summarises the suspicion of totalizing 
thought well in The Politics of Postmodemism: 
The function of the term totalizing, as I understand it, is to point to the 
process (hence the awkward ling' form) by which writers of history, fiction, 
or even theory render their materials coherent, continuous, unified - but 
always with an eye to the control and mastery of those materials, even at 
the risk of doing violence to them It is this link to power, as well as 
process, that the adjective 'totalizing' is meant to suggest, and it is as such 
that the term has been used ta characterize everything from hl>eral 
humanist ideals to the aims of historiography. 8 
However, what Jameson calls the 'war on totality' seems to be more specifically directed 
against Marxism rather than against liberal humanist views in generaL 9 In short, totalizing 
thought was seen to eradicate difference and heterogeneity, if necessary through force and 
violence, and as Jameson writes 'in the memorable words of the nouveaux philosophies ... 
a direct line runs from Hegel's Absolute Spirit to Stalin's Gulag' (PU, S 1). It is within this 
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context that the political and polemical thrust of Jameson's insistence on the need for 
totalizing thought must be understood. However, Jameson's attempt to co-opt certain 
aspects of post-structuralism have necessitated a change in his use of the term and a 
precarious balancing act of contradictory theoretical positions. It is to this development 
that I shall now tum. 
In Marxism and Form Jameson works with an essentially Lukacsian conception of totality, 
that is to say, the totality is seen as the "concrete" whereas isolated experience is defined 
as the abstract. According to Martin Jay Lukacs was indebted to Hegel for this particular 
conception of the concrete and its linkage with totality. Jay writes: 
What from a positivist point of view would seem oxymoronic, linking 
concreteness with totality, was accepted by Lukacs because of his Hegelian 
notion of the concrete. Instead of equating it with discrete entities or 
individual facts, he followed Marx's Hegelian usage: "The concrete is 
concrete because it is a synthesis of many particular determinants, ie. a 
unity of elements." The totality could be concrete precisely because it 
included all of the mediations that linked the seemingly isolated facts. 10 
Thus, in his discussion of Lukacs' conception of the concrete in art, Jameson writes, 'such 
work permits life and experience to be felt as a totality: all its events, all its partial facts 
and elements are immediately grasped as part ofa total process' (MF. 169). The totality is 
the social whole in which 'everything depends on everything else' (MF, 188). But the 
concept of totality also functions as, what I called in a previous chapter, a term limit. 
Following Lilies, Jameson writes, 'the limits of middle-class philosophy are signalled by 
its incapacity or unwillingness to come to terms with the category of "totality" itself (MF, 
184). Without once more rehearsing Lukacs' views on the antinomies of bourgeois 
thoughtll I will just briefly state here what is necessary for the discussion of totality. 
Jameson writes, the 
privileged nature of the worker's situation lies, paradoxically, in its narrow, 
inhuman limits: the worker is unable to know the outside world in a static, 
contemplative manner in one sense because he cannot know it at all, 
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because his situation does not give the leisure to intuit it in the middle-class 
sense; because, even before he posits elements of the outside world as 
objects of his thought, he feels himself to be an object, and this initial 
alienation within himself takes precedence over everything else. 
(MF, 186-7) 
It is this privileged position, according to Lilies, that enables proletarian thought to 
overcome the limits of bourgeois thought. The proletariat is both subject and object, and 
therefore permitted 'access to the totality or reality, to that totalizing knowledge which 
was the stumbling block of classical bourgeois philosophy' (MF, 186). According to 
Martin Jay, Lukacs' conception of the proletariat as the first universal subject of history 
relied on Vico's verum-factum principle, that is, that 'the true and the made are 
interchangeable'.ll However, for Lukacs 'the verum-factum principle applied only when a 
universal totalizer made history in a deh'berate and rational manner. To know the whole 
was thus dependent on the existence of a collective historical subject who could recognise 
itself in its objectifications'.13 That is to say, the proletariat. Thus Lukacs' conception of 
totality, as we saw in chapter 2 can be said to be expressive in the sense that 'the whole 
expresses the intentionality and praxis of a creator-subject, who recognises itself in the 
objective world around it'Y 
The discussions of totality, within Marxism and Form, take place within the context of an 
exposition of Lukacs' work and could therefore be said to be Lukacs' conception rather 
than Jameson's. However, as this study has frequently had recourse to highlight, Jameson 
never gives simple definitions of his categories and concepts: the meaning of a word has to 
be derived from its context and use. Thus, we should note that Jameson does not offer a 
critique of Lukacs' concept of totality. Furthermore, in his constant invocation of the 
dialectical imperative to move from the abstract to the concrete, and through his insistence 
that there is no content for dialectical thought 'but total content' (MF, 306) one must 
assume that Jameson endorses, and is working wi~, a LukacsianiHegelian conception of 
the concrete as the totality or (as Jameson puts it in the quotation above) reality. 
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Further support for the Lukacsian paradigm can be discerned from Jameson's 
consideration of Sartre. Discussing Sartre's concept of totalization, Jameson identifies it 
with, what Jay calls, Lukacs' 'progressive longitudinal totality,' that is, a conception of 
history as 'a coherent and meaningful unity'. IS Or as Jameson puts it, 'the concept of 
totalization enables Sartre to do away with the relativism inherent in the notion of the 
project ... It is only on this condition that history as a whole can have a meaning, or a 
single direction' (MF, 231). We find this progressive longitudinal totality re-emerging in 
The Political Unconscious in the form of Jameson's capitalised History as the single great 
adventure of class struggle to wrest the realm of freedom from the realm of necessity. 
However, the concept of totality invoked in this text is rather different from 'positive 
dialectics of Lukacs' subject-object unity'16 that Jameson worked with in Marxism and 
Form. Jameson now emphasises the second aspect of totality that I indicated above, that 
is to say, as a term limit, a methodological standard against which other forms of thought 
can be measured: 
It has not been sufficiently grasped [writes Jameson] that Lukacs' method 
of ideological critique - like the Hegelian dialectic itself and its Sartrean 
variant, in the methodological imperative of totalization proposed in the 
Critique - is an essentially critical and negative, demystifying operation. 
(PU,52) 
Certainly Jameson's own stress upon the positive aspect of the adequation of subject to 
object in Marxism and Form has now been abandoned as has any appeal to an Hegelian 
, 
conception of the concrete. Jameson now argues that: 
Lukacs' central analysis of the ideological character of classical German 
philosophy may from this perspective be seen as a creative and original 
variant on Marx's theory of ideology, which is not, as is widely thought, 
one of false consciousness, but rather one of structural limitation and 
ideological closure. (PU, 52) 
Quoting Marx's analysis of petty bourgeois ideology in The Eighteenth Brumaire 
Jameson argues for a formulation of ideology as "strategies of containment": that is to say, 
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the limitation imposed upon our modes of thought by the specific historical situation from 
which such thinking emerges. It was Lukacs' great achievement according to Jameson to 
reveal how such strategies of containment can 'be unmasked only by confrontation with 
the ideal of totality which they at once imply and repress' (PU, 53). What Jameson means 
by this can be seen in his exposition of the ideological nature of post-structuralist thought. 
Citing the example of Deleuze and Guattari's molecular politics and Derridean 
deconstruction, Jameson suggests that if such repudiations of totalization: 
are to be celebrated in their intensity, they must be accompanied by some 
initial appearance of continuity, some ideology of unification already in 
place, which it is their mission to rebuke and shatter. The value of the 
molecular in Deleuze, for instance, depends structurally on the preexisting 
molar or unifying impulse against which its truth is read. (PU, 53) 
The ideological aspect of post-structuralism is revealed in its inability to think beyond the 
immediate, disparate moments of intensity and flux; and to attempt to understand the 
historical conditions which produce such fragmented and isolated experience. In that they 
presuppose the existence of the totality which it is their aim to deconstruct the post-
structural ideologies of difjerance, schizoid intensity and heterogeneity are, argues 
Jameson, second degree critical philosophies 'which reconfirm the status of the concept of 
totality by their very reaction against it' (PU, 53). However, the problem with this kind of 
dialectical thinking is that it could equally operate in the opposite direction. Thus, as 
Terry Eagleton observes, Jameson 'stubbornly refuses to contemplate the converse 
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possibility, one flamboyantly entertained by Jacques Derrida, that our conceptions of 
totality may have been all along more parasitic upon some primordial movement of 
difference than we care to admit'.17 
As we saw in chapter 2, in The Political Unconscious Jameson equates the notion of 
totality with the Althusserian conception of History as an absent cause. Jameson writes: 
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Totality is not available for representation, any more than it is accessible in 
the form of some ultimate truth (or moment of Absolute Spirit). 
(PU, 55) 
The totality can only be represented through its absence, this allows Jameson 'without any 
great inconsistency to respect both the methodological imperative implicit in the concept 
of totality or totalization' (PU, 57) and the various kinds of'symptomal' analysis demanded 
by post-structuralism. However, as I argued in chapters 2 and 3 the incompatibility of 
holding these two positions simultaneously can only be maintained at the expense of the 
specificity of each opposing conception of totality. 
On the one hand, then, Jameson has attempted to accommodate the post-structuralist 
critique of totality by playing down the positive aspects of the concept with its Hegelian 
emphasis on the concrete, and stressing the concept's negative function as an unrealisable 
ideal against which our partial representations of the world can be judged. On the other 
hand, this then allows Jameson to rewrite the concept at a higher level of abstraction, as an 
absent cause, beyond representation, whereby the various critiques of totality can only be 
said to make sense in terms of a prior concept of totality. Thus, the concept can never be 
empirically verified but at the same time is confirmed through our very inability to realise 
or represent it, as the background. against which our partial understanding and 
representations of the world make sense. Jameson further develops this understanding of 
totality in Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. 
In this later work Jameson insists on the need to distinguish between notions of totality 
and totalization: 
if the word totality sometimes seems to suggest that some privileged bird's-
eye view of the whole is available, which is the Truth, then the project of 
totalization implies exactly the opposite and takes as its premise the 
impossibility for individual and biological human subjects to conceive of 
such a position, let alone to adopt or achieve of it. (PLLC, 332) 
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Furthermore, we need to distinguish both of these concepts from any connection with 
totalitarianism. The term "totalization" derives from Sartre's Critique of Dialectical 
Reason and, suggests Jameson, marks that process of partial snmming up that subjects 
must make in order to construct a meaningful narrative of their lives. In Sartre's usage the 
term tended to 'envelope and find a least common denominator for the twin human 
activities of perception and action' (PLLC, 332). The term therefore became synonymous 
with the more Marxian term of "praxis" and designated the 'unification inherent in human 
action' (PLLC, 333). In this sense argues Jameson it seems difficult to see how the subject 
in a postmodem era could avoid the experience of totalization: 
Totalizing, in Sartre, is, strictly speaking, that process whereby, actively 
impelled by the project, an agent negates the specific object or item and 
reincorporates it into the larger project-in-course. Philosophically, and 
barring some genuine mutation of the species, it is hard to see how human 
activity under the third, or postmodem~ stage of capitalism could elude or 
evade this very general formula, although some of postmodernism's ideal 
images· schizophrenia above all • are clearly calculated to rebuke it and to 
stand as unassimilable and unsubsumable under it. (PLLC, 333) 
This continual process of partial snmming up is distinct from the concept of totality itself: 
which for Jameson is linked to the notion of "mode of production". In the book on 
postmodernism Jameson reiterates the notion of mode of production he formulated in The 
Political Unconscious; insisting that if the concept of totality is to have any meaning then 
we must accept that, like the Althusserian notion of structure, there is only one totality, 
that is, the mode of production. Jameson 'further distinguishes his conception of totality 
from the Weberian notion of a "total system": 
a mode of production is not a "total system" in that forbidding sense; it 
includes a variety of counterforces and new tendencies within itself: of 
"residual" as well as "emergent" forces, which it must attempt to manage or 
control, (PLLC, 406) 
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In short, Jameson's formulation of non-synchronicity and uneven development. As I 
pointed out in chapter 2 the problem with Jameson's position is that on one level he insists 
that there can only be one totality but the logical implication of non-synchronicity, or the 
co-existence of differing modes of production, is that there will be co-existence of 
differing totalities. What I wish to draw attention ~o in this particular discussion of mode 
of production though is Jameson's contention that what is at stake in the "wars on totality" 
is in fact the rejection of Utopian thought. For Jameson. the language of utopianism is 
code for 'the systematic transformation of contemporary society' (PLLC, 334). 
Consequently in rejecting the concept of totality, postmodernism is turning its back on that 
larger political project of transforming capitalism itself which is traditionally identified as 
Marxism's emancipatory narrative. As Jameson puts it. what 'is sometimes characterised 
as a nostalgia for class politics of some older type is generally more likely to be simply a 
"nostalgia" for politics tout court" (PLLC. 331). 
As one follows Jameson's argument one becomes increasingly aware of the problems of 
this type of totalizing reasoning. In the above discussion I have slipped from an Hegelian 
concept of totality as the concrete. through Lukacs' negative and demystifying function of 
totality to Sartre's totalization or partial snmming up, through Althusser's notion of 
structure to mode of production and finally to Utopian thought and the collective 
transformation of capitalism. Each of these categories has become synonymous in 
Jameson's discourse and this allows him to slide from one register to another. from the 
philosophical implications of the concept to the need for renewed class struggle. This 
procedure, I would suggest, tends to elide the specificity of each differing conception of 
totality and enact precisely that denial of difference proposed by the post-structuralist and 
postmodernist criticisms of the concept of totality. This overly homogenising tendency of 
totalizing thought is most starkly revealed in Jameson's reading of Adorno. 
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In Late Marxism: Adorno, or, The persistence of the Dialectic Jameson maintains that 
Adorno's unique contribution to Marxist theory lies: 
in his unique emphasis on the presence oflate capitalism as a totality within 
the very forms of our concepts or of the works of art themselves. 
(LM,9) 
As I suggested in the previous chapter Jameson's reading of Adorno in the 1990s is very 
different from his reading of Adorno in the early 1970s. In particular the emphasis 
Jameson placed on the reflexivity of dialectical thought in his early work must now be 
rejected as 'part of the baggage of a modernist thinking no longer very authoritative in the 
postmodemist era' (LM, 25). Therefore Jameson proposes an alternative view of the 
dialectical process, that is: 
to think another side, an outside, an external face of the concept which, like 
that of the moon, can never be directly visible or accessible to us: but we 
must vigilantly remember and reckon that other face into our sense of the 
concept while remaining within it in the old way and continuing to use and 
think it. (LM, 25) 
Jameson defines this process as that of thinking both with and against the concept 
simultaneously and it is here, he argues, that the concept of totality in Adorno comes into 
its own. According to Jameson, the notion of totality rises up as a solution to the problem 
of thinking both with and against the concept, in the sense that 'the concept can be 
retained and dereified all at once' through 'its reinsertion into totality or system' (LM, 26). 
Totality, maintains Jameson, 'plays a strategic role in freeing us from the "spell" of the 
concept' (LM, 26). In other words, there is a drive from the individual and isolated 
-
concept towards totality or unity. However, notes Jameson, there is, at the same time, in 
Adorno's work a sense in which totality has 'something illicit about it, expressing the 
idealism and the imperialism of the concept' (LM, 26). But to read this as a rejection of 
totality itself: or to stress its totalitarian aspect, argues Jameson, is a fundamental 
misunderstanding which: 
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lies in drawing the conclusion that philosophical emphasis on the 
indispensability of this category amounts either to a celebration ofit or, in a 
stronger form of the anti-utopian argument, to its implicit perpetuation as a 
reality or a referent outside the philosophical realm. (LM, 27) 
In other words, we should not confuse the use of abstract categories, such as mode of 
production or totality, with an actual belief in their substantive and empirically verifiable 
existence; that is a confusion between the 'concept and the thing itself (PLLC, 40 I). The 
totality or system is precisely that outer face of the concept, I alluded to above, that is 
outside and 'forever inaccessible to us' (LM, 28). 
Jameson's reading of Adorno, then, emphasises the critical and negative aspect of totality, 
it is neither immediately knowable nor representable but remains an absent presence 
against which our fragmented and isolated concepts stand judged. Furthermore the notion 
of totality, proposed in Late Marxism, is also synonymous or interchangable with the 
categories of system, universal, concept, exchange system and history itself 18 This 
reading of the notion of totality would appear to be very much in line with the negative 
conception developed in The Political Unconscious. I do not wish to suggest that 
Jameson's reading of Adorno is wrong as such,19 as it would be consistent with both 
Jameson's and Adorno's work to be able to sustain very different and even incompatible 
readings,20 but I do wish to raise what are essentially political implications of his reading. 
As I indicated above, what appears to be lost in Jameson's totalizing approach is the 
specificity of the concepts themselves as they are folded back into the tradition of Marxist 
thought which Jameson adheres to. In Marxism and Totality Martin Jay stresses an 
alternative reading of Adorno's conception of totality and identity theory. Like Jameson, 
Jay focuses upon Adorno's negative conception of totality but unlike Jameson he 
emphasises that Adorno's negative dialectics are strongly opposed to Lukacs' positive 
dialectics and in particular the verum1actum prInciple which posited a subject-object 
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unity, or, 'a symmetry between making and knowing'.21 For Jay argues that Adorno's 
'reluctance to link epistemological validity with social genesis'22 rules out the expressive 
concept of totality advocated by Lukacs. Indeed: 
the very notion of a meta-subject capable of totalizing reality was an 
illegitimate hypostatisation taken over from idealism's notion of a 
transcendental subject. 23 
Adorno's particular animus against the concept of totality, according to Jay, was 
'especially directed against its longitudinal form, the belief in universal history as a 
coherent whole',24 that is to say, exactly the conception of history and totality that 
Jameson proposes in The Political Unconscious. Jay insists that Adorno's use of totality 
is 'an example of his general anti-realist use of concepts'2' or, as Jameson highlights, the 
non-adequation of a concept to its real object or counterpart. There can, for Adorno, be 
no identity, as in the Hegelian-Lukacsian tradition, between subject ~d object, concept 
and referent. What all this amounts to, according to Jay, is that the concept of totality in 
Adorno's work is not simply a negative but is a "pejorative" term shorn of all positive 
connotations and 'almost a synonym for totalitarianism'.26 Indeed, after Adorno, writes 
Jay: 
No longer could a Western Marxist defend an expressive view of the whole 
in which a meta-subject was both the subject and object of history. No 
longer could history itself be seen as a coherent whole with a positive 
conclusion as its telos. No longer could totality ignore the non-identity of 
the historical and the natural and subordinate the latter to human 
domination. And no longer could the totalizing epistemology of the 
Hegelian tradition be invoked with confidence against the antinomies of 
bourgeois thought. 27 
The question, then, is how can Jameson apparently do just such a thing? 
Firstly, it would be erroneous to suggest that Jameson would uncritically endorse any of 
the above positions. To speak of Jameson, as Terry Eagleton does, as a 'shamelessly 
unreconstructed Hegelian Marxist'28 overshoots the mark to the extent that Jameson has 
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explicitly reconstructed his Hegelian Marxism Jameson's practice of transc odin g and. as I 
shall argue below, of qualification enables him to adopt a position that at once appears to 
endorse the views enumerated above and at the same time problematize them So, for 
example, Jameson may not endorse the view of a Lu1cicsian totalizing meta-subject or that 
history has a positive telos but he would still maintain that history remains a single great 
adventure and that although the outcome remains to be decided there is a positive aspect 
in the form of the Utopian impulse. Similarly, the totalizing epistemology of the Hegelian 
tradition can still be invoked against the fragmentation and dispersion of late capitalism 
but only ifwe grasp that the problem of totalizing thought is first and foremost a problem 
of representation: 
the very problem of representability now becomes in some sense its own 
solution - the thing being done, as it were, by showing it cannot be done in 
the first place. (GPA, 56) 
Jameson, then, wishes to retain both the positive and negative, or critical, aspects of the 
Western Marxist tradition: a position he finds tenable as long as an concepts and problems 
are historicized. For instance, in a footnote to The Political Unconscious Jameson 
challenges Martin Jay's reading of the Frankfurt school: 
by overstressing the leitmotif of non-identity theory, [Jay] ends up 
conveying the misleading impression that the fundamental target of "critical 
theory" was Marxism rather than capitalism. The non-identity between 
subject and object often means little more than a materialist and 
"decentering" approach to Knowledge. (PU, 52) 
Jameson substantiates this view at much greater length in Late Alarxism for which the 
opening sentences of the first chapter will suffice. Reflecting on the claims of Adorno's 
post-Marxism, Jameson insists that this misreading 'rests on a misunderstanding of one of 
Adorno's basic leitmotivs, namely 'non-identity" whilst in actual fact 'Adorno is ... the 
philosopher of Identity in a very special case' (LM, 15). Whether or not this is a 
philosophically sustainable position is not my concern here, rather I wish to highlight the 
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political consequences of Jameson's choice. By folding Adorno's non-identity theory back 
into identity theory, in whatever special sense, Jameson has diminished the polemical and 
critical force of Adorno's work. Adorno simply becomes one more figure in a long 
tradition of Marxist philosophy rather than a powerful and remorseless critic of both 
capitalism and the aporias of that very tradition of Marxist thought. I am not advocating a 
gradual slippage into post-Marxism here but I am suggesting that it may be more 
politically astute to retain a separation between certain ideas and concepts, even if they are 
philosophically reconcilable. In a postmodem era of micro-politics, differance and 
schizophrenic flux Jameson's reassertion of the concept of totality is both timely and to be 
welcomed. Although the language may change one has only to think of some of the more 
holistic approaches to Green politics to be acutely aware that totalizing thought can not be 
wished away. But at the same time, neither can we ignore the critique of totalizing 
thought, as Jay suggests: 
there has been a growing fear in certain quarters on the left that the old 
argument linking the Marxist aspiration for normative totality and 
totalitarian politics made by earlier critics like Camus may have a certain 
legitimacy after all29 
We need to be sensitive to the need for totalizing thought and systematic change but that 
practice must not be coercive, eliminating difference and imposing a unilateral or unilinear 
perspective upon history, it can only ever be a partial totalization, always open to change. 
Mediation, Reification and Agency 
In chapter 2 I showed how Jameson defended the concept of mediation against the 
Althusserian critique of expressive causality; insisting that mediation does not impose an 
identity between distinct phenomena but rather points to the existence of a relationship 
between different phenomena and social levels. I shall now consider Jameson's central 
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mediatory category, reification, in more detail. Reification is by no means the only 
mediation that Jameson has recourse to; one could also highlight his use of categories such 
as aesthetic, form, narrative and genre. Reification, though, 'that special bugbear of 
Hegelian Marxism'30 as Martin Jay descnoes it, remains for Jameson perhaps his single 
most important theoretical, philosophical and political concern. This position is strongly 
reconfirmed in the concluding pages of The Geopolitical Aesthetic, where he states: 
that those doctrines of reification and commodification which played a 
secondary role in traditional or classical Marxian heritage, are now likely to 
come into their own and become the dominant instruments of analysis and 
struggle. (GP~ 212) 
For Jameson, the logic of commodification and remcation is relentless and unremitting. I 
have discussed in the preceding chapters how Jameson utilises the concept to account for 
the waning of historicity; the effacement of traces of labour from commodity production; 
the aesthetization of the commodity process; the fragmentation of our psyches and 
fracturing of our subjective identities; the colonisation those last enclaves of resistance to 
global capitalism, the aesthetic, the unconscious and the Third W orId; and finally the 
splitting of the signifier and signilled couple. 
As Terry Eagleton has pointed out, the 'power and versatility of insight that Jameson can 
generate from these twin notions [commodification and reification] is little short of 
staggering'31 but such a degree of versatility has entailed a high political price, of which I 
,. 
will say more below. Firstly I shall consider the concept itself: for it has occasioned no 
small degree of controversy within Marxism, over its precise meaning and its significance 
for the Marxian theory of praxis. Andrew Arato points out that Lukacs uses the term 
reification 'as a synonym for alienation, rationalization, atomisation and deactivization',3l a 
position that Jameson, initially at least, would appear to endorse.33 Many Marxists, on the 
other hand, insist on the need to distinguish betwe~ these distinct categories, for instance: 
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While some have regarded alienation as an 'idealist' concept to be replaced 
by the 'materialist' concept of' reification', others have regarded 'alienation' 
as a philosophical concept whose sociological counterpart is 'reification'. 
According to the prevailing view alienation's a broader phenomenon, and 
reification one of its forms or aspects. l4 
Eagleton has described Jameson's equating of reification and rationalization as 
"spuriOUS"lS and Philip Wood in an article on Sartre and Anglo-American Marxism, has 
insisted upon the need to separate the concepts of rationalization and reification: the 
former designating the reorganisation of the work process and the latter defining 'a definite 
social relation between human beings'.l6 Clearly Jameson does not accept the "prevailing" 
view ofreification as a specific form of alienation; on the contrary, for Jameson, alienation 
appears to designate a specific form of reification. In many of Jameson texts the 
categories of: reification, rationalization, alienation, commodification, specialisation and 
fragmentation frequently appear to be synonymous or identical. However, we should not 
be too hasty in assimilating these categories to each other, for Jameson, Lukacs' theory of 
reification provides a synthesis of Marx and Weber rather than an identity between them 
Reification is not identical to rationalization but "includes" itl7 providing the first systemic 
account of the logic of capitalism as: 
it insists on extreme fragmentation as a social norm It attempts to project 
a process which separates, compartmentalizes, specializes, and disperses: a 
force which at one and the same time operates uniformly over everything 
and makes heterogeneity a homogeneous and standardizing power.l8 
; 
In an exemplary study of Lukacs' theory of reification Andrew Arato has pointed to the 
inconsistencies in Lukacs' formulation. 'The analysis of reification', writes Arato, 'moves 
through the moments of "alienated labour", of the reification of capitalist society as a 
whole, and of the reification of consciousness in bourgeois science and philo sophy'. 39 
Following this procedure, contends Arato, it is misleading to identify the concept of 
reification with alienation, and indeed objectification as Lukacs desires to do. Starting 
from the initial premise that the 'theory of reification is an indispensable part of the 
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dialectical theory of society', 40 Arato can only conclude that without senous 
reformulation Lukacs' theory proves to be inappropriate as a dialectical theory of society 
in the era of advanced capitalism: 
Although Lukacs' theory of reification was intended as a dialectical theory 
of capitalist society, it is/or us "only" a fundamental work in the history of 
the philosophy of praxis. 41 
Unfortunately Jameson does not appear to have undertaken such a reformulation. Whilst 
his analysis of late capitalism is not limited to the theory of reification, the pre-eminence 
accorded to this category in Jameson's work and his tendency to conflate what I have 
suggested are distinct concepts results in significant and detrimental consequences. 
Eagleton summarises the problem well: 
the 'question' to which the concept of reification is an 'answer' is not in the 
first place one of class struggle, but a dual query about the nature of 
capitalist economic production and the quality of lived experience within it. 
If reification returns a vital economic answer to the question of how we 
have come to experience as meagrely as we do, it promises to put cultural 
formation and mode of production back together only at the risk of 
displacing the political If everything is mediated through the commodity, 
class struggle becomes an answer to this unhappy condition, rather than the 
first question of historical materialism 42 
In other words, reification is not the primary proble~ which then must be overcome 
through class struggle, but the actual conditions of possibility and need for class struggle 
in the first place is the principal concern. of historical materialism. Indeed, following 
Arato's analysis of Lukacs, we can locate this aporia in Jameson's work to a too Wlcritical 
endorsement of Lukacs' original theory. As we have seen Lukacs identified the proletariat 
as the universal subject of history through the principle ofvenlm-Jactum. Arato highlights 
two problems with Lukacs' position; firstly, Marx, he argues, reached the position of the 
proletariat as a universal subject through an understanding of human "needs" whereas 
Lukacs bases his thesis of the proletariat as identical subject-object of history on a 
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proposition about "class consciousness". Arato maintains that 'the question of class 
consciousness can be related to the individual consciousness of members of the class only 
through the dialectics of human needs and constraints'43 and not simply through a 
consideration of consciousness. Lukacs does not consider the question of needs and 
constraints. Secondly, Lukacs' attempt to find the identical subject-object of history 
proceeds entirely from 'the side of the potential subjectivity'44 and does not take into 
account the objective conditions of possibility. Lukacs' claim that the proletariat is the 
identical subject-object of history presupposes that the 'the historical process has become 
transparent to theory'.45 According to Arato, there are two dialectics at work here: firstly 
the dialectic of the identical subject-object upon which the philosophy of praxis is based, 
and secondly, the dialectic of immediacy and mediation upon which all dialectical social 
theory is based. These, insists Arato, derive from different conceptual presuppositions 
which are not reconciled in Lukacs' theory: 
the subject-object dialectic (in what ever modified form) and the dialectic 
of immediacy and mediation remain two sides of a subject-object split 
within History and Class Consciousness, a split that appears most 
fundamentally as a methodological duality between philosophy of praxis 
and the dialectical social theory this philosophy of praxis is aiming at. 46 
Arato points out that the consideration of the identical subject-object at the expense of the 
dialectic of immediacy and mediation tends 'to exclude mediations between the collective 
subject and all individuals'.47 As with Lukacs Jameson focuses upon our subjective 
. 
experience of capitalism which tends to supplant questions of politics with questions of 
consciousness and the need to overcome. reification. Finally, as I shall argue below, 
Jameson tends to evade, or diminish the significance, of essential mediations, such as 
institutional practices and nation states, as he slides from individual and fragmented 
psyches to the global totality. 
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As we have seen, according to Jameson, the unremitting logic of reification and 
commodification has finally colonised the last areas of resistance: the unconscious, the 
aesthetic and the Third-W orId. I will take just the last of these areas to highlight the 
problems with Jameson's theory. In The Geopolitical Aesthetic Jameson restates his 
conviction that the Third-World and in particular Third-World culture has been co-opted 
by the global economic system: 
Third-World cinema itself is rarely today defended as a space in which 
models for alternate cinema are to be sought. Indeed the very term Third 
World seems to have become an embarrassment in a period in which the 
realities of the economic have seemed to supplant the possibilities of 
collective struggle, in which human agency and politics seem to have been 
dissolved by the global corporate institutions we call late capitalism. 
(GPA, 186) 
As so often with Jameson there is the problem of the "we" whom he appeals to and 
generalises the experience o£ For example, as I argued in a previous chapter,48 the term 
"Third World" is not so much an "embarrassment" as a strategy to reduce a diversity of 
cultures to the single historical perspective of the West and in particular North America. 
Secondly, the term "late capitalism" is by no means as broadly acceptable as Jameson 
statement implies; for many of us the term has unwelcome and unhelpful teleological 
implications, that we are somehow coming to the end of capitalism; which is by no means 
self-evident. To return to Jameson's assessment of Third-World culture: 
Third-World 'culture', however, in,the narrow sense, has been gratefully 
absorbed by the international entertainment industry, and has seemed to 
furnish vibrant but politiclly acceptable images of social pluralism for the 
late capitalist big city. (GPA, 187) 
Jameson's view of the fate of Third-World culture is an extension of his general view of 
postmodernism as the first global (North American) cultural dominant, which as we know 
is underwritten by Ernest Mandel's thesis of late capitalism as a new stage in capitalist 
expansion and development. The problem with this is that, for Mandel, the expansion of 
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late capitalism is dependent upon those very areas of Third-World economic and 
technological underdevelopment that Jameson wishes to abolish. Mandel's theory of global 
capitalism is predicated upon a thesis of unequal and combined development, that is to 
say, that the different phases of capital accumulation - primitive accumulation and 
accumulation through the production of surplus value - are not successive or 
chronological phases of economic history but are also 'concu"ent economic processes'.49 
Mandel identifies a dialectical relation between three distinct moments: firstly, capital 
accumulation in the sphere capitalist production proper; secondly, the continuing primitive 
accumulation of capital outside this sphere of capitalist production, and finally, the 
constraint and limitation of the second moment by the first through competition and 
struggle. Each dialectical expansion or "long wave" of capitalist development marks a 
further penetration of capitalist modes of production into areas of under-development and 
primitive accumulation: 
the capitalist world economy is an articulated system of capitalist, semi-
capitalist and pre-capitalist relations of production, linked to each other 
by capitalist relations of exchange and dominated by the capitalist world 
market. so 
On one level this argument would very much appear to support Jameson's view that late 
capitalism represents the final colonisation of the last enclaves of under or ahemative 
development. However, Mandel poses exactly this question: does the continuing 
penetration of the capitalist mode of production into areas of under-development indicate 
a 'tendency towards a thorough industrialization of the Third Worl~ a universalization of 
the capitalist mode of production and the eventual homogenisation of the world 
economy?,Sl Mandel responds that it emphatically does not! Indeed. he writes: 
It simply means a change in the forms of juxtaposition of development and 
underdevelopment, .or more correctly: new differential levels of capital 
accumulation, productivity, and surplus extraction are emerging, which 
although not of the same nature are still more pronounced than those of the 
'classical' imperialist epoch . .52 
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Capitalism according to Mandel's theory could not exist without this interrelation of 
development and underdevelopment and it requires for its continuing existence the 
survival of these semi and pre-capitalist enclaves. Indeed, Jameson's own emphasis upon 
the non-synchronicity of modes of production, that no mode of production exists in a pure 
state, would appear to allow for just such a co-existence of differing modes of 
accumulation. On the other hand, Jameson's insistence on the unremitting logic of 
reification would seem, at best, to contradict the non-synchronicity of different modes of 
production and, at worst, to rule it out all together. In terms of cultural production, the 
differing social relations of underdevelopment of pre-capitalist modes of accumulation 
may just as well facilitate the production of alternative representations of the system and 
alternative forms of cultural politics that Jameson's over tota1izing view ofpostmodemism 
has ruled out. 
Martin Jay identifies a problem with Adorno's usage of the concept of reification that I 
believe can be extended to Jameson, Jay writes: 
Either the totality was completely watertight in its reifying power and 
resistance could only be co-opted, or the totality still contained negations 
and Adorno's descriptions of its Satanic "falseness" were exaggerations.~J 
For Jameson, the reifying power of late capitalism has become all encompassing, all 
attempts at resistance will be (one senses in Jameson's writing) "inevitably" co-opted and 
by implication hopeless. However, if Jameson is not exaggerating the totalizing logic of 
late capitalism and its reifYing power, a whole series of questions arise: how can one resist 
such a ubiquitous force? If it has now penetrated every aspect of our lives and experience 
how can one achieve a position from which to provide a critique of reification? Is not the 
highly abstract and at times tortuously complex discourse of the Hegelian Marxist as much 
a product of reification as that of any other? If it is so all-pervasive, then where is 
resistance to come from? 
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Jameson identifies "theoretical discourse" as itself a postmodern phenomenon, so clearly 
Jameson is within postmoderni~ indeed it would seem to be impossible following 
Jameson to be outside of it. How, therefore, can Jameson perform the totalizing and 
periodizing operation that he does without the critical distance that the theory itself has 
abolished? This problem is starkly demonstrated in The Geopolitical Aesthetic where 
Jameson returns to the questions of religion and nationalism in the postmodern era (GPA, 
188). Jameson, we should note, has already informed us it is 'axiomatic that what is now 
called fundamentalism is also a postmodern phenomenon' (PLLC, 388) and that belief is 
rather 'a casualty of a period in which otherness' (PLLC, 388) and depth still prevailed, 
that is modernism So it is with some exasperation that Jameson finds he must once again 
return to the subject of resurgent fundamentalism and nationalism in Eastern Europe; 'may 
one in passing' he writes in a footnote to his essay on Russian film.: 
express exasperation with the various religious revivals in the East? The 
Roman Catholic wedding in Man of Steel (complete with Lech Walesa!) 
was already disgraceful; we have now seen the consequences. ... Surely an 
anti-foundational era is able to satisfy its aesthetic, philosophical and 
political needs without the trappings of superstition, and is at least in a 
position to jettison the baggage of the great monotheisms (the animisms 
and polytheisms might still be acceptable on other grounds; while 
Buddhism is in our sense atheistic). (GP A, Ill) 
The superior tone of this footnote is extraordinary as one senses Jameson's irritation that 
so many of us have not caught on to th~ schizophrenic logic of late capitalism to be 
beyond such regressive experience. There is more than a hint of the old intellectual 
Mandarin present here, the kind of universal intellectual stigmatised by Foucault, and 
which postmodernism itself was supposed to have consigned to history. One senses the 
exasperation of the theoretician who after painstakingly elaborating a global theory finds a 
world that refuses to conform to it. Whilst one may share Jameson's exasperation that 
Eastern Europe, and indeed many other parts of the globe, have turned to religious 
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fundamentalism and rampant nationalism rather than some socialist third way one cannot 
help but feel that Jameson's diatribe, to use his own term, represents a profoundly 
undiaiectical and unhistorical appreciation of the situation. Surely one of the many 
reasons why people are turning to fundamentalism and nationalism is that these social 
forces have provided a focus for collective opposition which in a different context 
Jameson may read as a positive Utopian impulse? Whilst Jameson is not suggesting that 
belief and nationalism have disappeared he does maintain that they have been 'threatened 
by postmodernity' (GP A, 117) and no longer have meaning in the old modernist sense. 
Resurgent nationalism and religious fundamentalism are political responses which need to 
be confronted on a political terrain which is at once local, institutional and national as well 
as multinational and corporate. 
In an interview with Stuart Hall, Jameson concedes that he is today rather pessimistic 
about the opportunities for new political initiatives: 
My feeling about politics, which may be an old-fashioned one, is that 
nothing really happens without the reconstruction of a certain basic unity 
among groups. My own sense of this may be too pessimistic, but from the 
perspective of a politics of solidarity, culture would not be a substitute for 
politics. ... I am more pessimistic about a purely cultural politics than I 
would obviously like to be. S4 
Indeed the privileged form of political activity remains for Jameson the possibility of 
alliance politics that he outlined in The Political Unconscious : 
> 
The privileged form in which the American Left can develop today must 
therefore necessarily be that of an alliance politics; and such a politics is 
the strict practical equivalent of the concept of totalization on the 
theoretical leveL In practice, then, the attack on the concept of "totality" in 
the American framework means the undermining and repudiation of the 
only realistic perspective in which a genuine Left could come into being in 
this country. (PU, 54) 
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It is surely difficult to predict and debatable what conditions need to prevail in order for a 
genuine Left politics to emerge in North America. Indee~ there would probably be very 
little agreement over what constituted a "genuine" Left rather than less genuine form of 
Left politics. But what I want to highlight in Jameson's statement is its "all or nothing" 
quality: without totalizing theory alliance politics could easily be seen as purely 
opportunistic, without alliance politics "no" genuine Left politics can emerge. It has 
frequently been observed that in the divergent tradition of Western Marxism a profound 
sense of pessimism has been accompanied by equally strong sense of optimism 55 Thus as 
Jameson's views on cultural politics become increasingly pessimistic, as I argued in the 
previous chapter, his new spatial awareness appears to explicitly exclude politics in any 
meaningful sense, his calls for renewed Utopian thinking have increased apace. What one 
misses in Jameson's work though is any real sense of who the new historical agents may be 
in a global multinational economy. 
In a series of articles56 the sociologist Mike Featherstone has criticized Jameson's theory 
of postmodernism for directing too little attention to the changing experiences of different 
groups, preferring, like many intellectuals, to generalise from his own experience. 
Featherstone insists on the need to focus upon the institutions which mediate our 
experience of this form of production and the practices involved in contemporary culture. 
Jameson's response is, understandably, that he is not a sociologist: 
I [do not] see why any of those topics should be excluded, they are very 
interesting matters indeed. But it is hard to see how sociological inquiry at 
that level would become explanatory: rather, the phenomena he is 
concerned with tend at once to reform into their own semi-autonomous 
sociological level, one which then at once requires a diachronic narrative. 57 
So, although it may appear that concrete social agents once more emerge in Featherstone's 
work we still need to respect different levels of theoretical abstraction if we are not to fall 
back into the rewed specialisations of academic disciplines. There is, however, more to be 
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said for Featherstone's position than Jameson allows. In particular Featherstone focuses 
our attention upon other forms of mediation between the individual subject and the social 
whole. Dominick LaCapra, in a review of The Political Unconscious, maintains that the 
major difficulties of Jameson's theoretical strategy' cluster around the axial "dialectical" 
problem of mediation itself. 58 For Jameson, mediation provides the mechanism to move 
beyond the specialisation and compartmentalisation of contemporary society. LaCapra, on 
the other hand, identifies the very complexity and density of Jameson's style and 
vocabulary as itself a symptom rather than a solution to the problem of reification: 
[Jameson's] own comments on the problem of mediation reinforce the 
impression of an addiction to a highly hermetic approach that remains on a 
narrowly hermeneutic level in attempting to "break out of specialized 
compartments of (bourgeois) disciplines". A model-centred semiotics with 
its own proliferating lexicon of code words becomes Jameson's all-too-
modem "political" answer to the problem 59 
In short, and as I shall argue below, style has come to replace politics. According to 
LaCapra Jameson's highly restricted view of mediation is accompanied by 'an abstract and 
exaggerated conception of the role of codes in relation to actual usage',60 a conception 
that is not specifically Marxist. However, the problem of mediation is not simply a 
question of the relations between various reified and specialised disciplines but also 
between these disciplines, with their esoteric languages, and other social spheres and what 
could be termed "ordinary language". As LaCapra writes: 
This mutual questioning between the ordinary and the "esoteric" might help 
to create the "space" for an effective transformation ofboth.61 
For LaCapra, Jameson's oeuvreism essentially evades the issue of working out mediations 
between different social spheres and in particular at institutional levels: 
At the very least, it functions to divert attention from the problem of 
institutions. For it is the institution in the broad sense that mediates 
between individual and society as well as between various uses of 
language. 62 
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A greater attention to institutional practices may also provide Jameson with a firmer 
ground for a new form of postmodem politics rather than the loose and ambivalent 
conception of alliance and group politics that he can only at present envisage. For even in 
terms of cultural practice it is now at the various institutional levels that political 
intelVentions are made. I am not suggesting that this can provide a substitute for more 
holistic and abstract forms of political thought but it will facilitate more concrete political 
objectives than Jameson's at present pessimistic and disabling "empty chair", his yet to be 
formulated properly postmodem politics. 
Politics and Style 
I commenced this study with an analysis of Jameson's style of writing, maintaining that his 
particular dialectical style, always making unexpected connections, drawing together 
disparate phenomena, doubling back on itself and creating what Jameson called, 
"dialectical shocks", was to be seen as an enactment or embodiment of dialectical thought. 
With the development of Jameson's career the dialectic has played a less central role, 
although along with Hegel it is still very much in evidence, and has been replaced by 
notions of "transcoding" and "cognitive mapping". This has not, however, resulted in a 
discernible decrease in the density and complexity of Jameson's style, as is evident from 
the opening sentence of 'Conspiracy as Totality', the first essay in The Geopolitical 
• 
Aesthetic: 
In the widespread paralysis of the collective or social imaginary, to which 
'nothing occurs' (Karl Kraus) when confronted with the ambitious program 
offantasizing an economic system on the scale of the globe itself: the older 
motif of conspiracy knows a fresh lease on life, as a narrative structure 
capable of reuniting the minimal basic components: a potentially infinite 
network, along with a plausible explanation of its invisibility; or in other 
words: the collective and the epistemological. (GPA, 9) 
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It is not that the sense of this sentence is particularly difficult to grasp or that one cannot 
follow through the idea. It is rather that one is left almost breathless as each subsequent 
clause is piled upon the preceding one. One is immediately immersed in the problem itsel( 
the epistemological problem of knowing, and thus representing, the totality. Jameson's 
text makes no concessions to this difficulty, the impossibility of representing the totality, 
but rather like a helix returns upon itself time and again to pick up new threads and weave 
them into the global patchwork of multinational capitalism. With characteristic virtuosity 
Jameson slips from close textual analysis of specific films to a consideration of the global 
economy, finding traces of that absent presence, the totality, in the most unlikely offilms. 
As we read sentence after sentence of Jameson's spiralling prose we are taken up by the 
language itsel( carried through a whirlwind tour of world cinema. One is astonished by 
the readings Jameson can generate from these films, some of them little known and others 
(like Videodrome) perhaps unusual choices. One is indeed confronted by an 
epistemological dilemma as one attempts to hold these disparate analyses together to 
follow the path from the particular to the universal and back again. Jameson's text seems 
to generate that spatial and cognitive disorientation that he is concerned to explicate. But 
to what extent is this disorientation the result of a paralysis of the collective imagination or 
as much a consequence of Jameson's own writing? For example, Jameson's opening 
statement· concerning the paralysis of the collective imagination is the central premise of 
this whole book but it is given at the outset and will be elaborated with great style and 
panache throughout but in a sense it has never been argued for. One must accept the 
premise as "given". Throughout this study I have referred to the Jameson's work as an 
oeuvre, as a corpus or body of work that must be seen as a totality in its own right. To 
engage with any particular part of the corpus is to engage with work as a whole. Thus 
one assumes that the ground work has been done elsewhere, in the essays on cognitive 
mapping for example, but when one reads those essays one finds that the spatial 
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disorientation that Jameson is concerned with here is also assumed there. Without a closer 
analysis of the intermediary levels of mediation one must either accept Jameson's cognitive 
and experiential dilemma or not. Jameson's recent work on postmodernism, spatiality and 
cinema forces one to think the unthinkable, to attempt to map the global totality of late 
capitalism, but one could ask: is this really the most pressing political, theoretical and 
cultural dilemma for the Left today? Or does it not rather tell us something about 
Jameson's own social and historical position as a global theorist with a specifically North 
American perspective upon the world? As Martin Jay writes: 
"totality," had a special place in the lexicon of all Western Marxists. In 
privileging it as they did, they betrayed their unmistakable status as 
intellectuals: throughout modem history, only "men of ideas" have 
combined the time (and economic support) to reflect on matters beyond 
their immediate material concerns with the hubris to believe they might 
know the whole of reality. 63 
According to Jameson, the 'first business of a Marxist teacher ... is clearly to teach 
Marxism itself64 but is it the first business of Marxism simply to be taught? If there is still 
a sense in which Marxism can be argued not to be just like any other academic discourse, 
not to be just another theory ofhlstory, then it is surely in its notion of praxis. That is, the 
unity of theory and practice, not simply as a pious injunction or a slogan but as a necessary 
requirement to link theory and politics. From the outset Jameson's project has been 
explicitly theoretical Within the United States, he wrote in Marxism and Form, 'there is 
no tactical or political question which is not first and foremost theoretical' (MF, xviii). 
Whilst I still believe Jameson to be correct in this assertion I believe it to be only half the 
problem, that is to say, there is also no theoretical problem that is not first and foremost 
tactical and political. In other words, Marxism is not just about making theoretical 
interventions, or interventions at "street" leve~ 6.5 but about attempting to create change at 
all levels of society: theoretical, political, cultura~ economic and specifically within the 
arena of teaching, at an institutional level If MarXism is to remain a vital theoretical and 
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political force it must contribute at the level of institutional practices. However, in the 
case of Jameson, there is not only a difficulty in understanding many of his texts there is 
also a difficulty in utilising them. Frequently, Jameson's most interesting ideas, for 
example the notion of a political unconscious, a h'bidinal apparatus, of national allegories 
and of cognitive mapping, are peculiarly difficult to get ahold of One can superficially 
grasp the idea but one always has the sense that there is more to it than one thinks, if only 
one could work out how Jameson achieves his ends. I have suggested throughout this 
study that one way in which Jameson is able to move across such a large theoretical 
terrain and to draw together such disparate thinkers as Lukacs, Althusser and Adorno is 
through the elision of their specific differences, an elision that tends to blunt the political 
cutting edge of the original positions. For example, LaCapra has highlighted Jameson's 
rather mystifying use of the Althusserian concept of "absent cause": 
the 'absent cause' seems to designate an empty but paradoxically crowded 
space wherein a number of concepts meet or even fuse with one another: 
the Real, History, Utopia, totality and the "political unconscious" itsel£66 
It is difficult to work with concepts, let alone teach them, when they continually dissolve 
into one another. One can accept Jameson's argument that questions of culture are no 
more simple than scientific disciplines and should not therefore be made to appear simple, 
but at the same time ask for a higher degree of analytical rigour. 
There is also a stylistic dimension to this problem Jameson's texts are pervaded by lexical 
. 
equivocations; most notably with such phrases as: "something like" and "kind of'. In a 
review of The Political Unconscious Robert Scholes lists thirty such equivocations 
including: "something like", "would seem", "at some level", "virtual" and "one would 
imagine".67 The difficulty such equivocations pose is that they indicate an equivalence is 
being posited but the exact nature of that equivalence remains unclear. As Scholes points 
out all writers occasionally fall back on the use of equivocal devices but with Jameson it is 
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in danger of becoming 'the dominant principle of discourse'.68 It also helps to clarify the 
peculiar difficulty that one finds in utilising Jamesonian concepts. Scholes writes, the 
'expression "something like" is not only the weakest possible form of comparison, it 
logically implicates its own contradiction (something unllke)'.69 In other words. it 
simultaneously suggests an analogy or a relation and at the same time cancels it. Thus one 
hesitates to use a Jamesonian term or formulation because the precise nature of the 
formulation or the mechanisms by which it operates remain unclear or contradictory. 
Scholes notes that: 
Jameson's text, which is full of serious thought and learning, is also 
astonishingly reluctant to emerge from its own web of textuality to make 
contact with the world. 70 
Thus, paradoxically, for all Jameson's assertions of the need to reground texts in their 
social and historical contexts his own texts remain strangely aloot: Eagleton has also 
identified the paradox of Jameson's style, observing that his prose has a tendency to escape 
'even his own most strenuously analytical habits' and slip 'through the very dialectical 
forms it so persuasively delineates'.71 For Jameson, the dialectical style is not only a 
political imperative but a pleasure in its own right and it is this. suggests Eagleton. 
Jameson's own style, that represents the utopian impulse of his work rather than the 
discussions of Em est Bloch or Herbert Marcuse: 
The duality of the Jamesonian sentence, at once political message and play 
of signifier, seems to me an eminently dialectical figure of the relation 
between desire and its historical deferment. opening a space between these 
options in which the reader is suspended.72 
Ultimately style represents a political deferment, a compensation for pleasures historically 
postponed and unrealisable goals and to this extent foreshadows 'a bleak and politically 
instructive displacement'.73 
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Finally, it is necessary to underscore the extent to which the problems I have highlighted 
with Jameson's work are not merely the result the individual intellectual failings but are as 
much consequences of the tradition of thought that Jameson is working within. In his 
short study of Western Marxism, Considerations on Western Marxism, Perry Anderson 
has pointed to the widening gap between theory and practice in Western Marxism from 
the end of the First World War to the late 1960s. From the 1930s onwards Western 
Marxism was to speak increasingly in its own esoteric language ever more removed from 
the class whose interests it was supposed to serve and further. The final severance 
between the two was definitively marked with the publication of Herbert Marcuse's One 
Dimensional Man. In the gulf between theory and the practice and constraints of a mass 
movement, writes Anderson, socialist thought 'inevitably [became] 'utopian' once again'.74 
The focus of Western Marxism, argues Anderson, has shifted towards philosophy from its 
earlier concerns with economics and politics7' with an emphasis upon epistemology and 
method. That is to say it has become a discourse upon Marxism rather than within 
Marxism The corollary of this has been that it's language became increasingly 'specialized 
and inaccessible'.76 Anderson writes: 
The original relationship between Marxist theory and proletarian practice 
was subtly but steadily substituted by a new relationship between Marxist 
theory and bourgeois theory. 77 
Martin Jay has also emphasised this trait of Western Marxism, that is, its tendency to 
borrow from and engage with other philosophical traditions rather than mass political 
movements.78 Jameson's wor~ I would contend, remains very much within this tradition. 
Indeed, the extent to which Jameson simply co-opts other ideas rather than providing a 
critique of them has been a recurrent theme of Jameson criticism from his early work on 
Formalism and Structuralism through to his endorsement of Baudrillard and 
postmodemism There is always a sense in which Jameson's strategy of working through 
other philosophical traditions does not so much transform our perspective as, by some 
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dialectical sleight of han~ leave everything profoundly untouched. mtimately, th~ it 
may be time to conclude that the Marxism of the critical theorists, with their emphasis 
upon reification and commodification, is no longer the order of the day. 
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